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Le  secteur  forestier  québécois  traverse  actuellement  une  des  pires  crises  de  son 
histoire.  Bien  que  les  causes  structurelles  et conjoncturelles  attribuables  à  cette  situation 
soient nombreuses et fassent l'objet de vives spéculations entre différents groupes d'initiés, 
les  causes sous-jacentes de cette crise (soit les  facteurs  sociaux, politiques et économiques) 
suscitent étonnamment peu d'intérêts. De plus, alors que l'origine de la présente situation est 
la plupart du temps attribuée à la refonte du régime forestier de  1986, 1  'examen exhaustif de 
1  'évolution des  institutions de  gouvernance forestière depuis  le  début du  19e siècle indique 
que les problèmes de ce secteur ne sont pas nouveaux. 
Les  défis  qui  touchent l'industrie forestière aujourd'hui  découlent d'un  ensemble de 
problématiques récurrentes et historiques, mais dont les effets ont toujours pu  être tempérés 
par des manipulations structurelles peu coûteuses, par des développements technologiques ou 
simplement  par  l'abondance  même  des  stocks  de  ressources  dont  bénéficiait  naguère  le 
Québec.  Or,  si  la  crise  actuelle  résulte  de  défaillances  qui  sont  à  la  fois  chroniques  et 
systémiques, quelle est  la structure du dilemme qui  amenuise systématiquement la capacité 
des  acteurs  sociaux,  politiques  et  économiques  à  entreprendre  les  actions  collectives  qui 
s'imposent?  La  caractérisation  historique  du  régime  forestier,  depuis  ses  origines 
jusqu'aujourd'hui, suggère que  la  rigidité constitutionnelle de  la gouvernance forestière de 
même que  la  structure  centralisée de  l'arène des  choix collectifs seraient en  grande  partie 
responsables  des  crises  qui  se  sont  succédé  et  des  difficultés  qu'éprouvent  les  acteurs 
concernés à résoudre conjointement les problèmes engendrés par 1  'exploitation forestière. 
Par le biais d'une analyse historique, basée sur le cadre d'analyse et de développement 
institutionnel  (IAD - Institutional  Analysis  and  Dvelopment Framework),  nous  traçons  le 
développement  conjoint  des  institutions  constitutionnelles  et  de  gouvernance  forestières 
depuis le  début du régime anglais en 1763 jusqu'à  1986. L'étude s'appuie sur une approche 
qualitative comparée des documents d'archives publiques issus de cinq périodes de l'histoire 
du Québec, choisie en fonction des changements institutionnels survenus durant ces périodes 
et les problématiques propres  à chacune de ces périodes : (1) le système colonial  1763-1839 
(2)  le  Canada  Uni  1840-1866,  (3)  le  Québec  souverain  préindustriel  1867-1906,  (  4)  Le 
Québec à  l'ère des  papetières  1907-1950, et (5)  le  Québec suivant la Révolution tranquille 
1960-1986. xviii 
Le  cadre  théorique  est  issu  des  traditions  du  Choix  public  et  l'Institutionnalisme 
rationnel. Le suivi des processus de causalité (process tracing) et la juxtaposition des données 
empiriques  au  cadre  théorique  ont  été  utilisés  pour .assurer  une  plus  grande  rigueur 
méthodologique et augmenter notre confiance envers les résultats obtenus. 
L'évaluation  de  données  empiriques  soutient  l'existence  d'un  lien  probant  entre 
l'évolution  des  institutions  de  gouvernance  forestière  du  Québec et les  intérêts  des  divers 
gouvernements  qui  se  sont  succédé.  L'analyse  historique  de  l'exploitation  des  forêts 
québécoises montre comment le droit constitutionnel exclusif détenu par le  conseil exécutif 
du gouvernement du Québec et l'absence de contraintes efficaces sur le processus décisionnel 
de ce dernier ont été systématiquement employés à des fins politiques et économiques, et ce, 
au détriment de solutions connues pour une meilleure gestion des ressources ligneuses pour 
l'intérêt commun. Étant la seule entité responsable de la gestion des ressources naturelles sur 
le  territoire public,  cette thèse établit que  les  gouvernements qui  se sont succédé au  fil  du 
temps  ont exercé  une  influence  décisive  sur  1  'évolution  des  institutions  de  gouvernances 
forestières, en affectant la sélection et la réplication des idées, des valeurs et des intérêts qui 
ont défini le rapport des Québécois à la forêt depuis plus près de deux siècles. 
Mots clefs : Gouvernance, institutions, constitution, évolution, actions collectives ABSTRACT 
Quebec's forest sector has  recently  witnessed one of its  worst crises ever.  While the 
structural  and  conjectural  causes  attributable  to  this  situation  are  widely  debated,  the 
underlying causes of the crisis  (i.e.,  the social,  political  and  economie factors)  ave  so  far 
solicited very  little interest amongst social scientists. Similarly, discussions on the origins of 
the  crisis  have  largely  focused  on  the  legislative  reforms  of the  1980s  and  the  faulty 
assumptions that were then  used to  determine the  maximum sustainable yield.  Yet,  as  any 
cursory overview of the history of forest management in  Québec would show, concern over 
the administration of  this public resource asset dates far back to the early 1800's. 
Viewed through a  historical  lens, the reasons  for Québec's (re)current forestry  crisis 
become decidedly  murkier.  If sub-optimal  patterns  of forest  resource  can  be  traced  as  far 
back as the onset of commercial exploitation in the early 1800s, then the recent predicament 
of  Québec's  forest  sector  cannot  entirely  be  attributed  to  flawed  models,  inadequate 
oversight,  or  poor  management  procedures.  Other,  more  fundamental  factors  need  to  be 
considered.  Given  that  the  right  to  make,  alter  or  abrogate  laws,  rules  and  regulations 
pertaining to the use, management or alienation of public resources is  constitutionally vested 
in  provincial legislatures within the Canadian context, then the phenomenon that needs to be 
explained is  how forest resource institutions evolved in  the hands of successive governments 
and why. 
Using a qualitative case study approach, grounded in archivai research, the thesis relied 
on process tracing as the principal method of  analysis, this thesis focused on the development 
of constitutional and collective choice rules related to the governance of public forests, from 
the  onset of the  British  Regime  in  1763  until  1986,  when  the  last  significant  legislative 
reform  took  place.  To  strengthen  the  validity  of hypothesized  causal  relationships,  a 
comparative  historical  and  within-case  analytical  approach  was  used.  The  theoretical 
framework builds on the traditions of public choice and  institutional analysis and  relied  on 
the lnstitutional Analysis and  Development framework (lAD) to  create a coherent approach. 
The evolution of forest  governance  institutions  was  considered  across  five  distinct  period 
covering  three  different  constitutional  regimes:  (1)  Colonial  rule  1763-1 839  (2)  Union 
government 1840-1866, (3) Provincial self-government prior to industrialisation 1867-1906, 
(4)  Self-government following  industrialisation  1907-1950,  and  (5)  Québec following  the 
quiet revolution 1960-1986. xx 
This thesis argues that the evolution of forest governance institutions and the resulting 
struggle  to  develop  more  sustainable  patterns  of  forest  resource  use  in  Québec  are 
fundamentally tied  to the constitutional choices that have concentrated the  instrumentalities 
of collective action in  the hands of the provincial government. Put differently, constitutional 
rules  applicable  to  the  use  and  management of public  forests  in  the  province  ultimately 
affected outcomes in the world by exercising a determining effect on the habits, values, ideas 
and  social  institutions  (i.e.,  variations)  that  were  selected,  replicated  and  enforced  (i.e., 
inherited) over time. By exercising a monopoly over collective choice rights, this thesis finds 
that rules were systematically used to favour political-economic interests that neither served 
the  public's  interests,  nor the  need  to  achieve  sustainable  outcomes  in  the  use  of public 
forests. 
Keywords: Governance, institutions, constitution, evolution, and collective action CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1  Research Problem 
At the  turn  of the  21 st  century, the ability  of government in  Québec to  responsibly 
administer the province's  public forests faced  its strongest challenge ever.  Doubts over the 
sustainability  of forest resource  use  at the scale of the entire boreal  forest came to a  head 
towards the end of the 1990s. The extent to which public forests were appropriately managed; 
addressed the interests of commercial and non-timber forest user groups;  protected the long 
term  interests  of forest  dependent  communities  or  helped  preserve  the  environment  and 
biological diversity were but sorne of the issues that preoccupied the scientific community, 
citizens and interest groups during the 1990s. To appease concerns, the 1986 Forest Act was 
amended  in  1994  to  facilitate  public  participation  in  resource  management  decisions. 
Stronger language on the need for sustainable forest resource use was introduced in  1996 and 
formai discussions on the need to reform the existing legislation in  light of emerging research 
on  sustainable forest management were  initiated  in  1998.
1 Then  in  1999,  film-makers  and 
activists Desjardins and Monderie
2 released their highly critical documentary film  "L'Erreur 
Boréale."  Scenes  of vast  clear  cuts,  poorly  prepared  government  officiais,  a  seemingly 
dysfunctional  ministry,  and  compelling  evidence  of  growing  socio-economic  and 
environmental costs helped galvanize public opinion on the need for serious reforms. Though 
the film 's assertions  were  initially  rejected  by  industry  spokesmen,  senior bureaucrats  and 
various public officiais,  the government's ability to ward off the charges conferred against it 
was dealt a serious blow in  2002, when an investigation by  the province's Auditor General 
revealed a similar slew of defects in the administration of public forests.
3 
1 MRN. 1998. "Mise à jour du régime forestier. Document de référence". In  Bilan - Enjeux- Orientations. Québec:  Ministère 
des Ressources naturelles. 76 p. 
2 Desjardins, R., and R. Monderie. 1999. "L'Erreur boréale". Montreal: Cinema Libre and Office National du Film Canada 
3  Rapport du  Vérificateur général, 2002. "Faits saillants, chapitre 4:  Les  Ressources  forestières". In  Rapport à  l'Assemblée 
nationale pour l'année 200/-2002, Tome Il. Québec. 2 
The situation became politically  untenable and  following a change of government in 
2003,  a  full  inquiry  into  the  management of public  forests  was  ordered.  Drawing  on  the 
results  of  extensive  consultations,  the  Commission  for  the  Study  of  Public  Forest 
Management  released  its  report  in  December  2004.  Though  critical,  the  Commission's 
findings  were  neither  new nor  unexpected. In  brief,  the  Commission  found  major failures 
relative  to  the  governance and  management of public  forests,  including  widespread  over-
harvesting,  flawed  timber  estimates,  poor  silvicultural  practices  and  weak  control 
mechanisms.  To remedy the situation, the Commission recommended immediate reductions 
in  harvesting rights, revisions to the maximum allowable cut,
4 the adoption of an ecosystem-
based management approach, and the decentralization of decision-making structures. 
For the  industry,  the timing  of the  Commission  and  the  government's  promise  to 
uphold the latter's recommendations could scarcely have come at a worse moment. As debate 
over the Commission 's findings  and  recommendations entered the public arena, the  forest 
sector was  already  feeling the  brunt of growing economie uncertainty,  sparked  by,  among 
other things  - falling  commodity  priees,  declining U.S.  demand,  the  rising  value  of the 
Canadian dollar, and growing competition from Asian and South American producers. When 
precautionary  reductions  in  harvesting  rights  were  introduced  in  2005  and  2006,  the 
industry's  line  of  defence  quickly  shifted  from  an  overt  confidence  in  the  existing 
arrangements and conditions to warnings of dwindling levels of accessible and merchantable 
stock,  rapidly  aging  processing  facilities,  and  comparatively  high  labour  costs.  Within  a 
matter of months, the industry feil  into one of its worst crises ever.  Forestry operations came 
to  a  near  standstill,  sorne  40,000  jobs  were  reportedly  !ost,  severa!  large  firms  sought 
bankruptcy  protection, and forest-dependent communities were  left to  fend  for themselves. 
While there  are  signs  that the  forest  sector is  slowly  regaining strength  and  that a  newly 
adopted forest  legislation
5 will  go  a  long  way towards answering stakeholder concerns and 
the recommendations of  the 2004 Commission, the extent to which the proposed changes will 
in  fact direct provincial forest management decisions towards more sustainable and equitable 
outcomes remains to be seen. 
4 The maximum allowable eut is more commonly referred to as "le calcul de possibilité forestière." 
5 Sustainable Forest Development Act, Bill 57 (L.Q., 2010, chapter 3) 3 
Since the debate first caught the public's attention at the end of the 1990s, discussion 
on the origins of the government's mishandling of public resources  largely  focused on the 
legislative reforms of the 1980s and the faulty assumptions that were then used to determine 
the  maximum  sustainable  yield.  Yet,  as  any  cursory  overview  of the  history  of forest 
management in  Québec will  show,  concern over the administration of this  public resource 
as set  is  not  new.  ln  fact,  archivai  evidence  shows  th at  from  the  1820s  onwards,  the 
mismanagement of public  forests  represents  a  recurrent theme  in  public  debates,  and  the 
subject  of ongoing  inquiry  both  within  and  outside  of government.  Viewed  through  a 
historical lens, the reasons for Québec's (re)current forestry crisis become decidedly murkier. 
If  sub-optimal patterns of  forest resource can be traced as far back as the onset of commercial 
exploitation in the early 1800s, then the recent predicament of Québec's forest sector cannot 
entirely  be  attributed  to  flawed  models,  inadequate  oversight,  or  poor  management 
procedures. Other, more fundamental factors need to be considered. 
Given that ali  forms  of organization entai!  the  need "to  formulate  rules  for ordering 
relationships among the individuals who interact with one another" (V. Ostrom, [1980]  1999, 
p.  382), then  one obvious place to  start is  to  consider how the  rules  of the game actually 
affected the play of the game over ti me. This requires a shi ft in the leve! of analysis from the 
choices made within a given set of rules, to  the rules that govern how choices are actually 
made  and  enforced  (Buchanan,  [1990]  1999;  V.  Ostrom,  [1979]  2009).  Moreover,  if the 
struggle to  manage Québec's public  forests  on a  more  sustainable  basis  is  not  new,  then 
greater analytical attention should likewise be given to the way forest governance institutions 
evolved and why. Assuming that hum  an  social  institutions constitute adaptive responses to 
ongoing human-environment interactions, and that past decisions have determining effects on 
the  social  and  ecological  outcomes that affect the  iterative  choice-sets and  preferences of 
human  agents  in  repetitive  problem  solving  situations  (Haydu,  1998;  Katznelson,  2003; 
Sewell, 2005), then the development of  a testable hypothesis that can help exp lain the chronic 
nature of Québec's forest resource problems implies a need to understand how the past came 
to forge the present. 
Given that the right to make, alter or abrogate laws, rules and regulations pertaining to 
· the use, management or alienation of public resources is  constitutionally vested in  provincial 4 
legislatures within the Canadian context, then the phenomenon that needs to  be explained  is 
how  forest  resource  institutions evolved  in  the  hands  of successive governments
6  and why. 
Using  an  evolutionary  approach  to  the  study  of institutional  change  (Blyth  et al.,  2011; 
Hodgson and Knudsen, 201 0;  Lewis and Steinmo, 20 12; Steinmo, 201 0), this thesis seeks to 
understand  how  constitutional  choice  rules  structured  collective  action  arenas  and  the 
consequent selection, replication of forest governance institutions over ti me. 
After a brief overview .of the literature on the  political economie structure and  history 
of forest resource use  in  Québec and the  broader Canadian context to clarify the gaps  in  the 
existing  scholarship,  the  remainder  of this  Introduction  is divided  as  follows:  section  1.2 
presents the research  field; section  1.3, the research questions; section  1.4, methods; section 
1.5,  the  thesis  argument; section  1.6, the  contributions  of this  thesis, and  section  1.7, the 
general outline of the thesis sections. 
1.1 .1  Reasons for lnquiry: A Review of Past and Present Scholarship 
Existing theoretical  and  analytical  contributions  to  the study  of natural  resource  use 
within the  broader Canadian context answers only  part of the puzzle  posed  by the  recurrent 
patterns of overexploitation, and the boom and  bust cycles of resource-led eco nom ic growth. 
This section presents the main contributions and limitations of  the existing body of literature, 
dedicated  to  the  study  of forest  resource  use  in  Quebec and  Canada more  broadly.  It ends 
with  a brief introduction  to  the  purpose and  relevance  of this  study,  relative  to  the  current 
wealth of scholarship. 
Of ali the different strands of scholarship that have emerged over the years, none have 
made  as  significant  a  contribution  to  the  study  of Canadian  resource  exploitation  as  the 
staples thesis.  The  staples  theory was  developed  by  Harold  Innis (1946,  [  1930] 1999)  and 
others  (  e.g.,  Creighton,  1937;  Lower,  1938,  1973;  Mackintosh,  1923;  Watkins,  1963)  to 
explain  export-led  economie growth within the Canadian context,  and  its effects on  regional 
development and  infrastructure  investments to support the  production and  transportation  of 
6  Following the Westminster mode) upon which the Canadian parliamentary system is established, "government"  refers to the 
body  of elected  representatives  that  holds  the  confidence  of  the  legislature  and  is  therefore  responsible  to  Parliament. 
"Government"  thus  implies "executive government", and  consists in  the  Prime  Minister (or Premier in  the  provinces), the 
Cabinet (i .e., appointed  ministers), and  the Governor-General (or Lieutenant-Governor in  the  provinces). A  more complete 
definition of government and  its implications for analytical inquiry is developed in Chapter Ill. 5 
raw and unprocessed staple commodities (i.e., natural resources) to foreign markets. lt argues 
that in  a comparatively vast and resource-rich landscape, the limited labour and capital pools 
of the early settlement period gave colonists  a comparative advantage in  the development of 
extractive  industries,  built  around  the  supply  of raw  resource  commodities  to  feed  the 
insatiable  but volatile and competitive commodity markets of early  industrialism (Watkins, 
1963, Drache,  1995).  Over time,  foreign investments, public indebtedness/  uneven regional 
development,  limited  institutional  authority  (i.e.,  enduring  colonial  status),  and  heavy 
dependence on foreign manufactured goods collectively  created positive feedback loops that 
undermined  the  development  of strong  indigenous  market  institutions,  thus  furthering 
Canada's  political-economic dependence on staple-led economie growth (Drache,  1995,  pp. 
xix-xxx). 
Reliance on  the  staples  theory,  to  explain  forest  resource  over time  in  Quebec and 
elsewhere in  Canada, has  yielded mixed results. Creighton (1937) for instance, purposefully 
sought to link the intransigent needs of early commercial imperialism to  the development of 
Canada's constitutional foundations, but his arguments fall  short of explaining the continuity 
of resource driven institutional developments in  Canada after the repeal of the corn  laws  in 
the mid-nineteenth century. Lower ( 1973, p.  119), furthered th at local control over Canada's 
forests was figurative only, for as he  concluded, "no  storehouse of raw materials needed by 
the  outside  world  [  could]  have  mu  ch  mastery  over  its  destiny".  Like  Creighton,  Lower 
posited  that  the  forest  industry  in  Québec  (and  Ontario)  flourished  as  it  did  because  of 
favourable economie incentives, access to cheap and abundant supplies, a largely subservient 
workforce,  and  the  geographie  outlay  of the  greater  St-Lawrence drainage system,  which 
provided unimpeded access to the forest wealth of the North American interior. While Lower 
recognized  the  pervasive  effects  of government  institutions  and  trade  policies  on  the 
incentives  resource  users  faced,  analytical  emphasis  was  placed  on  the  dynamics  of the 
resource-led development, and not the development and  path of resource institutions per se. 
More  recent scholarship  in  the  staples  tradition  shows  that  the  link  between  Canada and 
foreign  commodity  markets,  and  the  internai dynamics of resource  exploitation  have  both 
changed and become more complex in  the last severa! decades (e.g., Brownsey and Howlett, 
7  Due to  public  investments  in large  infrastructure  projects  that were  designed  to  reduce  transportation costs of increasingly 
remote and  bulky staple resources, and  regulate water flows to ensure constant supply of energy. 6 
2008).
8  However,  as  with  past studies  in  this  genre, the critical  question of why  past and 
present  efforts  to  improve  the  sustainability,  efficiency,  or  equity  of staple-producing 
industries  remain  such  a  struggle  is  left  unexamined.  The  origins,  development,  and 
consequences of natural resource governance institutions are not addressed. 
In  spite of the  fact  that the  proposed  structural  interpretation of Canada's  political-
economic history  is  largely consistent with empirical evidence, the explanatory depth of the 
staples  thesis  presents  severa!  drawbacks.  Among  other  things,  the  staples  thesis  largely 
omits the rote of agency; it undermines the long run effects of social institutions (i.e.,  rules) 
on the choice-sets of actors over ti me; and it neglects the rote of  endogenous power structures 
in  the governance and  exploitation of natural resources.  Whether old or new, the analytical 
framework of the staples tradition provides but a partial view of  the underlying dynamics th at 
have conditioned natural resource use for the better part of  the last two centuries. Renee, even 
though  scholarship in  the staples tradition  has  considerably furthered  our understanding of 
the consequence of choice (i.e., the general dynamics of economie development in  Canada), 
it has not been as effective in explaining the choices themselves. 
Another venerable strand of scholarship that deals with the political economie structure 
of forest  and  natural  resource  use  in  Canada rests  in  the  use  of policy  science  methods 
(Howlett  and  Ramesh,  2003).  Policy  science,  which  concerns  itself  with  the  study  of 
government-in-action,  has  been  useful  in  generating  an  understanding  of the  observable 
patterns of political  behaviour, the corn pl ex set of interactions that inform  po licy,  and  the 
comparative strengths and  interests of the various groups of actors (i.e., policy communities 
or advocacy coalitions) vying for public attention and  a  rote  in  the policy  making process 
(e.g., Cashore and Vertinsky, 2000; Grant,  1990; Hessing et al. , 2005; Howlett and Rayner, 
1995, 2001; Lindquist and Wellstead, 2001 ; Pross, 1986; Wellstead et al., 2004). Emphasis in 
this tradition  is  placed on  how actors,  interests and  ideas  coalesce to  form  'policy  beliefs' 
within jostling sets of 'policy subsystems,' which interact to set the 'policy agenda' or affect 
the underlying  'policy regime'  (i.e., paradigm) within which actors operate (Howlett, 2001 ; 
Howlett and  Ramesh, 2003;  Hessing,  2005). The  contribution  that is  most  relevant  to  the 
intentions of this thesis  was  developed  by  Howlett and  Rayner (1995, 2001).  The authors 
8 See Special Issue, 2007 Can. Poli . Sc. Rev., Vol.l , Issue. 1 7 
brush  a  broad  interpretation  of the  evolution of forest  policy  regimes  throughout Canada. 
They argue that the overall  pattern of forest policy development proceeded from  a  largely 
unregulated  situation  towards  a  series  of  regimes  focused  on  revenue,  conservation, 
management  (i.e.,  liquidation  and  conversion),  and  most  recently,  integrated  use  and 
sustainability.  Central  to  the  general  dynamics  of forest  policy  change  are  the  close 
connections that lie between industry and government, and their quasi monopoly over forest 
policy decisions, aided by  the  employment interests of labour, and only  recently challenged 
by  the nascent environmental  movement.  While  insightful of the  different stages that have 
marked the progress of forest resource use  in  Québec and elsewhere in  Canada, the coarse 
filter  used  to  separate  the  hypothesized  stages  of development  necessarily  leaves  out 
important  details  concerning  the  factors  and  events  that  characterize  the  proposed 
generalizations. In addition to the fact that the suggested framework provides limited insights 
on why, when and how purported changes occurred, it leaves behind the broader issue of the 
problems  resource  users  and  administrators  faced  over  time,  and  the  incentives  and 
constraints that structured their respective situations. 
Consequently, scholarship in this tradition has little to say about how collective action 
proceeds  or might be  improved  and  the structure of the  situation  that affect the  iterative 
choice-sets  of actors  over time.  Moreover,  reliance  on  a  simplified  mode!  of reality,  the 
po  licy cycle, tends to  underestimate the complexity and pitfalls of how actors actually learn, 
communicate, develop norms of trust and reciprocity, and seek to affect change. Choice and 
agency  are  not  constitutive  of the  suggested  policy  process,  nor  is  there  any  interest  in 
developing testable propositions of alternative arrangements that could  potentially  improve 
outcomes in  human-environment interactions. More fundamentally, contributions in this field 
deny  the  importance of the  underlying  rules  of the  game,  as  explanatory  variables  to  the 
conclusions reached.  As  Howlett and  Ramesh (2003,  p.  3)  put  it, the  focus  is  not "on the 
structure of governments or the behaviour of political actors, or on what governments should 
or ought to do, but on what governments actually do." In  short, the aim of research in  this 
tradition  is  to  determine "who gets what,  when,  and  how" (Lasswell,  1958),  which,  as  V. 
Ostrom ([1979] 2009, p.l6) pointed out severa) decades ago, has yet to provide "a noticeable 8 
improvement in  the quality of generalizations that can  be made about political  [and  indeed 
environmentally related] phenomena." 
The role of Québec's forests  in  the economie development of the province has also 
been  discussed  in  more or  less  general  terms  by  a  number of other historians,  including 
Faucher (1970), Ouellet (1980), Hamelin and Roby (1971), Rumilly (1977), and Armstrong 
( 1984 ).  Others have sought to chronicle specifie events and historical developments, su ch as: 
the links between forestry and Québec's early agrarian economy (e.g., Hardy, 2011; Séguin, 
1977);  regional  histories  of Quebec's forest economy (Côté,  1999;  Lee,  2006);  the rate of 
timber harvesting in  nineteenth century Québec and Ontario (Gaudreau,  1999); the 1  ife and 
times  of early  lumbermen  (Hughson  and  Bond,  1965);  the  evolution  of forest  labour 
conditions (Legendre, 2005); the development of pulp and  paper manufacturing (Charland, 
1990); changes in forest legislation (Asse  lin, 1944; Bouffard, 1921; White, [ 1899]  1907); the 
development of the sustainable yield paradigm (Bouthillier, 2001); the limited success of the 
conservation movement (Hébert, 2006; Hodgins et al.,  1982); and the more or less systematic 
failure of both provincial and  federal  governments to improve forest resource use outcomes 
over time (Gillis and Roach, 1986; Malenfant, 1987; Nelles, 1974).  While these works offer 
rich  accounts of the people,  decisions  and  events  that shaped  the  course of human-forest 
interactions in Québec from the eighteenth century onwards, the foc us  of these contributions 
is  essentially  historical  and  the~efore  descriptive.  Theoretical  assumptions  are  either 
unspecified (e.g., Gillis and Roach, 1986; Hodgins et al., 1982; Bouthillier, 2001) or broadly 
grounded in the staples theory or a close variant (e.g., Gaudreau, 1999; Hardy, 2011; Lower, 
1936,  1938; Malenfant, 1987). The relationship between institutions, the incentives resource 
users and political economie agents faced, the nature of the goods involved and the resource 
system  as  a  whole,  as  weil  as  the  means  to  aggregate  preferences  (i.e.,  decision-making 
arenas) are absent from most accounts. The failure to amend problematic situations that lead 
to  resource  problems  and  their  externalities  are  attributed  to  such  factors  as  the  "lack of 
political  will"  (e.g.,  Gillis  and  Roach,  1986),  poorly  adapted  technocratie  solutions  (e.g., 
Bouthilier, 2001 ), heterogeneous core-periphery relationships ( e.g., Gaudreau,  1999; Lower, 9 
1938), and  the relentless  push towards the accumulation of capital ( e.g., Mal enfant,  1987).
9 
As  such,  existing  contributions  to  the  history  of forest  resource  use  in  Québec  and  the 
evolution  of forest  governance  institutions  in  particular  are  incomplete.  Missing  links 
between selected  events are  numerous, reliance on secondary  and  often misread sources of 
data  are  common,  and  conclusions  about  hypothesized  theories  or  predictions  are  often 
indeterminate, due to the Jack of  tracing of the variables of interest. 
To be sure, the history of forest exploitation in  Canada is  replete with stories of failed 
experiments,  overexploitation,  and  socio-economic  hardship  (  e.g.,  Lower,  1938,  1973; 
MacKay, 1985; Marchak, 1983; Minville, 1944; Swift, 1983). The fact that forest governance 
institutions  in  Québec  and  those  charged  with  their  enforcement  have  more  or  Jess 
systematically failed to safeguard the long-term  viability of forest systems in the province has 
likewise been weil  documented (e.g., Coulombe, 2004; Gillis and Roach,  1986; Hodgins et 
al. , 1982; Mal  enfant, 1987; Minville, 1944). However, in spi te of such scholarship, the search 
for an endogenous theory of institutional change that can exp  lain  the emergence of staple-led 
industrial  growth  (and  resource  exploitation),  the  dominance  of government  and  industry 
actors  in  defining  public  policy,  and  the  marginal  success  of those  outside  of dominant 
coalitions to affect change remains largely unaddressed. 
If  institutional  arrangements  constitute  adaptive  responses  to  changing  social-
environmental conditions (B1yth  et al.,  2011; Lewis and Steinmo, 2012), then any  effort to 
understand  the  evolutionary dynamics of a  given social-ecological system  must necessarily 
consider  how  the selection,  inheritance,  and  replication of institutional variations  proceeds 
within a given social-order. Y  et, in spi te of the fact that natural resource rights in Canada are 
predominantly  vested  in  provincial  legislatures,  the  relationship  between  repeated  policy 
failures and the rule-ordered arrangements applicable to the administration of public affairs in 
9 The contribution of Malenfant (1987) to the political-economic history of forest resource use in Québec deserves to be singled 
out.  Using Wallerstein's ( 1974) world-system approach and the staples thesis as his thcorctical foundation, Malenfant ( 1987) 
traced the evolution of forest resource use in Que  bec from the start of the French regime un til  1986. Wh  ile most of his analysis 
is based on secondary sources of information, Malenfant clearly demonstrated the remarkable consistency  of forest resource 
use outcomes, relative  to  the distribution of benefits and  the social  and environmental costs thal were generated. This thesis 
both  complements  and  challenges  sorne  of the  results  of this  earlier inquiry.  While  Mal enfant  posited  that  the  use  and 
exploitation of forest resources in Quebec emerged out of an overt drive to support the accumulation of capital and concentrate 
the means of production, the approach taken here argues that such outcomes are attributable to the institutional context, and the 
incentives they generated. 1 remain  however indebted to Malenfant, for his provocative insights and  his insistence that history 
matters when it cornes ti me to understanding political-economic phenomena. 10 
the provinces has so far solicited very little attention from scholars. This is  surprising, given 
that the  right to  make laws  pertaining to  "the  management and  sale of the  public  lands" 
belongs to provincial  legislatures, as  do  "the timber and  wood thereon,"
10  and  the "mines, 
minerais, and royalties"
1  1 that may be extracted from the public domain. While such authority 
has  been discussed  by  constitutional  scholars (e.g.,  Cairns,  1992; La Forest,  1969; Moull, 
· 1983)  and  political  scientists (Hessing et al., 2005;  Ross,  1995), and  is  acknowledged  by 
most  students  of forestry  in  the  Canadian  context  (Howlett,  2001 ),  the  evolution  and 
consequences  of Canada's  constitutional  choices  relative  to  the  use  and  management of 
natural  resources remain under investigated.  For the most part, the constitutional setting is 
"taken  as  a  meta-contextual  given  within  which  any  form  of analysis ... must  take  place" 
(Howlett, 2009,  p.  159).  In  other words, scholarship on  the social,  political, and economie 
dimensions of natural  resource use  in  Canada has  largely focused on the play of the game 
within the existing set of rules. The governing variables that effectively structure the nature 
of the game have not been the subject of formai empirical inquiry. Missing from the existing 
literature are the links between the extensive executive powers of provincial cabinets (Bernier 
et al.,  2005; Dunn,  1990, 2006), the relative absence of appropriate checks and balances in 
the  political  institutions  of Canada  (Hicks,  2010;  Mallory,  [1974]  20ll,  [1984]  2011; 
Simeon,  [2006]  2011;  Smith,  1991 ),  and  the  incentives  provincial  governments  face  in 
determining the use and management ofnatural resources under their jurisdictional authority. 
This thesis seeks to address these issues and the corresponding gaps of  the existing literature. 
1.2  Research Field 
This thesis is  grounded in  the field of political economy, which draws attention to the 
interrelatedness ofpolitical science and economies. It builds on the distinct yet closely related 
research programs of public choice and institutional analysis, and their shared commitment to 
the role that institutions play in  structuring the incentives and constraints individuals face in 
interactive  settings,  and  the  outcomes  they  produce. 
12  Common  to  both  is  a  reliance  on 
1 0 Section 92(5) of the Constitution Act 1867/1982 
11  Ibid., Section 109. 
12  New  lnstitutional  Economies, which  emphasizes importance of interactions  within  particular institutional  forms, including 
transaction costs and  property  rights and  Rational  Choice lnstitutionalism, which seeks  to apply  rational choice  behavioural 
assumptions to the en tire spectrum of political interactions (McGinnis, 2000, pp.  10-11) re present two related fields of study 
thal  are  largely  consistent  with  Public  Choice  and  lnstitutional  Analysis.  The  growing  fields  of  comparative  historical 
(Mahoney and  Rueschemeyer, 2003) and analytical narratives (Bates et al., 1998; Greif, 2006) parallel these developments. Il 
inductive  methods  of analytical  reasoning  to  develop  empirically  grounded  theoretical 
propositions that can be further tested and elaborated upon through a variety of methods and 
empirical settings. Emphasis is  placed on the ways in which societies organize themselves to 
solve dilemma situations, produce public goods, and develop rule-ordered relationships that 
are responsive to the vulnerabilities of political economie structures.  White contributions in 
the Public Choice tradition primarily, though not exclusively, concern the factors that affect 
non-market decision-making in government structures, scholars associated with Institutional 
Analysis have purposefully sought to expand their research agenda to include issues relevant 
to non-market and non-hierarchical organizations, and the provisioning problems associated 
with  both  public goods and  common-pool  resources.  Consequently, Public Choice is  more 
closely  associated  with  efforts  to  understand  the  performance  of political  economies, 
Institutional Analysis focuses its analytical attention on public economies broadly considered 
(Aligica and Boettke, 2011). Both approaches are evaluative in  nature and  use  comparable 
frameworks to study the administration of human affairs.  A central  lesson of Public Choice 
and Institutional Analysis is that owing to the complexity of hu man interactions, no system of 
rules or governance structure can yield superior outcomes in  ali situations (Buchanan, [1981] 
2001; Buchanan and Tullock, 1962; E. Ostrom, 2005b, 2007). 
1.3  Distinctions 
Public Choice may be better understood as a revival of the intellectual tradition of the 
seventeenth and  eighteenth century  political  philosophers. The modern  approach  to  public 
choice takes as its source the works of nineteenth century Swedish economist Knut Wicksell 
and  later  contributions  by  Black  (1948;  1958),  Arrow  (1951),  and  Downs (1957)  among 
others (see Rowley, 2008). ln its more elementary form, public choice relates to the study of 
"alternative  political  choice structures"  (i.e.,  rules)  and  their corresponding  effects  on  the 
behaviours ofpolitical and economie agents (Buchanan, [1979] 1999, p. 48; [1987] 2001a, p. 
8).  Specifically, public choice uses the tools and methods developed in  economie theory, and 
applies  these  to  the  political  sphere,  ali  the  while  recognizing  that  economie  theory  is 
relatively  simple in  comparison to  the world of politics (Buchanan [1979]  1999, p.  48-50). 
The reasons for such complexities are twofold.  First, efficient or equitable political exchange 
can  only  proceed  in  light of prior agreement,  a  contract that  establishes  the  constitutional 
order  within  which  actors  agree  to  operate.  And  second,  "political  exchange  necessarily 12 
involves all members of the relevant community rather than just the two trading partners that 
. characterize economie exchange" (Ibid, emphasis in  original).  The quest to resolve these two 
fundamental problems underlies much of  the Public Choice research agenda. 
The development of an economie theory of constitutions was the  primary  purpose of 
Buchanan and  Tullock's  (1962) seminal contribution, the  Calculus of Consent (Buchanan, 
[ 1979]  1999,  p.  50,  f.n.3).  Building  on  the  insights  of the  classical  moral  philosophers 
(Hobbes,  Spinoza,  Rouseau,  Locke,  Hume,  Smith,  Montesquieu  and  the  authors  of the 
Federalists  - Hamilton,  Madison,  and  Jay),  Buchanan and  Tullock  introduced  a  series of 
crucial insights that had profound effects on the scope and purpose of the severa! strands of 
institutional analysis that were then emerging, provided fertile ground for the development of 
a  more  comprehensive  theory  of collective  action,  reaffirmed  the  science  of  political 
economie  scholarship,  and  established  what Vincent  Ostrom  would  later  refer  to  as  the 
"logical foundations of constitutional democracy " ([1 997] 2012, p.  91, emphasis in original). 
The Calculus is credited with distinguishing between the leve! of  constitutional choice, which 
sets  the  rules  for  collective  action,  and  the  operational  leve!  of collective  choice,  which 
pertains to the actual pursuit of collective action or "ordinary politics"  within the bounds of 
previously established ru les. The central premise of the theory of constitutions developed in 
the Calculus concerns the limits to be placed on the exercise of government, including what 
the  appropriate  sphere  of political  action  should  be  and  the  normative  criteria  by  which 
government actions ought to be directed and evaluated. In short, the Calculus re-introduced 
contractarianism as  a  fundamental  precept to  social  order and differentiated the distinctive 
decision-making requirements of near unanimity at the constitutional leve!  versus the more 
diversified range of possibilities for making collective or operational  leve! decisions. Further, 
by  viewing politics as a process of exchange,  the Calculus brought to  light the fallible nature 
of government and the limited assurances that majoritarian voting schemes  provide against 
the  inherent problems of cyclical  majorities, vote trading, logrolling and the principal-agent 
problem  of electoral  competitions  (Buchanan,  [1979]  1999).  Finally,  by  arguing  that 
politicians  and  bureaucrats  are  essentially  ordinary  people  with  subjective  preferences, 
motivations and interests "much like the rest of us," Buchanan and Tullock (1962) turned the 
Weberian conception of the rational and efficient public bureaucracy on its  head and called 13 
attention  to  the  limits  of legislative  control  over the  discretionary  powers of bureaucracy 
(Buchanan [1979] 1999, pp. 56-57), thus setting the stage for other major contributions in the 
public choice tradition,  including the rent-seeking  insight (Krueger,  1974; Tollison,  1997; 
Tullock,  1965) and the  principal-agent problem of public bureaucracies (Knott and  Miller, 
1987; Miller, 1992) among others. 
Constitutional pol itical eco  nom ics, 
13  as it is now understood, emerged in the 1970s as a 
way to analyse the effects of alternative sets of rules or "choice of  constraints," as opposed to 
"choices made within constraints" (i.e., poli ci es, ru les, legislations) (Buchanan [1987] 2001, 
pp. 4-7). Drawing on  Wicksell (1896), Buchanan urged lasting reform  cannot emerge from 
changes  made  within  existing  rules,  but from  changes  in  the  rules  for  making  decisions 
(Buchanan, [1981] 2001 , p.  46; [ 1987] 2001, p.  1  0). In this sense, "[t]he laws and institutions 
that define the economic-political order become the variables subject to possible adjustments 
and reform"  (Buchanan,  [1990]  1999, p.  388). To understand the  limitations of an existing 
social  order  and  develop  normative  advice  that  can  withstand  the  scrutiny  of scientific 
warrantability,  constitutional  economies  relies  on  the  positive  analysis  (i.e.,  what  is)  of 
normative issues (i.e., what ought) such as efficiency, distributional equity, or environmental 
sustainability.  Attention  is  placed  on  how  individuals  can  realize  mutual  gains  by  jointly 
committing to social orders that can guide their interactions towards more productive paths 
than what would otherwise be the case (Vanberg, 2006, pp. 2-3). 
While  constitutional  economies  is  essentially  comparative  111  nature  - testing 
alternative rule structures that yield Pareto better outcomes- emphasis in this thesis  is  placed 
on the theoretical underpinnings of constitutional political economies. And since the primary 
motive for this research lies  in  developing a hypothesis that can better explain  the historical 
patterns  of forest  resource  use  in  Québec,  pre-constitutional  issues  relevant  tb  decision-
making processes, unanimity, and use of a hypothetical "veil" (Buchanan and Tullock, 1962; 
Rawls, 1971) are not formally addressed. Contributions from constitutional economists in the 
1 3  McKenzie ( 1984) is credited with having introduced the term "constitutional economies". Buchanan (2004, p. 65) succinct! y 
summarises constitutional political economy as a "domain of inquiry  and discourse among scientists who choose to  perceive 
social interaction as  a set of complex  relationships, both actual and  potential , among autonomous persons, each of whom is 
capable of making rational choices." 14 
public  choice  tradition  were  used  as  structuring  elements  of the  analytical  framework 
developed in Chapters II and III. 
Institutional Analysis,  as  embodied  in  the  collected  works  of Elinor  and  Vincent 
Ostrom, and the  growing number of scholars  who share  their vision,  begins  where  public 
choice ends (V.  Ostrom, 2009),  by  explicitly  inviting scholars  and  practitioners  to  extend 
analytical  inquiry  beyond  the  limitations  of markets  and  hierarchies  (E.  Ostrom,  2005a, 
2010a; E. Ostrom and Walker, [1997] 2000; V. Ostrom, 1997; V. Ostrom and Ostrom, [1971] 
2000). The Bloomington School of Tnstitutional Analysis, as it is increasingly being referred 
to  (Aligica  and  Boettke,  2009,  2011;  Eggertsson,  2010),  embodies  an  interdisciplinary 
research programme that is arguably one of  the most dynamic and ambitious efforts to date in 
the broad field of political economie studies. White the core of this research programme has 
yet to be detined in  any succinct or broadly accepted terms (Aligica and Boettke, 2009), the 
ontological  and  methodological  foundations of institutional analysis  are sufficiently  robust 
and  unique  to  suggest  that the  approach  developed  by  the  Ostroms  and  their colleagues 
represents a  unique school of thought in  public administration (Aligica and Boettke, 2009, 
2011; Eggertsson, 201  0; Toonen, 201 0). To better situate this thesis within the broad scope of 
the Bloomington research agenda, I briefly sketch out the relevant elements of the School's 
theoretical  and  methodological  contributions  in  terms of core ontological  postulates  rather 
than  conjectures  that  await  the  scrutiny  of further  empirical  analyses  or  more  elaborate 
theoretical developments.
14 
The central tenet of institutional analysis is that individuals are not necessarily trapped 
in  the dilemmas they face (E.  Ostrom,  1990,  1998,  1999, 2009a, 2010a).  Opportunities for 
choice  exist.  Through  learning,  communication,  and  the  sharing  of  ideas  and  values, 
individuals  can  develop  norms  of trust and  reciprocity,  facilitate  organization,  and  create 
rule-ordered  arrangements  that  support  mutually  productive  outcomes  (E.  Ostrom  and 
Walker, 2003; V.  Ostrom, 1997; Poteete et al. , 2010). From the provision of public goods to 
the sustainable use of common-pool resources, Workshop scholars have relentlessly pursued 
the  development  of an  empirically  grounded  theory  of collective  action  that  has  since 
14  For recent  discussions  on  the  dcpth  and  scope of contributions  using  Institutional Analysis  and  in  particular, scholarship 
associated with the Workshop in  Political Theory and Policy Analysis at Indiana University, see Ostrom (2010); Aligica and 
Boetlke (2009, 20 Il); Eggerlsson (20 1  0); Toonen (20 1  0); McGinnis and Walker (20 1  0); and Poteete el al., (20 10). 15 
changed the way most scholars think about and analyse dilemma situations and the capacity 
of hu mans  to  fi nd  enduring  solutions  to  the  ir  problems  (E.  Ostrom,  1998,  2009a,  201 0; 
Poteete et al.,  201 0).  Hu man systems are regarded as  complex adaptive systems (Janssen, 
2002; Janssen et al.,  2007; E. Ostrom, 2007, 2008b), endowed with the capacity and indeed 
propensity to self-organize into units of varying size and composition (Toonen, 2010, p.  199). 
And  like  ali  self-organizing  organisms,  the  social  structures  humans  create  tend  to  be 
polycentric in  nature, not monocentric. 
Polycentricity and complexity  are regarded as essential elements of productive rule-
ordered  relationships  (Aligica  and  Boettke,  2011;  Eggertsson,  2010;  Toonen,  2010). 
Complexity must be met with complexity (Ashby, 1956; E. Ostrom, 201 Oa;  V. Ostrom, 1997) 
and when compared to monocentric systems of governance, polycentricity radically increases 
the degree of variety that humans can potentially access to maintain "some essential value or 
values within  limits" (V. Ostrom, 1997, p.  121). As complex adaptive systems, institutional 
analysis assumes that nearly every human situation represents a constituent part of a "part-
whole structure" that is  itself nested in ever larger fonns of organisation (E. Ostrom, 2005b, 
p.  11).  At  the  base  of this  hierarchical  scaffold  lie  the  essential  ingredients  of human 
'distinctiveness,  captured  in  terms of values,  ideas  and  beliefs  that  are  expressed  through 
language,  and  acquired  through  learning  and  the  development of shared  communities  of 
understanding (V. Ostrom, 1997). Regularized social interaction depends on the use of rules 
to order relationships among interacting individuals. And since rules are essentially linguistic 
constructions that rely  upon the use of knowledge, norms and cultural  referents - "artifacts 
th at con  tain the ir artisans" (V. Ostrom, [ 1980]  1999), the potential for institutional diversity 
is  nearly limitless (E. Ostrom, 2005b). 
A  hallmark  of the  Bloomington  research  program  has  been  to  treat  institutional 
diversity  with  analytical  diversity  (Poteete  et  al.,  2010).  Years  of empirical  research  in 
diverse institutional settings across ail  regions of the globe combined with a profound respect 
for  ali  disciplinary  perspectives,  and  an  unyielding  commitment  to  the  use  of multiple 
methods  of  inquiry  have  led  scholars  of the  Bloomington  research  program  to  make 
numerous cri ti cal  ad van ces towards the development of (  epistemic) communities of shared 
understanding. Crucial  distinctions have been  introduced regarding a wide range of factors 16 
that directly or indirectly affect resource use outcomes in  different settings.
15 They include: 
the nature of goods (E. Ostrom et al.,  1994; E. Ostrom and Walker, [1997] 2000; V.  Ostrom 
and Ostrom, [ 1971]  2000) the three worlds of action (Kiser and Ostrom, [ 1982]  2000); the 
fundamental  elements that can  be  used  to  analyse and  evaluate outcomes  in  the different 
levels  of decision  making and  the  composite elements of the  prototypical  structure of an 
action situation (Kiser and Ostrom, [1982] 2000; E. Ostrom, 1986; 2005b  ); the limitations of 
the conventional  the01·y  of collective action (National  Research Council,  2002;  E.  Ostrom, 
1990;  Poteete et al.,  2010);  the  role  of trust and  reciprocity  in  overcoming dilemmas  (E. 
Ostrom and  Walker,  2003;  Rothstein,  2005); the  bundles of property  rights  (Schlager and 
Ostrom,  1992); the  grammar of institutions (Crawford and  Ostrom,  1995); the structure of 
common-pool  resource  situations  (E.  Ostrom,  1990,  1999;  E.  Ostrom  et  al.,  1994);  the 
emerging theory  of human  behaviour (E.  Ostrom,  1998,  2010b;  Poteete et al.,  2010);  the 
microsituational  variables that affect cooperation (Poteete et al.,  2010, p. 228-233); design 
principles for long enduring resource institutions (Cox et al., 201 0; E. Ostrom, 1990, 2005b  ); 
the constitutional levet of analysis (V. Ostrom, 1987, [1979] 2009, [1982]  1999); and what it 
means to live in  democratie polities (McGinnis and Ostrom, [1999] 2012; V.  Ostrom, 1973, 
1987,  1991, 1997, [2002] 2012). Together, these and many other contributions have allowed 
scholars associated with the  Bloomington School  to  develop frameworks for  analyzing the 
diversity of human situations (the Institutional Analysis and Development framework - see 
Ostrom, 2005b) and the complexities of social-ecological systems (E. Ostrom, 2007, 2009b) 
through the use of meta-theoretical, multidisciplinary, and multi-tiered conceptual maps that 
allow researchers to  dissect the complex problematical situations into their working parts to 
better understand the weight and effects of variables that impinge on hu man actions. 
The  Bloomington  School  shares  many  of the  concems  that  have  guided  James 
Buchanan's own efforts to develop a theory of constitutional political economie order. Both 
schools  represent  an  extension  of the  fundamental  questions  that  preoccupied  the  moral, 
political, and economie philosophers of the  1  i" and  18
111  centuries, but the Ostroms pushed 
their own reflection and appreciation of the central  problem of collective action beyond  the 
mere need for constraints in the exercise of public choice. As El inor Ostrom put it,  two key 
questions  underlie ali  of the  School's  work:  "how  can  fallible  human  beings  achieve and 
1 5 Contributions that have a direct bearing on this thesis are examined in section 1.4 and in Chapters II  and III . 17 
sustain self-governing entities and self-governing ways of !ife," and "[h]ow can individuals 
influence the  rules  that structure their lives" (quoted  in  Aligica and Boettke, 2009, p.159). 
For  the  Ostroms,  self-governance  does  not  imply  the  removal  of state-government,  the 
privatization of public goods, or a societal shift towards communal governance regimes writ 
large. Rather, something cal led democracy exists when citizens jointly and voluntarily act to 
find  solutions to  the problems and dilemmas they  face:  "[C]itizens need to  understand that 
they parti ci pate in the constitution and reconstitution of rule-governed polities. And they need 
to  learn  the art and science of  association " (Ibid), which Tocqueville ([1835-1840]  1990) 
rightly  understood  as  the  foundation  for  a  theory  of collective  action.  In  this  sense, 
polycentricity, self-governance, and  self-organization are  neither panaceas, nor should they 
be  considered  contrary  to  emergent  ideas  on  the  effectiveness  of centripetal  governance 
(Gerring and· Thacker, 2008), 
16 Instead, they provide a framework for considering alternative 
structures of association that give meaning to  human agency as  citizens and  participants  in 
democratie structures, as weil  as a more diversified set of tools and theories for coping with 
increasingly complex social-ecological problems. In this view, the Institutional Analysis and 
Development framework
17  was  used  to  structure and  guide the  development of this  thesis, 
and  contributions  from  the  Bloomington  School  were  used  to  strengthen  the  overall 
theoretical framework addressed in Chapters II and III. 
White public choice and institutional analysis provide the core theoretical elements of 
this thesis, studies dealing with the evolution of institutional arrangements in  common-pool 
resource situations- using comparative historical analyses as  a methodological foundation-
are relatively rare. This created a number of methodological  and conceptual challenges, but 
also  opportunities  to  break  new  ground  by  bringing  attention  to  the  historical  nature  of 
modern  resource dilemmas,  including the long term  effects of initial  set conditions on  the 
evolution of resource governance institutions and the capacity of actors to solve the problems 
they confront. To this end, this thesis also draws heavily from the complementary insights of 
historical  and  sociological  institutionalism,  and  in  particular,  recent  scholarship  on  the 
evolutionary dynamics of institutional change (see Chapter II). 
16  Recent scholarship on centripetal democratie governance (Gerring and Thacker, 2004, 2008; Gerring et al., 2005, 2009), and 
its relationship to the underlying theoretical framework used in this thesis are discussed in Chapter III. 
17 A modified version of the frarnework, along with explanatory notes on its structure and application are presented in  the section 
on Methods. 18 
1.3 .1  Two Core Postulates 
Structural  Individual  Interdependency:  Methodological  and  normative 
individualism are central to public choice and tne Bloomington research program (Buchanan 
and Tullock,  1962;  V. Ostrom,  1997).  While careful  not to  discard the social, cultural and 
institutional contexts within which choices are made and the subjective heuristics people use 
to  make  decisions  in  complex  settings  (V.  Ostrom,  1997,  pp.  102-108),  methodological 
individualism asserts that only individuals choose, not societies  nor collectives (Buchanan, 
[1987] 2001a; Buchanan and Tullock,  1962). However, if individuals are embedded in, and 
conditioned by, their social circumstances and the institutional milieu that frames their habits, 
values  and  beliefs,  then  the  idea  that complex  social  phenomena  can  be  reduced  to  the 
autonomous  choices  of rational  sovereigns,  as  Buchanan  ([1990]  1999,  p.  383) suggests, 
would  tend  towards  an  oversimplification  of causation  - an  assumption  that  is  both 
empirically  and  theoretically  unwarranted.
18  A  more  complex  appreciation  of the  causal 
mechanisms underpinning social outcomes and the challenges inherent to the task of social 
enquiry is applied in this thesis. 
Following  Arrow  (1994  ),  Archer (1995),  Katznelson  (2003),  and  Hodgson  (2007a, 
201 0),  I  assume  th at  agency  and  structure  are  interdependent.  In  other  words,  choice  is 
always embedded in  context, rooted in  normative and socialized habits that form  enduring 
(pre)dispositions (i.e., values and beliefs) or "solidarities", as Bourdieu (2000, p.  145) put it, 
between the "socialized body " and  "the social  body. " Accordingly, "[a]gency  is  both free 
and constrained. Human beings are reflective of, and reactive to, their circumstances, as well 
as  being conditioned by  them"  (Hodgson (2007a, p.  1  02).  Under such circumstances, ti me 
becomes  crucial  to  the  study  of social  phenomena,  for  the  manifestation  of observable 
outcomes necessarily evolves from  the dynamic  interplay of structure and  agency (Archer, 
1995,  p.  65).  From  an  "evolutionary  perspective"  Hodgson  (20 10,  pp.  14-15)  furthers, 
structural-individual  interdependency  implies  the  need  to  "understand  how  individuals  are 
affected  by  social  structures,  as  weil  as  how  structures  are  constituted  by  individuals." 
Movement back and forth  between the two is  essential, for "ali viable explanations of social 
18  As  Hodgson  argues  (2012,  p.  43), "No  social  science  can  derive  its  explanation  from  the  properties  [or  attributes]  of 
individuals alone". For assessmcnts of the  different and  contradictory  meanings  assigned  to the concept of methodological 
individualism, see Udehn (2002) and  Hodgson (2007b). For a critique of the ontological, theoretical and empirical foundations 
of methodological individualism, sec Hodgson (2004, 2007a) 19 
phenomena  involve  both  individuals  and  social  structures:  there  is  no  known  exception" 
(Ibid.,  p.  14). 
As a postulate for analytical inquiry, structural-individual interdependency means that 
"history cannot be explicated without theory, that social who les are not reducible to the sum 
of individual patts, and  that the properties and  features  of individuals are deeply shaped by 
their situation inside large-scale structures and  processes" (Katznelson, 2003, p. 280).  Hence, 
even though actors  may  not be  a priori trapped  in  the dilemmas  they  face,  their  ability to 
solve such problems depends as much on the social-cultural ethos and habits that inform their 
values,  norms  and  beliefs,  as  it  does  on  the  reliability  of their  mental  models,  and  the 
prevailing political-economic structures  that have shaped their institutional environment and 
power relations over ti me. 
Boundedly Rational Behaviour: A corollary to the postulate of structural-individual 
interdependency  is  the  idea  that  human  actors  have  inherently  limited  cognitive  and 
reasoning  capabilities.  Instead  of  assuming  that  individuals  are  able  to  rank  order  their 
preferences along  sorne  internai  value  scale,  as  in  the  public  choice  tradition  (Buchanan, 
[1 990]  1999, pp. 391-392), the approach taken here posits that actors are boundedly rational 
beings that  rely  on  rules  of  thumb or similar other heuristics  to  deal with  complexity  and 
uncettainty  (Simon,  1957,  1997).  Following  more  recent contributions  by  Elinor  Ostrom 
(1 998, 2010b) and  colleagues (e.g.,  E.  Ostrom et al., 1994; Poteete et al., 2010),  actors are 
assumed  to  be  purposeful  in  their  actions;  capable  of  learning  and  improving  their 
understanding ofthe structure of the situation they face; achieve greater predictability in their 
decisions over time; and  incorporate other-regarding  norms and  preferences (Poteete et al. , 
20 l 0, pp.  222-223). However, to  exp  lain social outcomes  from an evolutionary perspective, 
this  thesis turns  again  to  the  crucial  role  of habits  and  instinct,  as  distinct and  precursory 
elements ofreason, deliberation, and choice (Hodgson, 2010, p. 2). 
Following the insights of pragmatist philosophers and institutional economists such as 
John  Dewey  and  Thorstein  Veblen,  Hodgson  argues  that  habits  constitute  "submerged 
repertoires  of potential  thought  or  behaviour"  that  "act  as  filters  of experience  and  the 
foundations of intuition and interpretation" (2007a, pp. 106-1 07). Habits are informed by the 
cultural  knowledge  that emerges  from  social  processes  of trial  and  error  learning.  They 20 
constitute  cultural  and  normative  adaptations,  and  together with  biological  instincts,  they 
ultimately affect the preferences and beliefs of individual choice sets (Ibid. , 2010, pp.  12-14). 
By  modulating the "durability, power, and normative authority" of rules,  preference-
creating habits  become essential  constituents of any effort to  measure the  performance of 
emergent  institutions  (Ibid. ,  2007a,  p.  107).  New  rules  can  alter  habits,  beliefs,  and 
preferences  through  ongoing  cycles  of adaptation  that  lead  to  cultural  selection  and  the 
development  of  revised  normative  assumptions,  incentives  and  constraints.  From  an 
evolutionary  perspective,  individuals,  therefore,  are  affected  by  habit-forming  "social 
structures," and "structures are constituted by individuals" who can exercise agency, and thus 
introduce variety and complexity in  the systems they create  (Ibid.,  2010, p. 15). Hence, the 
"endogenous preference formation"  of habits  suggests that "history provides  the resources 
and  constraints"  through  "which  we  think,  act  and  create"  (Ibid.,  2007,  pp.  108-1 09). 
Incorporating the  role  of habits  in  the  basic  definition  of boundedly  rational  behaviour is 
essential  for  understanding  preference formation  over time,  and the  resulting  choices that 
affected the evolution of  governance institutions in comparative historical analyses. 
1  .4  Research Questions 
Consistent with the central concerns of constitutional political economie the01·y  and the 
evolutionary dynamics of institutional change in  complex adaptive socio-ecological systems, 
the overarching question guiding this thesis is as follows: 
How have forest governance institutions in the province of  Québec evolved and wh  y? 
Underlying this question is  the need to  understand the role of initial set conditions on 
the constitution of social order and the evolving interests of those who held collective-choice 
rights over the use and management of forests during the formative years of the province's 
history. In other words, in order to appreciate how and why forest governance institutions in 
Québec  evolved  the  way  they  did,  one  needs  to  acquire  a  theoretical  and  empirical 
understanding of the linkages that lie between the nature of social order, the long-run effects 
of social-ecological  commitments  (i.e.,  policies)  and  outcomes,  and  the  constant  flux  of 
change in  the preferences and  strategies of the evolving set of actors who  were faced  with 
reiterated problem-solving situations. To develop a plausible answer to the overarching issue 21 
of institutional change in Québec's forest sector, four separate but linked clusters of questions 
were addressed. The first two deal with theoretical issues and third and fourth clusters focus 
on empirical evidence. 
1.  Institutional change in the context of natural resource use (Chapter II). 
• 
How do resource governance institutions evolve and why? 
What  role,  if any,  do  constitutional  choices  play  in  the  progress  of institutional 
change? 
2.  The nature of constitutional choice rules (Chapter III). 
• 
• 
• 
What are constitutional choice rules? 
How do they affect choices at the collective and operationallevels? 
What is  the nature of social arder in  the Canadian provincial context and in Québec 
more specifically? 
3.  The  evolution  of  forest  governance  institutions  m  Québec  prior  to  Confederation 
(Chapters IV and V). 
• 
• 
How did centralized forest resource governance in Québec emerge and why? 
What factors, events, or conditions informed  the  choice-sets of those charged  with 
the  administration  of  public  affairs  in  the  province,  including  the  use  and 
management of public forests? 
4.  The consequences of constitutional and collective choices in reiterated  problem-solving 
situations  and  their  effects  on  the  evolutionary  dynamics  of  forest  governance 
institutions in Québec (Chapters VI, VII and VIII). 
• 
• 
• 
What  problems  did  political-economic  actors  face  over  time,  how  were  forest 
governance  institutions  changed  to  address  such  emergent  situations,  and  what 
effects did these decisions have on subsequent problem-solving situations? 
How  have  constitutional  choice  rules  affected  the  evolution  of forest  governance 
institutions in Québec? 
Wh  at effects, if any, has the  concentration of collecti ve-choice rights over the use 
and  management of public forests in  Québec had  on  the resulting patterns of forest 
resource use in the province? 
In the end, the purpose of this  thesis  is  to contribute to  the development of a  more 
comprehensive understanding of the  evolution of forest governance institutions  in  Québec. 
By bringing attention to the causal influence of initial set conditions in the administration of 
public  resources  and  the  long term  consequences of reiterated  problem-solving efforts  by 22 
those who hold collective-choice rights over the use and management of public forests in the 
province, this thesis develops a testable hypothesis on the influence of constitutional choice 
rules on the evolution of forest governance institutions in  Québec and the resulting patterns 
of forest resource use over ti me. 
1.5  Methods 
The relationship  between constitutional  rules, institutional change and forest resource 
use  outcomes in  Québec was  investigated through a comparative historical analysis of five 
distinct time  periods,  using a  case study  approach.  Case study  research  provides  an  ideal 
framework  for  testing  and  developing  theoretical  explanations  that  are  consistent  with 
historically  situated  phenomena (George and Bennett, 2005, p.  20; Lijphart,  1971, p.  691 ). 
George and Bennett (2005, p.  5) define case study research as "a detailed examination of an 
aspect  of a  historical  episode  to  develop  or  test  historical  explanations  that  may  be 
generalizable to other events." Through "the intense study of a limited number of units (or 
cases)," case study methods provide greater internai validity and analytical depth, as weil as a 
stronger  foundation  for  exploring  causal  mechanisms  and  the  consistency  of  causal 
relationships  that  can either  validate  theoretical  predictions  or enable  the  development of 
more  plausible  hypotheses  (Gerring,  2007,  pp.  37-38).  As  such,  case-study  research  is 
particularly weil suited for the study of causes-of-effects, as  opposed to the effects-of-causes 
1 
(Brady  and  Collier,  2004;  Mahoney  and  Goertz,  2006).  lndeterminacy  is  minimized  by 
placing analytical  weight on  "whether and  how "  selected  variables  affect outcomes rather 
than "how much" they do so (Bennett and Elman, 2006b, pp.  457-458; George and Bennett, 
2005, p.  25). Nevertheless, trading breadth and frequency for depth and limited variance does 
create a number of limitations. Of specifie relevance to this study are the consequences that 
flow  from  its  limited  geographie  scope  and  small  number of selected  cases  (George and 
Bennett, 2005,  p.  22).  White the methods used limit the generalizability of the findings and 
the causal weight that may be attributed to the selected independent variables, the conjectural 
and  historical nature  of this  thesis  makes  it  an  appropriate  choice for case study  research 
(Gerring,  2007,  p.  39).  Further,  the  similarity  between  the  historical  patterns  of forest 
governance  institutions  in  Québec  and  those  of  its  sister  provinces  (Howlett and  Rayner, 23 
1995,  2001)  suggest that  the  approach  taken  here  bears  relevance to  the  broader Canadian 
context. Even so, severa! strategies were used to increase the reliability of the study design. 
To  strengthen  the  validity  of  hypothesized  causal  relationships,  a  comparative 
historical  and  within-case  analytical  approach  was  used  to  safeguard  against  spurious 
correlations and increase inferential leverage. Comparative historical analysis draws on a rich 
tradition  of inquiry  that  has  dominated  the  social  sciences  for  centuries  (Mahoney  and 
Rueschemeyer,  2003,  p.  3).  This  mode  of  investigation  is  marked  by  an  intellectual 
commitment  to  using  historically  grounded  explanations  to  address  questions  that  have 
substantively  or  normatively  broad  implications  (Ibid.,  p.  7).  Specifically,  comparative 
historical analysis implies the study of causal relationships in processes that unfold over ti me, 
along with the "use of systematic and contextualized comparisons" (Ibid. , pp.  1  0-13).  Wh ile 
the  extent  to  which  study  results  hold  across  time  and  differing  sociocultural  contexts 
necessarily depends on the safeguards that are used, Mahoney and Rueschemeyer (2003, p.  9) 
argue  that  such  methods  "can  [nevertheless]  yield  more  meaningful  advice  concerning 
contemporary  choices and  possibilities than  studies that aim  for  universal  truths  but cannot 
grasp  critical  historical  details." This  is  a particularly  important observation  given  that the 
object of this  study  lies  in  understanding  the  influence  of constitutional  choice  rules  and 
reiterated  problem-solving efforts on  the evolution of forest governance  institutions and  the 
resulting  social-ecological  outcomes.  Since  Québec  shares  the  same  constitutional 
foundations  as  its  sister  provinces - the  independent variable  of interest  in  this  thesis,  the 
hypothesized causal  influence of constitutional  rules  in  the  case of Québec  is  likely to  have 
had  a  similar  bearing  on  the  development  and  use  of natural  resources  elsewhere  in  the 
country. 
Historical comparisons of the five selected case study periods were strengthened using 
within-case  analytical methods  that  included  process  tracing  and  the  congruence  method. 
Process  tracing  involves  the  identification  of "intervening  causal  process[es]  - the  causal 
chain  and  causal  mechanism  - between  an  independent  variable  (or  variables)  and  the 
outcome of the dependent variable" (George and Bennett, 2005, p. 206). Movement back and 
forth  between theory and  empirical  evidence is  essential for  testing and  refining theoretical 
predictions in  light of comparative  insights  (Sewell, 2005).  As  such, process tracing derives 24 
its  power of inference from  the continuous thread  of historical  events (i.e.,  causal  process 
observations) th at can be explained by reference to the ory (George and Bennett, 2005, pp. 21 
&  30).  By  carefully  matching  available  evidence  to  specifie  conjectures,  process  tracing 
provides  a  methodological  foundation  for  "uncovering  traces  of a  hypothesized  causal 
mechanism  within  the  context of a  historical  case"  (Bennett  and  Elman,  2006a,  p.  262; 
Collier  et  al.,  2004,  pp.  252-255;  Gerring,  2007,  p.  44).  When  applied  to  the  study  of 
institutional change and collective action more broadly, process tracing allows the researcher 
to  develop clearer and more complex accounts of the context within which action  unfolds, 
and  the  specifie  causal  mechanisms  that  affect  the  creation,  reproduction,  and  change of 
institutions over time (Bennett and Elman, 2006a, p.  262).  Hence,  in  spite of the fact that 
small  "n"  case  study  research  does  not  yield  the  necessary  confidence  to  generalize 
theoretical  or  hypothetical  conjectures,  the  repeated  observations  that  can  be  leveraged 
through  within-case  analysis  and  small  "n"  case  comparisons  can  be  used  to  aggregate 
multiple sources of evidence, and develop theoretical  explanations that are  consistent with 
historically situated phenomena (Bennett and Elman, 2006b, p.  459; Gerring, 2007, p.  172; 
Mahoney, 2003,  pp.  360-367). As  the plausibility of the  underlying theoretical  framework 
increases, so does the likelihood that case study observations may be generalized to  a larger 
class of phenomena (Gerring, 2004,  p.  341). Following Mahoney (2010), confidence in  the 
causal  relationshi p  that  1  ie  between  independent  (i.e.,  constitutional  choice  ru les)  and 
dependent variables (i.e.,  social-ecological  outcomes) was  strengthened by  the use of three 
different causal  process observations: (i) observational data pointing to the  influence of the 
independent variable  over the  outcome of interest;  (ii)  evidence  of intervening  events  or 
mechanisms  (a causal  chain) that  are  consistent  with  theoretical  predictions;  and  (iii)  the 
presence  of auxiliary  outcomes  or  parallel  effects  that  could  only  result  from  a  positive 
relationship with the tentative hypothesis (see also George and Bennett, 2005, pp.  185-192). 
1.5.1  Study Framework 
To strengthen the ri gor of  analysis and develop causal process observations that can be 
testéd  and  further  elaborated  upon  in  subsequent  research,  this  study  relied  on  the 
Institutional Analysis and  Development (lAD) framework, developed by  scholars associated 
with  the  Bloomington  school  of institutional  analysis  (Kiser  and  Ostrom,  [1982]  2000; 
Oakerson,  1990;  E.  Ostrom,  1986, 2005b; E.  Ostrom  et al.,  1994). The lAD framework  is 25 
weil  suited  for  the  study  of collective  action  in  various  settings  (Ostrom,  2005b)  and 
common-pool resource systems more specifically (E. Ostrom, 201 Oa; Poteete et al., 201 0). Of 
special relevance to  this study is  the fact that the lAD allows for multiple levels of analysis. 
This  enables  researchers  to  peer  into  the  nested  structure  of rules  and  disaggregate  the 
hierarchical  scaffold  of institutional  arrangements  that  ultimately  impinge  on  operational 
decision-making  situations.  The  lAD  framework  explicitly  connects  the  micro-levet 
processes (or operational choice situations) th at direct! y affect the state of the world with the 
macro-levet  structures  that  are  nested  in  collective-choice arenas  and  constitutional  orders 
(McGinnis,  1999,  p.  3).  Recognition of the configurai  relationship  of institutions  and  the 
complex web of interdependencies  typical  of most action  situations  is  explicit.  Since the 
performance of any  given  rule  cannot be considered  in  isolation  of the  inter-institutional 
linkages  that  govern  human  interactions,  the  lAD  reinforces  the  relationships  that  tie 
individual and aggregate behaviours to the institutional  matrix within which actors operate, 
the attributes of their socio-economic and political setting, and the nature of the biophysical 
environment  (including  infrastructure  and  technologies)  that  jointly  affect  the  incentives 
participants face (see figure 1.1  below). 26 
Figure 1.1  The lnstitutional Analysis and Development Framework 
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Source: Adapted from  E. Ostrom et  al., (1994) and E.  Ost rom (2007). 
Central  to  the lAD framework are the  relationships  that link individuals,  occupying 
different positions, to actions or choices that cumulatively affect outcomes in the world. What 
is  important  to  consider  for  the  purpose  of this  thesis  is  that  the  relationship  that  links 
individuals to rules and outcomes is  likewise a rule-dependent arrangement subject to deeper 
level constraints.  Arenas wherein  actors  interact and  make decisions are  thus  mediated by 
"authority relationships that specify who decides what in relation to whom" (Oakerson, 1990, 
p.  9).  White actors involved in any one leve) of interaction may also occupy positions in  one 
or  more  action  situation  (see  right-hand  si de  of figure  1.1 ),  each  faces  a  unique  set of 
incentives motivated by their own preferences (which may or may not be congruent with the 
social optima), the  information  they  possess and the  choice mechanisms or mental  models 
they use for selecting among alternatives. 
Reference  to  the  temporal  dimensions  of social  (Pierson,  2004;  Sewell,  2005)  and 
ecological  (Gauthier et al., 2009; Liu et al.,  2007) change are  implicitly  tied  to  the doted 
feedback  arrows  that  link outcomes  to  the  greater  social-ecological  environment and  the 27 
arenas  wherein actors  interact, and  make  decisions that  iteratively affect the choice sets of 
others. The theoretical framework that was used to explore the evolution of forest governance 
institutions in Québec is developed in Chapters II and liT. 
1.5.2  Research Design 
ln order to develop causal accounts of institutional change that are consistent with the 
historical  contingency  of selected  case-study  periods,  the  causal  influence  of temporal 
heterogeneity,  and  the  multiple  and  mutable  sources  of causation  in  complex  adaptive 
systems  that  preclude  the  existence  of single  explanatory  deviees  or  generalizable  laws 
(Haydu,  1998, p.  356; Sewell, 2005, pp. 6-12; Steinmo, 2010, pp.  13-14), periodization was 
tied to recurrent dilemma situations that triggered significant political-economic events in the 
province's  history.  In  other  words,  time  periods  were  used  as  instances  (i.e.,  cases)  of 
ongoing  problem-solving  efforts  wherein  past  events  form  a  continuous  thread  of causal 
relationships that iteratively  inform and influence outcomes in future settings (Haydu,  1998). 
As  such,  temporal  casing  (or  event  sequencing)  is  consistent  with  process  tracing, 
evolutionary  the  ory,  and  the  lAD  framework.  By  providing  an  analytical  structure  for 
understanding  how  actors  in  distinct  historical  periods  "work  with  problems,  tools,  and 
options inherited from the past" (Ibid., p. 356) and  make decisions that ultimately affect the 
situations that others will face at later periods (i.e., engage one another in  action situations), 
event sequencing supports the development of causal explanations that explicitly  recognize 
the influence of structure and the agency of social actors as "historical pivots that link cases 
ofproblem solving" situations together (Ibid., p.  367). Though it admits the potential for path 
dependent causal  relationships  such  as  positive  feedbacks,  increasing  returns  and  lock-in 
effects,  event  sequencing  does  not  assume  that  past  solutions  or  choices  necessarily 
"f01·eclose future options ...  They may also lead to and  shape the switch points confronted by 
later generations, drawing the fault !ines along which later crises will  erupt and create options 
for new solutions" (Ibid., p.  357). Hence, this research design adheres to the following set of 
evolutionary  principles:  1)  history  is  not  a  linear  process,  meaning that  when  and  where 
something occurs can fundamentally shape what occurs; 2) chance or contingency matters; 3) 
outcomes are often the product of  emergent processes and therefore cannot always be sim ply 
reduced to,  and  understood  in  terms  of, their constituent parts;  and  4) interdependent and 28 
iterative relationships between important causal variables affect the way institutions evolve in 
complex adaptive systems (Steinmo, 2010, pp.  13-14). 
1.5.2.1  Unit of Analysis 
As operationalized through the  lAD framework, "whenever two or more individuals 
are faced with a set of potential actions that can jointly affect outcomes, these individuals are 
said to be  in  an action situation,"  and together, they form  the primary unit of institutional 
analysis (Ostrom, 2005b, p.  32). Correspondingly, the principle species of observations that 
fonns the basis of analysis (see Gerring, 2007, p.  339) in  this thesis is  the collective choice 
situation  associated with the arena for public decision-making (see right-hand quadrant of 
Figure  1.1  above). More specifically, the primary unit of analysis is government itself and 
what government means or implies in any given context can only be understood in light of 
the constitutional foundations upon which it rests. In other words, government is  a political 
institution,  grounded  in  the constitutional  principles and  conventions that define the scope 
and limitations of its powers, and the means used to exercise such political authority (Gerring 
and Thacker, 2008). Government, therefore, is not a generic category of analysis. It identifies 
a  specifie  regime  structure,  fashioned  by  historical  precedents  and  the  governing 
arrangements by which political authority is  convened and exercised. Hence, understanding 
the  boundaries of the regime that forms the focal  point of analysis,  and  the constitutional 
properties that underlie such a  political institution is  crucial  for the development of causal 
arguments  that  invoke  constitutional  choice  rules  as  a  detennining  variable  in  social-
ecological outcomes. 
Within  this  thesis,  government  is  used  in  reference  to  the  Canadian  political 
institutions that have emerged following the establishment of British rule in 1763. Within the 
Canadian context therefore, government bas very specifie meaning. To begin with, Canada is 
:first,  and  foremost, a  constitutional democracy, governed  by  the evolving principles of the 
British  parliamentary  system  and  the  Westminster  mode!  of government,  which  implies 
"cabinet government" (Johari, 2006, pp. 212-215; Mallory, [1984] 2011, pp.  13-18). Severa) 
distinctive  features  characterise  the  concept  of government  by  cabinet  in  the  Canadian 
context. First, as a federated structure with two distinct levels of government, provincial and 
federal  governments  enjoy  clearly  differentiated  (albeit  sometimes  contested)  legislative 29 
powers but are themselves structured according to the same constitutional principles. Second, 
cabinet government implies executive governement, wherein  the Prime Minister or Premier 
and  appointed  members of Cabinet are  selected from  the  body  of elected  representatives, 
which  by  convention  implies  that  they  hold  the  confidence  of the  legislature.  Since 
go vern ment owes its  existence to the support of the majority of the legislature, it  is  1  ikewise 
considered  responsible  to  Parliament,  and  through  it,  the  electorate. Third,  Cabinet is  the 
central governing body of the Canadian parliamentary system. Like its British counterpart, it 
is  the core element of provincial and federal politics, and in a system where the legislative 
and executive functions are essentially fused (Dicey, [ 1915]  1982), Cabinet constitutes "the 
supreme  directing  authority"  of  public  affairs  within  the  constitutionally  defined 
jurisdictional  boundaries  of provincial  and  federal  legislatures  (Jennings,  1959,  p.  1  ).  As 
such, Cabinet has sole custody over the setting of government priorities and  public policies, 
the allocation of public resources, the design of decision-making processes, the management 
of departments and agencies (i.e., ministries), and the flow of information, to name but a few 
(see  Chapter  III).  And  since  ministries  or "departments  are  mandated  to  administer  and 
achieve the political and policy purposes in  their respective domains of public affairs" (Tardi, 
2010, p.  27), cabinet ministers ultimately hold responsibility for the departments and agencies 
under their authority. In other words,  because political and policy directives are determined 
by  Cabinet,  not  by  Parliament,  the  actions  and  decisions  of public  administrators  are 
considered to be those ofthe government itself. 
Finally,  power within Cabinet ultimately rests with the Premier (provinces) or Prime 
Minister  (Canada).  He or she  atone  holds  a  monopoly  over the  allocation  of patronage; 
determines the design of government (i.e.,  the structure and composition of Cabinet); assigns 
ministerial portfolios; contrais the government's agenda; decides the organization of Cabinet 
committees; exerts control over the civil service through the appointment of deputy ministers; 
and maintains overall control over the disclosure of information and consequently, the public 
image  of government  itself (see  Chapter III).  In  short,  the  locus  of control  in  Canadian 
provincial  politics  resides  with  the  Premier and Cabinet (Dunn,  2006),  and  "government" 
implies  Cabinet  government,  or  in  broader  and  more  encompassing  terms,  the  executive 
government.  As applied within their historically appropriate context, the following terms will 30 
be used interchangeably in  this thesis to  mean government:  Governor in  council, Executive, 
Executive Council, Lieutenant-Governor in council, Cabinet, and Council of ministers. 
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1.5.2.2  Case Selection and Periodization 
Following Haydu (1998, p.  354) case periodization was  primarily determined by  the 
"contrasting solutions" to  recurrent problems in  the administration of public forests and the 
differing sets of constitutional arrangements under which such solutions were developed. As 
such,  the study  period  was divided  into  five  distinct cases,  which  collectively  address the 
evolution  of forest  governance  institutions  in  Québec  from  1763  to  1986.  The  logic  of 
periodization (see Table 1.1 below) was informed by the following considerations. 
The year  1763  was selected as  the point of entry  for this  thesis  for  severa!  reasons. 
Specifically, it corresponds to the onset of the British regime in Québec, as formalized by the 
Treaty  of Paris  (February  1763),  which  ended  the  Seven  Years  War,  and  the  Royal 
Proclamation of October 1763, which gave Québec its first constitutional framework. While 
·large-scale extraction of forest resources in  Québec did  not begin until the Napoleonic wars 
of 1793  to  1810,  one needs  to  revert  back to  the  reception of English  law,  applicable  to 
discovered and conquered territories, in  order to  understand the nature and consequences of 
the  Crown's  unalienable  rights  to  ali  natural  resources.  As  specified  in  Blackstone's 
Commentaries on the Laws ofEngland (Book 1,  Sect. IV, pp.-107-108), British constitutional 
conventions provided that: "Premier ministre" 
"[J]n conquered or ceded countries, that have already laws oftheir own, the king may 
indeed alter and change those laws; but, till he does actually change them, the ancien! 
laws of  the country re main, unless such as are against the law of  Gad." 
In  other words,  ali  laws,  rules,  prerogatives,  and  entitlements  derived  from  ancient 
customs  and  held  in  right of a  foreign  sovereign  were,  by  conquest or cession,  formally 
transferred to the British Crown a·nd made legal until otherwise changed or amended by  royal 
proclamation or acts of the British Parliament. Hence, the Royal Domain (i.e., "le  Domaine 
Royal") that was  claimed  by  and  for  the  French  monarch  prior to  the  Conquest of 1759 
19 ln French, government is alternative!  y referred to as: "Conseil des ministres", "l'Exécutif," and  "Cabinet du premier ministre." 
And "premier ministre" implies "Premier." 31 
became the property of the British Crown
20 and ali previously held entitlements applicable to 
the said  land were likewise vested in the Crown, for it to dispose of or amend at its pleasure. 
Consequently,  even  though the  regulation  of forest  resource  use  in  Québec was  initiated 
nearly a century earlier during the French regime/ ' the key to understanding the origins and 
subsequent development of public forest institutions in the province, from the early  1800s to 
this very date, lies with the beginning of the English colonial period in  1763. 
With  respect  to  the selected end-date of 1986,  it  corresponds to  the adoption of the 
Forest Act that large!  y governed public forest resource use until  the first decade of the 21 st 
century. Sin  ce the 1986 reforms are widely regarded as the source of the cri sis th at continues 
to  afflict Québec's  forest  industry  at  the onset of 2013, and  the  analytical  interests of this 
thesis  resides  in  understanding the long  term  institutional  dynamics  that  led to the current 
predicament,  it  made sense,  from  an analytical  perspective,  to  end this  investigation  were 
current problems are believed to originate. The selected cases (Table  1.1) are detailed below. 
Table 1.1  Selected cases, events and constitutional arrangements (i.e., regime) 
DATES 
tl@ 
EVENTS 
•W 
REGIME 
,:@, 
- Constitutional struggle for responsible government 
Representative 
1763-1839  - Forests- revenue beyond the rea ch of the Legislative Assembly 
- Crown's unalienable hereditary and customary rights  (i.e., colonial) 
- Union and the development of responsible government 
Union (Upper & 
1840-1866  - Forests - revenue and incentive for settlement 
- Competing land-use claims & mixed political interests  Lower Canada) 
- Provincial government & legislative autonomy 
Provincial 
1867-1907  - Forests- revenue, colonization, economie development 
- Competing land-use claims & emergent industrialism  (federated state) 
·····-·····-·········-··········-··-···-·-·······-·  ... ·-····-- ········-·····--···-········-···-·-... ·- ········-·····--·-····-····-·······-···-···-----····-··-····-··-··-····-····-···-······-- ······--·····---····-··-
- Forests- primary engine of economie development 
1908-1950  - Failure of conservation & adoption of managed MSY  Ibid. 
- Industrialisation, positive feedbacks & rapid expansion 
- Legacy of appropriation & provisioning problems 
1960-1986  - Market/Gov. failures & limits of concessionary system  Ibid. 
- lncrease access & use to stimulate growth & development 
20  Excluded from this transfer of property were those portions of the territory that had  been ceded and placed under the feudal 
land-hold of the "seigneurial system." 
21  Wh ile the earliest recorded efforts to both exploit and protect forest resources in Québec can be traced as far back as 1672 (see 
Chapter  IV), the  use  of forest  resources  for construction, ship  building, or  other commercial  purposes  remained  marginal 
throughout  the French regime, owing to the high costs of trans-Atlantic shipping and the over-riding interests of the fur !rade. 32 
The first case (1763 to  1839) focuses analytical attention on the constitutional struggle 
that emerged between the elected Legislative Assembly of Lower Canada (i.e.,  Québec) and 
the appointed colonial executive for the establishment of responsible government, the control 
of public spending, and the use and management of crown resources (i.e.,  public lands and 
timber). How the colonial government proceeded to solve these problems, and  in  doing so, 
established the institutional precedents that would ultimately affect the use of forest resources 
to  this  very  day  provides  the  main  focus  of this  chapter. The years  1763  to  1839  broadly 
corresponds to the British colonial  period, during which Québec (renamed Lower Canada in 
1791) was administered by a representative government appointed by the British Parliament, 
and directed by the British Colonial Office in London. 
The second case (1840-1866) follows the events that unfolded after the breakdown of 
the Constitution Act of 1791, from the unification of  Upper and Lower Canada in  1840 to the 
confederation debates of 1866 that led to British North American Act a year later. After more 
than  a  decade  of rampant  cronyism  in  the  administration  of colonial  affairs  leading  to 
unproductive  growth  in  the  Lower  province  and  an  unbearable  debt  Joad  in  the  Upper 
province,  fresh  supplies  of  revenue  were  needed  to  balance  the  budget  of the  unified 
government, and again, salvation was to be found in the sale of public forests. How the need 
for revenue and the rise of  democratie institutions (i.e., responsible government) evolved in a 
context of competing  land-use  claims  and  growing environmental  awareness  provides  the 
overarching narrative of this  chapter. The end date of 1866 corresponds to the breakdown of 
the unified regime and the need to reconfigure the very structure of  British North America. 
The third case (1867-1909) discusses the constitutional and empirical  implications of 
the Constitution Act of 1867 up to the turn of 20
1
"  century- a period that broadly corresponds 
to  a  pre-industrial  phase  in  the  use  of public  forests  and  a  pre-modern  approach  to  the 
administration  of public  affairs  overall.  The chapter considers  how  the  newly  established 
province of Québec dealt with  its  own  revenue-generating  needs  following entry  into  the 
Canadian confederacy. How government attempted to increase its share of revenue, deal  with 
an increasingly organized colonization movement, growing evidence of overexploitation, and 
a rapidly accumulating debt-load forms the centrepiece of discussion. The chapter ends with 
the rise ofthe pulp and paper industry and the consecration of"resource conservation" as the 33 
primary tool to limit the expansion of colonization and support the emerging imperatives of 
industrialisation during the first decade of  the 20
111  century. 
The  fourth  case  (1910-1950)  addresses  the  issues  and  concerns  that  emerged  in 
response to the intensification of forest resource exploitation, following the end of the First 
World War. From the advent of industrialisation to the development of  state bureaucracy, the 
chapter traces the professionalization of forest resource management, the ri se of government 
interventionism, and the adoption of the maximum sustainable yield paradigm to support the 
growing needs of industry. The end date of the chapter corresponds to the renewed vigour of 
the post-war economie boom, following more than a decade of criticism and warnings that 
the system as whole was unsustainable. 
Finally, the last case (1960-1986) provides a brief account of the results of more th an a 
century  of unconstrained  resource  exploitation  and  the  recurrent 20
111  century  dilemma of 
finding and taping into increasingly remote and Jess  productive pools of resources to sustain 
the needs of a largely unsustainable forest sector. The chapter begins  in  1960 with a historie 
change of government and the emergence of new political  ideals, and follows the ongoing 
efforts of public authorities to  resolve the anomalies created by  the conspicuous failures of 
the past and the relentless pursuit of growth. The chapter ends with an  overview of the factors 
that led  to the 1986  reform  of the Forest Act and  the assumptions underlying its  purported 
theory of change. 
1.5.2.3  Research Scope and Limitations 
The focus of this thesis lies explicitly on the role of government in  the administration 
of public forests and its  influence on the evolution of forest governance institutions. As such, 
the  factors  that are considered are those that affected  public decision  making processes, as 
reported or recounted in the selected primary sources of evidence. The absence of discussion 
on such important parallel events as the struggle for native land rights and the displacement 
of native inhabitants to serve the interests of European settlers was not deliberate. Rather, it 
was  the  paucity  of such  preoccupations  in  the  primary  sources  of data  (e.g.,  official 
correspondences and government reports) that led to their absence from the ensuing analyses. 
In fact, evidence (or Jack thereot) suggests that native interests have more or Jess been written 34 
out of history, as  if,  one might conclude, the constitutional and territorial claims of the First 
Nations people never really existed. 
Likewise,  the social consequences of forest resource use,  including the treatment of 
forest workers (wages and conditions), and the impact of forestry operations upon the health 
and  wellbeing  of forest-dependent communities are  only  indirectly  addressed.  Since these 
matters  have  been  authoritatively  addressed  elsewhere  (  e.g.,  Côté,  1999;  Hardy,  2011; 
Hughson and Bond, 1965; Lee, 2006; Legendre, 2005; Séguin, 1980), social considerations in 
this thesis have essentially  been limited to  issues that had a direct bearing on the course of 
forest resource use and the evolution of  forest governance institutions, su ch as the competing 
land  use  claims  of  settlers  and  the  employment  imperative  associated  with  regional 
development. 
1.5.3  Data Collection and Analysis 
This  study  is  based  on  primary  and  secondary  sources  of data  gathered  through 
archivai  research.  Primary  sources  of evidence  principally  included:  government  records, 
journals of the legislative assemblies and parliamentary debates, sessional papers, and legal 
notices; annual reports from appointed officiais and/or departments; transcripts from relevant 
public  and  parliamentary  committees  and  commissions;  the  proceedings  of national  and 
international forestry conferences; and period observations, commentaries or analyses drawn 
from  official correspondences, newspaper articles, pamphlets, public presentations and other 
published materials.  Secondary  sources  include analytical contributions of both  recent and 
distant  scholarship  and  commentaries  drawn  from  period  publications  and  newsprint. 
Secondary sources were primarily used to validate inferences, the interpretation of historical 
texts, and the significance of primary sources. 
The  meaning  and  evidentiary  worth  of archivai  resources  were  assessed  through 
careful consideration  of documentary  authorship,  pUI·pose,  and  context,  or as  George and 
Bennett  put  it:  "who  spoke  [or  wrote]  ta  whom,  for  wh  at  pur  pose  and  un  der  what 
circumstances" (2005, pp.  99-100, italics in  original).  As such, inferences were leveraged on 
the bases of how actors  perceived their experience and their situation. White careful  not to 
overburden the text with endless series of quotations, sufficient reference to original sources 35 
of data  is  provided  in  order to  allow  those  Jess  familiar  with  the  selected  time  periods  to 
critically judge the value and  relevance selected archivai data. The triangulation of multiple 
sources  of data  was  used  to  further  analytical  rigour  and  control  for  interpretive  biases. 
Consistency  in  the  views  expressed  by  historical  actors  - both  over  time  and  across 
geographie  space - provides  confidence  in  the  reliability  of selected data sources  and  the 
inferences  that  can  be  leveraged from  these. While  active citation  (Moravcsik, 2010)  (i.e., 
web links to online resources) was not employed in strict sense, in order to limit the length of 
footnotes, reference numbers from  the Canadian Institute for Historical  Microreproductions 
(CIHM) and  complete referencing information were  provided to  ensure the traceability  and 
reproducibility ofthe study results. 
Using  process  tracing  as  the  principal  method  of analysis,  sources  of data  were 
collated,  coded,  and  analysed  iteratively  over  a  four-year  timeframe.  To  keep  track  of 
relevant  data,  the  Institutional  Analysis  and  Development  framework  (see  Section  1.4.3 
below) was  used  to  code and  classify  rule-related  changes (E.  Ostrom  and  Basurto, 20 II), 
and  the factors affected decision-making processes in  iterative problem-solving situations.  In 
addition to the identification, validation and testing of key  causal  mechanisms,  the approach 
used provided the necessary distance to  reflect on and  refine the theoretical  propositions that 
could  best  explain  causal  process  observations.  The  search  for  a  proximate  fit  between 
empirical evidence and theoretical predictions was  used to sharpen inquiry, refine theoretical 
assomptions, and  dig deeper to  identify the underlying causal  processes  that  best explained 
available  evidence  and  the  outcome  of  interest  in  this  study.  As  su  ch,  the  foc us  on 
constitutional  choice,  as  the  primary  independent variable of interest did  not  emerge  at the 
proposai writing  stage  of this  thesis,  but  after  severa] years  of movement  back  and  forth 
between empirical evidence and  theory.  In  other words,  the  constitutional leve]  of analysis 
proposed herein was not a theoretical proposition that warranted further investigation, it is the 
investigation that led to the warrantability ofthe proposed theoretical solution. 
1.6  Statement of Argument 
This thesis argues that the evolution of forest governance institutions and the resulting 
struggle  to  develop  more  sustainable  patterns  of  forest  resource  use  in  Québec  are 
fundamentally  tied to  the constitutional choices that have  concentrated the instrumentalities 36 
of collective action  in  the hands of the provincial government. Put differently, constitutional 
rules  applicable  to  the  use  and  management  of public  forests  in  the  province  ultimately 
affected outcomes in the world by exercising a determining effect on the habits, values, ideas 
and  social  institutions  (i.e.,  variations)  that  were  selected,  replicated  and  enforced  (i.e., 
inherited) over time. In short, who makes choices and how choices are made matter. Though 
necessary for explaining the evolution of forest governance institutions in Québec, this thesis 
makes it clear that the sources of selection pressure were varied, and that factors such as the 
nature  of the  goods  involved,  the  relative  abundance  of forests,  high  enforcement  costs, 
market  pressure,  social  demands  and  emergent  social,  politicaJ,  economie  and  scientific 
paradigms  ali  weighed  heavily  in  the  use  and  management  of public  forests  over  time. 
However, how  such  problems were dealt with, what ideas, values or  interests  were  used to 
inform  decisions  at  the  collective and  operational  choice  levels  are  ali  symptomatic of the 
deeper-level  constitutional  structures  that  provided  the  primary  selection  mechanism  for 
collective choices in the province. 
As  in other Canadian jurisdictions, the power to use and dispose of natural resources in 
Québec is  derived from  a residual prerogative of the Crown that was  vested in  the executive 
go vern ment, subject to the legislative action of the Assembly (i.e., parliament- see Chapters 
IV to VI). However, in a system where the legislative and executive functions are essentially 
fused,  and  parliament  exercises  supreme  authority  over  the  instruments  of coercion,  the 
ability of the political sovereign (i.e., the electoral body and parliament more specifically) to 
constrain  or  even direct  the  actions  of the  legal  sovereign  (i.e., government)  has  arguably 
been  limited during the province's history (Chapters Ill to VII). At best, the concentration of 
rulership  prerogatives fostered  the belief that public officiais and  their advisors could solve 
the  myriad  problems  and  dilemmas  resource  users  faced  by  devising  broad  regulatory 
instruments  (Chapters  V  to  VIII).  At  worse,  it  has  provided  opportunities  and  indeed 
incentives  to  direct  the  course  of political-economic  affairs  in  favour  of more  narrowly 
construed interests, whether motivated by the concerns of government itself or the demands 
of special interests (Chapters IV to VIII). 
Empirical  evidence  drawn  from  nearly  two  centuries  of commercial  exploitation 
suggests  that  the  evolution  of forest  governance  institutions  seldom  produced  noticeable 37 
improvernents in  resource use outcomes. In spite of repeated calls for change, and a shared 
awareness of the externalities produced by  the system in  use,  th~ dominant patterns of forest 
resource exploitation have remained remarkably consistent over time.  From the progressive 
depletion  of  the  highest  to  the  !east  valued  stocks,  and  from  localized  patterns  of 
overexploitation  near  the  settlement  frontier  to  the  extensive  exploitation  of the  furthest 
regions of the boreal north, the difference between the extractive methods of the 19
111  century 
and  the  i·ndustrialized  exploitation  of the  tate  20
111  century  essentially  rests  in  the  ever 
increasing scale and intensity of forest operations. Knowledge, experience, improved mental 
models or concern for the welfare of future generations were never used to improve social-
ecological outcomes in any significant way. 
Hence, in the absence of effective constitutional safeguards, including clearly defined 
normative  boundaries,  proportional  representation,  more  inclusive  forms  of deliberation, 
and/or increased  local-leve!  authority  in  the  use  and  management of forest  resources  (see 
Chapter III  and  Conclusion), those who hold  collective-choice rights  over vast reserves of 
common-pool resources will likely face strong incentives to use such resources for their own 
benefit. Further, when no one is  sure to capture potential returns on investments, relative to 
the supply of appropriation and  provisioning costs;  when decision-makers do  not  bear the 
consequences  of their decisions;  when  the  illusion  of plenty  provides  a  pareto-improving 
rationality to social and environmental costs; or when political choices can be couched in the 
certitude  of scientific  knowledge,  resource  users  and  political  decision-makers  will  be 
inclined to  shirk their responsibilities and adopt strategies that tend to  rnaximize shoti term 
gains, rather than invest in  long term efforts that stand to benefit future generations. Without 
effectuai  constraints  on  the  actions  of government  and  related  changes  to  the  terrns  and 
conditions of collective action, efforts to improve the sustainability of forest resource use in 
Québec will  likely  remain a  struggle. In  this  sense, the development of a  robust theory of 
institutional  change that can  explain the  success  or failure  of collective  action  requires  a 
corresponding  commitment towards  the  development of a  theory  of constitutional  choice 
(Chapter  II  and  III)  th at  can  help  exp  lain  the  selection  and  replication  of institutions  in 
political-economic structures over time. 38 
Finally,  inquiry  at  the  constitutional  leve!  of analysis  embodies  theoretical  and 
empirical foundations that are ontologically and epistemologically different from other forms 
of analysis.  Following  the  work  of Vincent  Ostrom  and  James  Buchanan,  distinctions 
between the fundamental nature of social order, and the rules established within the confines 
of an  existing  order,  imply the  necessity  to  distinguish  between  empirical  (what  is)  and 
normative (what ought) forms  of inquiry. Put differently, efforts to  understand the structure 
of  the situation that affects behaviours and outcomes in the real world (i.e., empirical inquiry) 
must be complemented by normative forms of inquiry to  understand the habits, values, norms 
and  ideas  that  give  meaning  to  human  action  and  the  reasons  that campel  individuals  to 
willingly constrain there own freedom in order to achieve collectively valued ends. Arguably, 
social  dilemmas  at  the  constitutional  leve!  and  the  problematic  nature  of rule-ordered 
relationships  underlie  the  vast  majority  of social-ecological  problems  in  the  world  today. 
Solving the massive collective action problems associated with poverty, inequality, pollution, 
and  environmental  degradation  writ  large  will  not  be  achieved  in  the  absence  of more 
fondamental  changes  in  the  constitution  of rule-ordered  relationships  that  determine  who 
makes choices in society, how  these choices are made, and for who's benefit they are made. 
This  thesis  underscores  the  need  to  considerably  expand  analytical  inquiry  at  the 
constitutional leve! of analysis. 
1. 7  Thesis Contributions 
This thesis makes distinct contributions to  six different bodies of literature. First, this 
thesis contributes to existing theories of institutional change applicable to the study of social-
ecological systems by  shedding light on the complementary nature of the different strands of 
neo-institutional  scholarship.  The  thesis  argues  that  achieving  empirical  consistency  and 
explanatory  depth,  relative  to  processes  of institutional  change,  is  not  a  zero-sum  game. 
Instead of trying to substantiate the relative importance of one strand of theory over another, 
evidence suggests the need for a meta-theoretical approach that can reconcile the ontological 
differences  and  reinforce the  epistemological  similarities of social,  historical, and  rational-
choice institutionalism. Building on  recent contributions from  the  application of Darwinian 
evolutionary theory to the study of institutional change (Hodgson and Knudsen, 2006; Lewis 
and Steinmo, 20 12), Chapter II points to the need to better distinguish the different worlds of 39 
action  (Kiser and  Ostrom,  1982),  and  in  pa1ticular,  the  rules  that structure social  order in 
human societies.  In  short, whether and  how institutions change cannat be fully  appreciated 
without a  comparable commitment to understand  how  the rules of social  order  ultimately 
affect the selection and replication of institutions in a given context. 
Second,  scholarship  relevant  to  the  study  of common-pool  resources  (CPR)  and 
human-environment interactions have largely focused analytical attention on operational and 
collective-choice situations at the expense of more in-depth analyses of the underlying ru les 
of the  game.  The methodological  tendency to  assume a  fixed  situation for the  purpose of 
analysis and  the related  reluctance to investigate  second order dilemmas (i.e.,  institutional 
change) (Ostrom and  Walker ([1997]  1999, p. 435) have resulted in  a limited appreciation of 
the  constitutional  perspective.  This  thesis  seeks  to  address  this  weakness  in  the  relevant 
literature by  overtly tracing the development of Québec's forest governance  institutions and 
related  constitutional  choice  rules  from  their  inception  to  their  modern  day  situational 
outcomes. 
Third,  this  thesis  contributes to the  emerging  theory  of collective action  by  calling 
attention  to  the  temporal  contingency  of  its  underlying  assumptions  and  the  limiting 
conditionality  of constitutional  choice rules.  Following the  works  of Vincent Ostrom  and 
James Buchanan, and more recent contributions from evolutionary theorists such as Geoffrey 
Hodgson and Sven Steinmo (see Chapter II), the thesis argues that the long-term performance 
of any  social-ecological  system  is  invariably  tied  to  the  constitutional  arrangements  that 
determine  who  decides  what,  when  and  how.  In  other words,  constitutional  choice  rules 
affect social-ecological outcomes by affecting the institutional variations that may be selected 
and replicated on an iterative basis.  Whether communities are able to adapt to their changing 
circumstances large! y depends on the nature of the underlying social order and  the extent to 
which such  systems are  inclusive of the  interests of others and  responsive to  the time and 
place exigencies of social-ecological change, that is, whether or not they support institutional 
diversity. 
Fourth, historical analyses of social-ecological systems are rare and  our understanding 
of how common-pool resource institutions evolve over time and why are likewise Iimited (E. 40 
Ostrom, 2008a, p.  48; E.  Ostrom and  Walker,  [1997]  2000, p.  435;  Poteete et al.,  2010, p. 
244;  Stern et al.,  2002,  p.  477). In  fact,  most of what we know about sustainable resource 
governance stems from  the use of static analytical  tools  applied  to  the  study  of relatively 
small common property resource systems (McGinnis and Ostrom, 2008; E.  Ostrom, 2008a). 
While ideal for determining the effects of fixed operational and collective-choice ru les, such 
methods are  ill  suited for assessing the performance of constitutional choice rules.  Whether 
and  how  constitutional  choice  rules  affect  the  ability  of a  polity  to  solve  problems  and 
dilemmas  requires  a  long-term  perspective.  As  Buchanan  points  out,  constitutional 
arrangements should not be evaluated "in  terms of [their]  results  in  a  particularized choice 
situation, but in terms of[their] results over a who le sequence of  plays" ([ 1987] 2001 b, p.  72, 
emphasis in original). Greater leverage can be gained if one assumes a critical stance towards 
constitutional ru les and gives analytical attention to the patterns of results that tend to emerge 
from such systems over time (Buchanan, [1981] 2001, p.  49). In keeping with Tilly's (2006, 
p.  433) asse1tion that "every  significant political  phenomenon lives  in  history and  requires 
historically grounded analysis for its explanation" (see also North, 1990, p.  1  00; 2005, p.  51), 
this thesis follows the tradition of  inquiry set forth by North ( 1981, 1990) and others (Ba  tes et 
al.,  1998;  Eggertsson, 2005;  Greif,  2006; North and  Thomas,  1973; North and  Weingast, 
1989) to  address  existing shortfalls  in  the  literature  on  natural  resource  governance.  This 
thesis contributes to  scholarship on common-pool resources by  using comparative historical 
research methods to assess how the evolution of constitutional and collective choice rules in 
Québec structured the long-run performance of  forest resource governance in the province. 
Fifth, this  thesis contributes to  the existing literature on  Canadian forest  policy  in  a 
number of ways.  By  simply  considering the  relationship  between  rules  and  resource  use 
outcomes, the thesis breaks with most if not ail of the methods that have so far been applied 
to the study of forest resource governance in Québec and elsewhere in  Canada (see Section 
1.1.1 above). The thesis argues that institutional analysis is  an appropriate method of inquiry 
for developing testable propositions about  interactions between actors, rules,  and  resources, 
and  the  outcomes  that  are  jointly  produced.  In  doing  so,  it  rejects  the  prescriptive 
underpinnings  of the  staples  theory and the  rudimentary  assumptions of policy  analysis  to 
emphasize the  critical  roles  of structure  and  agency  in  the  development of the  Canadian 41 
constitutional experiment and provincial forest governance institutions.  By groundirig inquiry 
on  an  extensive theoretical  framework,  this  thesis  extends  the analytical  leverage  of past 
historical  contributions  by  defining  and  empirically  tracing  the  causal  influence  of a 
hypothesized  independent  variable  (i.e.,  constitutional  choice  ru les)  on  the  social  and 
ecological outcomes of the  system  of interest.  The approach  used  lies  in  contrast with  the 
descriptive  preoccupation  of "who  gets what,  when,  and  how"  that  has  do  far dominated 
social science research in Canadian forestry for more than halfa century. 
Finally,  this  thesis  contributes  to  the  existing  literature  on  Canadian  constitutional 
politics by focusing attention squarely on the arrangements that set the terms and  conditions 
of natural  resource  governance  in  the  Canadian  provincial  context.  The  thesis  helps  to 
substantiate the claims  made by  constitutional  and  political  science  scholars  regarding the 
centralising nature of Canadian government structures,  including  the dominant role of the 
executive in  deciding  the  fate of public policy  (Chapter III).  It supports  Mallory's ([1974] 
2011,  [1984]  2011)  claim  that  under majoritarian  rule,  responsible  government  is  largely 
meaningless in  Canada's  parliamentary  system. The analysis  presented herein suggests the 
existence  of causal  relationship  between  the  evolution  of natural  resource  use,  Canada's 
political economie structure, and the development of the country's constitutional choice rules 
pertaining to the distribution of legislative authority and the concentration of decision-making 
powers in  the hands of cabinet governments. 
1.8  Thesis Structure 
This thesis is organized as follows.  PartI presents the theoretical underpinnings to this 
research  in  two  distinct  chapters  (II  and  III).  Part  II  deals  with  the  origins  of forest 
governance institutions within the Canadian context and their relationship to the development 
of constitutional choice rules prior to Confederation (i.e., Chapters IV and V). Part III, begins 
by tracing the  longer-term impact of Québec's constitutional heritage in  two closely related 
chapters. The first deals with the preindustrial period of 1867 to 1910, wh  en forest operations 
were largely dominated by  the sawn  lumber  industry and  conservation ideals  were gaining 
widespread acceptance. The second focuses attention on the developments that followed the 
spread of industrialization as the main source of economie growth in the province (i.e., 1910 
to  1950.  Finally,  the  last section (Chapter VIII)  presents a  brief account of the important 42 
institutional transformations that were initiated from  1960 to 1986, which are thought to have 
triggered the major f01·estry crisis that Québec has been grappling with for nearly a decade. 
The thesis ends with a review of the key !essons learned and discusses the plausibility of the 
hypothesized  causal  relationship  between  constitutional  choices  and  the  struggle  to 
sustainably govern Québec's public forests. Emphasis is  placed on the implications of thesis 
for the future of  forest resource use in the province and the need for further scholarship on the 
constitutional levet of  analysis, both in Canada and elsewhere. 43 
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2.1  Introduction 
The quest to develop a robust theory of change is  central to the purpose of the social 
sciences.  Y et,  in  spite of the wealth of scholarship devoted to  unravelling the workings of 
change,  our ability  to  cogently  predict and  explicate  processes  and  events  that  alter  the 
conduct of hu man affairs remains a challenge (Mantzavinos et al. , 2004, p.  15). For scholars 
interested in the sustainable governance of forest resources, the importance of understanding 
the dynamics of change cannot be overemphasized. Despite evidence of a recent Juil  in  the 
pace of global deforestation (F  AO, 201  0), the diversification of  governance structures and 
broadening stakeholder involvement (Agrawal et al., 2008), concern over the impact humans 
have on the world's forests, and the goods and services these provide continues to grow (e.g., 
Bromley, 2006; Butchart et al., 2010; Foley et al.,  2005). Understandably, efforis to  achieve 
sustainable outcomes in  a rapidly changing world  represent.a constant struggle (Agrawal and 
Chhatre, 2006; Carpenter et al., 2009; Dietz et al.,  2003). However, the tools we dispose of 
for analyzing complex social-ecological systems are most strongly adapted  to  the study of 
static  situations  (E.  Ostrom,  2008).  So  although  we  may  be  able  to  better  diagnose  the 
performance of a given social-ecological system at a specifie point in ti me (E. Ostrom, 2007), 
our ability  to  explain  the  evolution of such  systems or bring  about change  in  suboptimal 
situations remains wanting. 
Yet,  as  scholarship  on  common-pool  resources  demonstrates  (e.g.,  NRC,  2002;  E. 
Ostrom,  1990;  Potee  te  et al.,  201 0),  societies  have,  everywhere  and  throughout  history, 
learned  how to  overcome collective action  problems  by  adopting norms of behaviour and 
crafting rules that support the production of public goods and avoid the development oftragic 
22  For  an  earlier version  of this  chapter,  see  Frechette, A and  N.  Lewis,  (2011)  Pushing the 
boundaries  of conventional  forest  policy  research: Analyzing  institutional  change  at  multple  levels. 
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situations (E. Ostrom, 1998). But if humans are indeed able to cooperate, solve di lem mas and 
improve joint outcomes, then why have selection processes not favoured the development of 
more  sustainable  social  units  overall?  What  factors  account  for  the  increasing  pace  of 
environmental change? And more puzzling stiJl, why environmentally harmful practices  and 
inefficient resource  regimes  are allowed  to  persist  over time  in  spite of repeated calls  for 
change and early recognition, in sorne instances, that the outcomes produced by a given set of 
arrangements are known to be unsustainable? 
As a land rich in  natural resources, Canada offers many examples of this paradoxical 
relationship.  So  pervasive  is  the  country's  dependence  on  natural  resources  that  it  has 
conditioned much of its development and subsequent political-economic order (e.g., Hessing 
et al.,  2005; Innis,  [1930]  1999; Lower,  1938,  1973;  Watkins,  1963).  And  historically,  no 
sector has had as strong an influence over the country's economie development and sense of 
self-identity as  forestry  (Drushka, 2003). Forged through more than three centuries of close 
interaction, the conversion and exploitation of Canada's forests began in the east in  response 
to  settlement and European demand for ship masts, naval stores, and rough-hewn timber of 
various  shapes  and  sizes  (Albion,  [1926]  1965;  Lower,  1973).  But  with  the  shift  from 
mercantilism  to  free  tracte  in  the  mid  nineteenth  century,  the  Corn  Laws  and  differentiai 
tariffs that had spurred the transatlantic timber tracte were abolished and attention irrevocably 
shifted southwards to the United States and  its  rapidly expanding economy (Lower,  1938). 
By the turn of the twentieth century, the pines and hardwoods ofthe eastern provinces had ali 
but been exhausted, the exploitation of western timber was weil  underway, and the new and 
Jess  discriminating  pulp  and  chapter  industry  was  poised  to  take  advantage  of the  yet 
untapped  boreal  forest.  Today,  even  though  the  productive  capacity  of Canada's  forest 
industries is  more varied than it  ever was in the past, the sector remains heavily dependent 
upon foreign commodity markets and the eco  nom ic health of key trading partners such as the 
United-States.  So  although  forestry  remains  a  leading  contributor to  Canada's  economie 
development and positive tracte balance, the recent collapse of the American housing market 
combined with falling demand for newsprint and increasing competition from  alternate and 
often  cheaper  sources  of supply  have  produced  sluggish  economie  conditions  with  no 
immediate signs of relief. 61 
In  spite of such  setbacks,  Canada nevertheless  continues  to  be  ranked  amongst the 
world's top producers of forest products (FAO, 201 0) and throughout most of its history, the 
forest sector was consistently regarded as  the country's largest industry and most important 
employer (Howlett, 2001 b,  p.3). Y  et, mu ch of this success rested on po licy interventions and 
management strategies  that were  known  to. be  inefficient if not outright unsustainable  for 
almost as  long  a  period  of time (Frechette, 2009).  The question  this  raises  is  why?  What 
factors  can  possibly  account for  the  persistence  and  maintenance of suboptimal  resource 
governance institutions over time? 
Over 90% of Canada's forests  are  held  under public  property  arrangements,  and  in 
conformity  with  its  constitutional  foundations,  the  provinces  hold  jurisdictional  authority 
over most of these areas  (La Forest,  1969).  While  such  powers were  initially  intended  to 
serve the revenue generating needs of provincial governments and the subsequent provision 
of public goods (Ibid.), the granting of  judicially acknowledged unitary control over any vast 
storehouse of natural resources inevitably creates opportunities and incentives for the pursuit 
of more narrowly construed interests (e.g., Ascher, 1999; Eggertsson, 2005). And in a context 
where  provincial  executives effectively  dominate the policy-making process,  including the 
raising of revenues and the allocation of resources (White, 2006, pp. 256-257), the result is  a 
monocentric system of governance that can only  be  altered  via periodic elections wherein 
every political formation faces strong incentives to  maintain the privileges of the office they 
seek  (Sproule-Jones,  1984).  So  although  the  allocation  of  resource  rights  (tenure 
arrangements) and the details  of policy  initiatives tend  to  differ from  one province to  the 
next, ali  have followed a similar path of experimentation (Howlett and Rayner, 1995). From a 
poorly  regulated  system  of exploitation  to  revenue  generation,  conservation,  intensive 
management  (maximum  sustainable  yield)  and  the  more  recent  shift  towards  ecosystem 
management, the policies that have so far been adopted by Canada's provinces and territories 
owe  their  uniformity  to  their  common  institutional  heritage  and  the  problems  that  flow 
therefrom  (Howlett and Rayner, 2001). The dynamics of Canadian forest  policy  have thus 
tended  to  evolve  in  response  to  (i)  the  increasing  needs  of  industry  and  consequent 
dissipation  of resource  rents;  (ii)  government  attempts  to  fulfill  regional  development 
priorities  and  the  corresponding  push  by  labour to obtain  more favourable conditions;  (iii) 62 
criticism  of  inefficient  and  unsustainable  resource  use  by  civil  society  and  periodic 
parliamentary commissions; and (iv) the choice-limiting constraints of past policy decisions 
and  sunk  costs  on  the  range  of alternatives  that  could  effectively  be  considered  (Ibid; 
Frechette, 2009). 
Using the evolution of forest resource management in Canada as a backdrop for further 
investigation,  this  chapter attempts to  provide sorne  generalizable answers  to  the  complex 
issue of change in  centrally governed natural  resource systems. The focus  here rests on the 
congruence of neo-institutional  theories to  existing empirical evidence in  an  effort to assess 
the  explanatory  leverage  of  the  three  most  commonly  discussed  approaches  to 
institutionalism (i.e., rational choice, historical and sociological institutionalism). So although 
the emphasis is first and  foremost theoretical, the chapter has strong empirical  implications 
for  the  analyses of change  in  resource-dependent  political-economic structures.  In  a  field 
dominated by  authoritative scholarship on the distinctive attributes of the different strands of 
institutionalism (see Peters and Pierre, 2007), this chapter contributes to the existing literature 
in  three  important  ways.  First,  it  provides  a  critical  assessment  of institutional  theories 
applicable  to  the  complex  problem  of change  (i.e.,  collective  action)  in  common-pool 
resource dilemma situations, particularly as they apply to centralized public property regimes. 
Second, it suggests that the insights that can be drawn from the different institutional theories 
are not only complementary to each other, but are in fact mutually necessary for developing a 
robust theory of change in common-pool resource settings. Finally, it argues that in  order to 
fully  appreciate the nature of persistent dilemma situations, political scientists and  resource 
economists  need  to  push  the  boundaries  of  their  conventional  foci  to  consider  the 
constitutional foundations of  the collective action problems they face. 
The structure of this chapter is  as  follows. After this  introduction,  basic conceptual 
elements  will  be  discussed  with  a  particular focus  on  the  nature  of change  itself and  its 
implications  for  analytical  inquiry.  This  will  be  followed  by  a  succinct  review  of neo-
institutional contributions to  the study of change. The chapter concludes with a cali to move 
beyond the analytical limitations of  the rules of the game. If one is interested in changing not 
only the ru les, but also the very nature of the game, then one needs to pay attention to  how 
the  latter  is  structured.  In  other words,  one  needs  to  look  at the  constitutional  rules  that 63 
condition the distribution of power and set the framework for collective action. Drawing on 
insights from  recent scholarship on evolutionary theory, the findings of this chapter suggests 
that constitutional choices stand to affect the world of  action- a polity's adaptive response to 
changing social and environmental conditions - by  exercising a decisive influence over the 
institutions that may ultimately be considered, selected, and replicated. 
2.2  The Nature of Change 
Change is  used by social scientists to exp lain a wide range of phenomena. It can imply 
either (i)  a  shift in  the  ideas,  values  and  beliefs  that lend  meaning to  a  social,  political  or 
economie order; (ii) changes in  the strategies resource users adopt within a fixed set of rules; 
iii) a modification of the institutional arrangements that condition action; or (iv) a functional 
redirection of po licy or institutional regime to either correct an undesirable outcome or favour 
an alternative end. Within the context of this study, institutional change is  used to signify any 
alteration to the rules that structure interactive situations.  Such modifications may affect the 
set of participants  within  an  action  situation,  the  positions  they  occupy,  the  strategies  or 
actions that are available to them, the  control they exercise over outcomes, the information 
they possess or must provide, and the payoffs (costs or benefits) associated with allowable, 
required or forbidden actions (E. Ostrom, 1986, 1999). Understanding where rules come from 
and  how  they  change is  key  to  understanding  the  incentives actors' face,  the choices they 
make,  and  the  consequences  that  follow.  For  "[o]ne  cannot  improve  outcomes  without 
knowing  how  the  structure  is  itself  produced"  (E.  Ostrom,  2005b,  p.  18,  following 
Eggertsson, 2005). 
Institutions are widely  regarded as  enduring regularities of human interaction that are 
difficult to  change (Mahoney and  Thelen,  2009,  p.  4).  Once produced,  rules  may  become 
entrenched  for  a  number of reasons.  First,  institutional  change  is  itself a  rule-dependent 
pro cess.  As  Ostrom  (1990,  p. 51)  put it, "Ali  ru les  are nested  in  another set of ru les  th  at 
defi ne how the first set of rules can be changed". What appropriators must, must not, or may 
do within an operational situation is defined by a hierarchical structure of rules wherein: (1) 
operational actions are structured  by  operational rules, (2) operational  rules are determined 
within  a  collective-choice  arena that  is  itself bounded  by  collective-choice  rules,  and  (3) 
collective-choice rules are crafted within a constitutional setting regulated by  constitutional-64 
leve!  rules (E.  Ostrom, 2005b, pp.  214-215). Efforts to  change institutions at any one leve! 
are thus  limited  by  the rules occurring at deeper levels  and "changes in  deeper-level  rules 
usually are more difficult and more costly to accomplish" (Ostrom, 1990, p.  52). 
Second,  institutions  within  any  political-economy are  linked  not only  vertically,  but 
also horizontally across existing sets of rules (Young, 2002) and  other organized forms  of 
behaviour (Crozier and Friedberg,  1977; North, 1990). Once established, institutions begin to 
affect the strategies,  investment decisions  and  the  policy  choices  actors make at multiple 
levels  of  interaction,  leading  to  a  complex  web  of  inter-dependent  arrangements  and 
parametric variables that ultimately render change costly and difficult to achieve. 
Third, if initial  policy choices generate increasing returns to their proponents, a self-
reinforcing pattern of policy  decisions  may  emerge and  affect the  long-run  path of future 
political and economie decisions (North,  1990, p.  95; Pierson, 2004). Obviously, the idea of 
path  dependence  does  not  preclude the  possibility of change.  Rather,  it  suggests  that the 
payoffs associated with initial policy choices may generate dominant strategies that make the 
adoprion of alternative pathways increasingly costly over ti me. And si nee institutions and the 
rules for making rules are prone to capture by those who hold power (Bromley, 2006; Knight, 
1992; North, 1981 , 1990, 1994; Powell and DiMaggio, 1991; Schmid, 2004), beneficiaries of 
the  resulting payoff structure will  likewise face strong incentives to  perpetuate the existing 
framework,  thus  locking-in  those  arrangements  that favour  their  interests  (Pierson,  2004; 
Pierson and Skocpol, 2002). 
Fourth,  if a  pool  of resources  is  relatively  abundant,  appropriators  will  have  little 
incentive  to  organize  themselves  to  develop  costly  institutional  arrangements  (Ostrom, 
2005b,  p.  247;  Poteete et al.,  2010).  When  the  costs  of providing and  enforcing resource 
institutions exceed the foreseeable gains of existing conditions, few  will  want to  invest the 
ti me and effort required to establish new sets of rules. Obviously, this may change over ti me 
as resources become less plentiful  and the benefits of maintenance activities become clearer. 
Finally,  given  that  institutions  allow  actors  to  reduce  uncertainties,  strengthen 
expectations  and  limit  transaction  costs  (Not1h,  1990;  Ostrom,  1990),  any  change  that 
threatens to deviate from the status quo- in a non-pareto fashion- runs the risk of attracting 65 
substantial opposition. But even if actors agree on the necessity of change, they will still need 
to overcome the potential for second order dilemma situations (E. Ostrom, 1990; Yamagishi, 
1988).  As  in  the  original  problem  situation,  some actors  may  be compelled  to  shirk their 
responsibilities towards the provision, maintenance, and enforcement of institutional changes 
and th us  li mit the overall effectiveness of the required collective effort. 
In  spite  of such  overarching  arguments,  there  is  yet  a  strong  contention  amongst 
scholars of the commons that individuals acting in  interdependent situations will  generally 
fee!  compelled to improve their circumstances and "find better solutions to their problems if 
they  can" (E.  Ostrom,  1990,  p.  34, emphasis added). But whether or not individuals "can" 
undertake such actions represents a critical issue. For although resource use outcomes tend to 
be context specifie and  cannot be attributed to  any  single set of variables (Agrawal, 2001; 
Agrawal and Chhatre, 2006; E.  Ostrom, 2007), the ability of actors have to actually change 
the  structure of their situation  is  conditioned  by  a  much  narrower  range  of elements  (E. 
Ostrom,  1986,  1999; E. Ostrom et al.,  1994). As  Ostrom and Walker ([1997] 2000, p.  435) 
summarize,  actors  facing  common-pool  resource  dilemmas  can  extricate  themselves  from 
such  collective action  problems  in  one of two  ways:  1)  participants  can  agree on  a joint 
strategy to reduce their aggregate impact within the constraints of a given set of operational 
rules;  or 2) they  may  decide  to  shift levels  of analysis  (action)  to  a  collective-choice or 
constitutional arena in  order to  change the constraints and opportunities associated with an 
operational  or collective-choice situation  (see also  E.  Ostrom, 2005b,  pp.  62-64).  In  other 
words,  the  ability  of resource  users  to collectively  resolve  appropriation and  provisioning 
problems
23  is  constrained  by  the  structure  of the  situation  they  face  (including  both 
institutional and parametric variables), and ultimately, the rules for changing rules (E. Ostrom 
et al., 1994, pp. 327-328). Mu  ch of the optimism underlying common-pool res ource theory is 
based on the hypothesis that if appropriators share some basic endowments, are able to devise 
and enforce their own rules and adapt these to  their changing circumstances, then they will 
also  be  more  apt to  improve joint outcomes  (E.  Ostrom,  2007;  Poteete  et  al.,  2010).  If, 
however,  the  situation  is  characterised  by  a  centralized  regime  wherein  users  have  fewer 
23  As detailed in E. Ostrom et al., (1994, pp. 9-15), appropriation problems concem the flow and  distribution of resource units 
over  time,  whereas  provisioning  problems  concern  the  relationship  between  system  productivity  and  the  means  used  to 
maintain or enhance such capacities over ti me. 66 
incentives  to  invest  time  and  resources  into  solving  potential  resource  problems,  not  to 
mention  the absence of any  legal  authority  to  create  new  rules,  how  then  do  institutions 
evolve to  reflect the  changing conditions of the  underlying  social-ecological  system? The 
remainder of this article attempts to provide some answers to this broad question. 
2.3  Understanding Institutional Change 
Efforts  to  understand  and explain  institutional  change are  central  to  theories of the 
policy  process  (Sabatier,  2007),  and  lie  at  the  core  of a  growing  body  of research  that 
includes contributions from ali the different strands of institutionalism. This study attempts to 
derive  theoretical  insights  from  the  three  major  traditions  of  institutionalism,  namely 
sociological, rational choice and historical  institutionalism (see Hall  and Taylor,  1996). The 
enduring nature of institutions and the challenges associated with institutional change suggest 
that amendments  to  the  rules  and  incentives  that  structure  action  situations  are  likely  to 
proceed in an overwhelmingly incrementai fashion (Mahoney and Thelen, 2009; N01th, 1994, 
p.  6).  For the most part, theories of institutional change adhere to evolutionary patterns that 
are  either  graduai  in  nature  (Currie  et  al.,  2010;  Vanberg,  1992,  1994),  or  marked  by 
punctuated-equilibria  (Baumgartner  and  Jones,  2009)  wherein  long  periods  of relative 
stability (susceptible to incrementai change) are interspersed by briefperiods of major reform 
(Lewis and Steinmo, 20 12; Mahoney and Thel  en, 2009).  Where the theories differ is  in  the 
causal elements that scholars use to explain policy outcomes. 
2.3.1  Rational Choice Institutionalism 
For rational-choiêe institutionalism, change during periods of relative stability tends to 
occur at the margins of existing rule structures (North, 1990, 1994). Changes are determined 
by the relative bargaining power of political and economie entrepreneurs, and their resulting 
efforts to increase economie efficiency, reduce transaction costs and achieve pareto improved 
outcomes (Ibid).  The demand  for efficiency-improving institutional  change  is  believed to 
emerge from  "the recognition that existing arrangements  leave potential  gains uncaptured" 
(Feeny,  1993, p.  176; No1th,  1990). Likewise, the demand for change can also emerge from 
entrepreneurs  who  apprehend  probable  loses  from  an  existing  or  proposed  institutional 
structure  (North,  1994,  p.  5).  Change  within  the  equilibrium  model  of new  institutional 67 
economies  is  closely  aligned  to  the  choice-theoretic  approach  of neoclassical  economie 
theory, which considers the utility-maximizing choices that individuals or organizations make 
within a given set of constraints (Jbid).
24  ln short, institutions create incentives and incentives 
condition the strategies actors adopt in  interdependent or competitive situations. At the core 
of this mode! rests the notion that individual perceptions of costs and benefits are the sources 
of action that lead to institutional change (North, 1994; E. Ostrom, 2005b). If the transaction 
costs associated  with  change exceed the  incentives  to  do so,  policy  actors  are  unlikely  to 
invest the ti me and resources needed to change existing rules or create new ones (Ibid). 
While endogenous sources of change may yield predictable outcomes in  self-governed 
systems,  they  do  not provide as  strong a  rationale  for  explaining sustainability  enhancing 
change in a centrally governed public property regime. As such, choice-theoretic models may 
be consistent with  demand-side changes for greater harvesting rights,  the  redistribution of 
potential  gains  or  reductions  in  transaction  costs,  but  they  do  not  provide  empirically 
grounded  explanations  for  the  adoption  of rules  that  would  reduce  aggregate  levels  of 
consumption or impose  user contributions towards  the  maintenance of a  resource system. 
Further,  in  a  dynamic  environment  where  each  actor  seeks  to  maximize  his  or  her 
preferences, public choice theory suggests that state representatives also play a strategie role 
in  selecting and maintaining governance institutions that are consistent with  their  political 
economie interests, as opposed to the broader public interest (Buchanan and Tullock, 1962). 
As  demonstrated  by  the  relatively  impermeable  relationship  that  has  evolved  between 
Canadian governments and forest industries (Howlett and Rayner, 2001 ),  the capability and 
willingness of political  elites to  provide new arrangements or change existing sets of rules 
may  be  limited  by  interests  that  are  not  necessarily  consistent  with  the  plausible  social 
optima. For as Feeny ( 1993, pp.  184-187) points out, the supply of institutional change by the 
prevailing  political-economic  order  ultimately  depends  on  the  "expected  net  benefits  to 
powerful  elite  decision  makers  who  exercise  positions  of domina,nce".  And  given  that 
resource regimes within developed political-economies are but part of a broader institutional 
matrix,  the  complementarities,  economies  of scope  and  network  externalities  that emerge 
from  such  institutional  interdependencies  can  render change difficult  if not  impossible to 
u  As  North  emphasizes, utility maximization  is  simply  a  proxy  for  the  pursuit  of a functional objective, something  that an 
individual, group or firm seeks to achieve (sec North, 1994, p. 3). 68 
achieve (Deeg,  2007;  North,  1994;  Young,  2002). The reason, North  argues,  is  that once 
institutions are established, they  "typically bias costs and  benefits  in  favour of choices that 
are consistent with the existing framework. The Iarger the number of rule changes, ceterus 
paribus, the greater the number of Iosers and hence opposition" (1994, p. 6). 
Y  et, in  spi te of  the numero us  barri ers to change and our assumption th at appropriators 
within public-property resource regimes are unlikely to pressure governments to reduce their 
harvesting rights or organize themselves to solve resource maintenance problems for which 
they have no jurisdiction (see  above), recent scholarship suggests that both endogenous and 
exogenous  variables  can  play  key  roles  in  overcoming  such  gridlocks.  Given  the  basic 
premise that institutions develop and persist when the benefits they produce exceed the costs 
associated with their creation and maintenance (North, 1990), it  follows that any shift in the 
cost-benefit ratios actors  use  to  determine their choice of strategies will  Iikely  result in  the 
demand or supply of alternative arrangements. The exogenous variables
25  that stand to affect 
such a rule change calculus  include the relative  priee structure of a given situation (North, 
1994);  changes  in  social,  political  or  economie  circumstances;  the  shifting  attributes  of 
communities  wherein  resource  users  operate;  and  changes  in  the  productive  attributes  of 
resource  systems  (E.  Ostrom,  2005b,  2007).  Endogenous  sources of change,  on the other 
hand,  tend  to  be  associated  with  shifts  in  the  ideological  constructs  actors  use  to  make 
decisions,  including  the  mental  models  actors  use  to  cope  with  uncertainty,  complexity 
(Denzau and North,  1994; Eggertsson, 2005; North,  1990), or socially warranted norms of 
behaviour  (Ostrom,  2009).  Values,  ideas  and  beliefs  within  any  polity  are  continually 
changing  (Vanberg,  1992)  and  thus  affect  the  behaviour of economie  agents  by  altering 
preferences, the set of available choices, and ultimately, market conditions themselves (i.e., 
transaction costs and  relative priee changes  initiated by  the shifting values and demands of 
consumers)  (Eggertsson,  2005;  North,  1990;  Schrnid,  2004).  Considered  more  broadly, 
endogenous sources of change are those that result from the development of informai rules or 
norms  of behaviour  that  yield  higher  joint  payoffs  (Schmid,  2004).  As  the  increasing 
relevance of certification schemes amply demonstrate (Agrawal et al., 2008), if priee signais 
25  Obviously, the extent to which such factors are considered exogenous to a situation is debatable. While the influence of the 
broader  social, political and  economie  environment may  be  considered external for the  purpose of  analysis, changes in  the 
attributes  of communities  or the productive  potential  of resource  systems  are  more  likely  to  result  from  the  actions  and 
decisions of actors them selves than the influence of external elements. 69 
shi ft in favour of th ose who are able to certify the sustainable and socially responsible nature 
oftheir operations, it follows that to remain competitive and maintain market shares, it is  the 
industry as whole that will be compelled to change (Auld et al., 2008). 
2.3.2  Historical Institutionalism 
Historical  institutionalism  is  grounded  in  the  belief that  history  matters.  As  North 
states, "We cannot understand today's choices  ... without tracing the incrementai evolution 
of institutions"  ( 1990,  p.  1  00).  Si mi !arly  to  rational-choice, historical  institutional ists  posit 
that  change  results  from  evolutionary  processes  marked  by  the  accumulation  of gradua! 
change,  which intime may produce substantial transformations (e.g., Pierson, 2004; Pierson 
and Skocpol, 2002; Streeck and Thelen, 2005).  Emphasis is placed on the dynamic nature of 
collective  choice  arenas  including  the  actors  involved  in  subsequent  rounds  of decision-
making, the evolving state of preferences and  power dynamics, the information that is  made 
available, and the values,  ideas and interests that animate action (Pierson, 2004). Historical 
institutionalism argues the need to differentiate  between the  rules  in  use, at any  particular 
moment  in  time,  and  how  such  rules  are  interpreted  over  time.  As  in  rational  choice 
institutionalism,  change  is  considered  more  likely  at the  margins  of existing  institutional 
structures,  where  confrontations  to  novel  situations  create  opportunities  for  alternative 
interpretations  or applications  of existing  rules  (North,  1990;  Streeck  and  Thelen,  2005). 
However,  change  rarely  strays  far  away  from  previously  settled  choices.  As  such,  this 
approach gives  a  determining but non-detenninistic role  to  institutional  legacies  and their 
effects on future policy-decision via the development of path dependencies (Pierson, 2000; 
2004). By directing the investments actors make within a given political or economie context, 
rules  may  generate  positive  feedbacks  that yield  increasing  returns  for  their  proponents, 
reinforce selected pathways and limit the scope of allowable action in  future settings (North, 
1990; Pierson, 2004; Pierson and Skocpol, 2002; Thelen, 2003). Consequently, the political-
economic structure that develops in response to a given institutional matrix will typically bias 
future  policy  decisions  in  favour  of previously  established  arrangements  (North,  1994, 
Thelen, 2003), thus limiting any change that could potentially alter the existing distribution of 
benefits or generate additional costs (North,  1990). Drawing on the work of Arthur (1994  ), 
historical  institutionalists  posit  that investments  made in  light of a  given  social technology 70 
may result in a "lock-in" effect that can perpetuate an established order regardless of its long-
run  efficiency  or  effectiveness.  As  such,  technological  developments  and  investment 
decisions  both  affect and  are  affected  by  the  long  run  path of collective-choice rules  (i.e., 
policies) (North, 1990; Pierson, 2000). 
Historical  theorists  recognize  exogenous  shocks,  and  endogenous  power  and 
distributional motives as sources of institutional change (Mahoney and Thelen, 2009; Thel en, 
2003).  Similar  to  the  work  on  advocacy  coalitions  (Sabatier  and  Jenkins-Smith,  1993; 
Sabatier and Weible, 2007), change is attributed to political manoeuvring amongst competing 
interest groups (Pierson, 2004) and shifts in  the underlying balance of power (Mahoney and 
Thelen, 2009). Institutions are believed to evolve in  response to  the choices made at critical 
junctures or nodes of decision-making,  the investment strategies actors adopt, and the long 
run  path of positive feedbacks generated by  this repeated sequence of events (Capoccia and 
Kelemen, 2007; Pierson, 2004). As a result, emphasis is  placed on the emerging patterns of 
change (e.g., see Mahoney and Thelen, 2009;  Pierson, 2004; Thelen, 2003), which help to 
explain how change proceeds but not why it necessarily occurs or fails to do so.  As Thelen 
(2003, p.  37) concedes, "the factors  or conditions that faci1itate  different modes of change" 
within historical institutionalism remain a "crucial frontier." If  historical analysis provides a 
useful vantage point for assessing the effects of positive returns and past policy decisions on 
institutional  change and  stability  over time,  it  does  so  at the expense of a  more thorough 
investigation of  the capacity actors have to actually change the structure oftheir situation and 
solve the collective action problems they face. In other words, the micro-situational variables 
that affect individual behaviours and cooperative outcomes in  collective action dilemmas are 
largely  le ft  unexamined  (Pote  ete  et al.,  2010,  pp.  228-232;  see  also  Powell  and  Co1yvas, 
2008). 
Nevertheless, insights drawn from historical institutionalism are useful for appreciating 
the overriding effects of time on institutional development and the constraints that positive 
feedbacks  exercise over future  policy  decisions.  As contributions to the study of Canadian 
forest  resource  po licy  reveal  (Howlett,  2001;  e.g.,  Lower,  1938;  Lower,  1973;  Minville, 
1944;  Ross,  1995),  the  evolution  of resource  institutions  within  the  various  Canadian 
jurisdictions  are  broadly  consistent  with  the  analytica1  insights  posited  by  historical 71 
institutionalists.  From  the  rents  generated  through  the  adoption  of  licensed  tenure 
arrangements in the early  1800s to the expansion of industrial processing facilities throughout 
much  of the  20
111  century,  the  cascading  effects  of past  policy  decisions  have  largely 
conditioned, if not constrained, the degree of freedom  that could  be exercised by  successive 
governments (Howlett and  Rayner, 2001). However, as I argue in  the concluding thoughts to 
this  chapter, the  effects  of positive  returns  on  the  change  calculus  of succeeding  resource 
management authorities is but symptomatic ofstill deeper-level constraints. For although past 
policy  decisions  may  generate  positive  returns  that  ostensibly  limit the  scope  of allowable 
action  in  future  settings,  they  do  so  because  the  constitutional  rules  for  making  rules 
consistently confront the  same class of actors  to  similar sets of prerogatives and  incentives, 
thus  locking-in a situational structure that supports the interests of those who  have access to 
power. 
2.3 .3  Sociological (Organisational) Institutional ism 
In  contrast to  rational chqice and historical  institutionalism, sociological contributions 
to  the  study  of institutions  and  their  effects  on  human  behaviour rely  on  a much  broader 
interpretation of institutional  concepts.  In  addition to  commonly adopted  definitions, which 
posit  institutions  as  formai and  informai  rules,  norms  or  shared  strategies  that  individuals 
adopt  in  interdependent and  repetitive  situations  (E.  Ostrom, 2005b ),  sociological  theorists 
place  added  emphasis  on  the  normative  and  culturally  significant  attributes  of rules  as 
symbols, cognitive schemata, social scripts or moral  templates (Jepperson,  1991) that frame 
meaning  and  guide  human  action  (Hall  and  Taylor,  1996,  p.  14).  Institutions  within  a 
sociological context may  thus  be regarded as  "structuring structures" or "systems of durable 
dispositions" (Bourdieu, 1977, p.  72) that provide the "enduring solidarities" through which 
individuals  construct the  world  and  give  it  meaning  (Bourdieu, 2000,  p.  142).  Institutions 
frame  not  only  the  cultural  mores  of a  given  socio-organizational  environment  (i.e.,  the 
values and  norms that are  deemed appropriate), they  also codify the cognitive or functional 
processes  (i.e.,  mental  models,  habits,  and  routines)  ac tors  use  to  structure  organized 
interactions  (Campbell,  2004).  In  this  sense,  they  offer  "inter-subjectively  understood 
schemas about [the]  formai  and  informai rules of behaviour" that tell  individuals what to  do 
in various situations (Lewis and Steinmo, 2012, p. 333) 72 
Sociological  accounts of institutional  change  likewise  rely  on  path  dependence  and 
incrementai  or punctuated models to explain change. What distinguishes it from  competing 
strands  of institutionalism  is  that change  has  neither  an  efficiency  enhancing  nor  utility 
maximizing  end  (March  and  Olsen,  1989).  In  contrast  to  the  "logic  of instrumentality" 
associated with rational-choice approaches, sociological institutionalists posit that individuals 
and  organizations are  primarily  motivated  by  a  "logic  of social  appropriateness"  whereby 
efforts  to  enhance  social  legitimacy  serves  as  the  primary  motive  for  change  (Campbell, 
2004).  In  other words,  individuals  and  organizations "seek to  conform  [themselves]  to  the 
culturally  appropriate  scripts,  schema,  and  organizational  models  in  their  environment" 
(Campbell, 2004, p. 19), even though such changes may potentially be counterproductive to 
the achievement of the latter's formai  goals (Hall and Taylor,  1996).  Institutional change is 
thus considered isomorphic in  nature and  regulated by processes of diffusion that Campbell 
(2004, p.  21)  summarizes  as  follows: 1) mimetic processes whereby organizations in  search 
of  higher  levels  of  performance  adopt  the  practices  of  other,  apparent! y· successful, 
organizations; 2) normative processes in  which organizationalleaders are professionalized to 
share similar views on what constitutes appropriate organizational practices; and 3) coercive 
processes  where  organizations  are  pressured  by  their  broader  socio-organizational 
environment  to  adopt  or  conform  themselves  to  certain  institutionalized  standards. 
Accordingly, institutions are believed to evolve in  response to the diffusion of rules, norms, 
cultural  values,  and  mental  models  across  the  permeable  fabric  of social-organizational 
structures,  as  weil  as  the  adaptive  demands  that  dynamic  social-ecological  environments 
place upon organized action. Sociological institutionalism helps to understand how emergent 
ideas, values and  beliefs gain currency within a given setting (or may be stifled by even more 
entrenched  paradigms) and  how these may  eventually  become  replicated  and codified into 
social  or organizational  norms.  Specifically,  it  provides  theoretical  insights  for  analyzing 
processes associated with social  learning and change. 
The historical pattern of forest po  licy reform within the Canadian context is correlated 
to changes in the social values, ideas, and beliefs that lend meaning to political action and the 
adoption of management paradigms that offered tentative solutions to the problems that each 
of the provinces  faced  (Howlett and  Rayner, 2001 ).  Broad scale  application of conservation 73 
policies  at  the  turn  of the  20th  century and  the  subsequent endorsement of the  'maximum 
sustainable yield'  paradigm as the revised management optimum in the ensuing decades both 
corresponded to socially and scientifically endorsed mental constructs that evolved over time 
to  affect provincial forest  policy  discourse  and  the  regulatory  strategies that were adopted 
(Howlett and  Rayner,  1995, 2001). However, the replication of institutions  is  never perfect. 
Socially driven ideas are inherently malleable concepts and their interpretation may vary over 
time  and  across  levels  of interaction.  What  version,  portion  or  aspect  of an  idea  gets 
transmitted within a given socio-political environment, and what variation or part of these do 
recipients  actually  learn,  use  and  adapt to  suit  their  circ~mstances and  make  choices  in 
interdependent situations  represent a  complex  puzzle.  As  contemporary  debates  in  global 
forest policy discussions arguably demonstrate, what constitutes sustainable resource use and 
what  implications  this  has  in  terms  of  distributional  equity  (e.g.,  resource  rights), 
management strategies  such  as  those  based  on  ecosystem  approaches,  or  calls  for  more 
inclusive  governance  structures  (e.g.,  public  participation,  decentralization,  third-party 
certification) cannot be answered by any one specifie set of ideas (see E.  Ostrom, 2007). But 
as the shortcomings of the Canadian conservation movement illustrated nearly one hundred 
years ago, resource policies can  always be adapted to  emerging sets  of ideas, symbols and 
social scripts without ever real! y changing the fundamental structure of  the situation affecting 
resource use outcomes (see Chapters VI and VII, as weil as Gillis and Roach, 1986; Hodgins 
et al., 1982; Minville, 1944). And as  more recent efforts to integrate sustainability concerns 
within Canadian forest policies have shown, provincial governments were quick to embrace 
the  sustainable  developmem paradigm  of the  1980s  and  to  exploit  the  vagaries  of an 
emergent ecosystem-based approach in the 1990s (Howlett and Rayner, 2001 ; Wilson, 2001 ), 
without ever really  committing themselves to anything  more than figurative changes in  the 
preambles of their respective legislations (Boyd, 2003). How such strategies will  evolve in 
response to the growing wealth of scholarship on su  ch things as ecos  y stem management (  e.g., 
Gauthier  et  al.,  2009)  remains  to  be  seen?
6  Fortunately,  changes  in  the  general  values, 
attitudes and beliefs of consumers are afoot (Goleman, 2009) and have si nee made it possible 
for  a  number of NGO and  industry-led  initiatives  to  bypass  the  more  arduous  channel  of 
26 Quebec's Sustainable Forest Development Act, Bill  57 (L.Q., 2010, chapter 3) marks a significant  change  of policy in this 
respect. The  Act effectively  places  ecosystem-based  management front  and  center.  Whether and  how  these  new  rules  are 
applied and cnforced should become clearer after April 2013, when the new law is scheduled to come into effect. 74 
formai  policy  dialogue  to  develop  non-state  market-driven  institutions  that  are  proving 
themselves to be effective instruments of  change (Auld et al., 2008; Cashore et al., 2004). 
2.4  Extending the Search for Plausible Answers 
Taken  individually,  the  three  strands  of institutionalism  offer  distinct  ontological 
pathways  for  understanding  how  different  subsets  of factors  can  affect  the  prospects  of 
change in public resource governance institutions. Each provides insights that are consistent 
with  observations  drawn  from  the  relevant  literature,  but  as  our  analysis  reveals,  their 
respective  strengths  also  contain  the  seeds  of  their  limitations.  Factors  such  as  the 
maximization of potential  gains, transaction costs,  power structures, positive feedbacks, or · 
shifts in  the values and  beliefs of society may be consistent with a number of situations but 
cannat possibly explain ali  situations, nor can they  independently account for ali  aspects of 
change  (or  Jack  thereof)  within  a  given  situation.  Put  simply,  the  regularities  of human 
behaviour cannat be  explained without complementary sets of theories (E.  Ostrom, 2005a, 
pp.  819-820). Further, just as  no  one body of theory  can fully  explain the performance of 
social-ecological systems over time, no single leve! of analysis can reasonably suffice in  the 
conduct of the same exercise. lnstitutional change is al ways conditioned by multiple levels of 
interaction  (E.  Ostrom,  2005b,  2007)  and  selection  (Blyth  et  al.,  2011 ;  Hodgson  and 
Knudsen,  201 0;  Lewis  and  Steinmo,  20 12).  ln  short,  the  quest  to  develop  plausible 
explanations  to  the  frailty  of human  undertakings  in  interdependent  situations  cannat be 
answered by restricting analytical  inquiry to a specifie theoretical lens or the  immediacy of 
rule transformation at a  particular leve!.  Rule-ordered relationships and the incentives they 
create are structured by the nature of the biophysical assets actors dispose of, the attributes of 
the community within  which they  operate,  the  formai  and  informai  rules  in  use,  available 
information,  and  the  choice  mechanisms  participants  use  to  make  decisions  in  action 
situations (Ostrom, 2005b). Failure to address the complex environment within which actions 
and decisions are nested can only lead to partial analyses and inconclusive results. 
Given that the problems associated with a social-ecological  system are specifie to the 
collective  experiment  under  consideration,  the  performance  of  specifie  institutional 
adaptations  (i.e.,  solutions)  can  only  be  assessed  in  light  of the  nature  (and  possible 
limitations) of the underlying experiment. In other words, to  understand the constraints and ~--- ~ 
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opportunities associated with change, one needs to  go  beyond the conventional theories of 
institutional  change  and  consider  the  very  foundations  of the  rules  ascribed  to  a  given 
situation.  Specifically,  one  needs  to  pay  attention  to  the  constitutional  arrangements  that 
structure social arder and frame problem solving capabilities (Sabetti et al., 2009). And since 
rules  are  always  subordinated  by  constraints  defined  at  deeper  Jevels  (Vanberg,  1994; 
Ostrom, 2005b), whether or not  individuals can effectively alter the deeper leve)  structures 
that  govern  social-ecological  interactions  depends  on  the  nature  of  the  constitutional 
arrangements that order the terms and conditions of governance (V. Ostrom, [1982]  1999, p. 
151). 
The dominant role  of provincial  governments  in  structuring forest  policy  dynamics 
within the Canadian context has generally been treated as a matter of fact rather than a matter 
of choice (e.g., Cashore and Vertinsky, 2000; Hessing et al., 2005; Howlett, 2001; Rayner et 
al.,  2001 ;  Ross,  1995;  Wilson,  1998).  As a  result,  scholars  have  been  inclined  to  restrict 
analytical  inquiry to  the  play of the  game within existing sets of rules (V. Ostrom,  [1979] 
2009, p.  15),  focusing on what Lasswell (1958) succinctly summarized as  "who gets what, 
when  and  how."  While such  a  leve)  of analysis  has  proven  useful  for  understanding  the 
general dynamics of Canadian forest po  licy issues, it offers little in  the way of guidance for 
improving collective action  Gr  solving resource  dilemmas.  Yet,  the  decision to  hand  over 
jurisdictional authority over most of Canada's natural  resources to  provincial authorities is, 
by definition, a constitutional choice. And if inquiry into the origins and development of ru les 
and their corresponding effects on operational and collective-choice situations is  to provide 
any  meaningful  insights,  then  greater  attention  will  likewise  need  to  be  given  to  the 
constitutional choices that shape the underlying structural conditions under which collective 
action and  institutional change  may  proceed. As  Edella Schlager puts  it, "to  understand  the 
patterns of arder in  a society ...  one must pay attention to constitutional choice" (2009, p. 
131). 
The pointis that "political constitutions ... have far more important implications than 
simply  constraining strategie behaviour"  in  collective  choice situations.  "If they advantage 
certain types of individuals over others ...  , then they may also have the evolutionary effects of 
shaping who wins, who Jases, who reproduces and who does not, and what we prefer"  (Biyth 76 
et al., 2011, p.  307). By drawing attention to the way ideas, values, habits, norms, and rules 
(variations)  are  selected,  replicated  and  inherited  in  complex  adaptive  social-ecological 
systems, the constitutional leve! of analysis ultimately reinforces the need to  develop causal 
narratives  that  explicitly  recognize  the  evolutionary  dimensions  of institutional  change. 
Developing  empirically  coherent  explanations  that  are  consistent  with  the  evolution  of 
complex systems requires a meta-theoretical framework, which only generalized Darwinism 
can provide (Hodgson and Knudsen, 2010, 20 12). 
2.4.1  Evolutionary Theory
27 
The idea that Darwinian evolutionary theory  can  deliver a  more cogent ontological 
framework for the study of social,  political  and economie change has  recently generated  a 
strong  revival  of earlier  propositions  by  the  likes  of Thorsten  Veblen,  John  Dewey,  and 
others (Hodgson, 2002, 2004, 2007; Hodgson and Kn'-:ldsen,  2006). Building on this earlier 
school  of  institutionalism,  emerging  scholarship  posits  that  ali  complex  systems  are 
invariably  governed  by  Darwinian  evolutionary  mechanisms  wherein  variations  may  be 
selected, replicated, and inherited over ti me (Biyth et al., 2011; Ho  !land, 1992). Further to the 
effects  of  genetic  selection  and  replication,  which  proceeds  slowly  and  almost 
imperceptively, human populations are also subject to social evolutionary change, driven by 
the acquired  inheritance and selection of norms, habits,  political  institutions and other non-
genetic replicators (Lewis and Steinmo, 2012, pp. 315-316). To understand the implications 
of social evolutionary theory, clear distinctions must be drawn between the "mechanisms of 
change" explored in  the previous sections of this chapter, and the process of change, "as a 
basic ontological  condition" of universal  Darwinism  (Ibid.  p.  319).  Essentially,  this  view 
holds  that  change  is  inherent  to  complex  adaptive  systems,  and  as  in  ali  evolutionary 
processes,  social-institutional  change  is  neither  pareto-improving  nor  self-optimizing 
(Hodgson  and  Knudsen,  2010,  2012;  Lewis  and  Steinmo,  2012).  Generalized  Darwinism 
merely suggests that a behavioral or physical trait is  more likely to survive (i.e., be inherited 
or replicated)  when those  who  hold  such  a  trait derive  a  competitive advantage  within  a 
particular  environment  (Ibid).  Such  an  advantage  may  be  short  lived,  as  when  the 
overexploitation of a forest yields measurable benefits for a generation or two, or limited in 
27  The author is  indebted to Amy Poteete for her insightful  observations on  the  need to consider evolutionary theory  in  this 
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scope,  as  111  concess10nary  land  hold  systems  that  selectively  favour  certain  subsets  of 
individuals  or  groups  (e.g.,  forest  industry)  over  the  broader  population  (e.g.,  forest 
dependent  communities  and  society  as  a  whole).  Hence,  "numerous  traits  can  survive 
simultaneously without being the optimal solution to an environmental challenge" (Lewis and 
Steinmo, 2012, p.  319). 
Institutional  change,  within  an  evolutionary  perspective,  is  thus  modulated  by  the 
human  capacity  to  generate  new  rules  and  ideas  (variation),  strategically  choose  among 
alternatives  (selection),  and  imperfectly  copy  or  implement  successful  behaviours 
(replication) (Ibid.,  p.  323).  Trial  and error leaming (E.  Ostrom,  1990,  2005b  ),  deductive 
tinkering (Beinhocker, 2006), and the imperfect replication of routines, cognitive schemas or 
habits (Hodgson and Knudsen, 2010; Lewis and Steinmo, 2012) are but sorne of the ways in 
which  variation  may  be  intf()duced  in  a  system, thus  creating the  potential  for social  and 
political  innovation.  However,  because social-ecological  systems are  inherently  complex -
contlated  by  configurai  relationships  that  make  it  nearly  impossible  to  foresee  the 
repercussions of change, humans do not have the capacity to fully  predict the consequences 
of the ir  actions (Lewis and  Steinmo,  20 12;  E.  Ostrom, 2005b  ). Outcomes are  products of 
emergent properties and  complex systems cannot be reduced to  the sum of their individual 
parts (Hodgson, 2010; Hodgson and Knudsen, 2012; Steinmo, 2010). 
Though  evolution  tends  to  proceed  rather  myopically,  selection  pressure  may  be 
endogenous,  as  when  indivjduals  attempt  to  solve  collective-action  problems  (Steinmo, 
201 0), or may be  affected by Lamarckian mechanisms of environmental selection, wherein 
exogenous factors  forcibly  affect the selection and  inheritance of adaptive traits  (Hodgson 
and  Knudsen,  2006,  pp.  12-13; Lewis and  Steinmo,  2012,  p.  321 ).  In  the  political  rea  lm, 
institutional change tends to  proceed through the selectorate (i.e., those who hold collective 
choice rights in  a given political order) (Lewis and Steinmo, 2012, p.  332). Governments, in 
other tenns, "make targeted decisions for  institutional reform, and seek artificially to shape 
social  outcomes  by  generati11g  new  mechanisms  of social  selection  in  addition  to  natural 
selection" (Ibid).  The evolution of political institutions therefore, crucially depends upon the 
selection of po licy  ideas by  decision-makers and the replication of such ideas "across other 
individuals,  organizations, aod  institutions" (Ibid.,  p.  318). As such,  constitutional  choices 78 
offer "selection  mechanisms"  for  "winnow[ing]  certain  ideas  relative to  others"  (Ibid.,  p. 
319).  While  evolutionary  theory  "does  not  privilege  the  direction of causality"  (Ibid),  it 
remains that "power holders within  regimes" effectively  play  a critical  role  in  "select[ing] 
and  direct[ing]  po  licy  ideas"  through  "iterated  variation-selection-replication  process[  es]" 
(Ibid., p.  337).  Ultimately, "different institutional  designs"  will  "structure different human 
natures," thus producing distinct evolutionary pathways (Blyth et al., 2011, p.  307). 
Viewed  accordingly,  the task of evolutionary  scholarship  lies  in  understanding "the 
forces and dynamics th at have shaped the world as  we know it"  (Steinmo, 2010, p.  12).  In 
this  sense,  "evolutionary  scientists  are  necessarily  engaged  in  path  analysis  and  process 
tracing.  They  are  interested  in  both  explaining  adaptations  and  understanding  the 
consequences of those adaptations" (Ibid.  centralized decision-making authority centralized 
decision-making  authority,  p.  13).  Following  Sewell  (2005),  they  argue  that  chance, 
contingency and critical junctures matter (Biyth et al., 2011). Change is  driven by structural-
agent  interactions  and  is  subject to  heterogeneous  temporal  causation  (see also  Hodgson, 
2010).  History,  in  other  words,  "is  not  a  linear  process"  (Steinmo,  2010,  p.  14),  and 
developing plausible accounts of institutional change that recognize "positive feedbacks and 
the comp1exities offitness 1andscapes" entai] the formulation of"historical narratives" (Blyth 
et al., 2011, p.  303). As Ernst Mayr (1988, p.  149) puts it, "wh en one attempts to exp lain the 
features  of something that is  the product of evolution, one must attempt to  reconstruct the 
evolutionary history ofthis feature." Social, political, and economie systems are conditioned 
by  their "historical  legacies,"  and thus constitute but "imperfect copies of earlier decisions 
and compromises"  (Lewis and Steinmo, 2012, p.  322). 
In  sum,  "[e]volutionary  theory  offers  a  framework  for  understanding  sources  of 
endogenous  and  exogenous  changes,"  providing  "an  explicit  theoretical  framework  for 
understanding how these sources of change interact in  an incrementai process" (Blyth et al., 
2011 , p. 309).  And  because "[c]omplex systems carry the baggage of their own history," 
understanding  the  nature  of a  specifie  phenomenon  means  that  "we  must  [also]  know 
something about its evolutionary past" (Hodgson and Knudsen, 2012). 79 
2.5  Conclusion 
Constitutional  choices  directly  affect  the  core  Darwinian  principles  of variation, 
selection and  replication by  exercising a determining effect on the ideas, values or interests 
that are selected and replicated within a given society. By exercising control over the problem 
solving  capabilities  of a  polity,  constitutional  choices  ultimately  affect  the  institutional 
solutions that are retained and  passed on.  In the absence of open deliberative processes that 
can  incorporate the interests of a  broader range of constituencies, the selective pressure of 
concentrated power will often underm ine the collective, but diffuse, interests of society. 
While  a  given  social-political  system  may  be  "driven  by  the  permanent  efforts  of 
individual human beings to improve their lot, to solve the problems they face, and to explore 
new opportunities" (Vanberg, 1994,  p.  173), such efforts are  invariably  constrained by  the 
degree of freedom  actors  have  for experimenting with  novel  ideas and  solutions (Vanberg, 
1992, p.  1  09). In sorne circumstances, the freedom to experiment may be  l  im ited to devising 
alternative strategies within a currently fixed  set of rules  or to  simply  vote with their feet, 
while in  other situations,  individuals may  be  able to  engage  in  what Ostrom (2005b) calls 
level-shifting strategies, whereby actors seek to affect change within higher-level  decision-
making  arenas.  But  as  pub lie  choice  theorists  warn,  achieving  long  lasting  reforms  or 
improvements in  the outcomes associated with a given set of rules cannat be done through 
changes in the "day-to-day polic[ies]  that temporary politicians may be somehow persuaded 
to  follow"  (Buchanan,  [1981]  2001,  p.  46).  Rather,  they  require  changes  in  the  "set  of 
constraints within which political decisions are made" (Ibid). 
The sovereign authority of  Canadian provincial legislatures to go vern the use of natural 
resources  and  harness  the  rents  associated  with  their  exploitation  is  unlikely  to  be  fully 
devolved  or  decentralized  to  lower  decision-making  bodies  anytime  soon.  Moreover, 
"because of the complex, interlocking relationships" that typify social, political, or economie 
systems, processes of adaptation tend to be "confined to incrementai and  partial adjustments 
within an existing structural configuration" (Hodgson and Knudsen, 20 12). If social scientists 
are  to  make  progress  in  de-veloping  policy  prescriptions  that  improve joint outcomes  in 
interdependent situations, then greater emphasis will need to be placed on the structure of the 
situation within which  actors are embedded and how this  affects the prospect of collective 80 
action,  institutional  change,  and  improved  evolutionary  outcomes  As  the  work  of 
constitutional scholars such as James Buchanan,  Vincent Ostrom and Viktor Vanberg clearly 
demonstrates, efforts to understand the constraints that hinder collective action must also take 
into account the theoretical foundation of the political experiment under consideration. And 
sin ce "evolutionary theory assumes complex causation"  (Stein mo, 2010, p. 10, emphasis in 
original),  no  single  body  of them·y  may  be deemed  sufficient to  explain the  dynamics  of 
complex ad apt ive systems. Analysts need to adopt a ri cher and more diverse set of theoretical 
tools to navigate across the complex temporal sources of causation. 81 
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3.1  Introduction 
The influence of governments over the world's natural resources is  pervasive. Whether 
concerns  relate  to  renewable ( e.g., forests,  inshore  and  offshore  fisheries, and  fresh water 
systems)  or  non-renewable  (e.g.,  oil,  gas  and  minerais)  resource  systems,  governments 
everywhere  either  directly  (e.g.,  ownership,  exploitation  or  concessionary  grants)  or 
indirect! y  (  e.g.,  laws,  regulations,  policies,  property  en forcement)  affect  the  way  natural 
resources  are  used,  managed and  governed.  Through  their domestic  and  foreign  economie 
policies,  the  trade  agreements  they  ratify,  and  whatever  environmental  agreements  or 
conventions they  may  be  persuaded to sanction, governments play  a determining role  in  the 
allocation  and  use  of common-pool  resources  both  within  and  beyond  their jurisdictional 
boundaries. Moreover, regardless ofwhether state proprietary institutions are enforced or not, 
states  and  their governments remain  residual  claimants  to  the  vast  majority  of the  Earth's 
resources and  to  the extent that they  maintain control over the prerogatives of rulership, the 
degree to which the resource rights of others are recognized and enforced ultimately depends 
on  the  actions  of governments.  In  a  world  where  global  environmental  change  is  vastly 
outpacing our capacity to  respond (ICSU, 2010), the need to  better understand how the rules 
of social order ultimately affect the ability of polities to solve the problems they confront has 
arguably never been greater. 
The  ability  of governments  to  affect  resource  us. e outcomes  in  public,  private,  and 
common-property  arrangements  poses  a  fondamental  challenge  for  the  maintenance  of 
biological  diversity and  the  sustainable  use  of natural  resources. Understanding the  source, 
legitimacy, limitations, and  benefits of political structures and the constitution of order are of 
crucial concern not only for the  health and wellbeing of democracy, but also for resolving the 
massive  inequalities  of human  societies  and  ensuring the  very  survival  of life-supporting 90 
ecosystems on  Earth.  Critical  questions arise when the leve!  of analysis is  shifted from  the 
play of the game within a given set of ru les to the ru les of the game themselves. What is the 
nature of social  order? How do  humans create arder in  their relationships to one another? 
What  are  different  models  of rule-ordered  arrangements  and  what  consequences  can  be 
expected to flow from such structures? How do constitutional choices affect collective action 
and  resolution  of  dilemma  situations,  including  the  sustainable  use  of  common-pool 
resources? How can the performance of such arrangements be improved over time? What is 
the role of hu man agency in structuring and improving the ru les that go vern the  ir lives? What 
does it mean to participate in the maintenance of viable democratie structures? 
The purpose of this  chapter is  to  investigate the  relationship  between constitutional 
choice rules and the struggle to sustainably govern natural resources, including the capacity 
of polities to resolve dilemma situations, produce public goods and maintain the viability of 
social-ecological  systems.  The  chapter  is  divided  into  two  sections.  Following this  short 
introduction,  the  first  section  focuses  on  the  theoretical  underpinnings  of constitutional 
choice rules, and is divided as follows: (i) the nature of common-pool resource problems; (ii) 
the logic of rules  for  ordering relationships, (iii) the consequences of rules, (iii)  normative 
methods of inquiry, (iv) social  contract theory,  (v) the basic models of political arder, and 
(vi) improving social-ecological outcomes. The second section links theory to the empirical 
reality of Canada's constitutional experiment relative to provincial governments. It provides a 
synoptic  view  of the  constitutional  provisions  that  define  the  constraints  within  which 
Canadian provincial  governments operate, with a  particular focus  on Québec. The Chapter 
ends with a brief introduction to the constitutional dimensions of natural resources within the 
Canadian context. 
3.2  Theoretical Underpinnings 
3.2.1  Common Pool Resource Dilemmas 
The nature of common-pool resources (CPRs) imparts unique challenges for collective 
action. They combine characteristics of both  private and public goods. Like private goods, 
CPRs are substractable, in that one person's appropriation  is  no  longer available for others, 
but like  public  goods,  the cost of excluding others  is  comparatively  high (E.  Ostrom  and 91 
Walker, [1997]  2000, pp. 430-433). Consequently, "[w]ithout sorne form of coordination or 
organization  to  enable  individuals  to  agree  upon,  monitor,  and  sanction  the  patterns  of 
appropriation from a CPR, the resource wi ll  be overused" (Ibid. , p.  458). In other words, in 
the absence of rule-ordered relationships that can affect the incentives that resource users and 
decision-makers face, theory predicts that each will be motivated to fulfil his or her own short 
term  interests, leading to overexploitation and the dilemma situation Hard\n (1968) referred 
to as a "tragedy of the commons." 
Dilemmas emerge whenever "individuals  make independent choices in  interdependent 
situations"  (Ostrom,  1998,  p.476,  citing  Dawes,  1975,  1980).  However,  contrary  to  the 
predictions heralded by  Garret Hardin's Tragedy mode!, non-cooperative game theory (e.g., 
Prisoner's  Dilemma  by  Rapoport  and  Chammah,  1965)  and  Mancur  Oison 's  Logic  of 
Collective  Action  (1965),  individuals  engaged  in  joint  use  situations  are  not  hopelessly 
trapped in "universally tragic situations" (E. Ostrom et al. , 1994, p.  15). Findings drawn from 
severa! decades of research on corn mon-pool resource problems in  both laboratory and field 
settings show that users of a  resource system are not bounded by  the dilemmas they create 
(  e.g., Berkes,  1989; Brom ley et al., 1992; NRC, 1986, 2002; E. Ostrom, 1990; E.  Ostrom et 
al. ,  1994).  Evidence shows that when  resource  users  are faced  with  repeated  coordination 
games and are able to communicate, build trust and adopt norms of reciprocity, they will  be 
more likely to develop joint strategies for reducing aggregate consomption levels and elicit 
contributions  towards  maintenance  activities  (E.  Ostrom,  2009;  E.  Ostrom  et  al. ,  1994  ). 
However, trust and reciprocity alone will not suffice to  overcome most resource dilemmas 
and the problems that lead to them (E. Ostrom, 2009). In the absence of effective monitoring 
and  enforcement measures,  sorne  individuals  may  be tempted  to  act opportunistically  and 
appropriate more resources or shirk their responsibilities towards the cost of maintaining the 
system  (Ibid;  see  also  E.  Ostrom,  1990;  E.  Ostrom  et  al.,  1994).  A voiding  potentially 
hazardous  resource dilemmas requires  durable solutions to  appropriation  problems,  which 
concern  the  flow  and  distribution  of  resource  units  over  time,  and  provisioning  or 
maintenance problems, which concern the relationship between the productive capacity of a 
resource system  and  the means by  which appropriators organize themselves to maintain or 
even enhance a system 's productivity over ti me (E. Ostrom et al., 1994, pp. 9-15). 92 
The emergent theory of common-pool resources (see Poteete et al., 2010, ch.  9) holds 
that  individuals  endowed  with  the  capacity  to  self-organize  in  a  relatively  predictable 
environment, communicate, learn, and develop norms of  trust and reciprocity, are more likely 
to  invest  in  collective  actions  that  lead  to  institutional  change  than  individuals  in  other 
comparable situations.
28  At the core of this  analysis  lie  the perceived costs and benefits of 
change  that  resource  users  or  policy  makers  rely  upon  to  make  decisions.  White  the 
cost/benefit calculus of boundedly  rational  actors  may  weil evolve  in  response to  trial  and 
error  learning  and  the  broadening  or refinement of individual  preferences (Ibid.,  pp.  222-
226),  their ability to  actually engage others  and  reduce the costs of change may  in  fact  lie 
beyond their immediate control. As  discussed in  the previous chapter, collective action may 
be hampered by: (i) the hierarchically  nested structure of rules that limits access to collective 
choice  arenas;  (ii)  the  development  of complex  webs  of inter-institutional  linkages  that 
increase the relative costs of change; (iii) the effects of previous po licy choices on subsequent 
investment decisions, which can produce increasing returns to the principle beneficiaries and 
a  corollary  dependence  upon  the  continuation  of  established  arrangements;  (iv)  the 
asymmetrical distribution of power and the formation of political coalitions and lobby groups 
with a vested interest; and (v) the exigencies of shifting socioeconomic concerns and political 
motives, which can limit opportunities for change. 
To better assess  how  these and other potential  problems can manifest themselves  in 
more  particularized  circumstances,  clarity  on  the nature  and  consequences of rule-ordered 
relationships  is  essential.  And  in  order  to  appreciate  the  constraints  and  opportunities 
associated with institutional change, analytical attention has to be placed on the constitutional 
arrangements that structure social order and frame problem solving capabilities (Sabetti et al., 
2009). 
3.2.2  The Logic ofRules 
Humans  rely  on  rules  to  order their  relationships,  coordinate their  behaviours,  and 
increase  predictability  in  interactive  situations.  By  determining  the  deontic  boundaries  of 
28 Among the frequently identified variables observed in commons rcscarch  are those associatcd with the nature of the resource 
system  (e.g.,  sizc,  productivity  and  predictability)  and  the  users  themselves  (e.g.,  number of users, their  socioeconomic 
attributes, previous experience, social capital, knowlcdge of the system and its perceived importance, and  autonomy to  make 
collective-choices). See Poteete el al., (2010, pp. 238-239). 93 
what actions or behaviours are  permitted, forbidden, or required, rules ultimately help frame 
social  order  in  hu man  societies  (E.  Ostrom,  2005b  ).  As  such,  ru les  are  fundamentally 
normative  creations  that  implicitly  or  explicitly  cali  upon  the  ability  of individuals  to 
distinguish  between what is  socially,  legally, or culturally appropriate and  what is  not.  ln 
order to  understand, apply,  and  enforce rules, humans rely on nonns or some other criterion 
to  make distinctions between permissible and proscribed actions. Rules therefore, represent 
shared prescriptions, framed in  linguistic constructions that embody the ideas and values of 
their  makers,  and  thus  depend  upon  the  ability  of  others  to  make  ethical  or  moral 
interpersonal  comparisons  so  as  to  a void  harming  others  in  interdependent situations  (V. 
Ostrom, [1988] 2011, pp. 460-461 ). "To act with reference to a rule requires that individuals 
make  normative  distinctions to  apply  rules;  and  to  enforce  rules  requires  that  nonns  and 
criteria of choice be subject to  public understanding by  ali ofthose who are involved" (Ibid. , 
p. 461 ).  Hence, ali  hum an societies are governed by  rule-ordered relationships th at function 
within shared communities ofunderstanding (V. Ostrom, 1997). 
However, because ru les are never self-formulating, self-applying, or self-enforcing, the 
constitution of social order depends on human agency to formulate, apply, monitor, enforce, 
and alter rules (V. Ostrom, 1997,  p.  138; [1 982] 1999, p.  383; [1 988] 2011 , p.  464). To make 
rules binding, communities rely  on authority relationships that distinguish between different 
decision-making arenas that specify  the authority actors  have for acting in  relation to  one 
another  (V.  Ostrom,  [ 1988]  2011,  p.  464  ).  Authority  relationshi ps  specify  the  worlds  of 
action that cumulatively  affect  the outcomes produced and subsequent rounds  of decision-
. making situations (Kiser and Ostrom, [1982] 2000). Key to understanding this relationship 
are  the  distinctions  made  between  (i)  authorized  relationships  (actions)  in  operational 
decision-making  situations;  (ii)  authoritative  relationships  that  are  established  through 
collective  decision-making  bodies  of  such  governments,  wherein  actors  possess  the 
extraordinary authority to formulate,  apply, enforce, and alter rules or legal  relationships in 
operational  situations;  and  (iii)  constitutional  relationshi ps  th at  specify  the  tenns  and 
conditions applicable to the exercise of  government, and thus pertain to the rules that apply to 
authoritative relationships and ultimately govern authorized relationships (E. Ostrom, 2005b, 
pp. 5  8-61; V. Ostrom [ 1988] 2011 , pp. 464-465). 94 
The significance of such authority relationships ultimately rests in  the illusive quest to 
develop  modes of govemance that can  uphold the  democratie and  civic ideals of political 
communities, without infringing upon them - what Vincent Ostrom  refers to  as  setting the 
"tenns and conditions of government" and the "due processes of law" (Ibid).  And working 
out what Gerring and Thacker (2008, p.  165) cali the "political-institutional foundations of 
good  governance"  may  quite  possibly  be "the  most critical  problem  in  the constitution of 
arder in human societies" (V. Ostrom, [1988] 2011, p. 466; see also Steinberger, 2004). 
3.2.3  The Consequences of Rules 
The failure of governments to devise policies and regulatory measures that support the 
production of public goods or encourage the efficient use of common-pool resources is  weil 
documented  (e.g.,  Acheson,  2006;  Ascher,  1999;  Ascher  and  Healy,  1990;  Bates,  2008, 
[1981]  2005; Buchanan and  Tullock,  1962;  Diamond,  2005; Eggertsson,  2005;  Gillis  and 
Roach,  1986;  Gunderson  et  al.,  1995;  V.  Ostrom,  1993;  Repetto  and  Gillis,  1988). 
Dependence on resource rents and the use of force (whether legitimate or not)  in  favour of 
domestic or foreign  political  and economie interests  is  reflected  in  a number of theoretical 
propositions, such as the rentier's thesis (e.g., Moore, 2004; Ross,  1999), the staples theory 
(  e.g., Innis,  [1930]  1999;  Watkins,  1963 ),  and world-systems theory ( e.g., Ciccantell et al., 
2005;  Hornborg  et  al.,  2007).  Governments  are  routinely  accused  of undermining  the 
collective efforts of local  resource users to self-organize and find  solutions to the problems 
they face. Reference to  ill-advised government interventions, the reluctance of state officiais 
to  recognize common-property arrangements, or the partiality of decentralization efforts  in 
favour of central govemments or other powerful interests  permeate the commons literature 
(  e.g., Lars  on and Soto, 2008; E.  Ostrom, 1990; Potee  te et al. , 201 0; Ribot and Larson, 2005). 
As  institutional  theorists  argue  (Knight,  1992; North,  1990,  1994;  Powell  and  DiMaggio, 
1991;  Schmid,  2004),  the  distributional  outcome of institutional  change  is  nearly  always 
slanted in fa v  our of  existing power structures. 
Of related importance to the problem of power asymmetries is the challenging issue of 
majoritarianism and the extent to which existing constitutional provisions provide a sufficient 
check on the propensity of ruling governments to direct pol ici es, including distributional and 
al locative outcomes, to  suit their own interests. The endogenous nature of collective-choice 95 
rules  combined with  majoritarian  governments can  allows successful coalitions to  use  their 
position to  order preferences in their favour and  restrict the set of alternatives to  be  selected 
to  those  that maxim  ize  payoffs  to  their members or constituencies at the expense of others 
(Buchanan  and  Congleton,  1998,  p.  21 ).  Findings  on  majority  voting  in  common-pool 
resource  situations  from  case  study  research  and  !ab  experiments  likewise  produced 
concentration  of distributional  gains  among  the  winning  coalitions  (Walker  et al.,  2000). 
Unless changes in  the electoral system can be  introduced to  enhance voter objectivity in  the 
selection of candidates and  further proportional representation (Gerring and Thacker, 2008), 
periodic  elections  will  not  provide  a  sufficient  security  for  holding  public  officiais 
accountable.
29 
Were  it  not for the  ubiquitous  problem of special interests  and  the  opportunity  costs 
associated with rent seeking, the ability ofmajority governments to control the policy-making 
agenda would arguably raise fewer concerns, as Gerring and Thacker (2008) seem to suggest. 
However, with increasing evidence of market pressure for more lenient regulatory measures, 
Jax  enforcement,  and  demands  for  corporate  handouts  - the  "systematic  tendency  for 
exploitation of the great by the small," as  Oison  (1965, p.  29) put  it, suggests the need  for 
much  greater  scepticism  in  the  ability  of majority  governments  to  uphold  the  public's 
interests. 
Yet,  failure  does  not  always  rest  with  those  who  hold  public  office.  Government 
hierarchies  are themselves  replete  with  oppo1iunities  to  obfuscate the production of public 
goods  and  ensure the sustainable  use  of natural resources.  Whether the  issue  is  rent-seeking 
(Baland  and  Francois,  2000; Tollison,  1997; Torvik,  2002),  corruption  (Abed  and  Gupta, 
2002; Barrett et al., 2005), or principle-agent problems within large public bureaucracies that 
contribute  to  information  distortion,  waste,  shirking,  free  riding  or  budget  maximization 
29  The  idea  that  individual  votes  should somehow  be  treated  as  a  reflection  of the  equal  intensities  of voter  preferences  is 
regarded as unfounded and  rnisleading (Buchanan and  Tullock, 1962, pp. 94-95). With regards to the electoral process itself, 
voting and  voting cycles has been the subject of  much scholarship in  recent decades (Schlager, 2009). Elections do not and 
cannot express  the aggregated  preferences of a  polity  in  a  way  that satisfies any  measure of fairness  or consistency in  the 
ordering  of  collective  intercsts  (e.g., Arrow,  1951;  Black,  1958; Tsebelis, 2002).  Further,  provid_!!d  that  candidates  face 
considerable  incentives to direct their electoral platforms to  sorne  broad generalization of the  median  voters (Downs, 1957; 
Buchanan, [1979]  1999b) and their more  immediate concerns regarding "who  gets what, when and  how"  (Lasswell ,  1958), 
political debates tend  to  focus on  the distributional and  allocative  strategies  of the  differing  policy  agendas  of competing 
political  formations, instead  of  the· more  substantial  and  arguably  more  important dimensions  of their  legislative  agenda, 
wh ether they have one or not (Hayek, 1979). 96 
(Miller, 1992; Niskanen, 1971 ; Tullock, 1965), the range offailures that can affect resource 
use outcomes are substantial and not amenable to quick fixes.  While effot1s by principals to 
maintain control over their agents is  a fundamental  problem in  the administration of public 
affairs,  ali  such  problems  ultimately  rest  on  institutional  arrangements  that  can  be 
disaggregated, analyzed, compared, and changed. 
Directly or indirectly, the failure of governments and/or markets ultimately rests within 
the  political  sphere  (Bates,  1995).  Viewed  in  this  light,  the  problems  that  flow  from 
inefficient, unsustainable or inequitable economie activities do not stem from  the failure of 
markets, high transaction costs or other purported flaws, but from the underlying structure of 
politics itself(Bates, 1995, p.  45; Buchanan, [1964]  1999, p.  38; [1987] 2001a, pp.  5-6; see 
also  Buchanan  and  Tullock,  1962).  For  it  is  within  the  political  sphere  that  the  legal 
relationships of market situations are established, and operational and collective choices are 
determined (Brennan and Buchanan, [1985] 2000, p.  16). It is through the political institution 
of government, at the national or sub-national levels, that rules (including norms, values and 
habits)  tend  to  be  sanctioned,  enforced,  or purposefully  neglected.  And  it  is  through  the 
actions of government that many of our social (cultural), political, and economie institutions 
(i.e., variations) tend to be selected and/or replicated. Hence, if"improvements in the patterns 
of political  outcomes  are  [ever]  to  be  expected,"  it  is  through  the  instrumentality  of 
constitutional structures that reform must proceed (Buchanan, 2002, p.  1  ). 
Long lasting and socially warranted .reforms therefore, will not be achieved through the 
policies  that  temporary  political  actors  may be  urged  to  adopt,  but  from  changes  in  the 
underlying rules that govern how the game is  to be played (Buchanan, [1981] 2001 , pp.  45-
46). In other words, Pareto improving solutions are unlikely to emerge without the imposition 
of constrain or conditions in the decisions actors can make in collective choice situations- as 
Wicksell (1896) recognized long ago (see Buchanan, [1987] 200la, [1987] 200lb), efforts to 
limit  the  prerogatives  of  rulership  (V.  Ostrom,  2008),  or  the  development  of  more 
inclusiveness,  fair,  and  effective  means of deliberation  (Gerring and  Thacker,  2008).  The 
ultimate purpose of politics  thus concerns  ways to  establish  rule-ordered  relationships that 
help foster mutually beneficiai outcomes, regard Jess of the interests and preferences of those 
who  may  be  called  upon  to  make  political  decisions  (Vanberg,  2006,  p.  12).  As  such, 97 
constitutional choice does not concern itself with the parti cu lars of choice within a given set 
of constraints but with "setting up  rules or constraints within which politicians [i.e.,  public 
decision-maker] must operate, rules that will make it a relatively trivial matter" who happens 
to be in go vern ment (Buchanan, [ 1981] 2001, p. 4 7). But if the intent of constitutional reform 
is  to strengthen the ability of a polity to achieve socially valued ends, then the question that 
needs to be addressed is  wh at are the criteria or performance standards that public institutions 
should uphold? This requires a shift from the positive analysis of what is  being achieved, to a 
normative leve! of inquiry into the realm ofwhat ought to be achieved. 
3.2.4  Normative Inquiry: Using the State as the Standard 
Understanding  how  people  solve dilemma situations  requires  a  theory  of rules  and 
institutions,  which  implies  a theory  of how  ideas  are linked  to  knowledge,  learning,  and 
change  (Aiigica and  Boettke,  2009,  p.  132).  Because  institutions  are  "created  by  human 
beings with  reference to  the use  of learning and  knowledge to  serve human  pw·poses,"  (V. 
Ostrom, [1980]  1999,  p.  377),  it  follows that the study of such artifacts should at the very 
!east consider the "intentions, conceptions and calculations" that were used to  inform choice 
(V. Ostrom, [1982]  1999, p.  152). In  other words, if "every measure of po licy  is", as Dewey 
suggests,  "of the  nature of an  experiment"  (1938,  p.  508),  then  one  needs  to  have  some 
understanding of the ex  periment in question and what it intended to achieve. 
Normative analyses of constitutional  and  collective choice  rules  focus  on  the  ideas, 
values,  and  norms  that  actors  use  to  inform  the  creation  of rule-ordered  relationships 
(Buchanan,  [1979]  1999a; V.  Ostrom, [1980]  1999).  Because normative considerations are 
context specifie (Frohlich et al.,  2004, p.  116; discussed  in  E.  Ostrom, 2005, pp.  109-113) 
and adhere to cultural referents that embody the values and beliefs of a given polity (North, 
2005,  pp.  50-51),  or social  structures  in  more  encompassing tenns (Hodgson, 2007, 2010, 
2012),  they  provide  an  essential  means  of  understanding  the  mental  constructs  that 
individuals  use  to  navigate  the  social  and  biophysical  world  within  which  they  operate 
(North,  2005,  p.  61 ;  Ostrom,  2005b),  and  the  standards  or  criteria  used  to  inform  the 
decisions and  choices that are made in  interdependent situations (V.  Ostrom, 2008, pp.  19-
21).  Consequently,  if  systems  of governance  are  assumed  to  derive  from  reflection  and 
choice, then inquiry into the long-term perfonnance of any social-ecological experiment has 98 
to be attentive to the complementary insights that can be leveraged by linking theory to action 
and experience to  learning (V. Ostrom,  1997), as  weil  as  the deeper leve!  social  structures 
and processes that condition human agency and the range of alternatives (i.e., variations) that 
can plausibly be selected or replicated (Hodgson, 2010; Katznelson, 2003). 
However,  given  the  near  end1ess  potentiality  of the  human  spirit,  to  both  imagine 
alternative  settings  and  disagree  upon  what these  should be,  what does  a  shift towards  a 
normative leve! of inquiry entai! and what prescriptive remedies are we likely to fi nd  in such 
considerations?  One  enduring  source  of  reflection  lies  in  Thomas  Hobbes'  seminal 
contribution  to  modern  political  theory,  and  his  normative  consideration  of  the 
commonwealth as  an ideal.  As  elaborated in  Leviathan (Hobbes,  [1651]  1839-45), Hobbes 
posited that "men [would] agree amongst themselves, to submit to sorne man, or assembly of 
men, voluntarily, on confidence to be protected by  him against ali others" (Ibid.,  p.99). Only 
by  "unity  of them  ali,  in  one and  the same person,  made by  covenant"  wherein eve1yone 
authorizes  and  gives  up  his  or  her  own  right  to  govern  themselves  can  a  "political 
commonwealth,  or  commonwealth  by  institution"  provide  the  peace,  justice,  equity  and 
security that ali  men long for (Ibid., pp. 98-99). Putting aside Hobbes'  own inclination for 
monarchical  government,  the  basic  tenet  of his  argument  is  not  that  individuals  should 
relinquish  their  autonomy  in  favour  of a  sovereign,  as  Vincent  Ostrom  consistently  and 
wrongly  emphasised  throughout  his  work,  but  that  the  ultimate  aim  or  purpose  of a 
commonwealth, is  to pursue peace, order, and unity  (Steinberger, 2004,  p.  49) through the 
fair and equal treatment of ali  before the sovereign (i.e., crown or state) (Wolin, 2004, pp. 
242-243). That Hobbes argued in favour of a monarchical system is secondary to the standard 
he  used to argue in  favour of his  preferred model.
30  In other words, "order for Hobbes is  a 
constitutive end of political society precisely because it  is  (an important part of) what makes 
political  society  useful  in  promoting  human  flourishing"  (Steinberger,  2004,  p.  49).  The 
Hobbesian prescience, Steinberger (Ibid. , p. 48) furthers, was to recognize that "philosophical 
inquiry ...  is  a  fundamental  and  necessary  feature  of  any  effort  to  think  prudently  about 
30  As  Steinberger  explains  (2004,  p.  xiii),  "Hobbes  argues  thar  a  legitimate  commonwealth  might  be  monarchically, 
aristocratically or democratically organized. ln  saying this, he suggests, in  effect, thar the notion of the state  itself  does not 
entai!  and  does  not depend  on any specifie  answers  to questions about the  best fonn of govemment, the  proper scope and 
direction of governmental  activity, the  true  nature  and  range  of  civil  liberties, and  so  on. Such  a  view  is  shared, mutatis 
mutandis, by a variety of au thors - Aristotle, Locke and  Rousseau" 99 
politics in  the real world. By failing to understand the concept of sovereignty, we are apt to 
pursue policies and institutional strategies ... that are doomed to fail." 
The elemental idea ofthe state, Steinberger (Ibid., pp.  10-14) argues, is fundamental to 
politics  because  it  resides  in  the  minds  of people,  forming what Bourdieu  (2000,  p.  142) 
referred to as enduring "solidarities" that "constructs  the world and gives it its meaning". It is 
a "structure of  intelligibility ... [  .. .  ], a structure of judgements about wh at is true and  what is 
not"  (Steinberger,  2004,  p.  13,  emphasis  in  original).  It is,  properly  speaking,  an  idea, 
reflected  in  such  terms  as  the  "body  politic,"  "political  community," "commonwealth"  or 
"nation" wherein government is only part of a complex and organic who le (Ibid.,  pp.  13-14). 
To use  Rousseau's  (du Contrat Social, III,  I)  insights  on  this  point,  government is  but an 
agent of the body poli tic, an intermediary between the aspirations of the public and  the state 
itself.
31  In  this  sense,  the  idea  of the  state  offers  a  philosophical  the01·y  or  normative 
framework on what the nature of social order, as  understood by members of society, should 
be or tend towards.
32 Y  et, because such ideas live in the minds of people and are embodied in 
the  language, concepts, and  propositions of a  polity,  without being  necessarily  codified or 
formalized, the  values,  norms and  beliefs  they  engender will  tend  to  evolve  more  quickly 
than  what  the  formai  institutions  of government  provide  for.  Simpler  and  more  direct 
pathways for replication and adaptation may yield selection pressures and social tensions that 
can spur demand for change from  the bottom and a resistance to such demands from the top. 
As  the  collected  works  of historian  Howard  Zinn  amply  demonstrates,  significant  social 
change has nearly always emerged from the people, not from the holders of public office. 
Renee,  ideas,  values  and  beliefs  are  the  malleable  concepts  actors  use  to  affect 
structures, organize processes, and influence patterns of conduct for the purposes of solving 
dilemma situations and improving joint outcomes (V.Ostrom, 1997, p.  115). To be effective 
31 "Il  faut  donc  à  la force  publique  un agent propre qui  la  réunisse  et  la  mette  en  oeuvre selon  les  directions  de la  volonté 
générale, qui  serve à la communication de l'État et du souverain, qui fasse en quelque sorte dans la personne publique ce que 
fait dans l'homme l'union de l'âme et du corps. Voilà quelle est, dans l'État,la raison du gouvernement, confondu mal à propos 
avec le souverain , dont il  n'est que le ministre. Qu'est-ce donc que le gouvernement? Un corps intermédiaire établi  entre les 
sujets et le souverain  pour leur mutuelle correspondance, chargé de l'exécution des lois et du maintien de la liberté tant civile 
que politique." 
32 In explaining this conception of the state, Steinberger (2004, p. 2 1) notes that 'T he state is nothing other than, and nothing Jess 
than, a  systematic  structure of ideas on  the  basis  of which  the  individuals of a  society  scek joint! y  to  control the  physical 
abjects that surround them .... At the core  of the state, one finds not tools but a conceptual apparatus; and  this is what makes it, 
in essence, a structure of intelligibility." lOO 
however,  rule-ordered  relationships  have  to  be  structured  through  language  imbued  with 
referents  that hold  meaning to  the  individuals that use them,  and  the  communities  within 
which  they  operate.  In  short,  "sound  policy"  prescriptions  "absolutely  presupposes  sound 
philosophy" (Steinberger, 2004, p.  49), for "things in the world are rendered meaningful and 
important  only  and  entirely  in  terms  of ideas"  (Ibid.,  p.  25)  Analytical  inquiry  into  the 
performance of  ru les th us requires sorne understanding of the conjectures and hypotheses that 
were used to inform causal  linkages,  and the value terms that were used to establish norms 
and criteria for choice (V. Ostrom, [1988] 2011, p. 461 ).  The standard for normative inquiry 
thus  lies  in  the shared  beliefs  and  aspirations of the  body  politic - that which  forms  the 
attributes of a viable commonwealth. And increasingly, the viability of commonwealths no 
longer  depend  on  peace,  order  and  unity  alone,  but  in  open  deliberative  processes  and 
normative  foundations  that  recognize  sustainability,  equity  and  equality  as  being  non-
negotiable.  How  polities  organize  themselves  to  ensure  that  government  "makes  good 
deaisions and fulfills, thereby, the aims of the state" (Steinberger, 2004, p. 273) is through the 
social contract of constitutional choice ru les. 
3.2.5  Covenants and Contracts 
Drawing upon the insights of the moral and political  philosophers of the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries, especially Spinoza, Locke, Hume, and Smith, as weil as the ideas of 
Wicksell  (1896),  Buchanan  and  Tullock  (1962)  (re)introduced  the  theory  of the  social 
contract  to  discern  what  they  referred  to  as  the  "logical  foundations  of constitutional 
democracy."  Essentially,  Buchanan  and  Tullock  posited  that  individuals  engaged  in 
collective unde11akings could minimize private costs and improve joint outcomes by  relying 
on ru les that increase the likelihood of  fair outcomes in collective-decision making arenas. In 
constitutional terms, individuals need not determine an  agreed upon collective preference, a 
proposition that is  as  much an  illusion as  it is  an  impossibility  (Arrow,  1951), but instead 
must jointly  determine  what would  be  an  acceptable  aggregation  rule  for  making  future 
collective decisions (V.  Ostrom,  [2007]  2012,  pp.  600-601).  The contractarian approach to 
constitutionalism  posits  that  the  choice  of rules  for  making  future  decisions  necessarily 
occurs  through a  process of exchange wherein  prior agreement (i.e.,  contract) between  or 
among choosing parties must be reached to ensure that the rules of the game will in fact yield 101 
plays that are  considered fair by  ali  players of the relevant community, independent of their 
respective  future  situations  (Buchanan,  [1986]  1999,  pp.  22-24).  Tt  is  at  this  particular 
juncture  that  constitutional  political  economies  maves  into  the  domain  of  political 
philosophy, and  in particular, that of social contract the01·y (Buchanan, [1979]  1999b, p.  50). 
As  discussed earlier,  the  rule-ruler-ruled  relationship always  implies the  potential  for 
fundamental asymmetries in the constitution of social arder (V.  Ostrom, [ 1988]  2011 ).  Wh at 
grants  legitimacy to the actions of governments, and  how such actions can be constrained or 
directed towards sorne socially  valued end are questions that lie at the heart of social contract 
theory (see V.  Ostrom,  1997, p.  262), and western political thought, since before the time of 
Aristotle  (Wolin, 2004).  In  effect,  social  contract  theory  implies,  by  definition,  "equality 
among autonomous individuals who are capable of entering into binding agreements with one 
another",  the  term  "federal" being  itself derived  from  the  Latin foedus,  which  means  to 
covenant (V.  Ostrom, [1996]  2012,  p.  75).  Covenanting with  others  implies  that authority 
relationships are  necessarily  bounded  and  limited, reinforced  by  veto  capabilities  that give 
reciprocating individuals the opportunity to  challenge or contest actionable  infringements  in 
diverse settings and  arenas (V.  Ostrom, 1997, p.  279).  In  short, covenants set the  terms and 
conditions of governance and the social "covenant" or "contract" implicitly refer to the actual 
constitution of  a body politic. 
Wh en  appl ied  through  the  more  state-centric  lens  of Pub! ic  Choice,  covenanting 
amongst  equals  turns  to  the  contractarian  logic  of the  limited  constitution  commonly 
discussed  by  proponents  of decentralism.  Attention  shifts  to  the  boundaries  within  which 
governments  operate,  including  the  constraints  that  are  placed  upon  elected  officiais  and 
bureaucrats  in  order to  constrain  not only what governments do, but also what they  achieve 
relative  to  collectively  defined  normative  considerations  such  as  peace, justice,  fairness, 
equality, and sustainability.  Y  et, as Buchanan ([1972]  1999, p.  430) points out, the idea of the 
social  contract is  more  mythological  and  theoretical than factual  and  historical.  Few  polities 
have ever engaged in  such tacit considerations of the  underlying rules of the game. A strong 
case  in  point  pertains  to  the  constitutional  foundations  of the  Westminster  parliamentary 
tradition  that  Canada and  the  provinces  inherited, and  which  largely  rests  on  "unwritten" 
conventions, customs, and traditions. Though such constitutional principles are always in flux 102 
and constantly  evolving to  address challenges  and unforeseen  impediments (Cairns,  1988; 
Johari, 2006), there are strong reasons to  believe that such changes are broadly out of step 
with the aspirations and interests of the citizenry (at !east in  the Canadian context) and that 
the  rules  in  place  are  largely  inadequate  for  addressing  the  emerging  social  and 
environmental  dilemmas  that  societies  such  as  Canada  now  confront  (e.g.,  Hicks,  2010; 
MacDonald, [1996] 2012, see also section 3.3 below) 
The  question  raised  by  social  contract  theory  is  whether  the  existing  (written  or 
unwritten) "rules that constrain the  activity  of ordinary  politics  could have emerged from 
agreement in a constitutional contract" (Buchanan ([1986] 1999, p. 467). Ifthe answer is yes, 
then  there  is  no  reason  to  believe  that  a  constitutional  order  affects  political  economie 
outcomes.  But  if the  answer  is  no,  then  the  basis  of a  justificatory  argument  for  the 
"normative  criticism  of the  existing  order,  and  a  criterion  for  advancing  proposais  for 
constitutional  reform"  may  be  established  (Ibid.).  The  fundamental  importance  of this 
question can readily  be  illustrated by  any  one of the massive environmental dilemmas that 
humanity now confronts. Paralleling an analogy developed by  Buchanan (Ibid.)  concerning 
debt financing, one could argue that it would be nearly "impossible to construct a contractual 
calcul us in  which representatives of separate generations wowd agree to allow majorities in a 
single  generation"  to  overexploit  common-pool  resources,  degrade  life-supporting 
ecosystems, and emit vast amounts of pollutants for its own benefit, and in  turn impose heavy 
"utility  !osses"  and  environmental  costs  to  future  generations.  In  other  words,  if the 
underlying  rules of the game allow one or more generations to  make decisions that benefit 
them at the expense of ali  other succeeding generations, or that benefit sorne groups at the 
expense of ali  others within a single generation - be it through environmental degradation, 
debt, economie inequality, or any other injustice- then the problem lies not in  the putative 
failure of markets or governments, but in  the more fundamental absence or inadequacies of 
existing  constitutional  choice  rules.  In  short,  "[g]overnment - however  formulated  - is 
always  underwritten  by,  and  must  always  serve  the  interests  and  goals  of,  the  state" 
(Stein  berger, 2004, p.  xiii) or social contract, as Rousseau puts it.  As the embodiment of the 
body politic, it is the state that is "omni-competent in scope, absolute in authority and organic 
in  composition,"  not government (Ibid.,  p.  xiv)  Keeping  public decision-makers within the 103 
bounds of normative (and constitutional) constraints, and  making sure that future  collective 
and operation al choices respect the terms a·nd conditions of the social contract is  the essence 
of contractarian theory and  the  rationale for  a more explicit focus  on the constitutional leve] 
of analysis. 
Being  able  to  appreciate  whether  the  existing  social  order  either  fails  to  address 
important normative considerations  or faits  to  enforce  existing social agreements  (towards 
improved social-ecological outcomes) is crucial. But understanding how such changes can be 
brought  about  within  existing  political-economic  structures  requires  sorne  basic 
understanding  of the  leverage  points  that  may  or  may  not  exist  within  a  given  political 
institution, and how such institutions can be made to yîeld Pareto better solutions for society. 
3.2.6  Whither the State: Basic Models ofPolitical Order 
Key to  understanding the structure of the situation ac tors face is the need to understand 
the  basic  models  of government  that  have  evolved  in  western  democracies  over  the  past 
severa! centuries, and how  these  may  be  expected to  affect social-ecological outcomes. Two 
fundamentally  different  forrnulae  are  thought  to  categorize  the  broad  range  political 
structures  humans  use  to  constitute  order  in  society,  namely:  1)  the  unitary  theory  of 
centralist  governments  and  2)  the  decentralist  theory  of federal  or  compound  republics 
(Gerring and Thacker, 2008; V.  Ostrom, 1982, 1997, 2008). 
One of the more powerful defences of unitary forms of government to have emerged in 
recent  years  is  provided  by  Gerring  and  Thacker  (2008).  Following the  ideas  of Thomas 
Hobbes, Jean  Bodin,  Walter Bagehot, and  John  Stuart Mill, among many  others, centralism 
argues that a common set of rules  and  common  body  of law  can  only  be  found  in  a single 
source of law, a conception which presumes that the "unity of law depends upon the unity of 
power" (V.  Ostrom [1988] 2011, p.  467). For in the absence of a defined center ofauthority, 
Hobbes posited, chaos would inevitably  unfold  as each individual sought to  maximise his  or 
her  own  self-interest  ([1651]  1839-45,  pp.  71-74).  The  modern  conceptualisation  of the 
centralist mode!  essentially developed in  19
1
h century England as an antidote to the American 
ideal, which most commentators at the time viewed  as  an  inherently weak, fragmented, and 
unaccountable system of government (Gerring and Thacker, 2008, pp.  1  0-12). For supporters 104 
of  the  Westminster  tradition,  good  government  could  only  be  achieved  through  the 
"consolidation of political  power within the framework of multiparty democratie elections" 
(Ibid.).  The  operational  features  of centralism  thus  invoked  severa!  distinctive  features. 
Centralist governments are unitary, rather than federalist, states; they rely  on parliamentary, 
rather than presidential modes of governance; they depend upon strong and cohesive parties; 
representation is  ensured through single-member districts or preferential voting schemes; and 
they rely upon an unwritten (i.e., flexible or adaptable) constitution (Ibid.). 
Left in  its  Westminster form  however, the centralist proposition can just as  well tend 
towards  the  concentration  of power,  opportunities  for  strategie  collusion,  the  ability  to 
obscure the legitimacy of  government actions, and an unyielding drive to satisfy the parochial 
interests of smaller though  politically  rewarding districts  (V.  Ostrom,  1997).  As discussed 
further  below,  there  are  strong  reasons  to  question  the  effectiveness  and  Canadian 
parliamentary  system  of government,  whether  at  the  federal  or  provincial  levels.  What 
distinguishes  Gerring  and  Thacker's  (2008,  pp.  15-23)  claim  that  unitary  systems  of 
government can  potentially  yield  superior outcomes  rests  on  essentially  two  propositions. 
First, political institutions need to be inclusive,  and thus reach out to ali  interests, ideas, and 
identities; and second, the need  to be  authoritative,  in that "they must provide an effective 
mechanism  for  reaching  agreement  and  implementing  that  agreement."  The  gist of their 
argument in favour ofwhat they cali centripetalism thus relies on the extent to which political 
institutions:  1)  are unitary, wherein constitutional powers lie  in  the hands ofthe center, and 
may be delegated or retrieved from sub-national units "without altering the fundamental rules 
of the game;" 2)  rely  upon  a parliamentary system of governance, "in which the executive 
(the prime minister and cabinet: collectively, 'the government') is chosen by, and responsible 
to,  an  elective  body  (the  legislature),  thus  creating  a  single  locust of sovereignty  at  the 
national leve!;" and 3) use a closed-listed form of proportional representation, thus providing 
"an  electoral system in  which each district is  multimember, each party  nominates a slate of 
candidates (the list), and parties control the nomination process (it is  closed)," thus avoiding 
the  pitfalls  of parochialism,  the  vagaries of popular opinion,  and  the  tendency  towards  a 
disproportionate  balance  of power,  rather  than  proportionate  numerical  majorities  of the 105 
whole.
33 The extent to which these constitutional arrangements help improve the provision of 
public  goods  depends on  strong  party  government  (relatively centralized and  ideologically 
coherent groups), effective contlict mediation processes, and  productive policy coordination 
mechanisms. 
By  contrast,  the alternative expounded by Locke ((1691]  1824), Montesquieu ([1748] 
1960), as weil  as  Hamilton, Madison and Jay ([ 1788] 2008), builds upon a contractarian view 
of rulership, wherein the prerogatives of go vern ment are exercised by an assembly of citizens 
on the  basis of mutually agreed upon terms and conditions. For citizens to rule by assembly, 
prior agreement must be  reached  on  the  rules  applicable to  collective decision-making,  the 
distribution of power, and the very exercise of power.  In essence, a contractual agreement, or 
constitution, must be established. To make such an agreement binding and enforceable-such 
that  no  one  may  exercise  unlimited  authority,  constitutional  provisions  should:  1)  assign 
certain unalienable rights to citizens, and  thus  impose  limits  on  the actions of governments; 
and  2)  divide the prerogatives of rulership  into  opposite and  equilibrating forces,  such  that 
rule-making,  rule-applying,  and  rule-enforcing  functions  of  government  are  nested  in 
different branches, thus limiting the powers that any one person or group can accumulate (V. 
Ostrom,  2008, pp. 13-14  ).  Alnong  other things/
4  constitutional  go vern ment associated with 
decentralism implies  limited government; the existence of multiple equilibrating forces  and 
veto capabilities that can  be used to constrain the "leviathan-like proclivities of government" 
(Buchanan,  [1979]  1999: 58); the separation of powers;  and  a strong judiciary. Emphasis is 
placed upon  sharing or diffusion of power, rather than  the  concentration of power (Gerring 
and Thacker, 2008, p.  5; see also Y.  Ostrom, 2008). 
The  theory  of decentralism  therefore,  has  two  distinct  "axioms,  one  pertaining  to 
horizontal  divisions  (separate  powers)  and  the  other  pe1iaining  to  vertical  divisions 
(federalism)" (Ibid.). And it is rooted in two fundamentally distinct schools of thought. There 
is  what Gerring and Thacker (Ibid.) refer to  as  "the dominant strand," supported by the likes 
33  Without  the  possibility  of  proportional  representation,  argued  Mill  (Arrow,  1951 ;  Ri ker,  1982),  "there  is  not  equal 
government, but a government of inequal ity  and  privilege:  one part  of the people rule over the rest; ...  For there is not equal 
suffrage  where  every  single  individual  does  not  count  for  as  much  as  any  other ·single  individual  in  the  community ... 
Democracy, th us constituted, does not even attain  its ostensible object, that of giving the powers of government in ali  cases to 
the numerical majority. lt does something  very different:  it gives them to a  majority of the majority; who may be, and often 
are, but a minority of the whole. 
34 For an extensive list of characteristics and critique of decentralism, see Gerring and Thacker (2008). 
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of "Blackstone, Montesquieu, and Madison" and which "sees in  decentralized institutions a 
mechanism to  prevent [or moderate] direct popular control." The other, more radical strand, 
"associated with Paine, Rousseau, and  others [such as  Tocqueville] ...  sees in  decentralized 
power a  mechanism for  bringing government closer to  the people"  (Ibid. , p. 6).  In  either 
case, both share a common distrust of government - a trait that is  likewise shared by  most 
scholars in the public choice tradition (  e.g., James Buchanan, Vincent Ostrom, Friedrich von 
Hayek, Milton Friedman and Gordon Tullock to name but a few). 
Of the two formulations,  the  literature on  common-pool  resources  has  clearly  been 
slanted  in  favour  of decentralised  approaches.  While  non-cooperative  game theory  (e,g., 
prisoner's dilemma) and metaphors such as 'the tragedy of the commons'  have reinvigorated 
calls for state-centric common-pool resources management in  the last half century (Gordon, 
1954;  Hardin,  1968;  Hessing  et  al.,  2005),  such  strategies  have  not,  as  a  general  rule, 
produced  sustainable  outcomes  over time,  nor  have  they  improved  conditions  for  locally 
adapted resource users. As scholarship associated with the Bloomington research programme 
shows, "any single,  comprehensive set of formai  rule and  laws  intended to  govern a  large 
expanse ofterritory, containing diverse ecological niches is  bound to fail in many ofthe areas 
where  it  is  applied"  (E.  Ostrom,  quoted  in  Aligica  and  Boettke,  2009,  p.153).  In  short, 
empirical research simply "does not support the idea that a central government could solve ail 
resource problems for a large region with simple, top down directives" (Ibid, p.152). Though 
there  are  no  panaceas  for  sustainability,  nor  institutions  that  yield  universally  superior 
outcomes (Dietz et al.,  2003; E.  Ostrom, 2005, 2007), the body of evidence supporting the 
notion that communities, endowed with the capacity to make collective choice rights, tend to 
achieve greater  levels  of sustainability  (e.g.,  E.  Ostrom,  1990; NRC,  2002;  Poteete et al., 
201 0)  has  led  to  increasing  demands  for  community-led  approaches,  including 
decentralization and state-level recognition of local res ource rights ((  e.g., Lars  on et al., 201 0; 
E. Ostrom et al., 1999; Ribot and Lars on, 2005). 
However, the message conveyed  by  the  works of Gerring and  Thacker, Vincent and 
Elinor  Ostrom,  or  James  Buchanan  seems  clear.  It  is  the  working  out  of  effective 
constitutional arrangements and the consequent performance of governments that need to be 
considered, not whether astate is  centralist or decentralist. Whether unitary or federalist, the 107 
performance of a state  government  tends  to  increase  when  democratie  institutions  favour 
proportional  representation,  inclusive  government caucuses, strong and  legitimate authority, 
and open deliberative processes (Gerring and Thacker, 2008). On the other hand, systems that 
concentrate  the  prerogatives  of rulership  in  the  bands  of a relative  few,  with  little  or  no 
constitutional  constraints  or safeguard,  will  tend  to  limit the  capacity  of a polity to  affect 
change and  achieve sustainable outcomes, regardless of the  nature of the  regime  itself (see 
Chapter II).  For in the absence ofwell-defined and enforceable rules that either sets  limits on 
the  actions  of government,  increases  accountability,  or  conditions  what can  and  cannat be 
clone, "rulers are likely to shirk their responsibilities" and use the privilege oftheir position to 
extract greater benefits for themselves or their constituencies (McGinnis, 2000, p. 8). 
While theoretical models of good government provide useful  standards for comparing 
the institutional design of various political experiments and for developing useful  predictions 
on  the  expected  benefits  of different  arrangements,  they  are  not  a substitute  for  empirical 
inquiry.  Whether and  how  theoretical  models  apply  to  particularised  circumstance  requires 
careful  consideration of the  nature  of the  regime  in  place  and  a clear understanding of its 
evolution (Steinmo, 2010).  Since the  performance of constitutional choice rules can only  be 
assessed over time (Buchanan,  [1981]  2001), it follows  that to  understand  the  strengths and 
weaknesses of a political  institution, one needs  to  appreciate "the  forces  and  dynamics that 
have  shaped"  the  experiment  under  consideration,  to  "both  [exp lain]  adaptations  and 
[understand] the consequences  of those  adaptations"  (Blyth  et al.,  2011,  p.  303).  For  in  a 
world of increasing complexity and rising social and  environmental dilemmas, the challenge 
that communities and governments will increasingly face is that of change. Understanding the 
bottlenecks and adaptations that allow communities to overcome the dilemmas they face and 
maintain  social-ecological  parameters  within  bounds  will  require  renewed  interest  in  the 
constitutional leve! of anal y  sis. 
3.2.7  Improving Social-Ecological Outcomes 
Achieving sustainable outcomes  in  complex social-ecological systems  where human-
environment  interactions  necessarily  differ  across  social,  political,  and  biophysical 
geographies lies at the heart of modern-day environmental dilemmas. Since social-ecological 
linkages  are  multi-variant  in  nature,  then  addressing  complexity  and  variations  in  the 108 
environment should  be  met with  covariant  responses  in  the  behaviours of individuals  and 
their  communities.  Following  Ashby's  (1956)  law  of requisite  variety,  Vincent  Ostrom 
(1997, p.  121) posits th at "it takes access to potential variety to  res pond to variety in  a way 
that maintains some essential value or values within limits." In  short, maintaining social and 
biological diversity  requires access to  institutional diversity.  This implies generating access 
to  variable  adaptive  strategies,  which  in  turn  suggests  that  to  be  effective,  sustainable 
resource governance has to  be adapted to the ti me and place exigencies of social-ecological 
interactions. In other terms,  crafting rule-ordered relationships that can address the adaptive 
contingencies of complex social and ecological environments requires shared communities of . 
understanding that are able to draw upon local  knowledge and  experience to devise locally 
adapted and socially appropriate solutions. In the simple though eloquent words of Wendel! 
Berry  (2012,  p.  91),  we  must,  "[b]y  way  of correction, ...  make  local,  locally  adapted 
economies, based on local nature, local sunlight, local intelligence, and local work." And yet, 
recognizing that the scale and  scope of our social-environmental  dilemmas  far  exceed  ali 
known  historical,  biophysical  and jurisdictional  boundaries,  solving the  myriad  issues that 
humanity now faces also hinges critically on creating rule-ordered relationships that support 
the human capacity to draw upon experience, reflection and choice to devise alternative rule 
arrangements for coping with collective action problems at multiple scales of aggregation (V. 
Ostrom,  [1999]  20 12). In considering the worth of centralist  and  decentralist  perspectives 
exposed above, it seems somewhat self evident that either/or choices, relative to the rules that 
govern  our relationships,  will  not  provide  the  soluble  solutions  that  polities  will  need  to 
deve1op  in  order  to  address  the  problems  they  face  in  a  world  of  increasing 
interdependencies. 
In  order  to  maintain  values  within  limits,  in  complex  multivariate  environments, 
political institutions will need to develop "error-correcting procedures in the organisation of 
decision-making  processes" (Ibid.,  p.14  7).  Th  at is,  the  development of organisational  and 
institutional  mechanisms by  which "diverse forms  of analysis can be mobilized  and where 
each form of analysis can be subjected to the critical scrutiny of other analysts and decision-
makers" (V.  Ostrom,  1973,  quoted  in  Aligica and  Boettke,  2011,  p.  43). Error-correcting 
procedures thus involve the use of mechanisms that can facilitate, rather than stifle, learning 109 
and the development of adaptive rule arrangements (V. Ostrom,  1997, p.  147; Vanberg and 
Buchanan,  1994,  p.  191).  functional  deliberative  processes,
35  of the  kind  proposed  by 
Gerring and Thacker (2008), offer a strong step in the right direction, as do the need inclusive 
and  authoritative  decision-making  structures.  ln  opposition  (or  rather  juxtaposition), 
polycentric forms  of governance offer another type of purposive institutional  structure that 
has been associated with positive social-ecological outcomes (E. Ostrom, 201 0). Composed 
of dispersed, independent, and  overlapping systems of administration, polycentricity has the 
potential of yielding greater institutional  flexibility and adaptability (V. Ostrom and Ostrom, 
[1971]  2000;  V.  Ostrom  et al.,  1961).  In  such  systems,  different  competitive  forms  of 
collective organizations, capable of taxing and regulating the use of collective-consumption 
goods and ensuring the production of valued public goods, can provide viable alternatives to 
hierarchical bureaucracies (V. Ostrom, [2007] 2012). So called "quasi-market arrangements" 
can  thus  shift  the  burden  of complexity  associated  with  highly  structured  hierarchical 
organisations to "networks of inter-organisational arrangements" that are more adaptive and 
less encumbered by the problems inherent in  larger forms of association (Ibid., pp.  598-599). 
Instruments of this  nature are increasingly being observed and  discussed in  areas related to 
the  environment  and  natural  resource  management,  as  communities,  private  sector 
organizations  and  public  service  providers  develop  alternative  arrangements  for  solving 
environmental problems at various  scales of interaction (Delmas and  Young, 2009; Lemos 
and Agrawal, 2006). 
While some argue that recourse to  a  single center of authority  for  dealing with  the 
aggregate  but  distinct  problems  of society  are  bou nd  to  fai 1 (E.  Ostrom,  2005,  201 0;  V. 
Ostrom,  [1987]  2012,  [1991] 2012, [1999]  2012), others point out that centralised systems 
tend  to  outperform  decentralist  institutions  on  nearly  every  front  (Gerring  and  Thacker, 
2008).  In  truth  it  seems,  both  perspectives  are  right  and  both  approaches  are  needed  to 
confront the challenges that societies face.  For in  the end,  both argue for the  need  to  have 
35  Five assumptions  underly  the effectiveness of deliberative processes (Geering and Thacker, 2008, pp.  173-174):  1)  people 
within a  political community are endowed  with  equal  moral value; 2) deliberation focuses on the  needs and desires of  the 
wh  ole  community,  rather  than  on  particular  interets  or  ideologies;  3)  a  wide  variety  of  goals  may  be  relevant  to  the 
consideration of any particular policy issue; 4) the process of consideration is truly deliberative - thal is, logical (not internally 
contradictory), evidence-based (wherever relevant), and disinterested (not merely a reflection of one own intercsts); and 5) the 
process of deliberation is  oriented to\\ ard a consideration of consequences. Only by considering alternative outcomes can we 
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institutions that are responsive to the needs and aspirations of commonwealths, whether local, 
regional,  or  global.  Devising  alternative  arrangements  however,  requires  an  explicit 
understanding of the  constitutional  leve!  of analysis,  the  need  for  normative  inquiry,  and 
access to the constitutional and collective choice arenas wherein such decisions are made. As 
Vincent  Ostrom  ( 1997)  argues,  democratie  polities  will  rem ain  viable  constitutional 
experiments  so  long  as  citizens  recognize,  understand  and  sustain  Alexander  Hamilton's 
reflexive inquiry on the capacity of individuals to establish "good government from reflection 
and choice" and Tocqueville's conditional response that such a challenge can only be met by 
a democratie literacy rooted in "the art [and science] of association." 
3.3  Constitutional Provisions of Canadian Provinces 
The preceding overview of the theoretical implications of constitutional choice for the 
administration of public affairs  suggests  that the nature of social  order can  have  profound 
effects  on  the  ability  of a  given  political  economie  structure  to  solve  collective  action 
problems and engage the creative potential of citizens to find  alternatives and Pareto better 
solutions to the dilemmas they face.  Understanding how Canadian provincial governments 
compare to the theoretical alternatives is necessary for developing a testable hypothesis of  the 
influence  of the  rule-ordered  relationships  on  the  use  and  management of public  forest 
resources. This section provides an overview of the key  constitutional features of Canadian 
provincial  governmerits as  they apply to Québec.  Details related to  the actual  evolution of 
Québec's constitutional framework are explored in the subsequent chapters. The intent here is 
to  capture  the  essence  of social  order  in  the  province,  particularly  as  it  applies  to  the 
dominant role of the executive in the administration of public affairs.  With the overarching 
theoretical  framework  of the  thesis  thus  established,  the  chapter  concludes  with  a  brief 
inquiry into the constitutional dimensions of natural resources use in  Québec, particularly as 
it applies to  public forests, and the consequences that may be expected to flow  from  such a 
situation. 111 
3.3.1  Executive Government 
The  government  of  Québec  is  derived  from,  and  structured  according  to,  the 
Westminster  Parliamentary  system,  and  the  long-standing  customs,  traditions  and 
conventions  that  have  informed  British  democratie  institutions.  Executive  and  legislative 
functions are therefore fused and  parliament reigns supreme over the powers conferred to  it 
through the British North American Act of 1867, and the subsequent decisions of  the Judicial 
Comi.nittee of the Privy Council (until 1949), the Supi·eme Court of Canada (after 1949), and 
the constitutional amendments instituted in the wake of patriation in  1982. Bence, other than 
issues  and  disputes  related  to  the  jurisdictional  boundaries of legislative  powers  between 
federal  and  provincial governments, the authority of the Québec's National Assembly (past 
and present) is  not bounded by  any external source of power, other than its own legislation 
and the confines of its  legislative authority, as  defined by  the constitution (Barr, 2006). 
36 In 
effect, the British constitutional principle of the unlimited sovereignty of the legislature has 
had the effect of reducing the  role of the courts to  that of a  constitutional  arbiter between 
federal and provincial powers(Mallory, [1984] 2011, p.  8). Consequently, the government of 
Québec is  best understood as a unitary government within a federated state. It is  centralized 
and centralizing by  nature, delegating only those powers and administrative functions of its 
own choosing to regional  or local  units,  while retaining the authority to change, modify or 
abrogate past decisions and legislation as required.
37 
As  with other Canadian provincial jurisdictions, cabinet (i.e.,  the executive council or 
council  of ministers  in  Québec)  is  the  pivotai  and  centripetal  force  of provincial  politics 
(Bernier et al., 2005; Dunn, 2006). Cabinet is formed by ministers appointed from the elected 
members  of the  legislature,  who  are  both  individually  and  collectively  responsible  and 
accountable to  Parliament (customarily  referred as  the National  Assembly  in  Québec) and 
together with the Lieutenant Governor, it fonns the government. Consequently, government 
may  retain  power for only as long as  it  maintains the confidence of the Assembly (White, 
2006,  p.  256,  see Responsible  Government below).  However,  like the  Westminster mode! 
36 Barr (2006, p. 279) emphasizes this point even more strongly by adding thal "Canadian provincial court systems are not only 
disengaged from the central  processes of  provincial politics, [they] are [also] disengaged to a greater extent than the courts in 
other federal systems." 
37 Following Dicey ([ 1885] 1915, p. 249): "Parliament is, from a merely legal point of view, the absolu te sovercign of the British 
Empire, since every Act of Parliament is  binding on every Court throughout the British dominions, and  no  rule, whether of 
morality or of law , which contra  venes an Act of Parliament binds any Court throughout the real m." 112 
upon which it is  based, adherence to the principle of the separation of powers, in terms of the 
executive,  legislative,  and  judicial  functions  of government,  is  figurative  only.  For  the 
executive Council is "the" principle decision-making body of government. It is the executive 
that defines the policy agenda, administers the state, applies the law, adopts rules (orders-in-
council) and regulations, defines the bills that will be submitted to the National Assembly for 
its consideration and approval, appoints senior officiais and the heads of public corporations 
or  organizations,  and  supervises  the  actions  of ministries,  including  the  allocation  and 
distribution of resources.  Although elected members may  introduce bills  or amendments to 
bills for legislative consideration, as per Section 90 of the Constitution Act (1867), they must 
first  obtain  approval  from  the  Lieutenant-Governor  (i.e.,  the  premier),  which  in  politica1 
parlance  implies  that few  private  members'  bills  ever get  introduced - a  situation  that  is 
further restricted  by  the fact  that only  ministers  can bring forward  supply  Qr  money  bills, 
since  "private  members'  bills  may  neither  raise  taxes  nor  directly  allocate  government 
spending" (White, 2006, p.  258). Bence, not only is "power concentrated in  the cabinet" but 
also the whole apparatus of government is itself "executive-dominated" (White, 2006, p. 257 
emphasis  in  original).  Though  the  "style"  of the  executive  may  have  changed  over  the 
decades,  from  the  "unaided" and  relatively  simple  cabinet structure to  the  more complex 
"institutionalized  cabinet"  and  its  more  diversified  decision-making  bodies  and  standing 
committees  (Dunn,  2006;  see  also  Bernier et  al.,  2005),  power has  consistently  migrated 
closer to  the centre, not away from  it,  thus broadening the executive's span-of-contro1  and 
decision-making authority over the fonctions and departments of government (Ibid., p.  231 ). 
Key  to  understanding  the  impo1iance  of the  centralizing  tendencies  of provincial  (and 
federal) politics lies in the notion that "cabinet government, under the Westminster system," 
implies  "collective  government"  (White,  2006,  pp.  256-257).  In  other  words,  "cabinet 
solidarity" is  not simply a survival strategy, "it is  a constitutional princip1e. lt means that ali 
ministers are  responsible for and must support government decisions regardless of whether 
they  personally  favour  them"  (Ibid.).  This  implies  party  rule,  a  steadfast  commitment to 
official  party  script,  and  strict  discipline  within  the  ranks  of the  cabinet  and  caucus 
backbenchers.  Individual  liberty,  freedom  of expression,  and  independent  voting  are  not 
acceptable patterns of behaviour, for the unity  of power ultimately depends on the unity of 
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At the head of the executive is the Prime Minister (or Premier) who has the sole ability 
to  define the contours of government, appoint line ministers, and set the  policy  priorities of 
government. The Premier is, in effect, the "architect of the general  machinery of the central 
executive"  (Dunn,  2006,  p.  217).  The  organization  of the  executive,  the  distribution  of 
patronage, and the ability to make or break political careers ali  lie  in  his or her hands (Ibid.). 
And yet, none ofthese powers exist in a strict constitutional sense (Dunn, 2006, p. 215). Ail 
have  been  derived  from,  and  established  through, the  conventions  and  exigencies  of the 
British  Parliamentary  system from  whence  the  power  and  legitimacy  of the  executive  in 
Canadian governments originates (Savoie, 2010). Put differently, the Canadian constitution is 
customary,  and  needs to  be  interpreted  in  light of conventions  and  past judicial decisions 
(Mallory, [1984] 2011, p.  8). As in the Westminster tradition, it relies on  unwritten "customs, 
practices, maxims, or  precepts"  that  are  neither  recognized  nor  enforceable  by  the  Courts 
(Dicey, [1915] 1982, p.  244). These unwritten rules are known as constitutional conventions, 
and  in  the parliamentary tradition, they are used  to determine how "the discretionary  powers 
of the Crown  ought  to  be  exercised" (Ibid., p.  246).  In  other words, they  determine "every 
kind  of action  which  can  legally  be  taken  by  the  Crown,  or  by  its servants,  without  the 
necessity  for applying to  Parliament for  new  statutory authority" (Ibid., p. 247). However, 
since  conventions  are  not  legally  enforceable  or  binding,  governments  have  been  apt  to 
interpret such "ru les" to their advantage and  th us expand the boundaries of the ir prerogatives 
to suit their political and administrative motives (Mallory, [1984] 2011; Hicks, 2010). At the 
federal  leve!,  the  indeterminate  nature  of such  conventions  have  essentially  "allowed  the 
Prime  Minister  to  reshape  relationships  in  government  almost  at  will-as, for  example, 
turning  cabinet  into  little  more  than  a  focus  group  for  his  benefit  and  the  benefit  of his 
advisors" (Savoie, 2010, pp.  172-173; Hicks, 2010). Similar trends have been observed at the 
provincial  leve],  where  executive  councils  are  becoming  increasingly  premier-centered 
(Bernier  et  al.,  2005).  The  growth  of a  presidential-like  system  without  the  institutional 
safeguards of a presidential  system has been observed as  a worrying trend amongst political 
and  constitutional scholars  for  severa!  decades  (e.g.,  Dunn,  1990;  Hicks,  2010;  Mallory, 
[1984] 2011; Savoie, 2010). 114 
3.3.2  Responsible Government 
The most fundamental constitutional convention of the Canadian political  system  lies 
in  the  principle  of responsible  government, which  was  progressively  instituted  in  British 
North  American  colonies  during the  l840s  (Mallory,  [1974]  2011 ; Russell, 2010; Savoie, 
2010;  David E.  Smith, 2006; White, 2006).  Responsible government implies  that executive 
powers, which are  formally  vested  in  the  Crown, must  be  placed  under  the direction  (i.e., 
council) of elected members of the legislature that hold the confidence, and thus the majority, 
of Parliament.  lt is  the  underlying democratie  principle of the  Westminster system  and  by 
extension, that of Canada  as  weil.  However,  as  with  ali  constitutional  conventions, there 
exists  no  legally  accepted  definition of responsible  government, nor  is  it  mentioned  in  the 
Constitution  Act  of  1867  and  the  amendments  and  judicial  decisions  that  followed. 
Ministerial responsibility implies that elected or appointed officiais are ultimately responsible 
for  what they  do  and  therefore  accountable to  the  legislature  and  the  public  itself (Dunn, 
1988;  Smith,  2006).  Under responsible government, ministers  must bear the  full  weight of 
political  and  legal  responsibility  for  their  actions  as  weil  as  the  conduct  of those  senior 
officiais who report to them. Any breach of trust, violation of ethics or other serious mistake 
must be met with the resignation ofthe appointed minister. Y  et, as recognized by ali students 
of the British parliamentary system, application of the ministerial responsibility doctrine has 
so  far  proven  difficult  (Dunn,  2006,  p.  222).  In  fact,  responsible  government  "does  not 
mean ... that any government defeat is cause for an election or for the government to resign." 
It merely suggests that government may  "suffer nothing more than political embarrassment" 
(White, 2006, p. 256; see also Mail ory, [ 197 4]  20 11, p.  23 ). 
Constitutional scholar James Mali my goes even further in  his  criticism of the system. 
The Westminster mode!  that was  used  to  construct the Canadian constitution, Mallory adds 
([1974] 2011 , p.  22), is essentially "a product of nineteenth-century England, and  as  such, it 
is not a democratie constitution, but an  oligarchie one.  The center of authority  in  the system 
was  not  the  people, but  the  legislature,  and  a  government  which was  able to  control  the 
legislature could govern  without serious  interference between elections." The reason for this, 
Mallmy (Ibid.) contends, is that Canada developed a party system along with an elitist system 
of  representation  that  provides  "little  or  no  opportunity  for  popular  participation  in 115 
government"  (see  also  Dunn,  1990;  Mallory  [1984]  2011;  Savoie,  2010;  Smith,  1991; 
Sproule-Jones,  1984;  White, 2006).  The  citizenry  is  in  fact  far  from  the  real  decisions  of 
government. As Mallory puts it,  the "cabinet system  provides strong institutional barriers to 
the development of more democratie ways of doing things" ([1974] 2011, p.  22). Other than 
the scrutiny of the legislature (i.e., opposition), the press, and the threat of public discontent 
or electoral defeat, there are no countervailing forces outside the reach of cabinet that can be 
used  to  restrain  the  legislative  actions,  policies  and  spending measures  of government,  as 
long as  such eff011s  do  not  intrude  on  the contested  constitutional  playing field  of federal-
provincial  politics  or  the  sensibilities  of the  electorate.  Hence,  ali  provincial  legislatures, 
White  (2006,  p.  257) argues, share a common set of characteristics that ultimately  weakens 
their ability  to  enforce the  idea of responsible government,  including: cabinet control  over 
policy  and  legislative action; adversarial tensions  between  government and  opposition with 
minimal  private member involvement  in  policy-making; asymmetries  in  the  distribution of 
resources  backing  the  cabinet  (permanent  bureaucracy  and  access  to  funds)  versus  those 
available to private members or the opposition; and "debilitating restrictions on the powers of 
committees to  determine public policy orto control  government activities." Add  to  this  the 
subjugation  of parliamentary opposition  under  majority  rule; the  "failure  of the  public  to 
understand  how  the  system  should  work"  (Mallory,  [1974]  2011,  p.  22);  the  use  of the 
governor's  reserve  powers  (or  Lieutenant-Governor)  to  advantage  the  executive  over  the 
legislative  bran ch  (Hicks,  2()1 0);  the  consistent  appropriation  of Crown  prerogatives  by 
provincial executives without any formai recognition of such authority in  either the Canadian 
or  provincial  constitutions  (Smith,  1991,  p.  460),  the  fact  that  the  number  of electoral 
divisions  is  only  loosely based  on  the  number of eligible voters  and  that governments can, 
and often do, win  majority positions with Jess than fifty percent of the electoral vote (Siaroff, 
2006), and  the picture that begins to  emerge is  anything but the democratie ideal  that most 
citizens in Canada arguably aspire to. Once in power, majority governments have little to fear 
from  opposition  and  the  threat of no  confidence  is  but  a  covenant  without  the  sword,  as 
Hobbes would put it (Mali ory, [ 1974] 2011, [ 1984] 201 1; Smith, 1991 ). 
Hence,  even  though  provincial  legislatures  now  have  access  to  a  wider  range  of 
resources than they did in the past, they have not "reversed the underlying cabinet domination 116 
of provincial  [governments]  in  any  fundamental  way"  (White,  2006,  p.  273).  The  idea of 
responsible  government  can  help  legislatures  "set  the  parameters  of acceptable  behaviour 
... by  requiring  public  office holders  to  exp lain  and  defend  the ir  actions  before a skeptical 
opposition" (Thomas, 2010, p.  169), but they can do little to change the underlying dynamics 
of a system, which opposition members have historically been inclined to  suppo11.  As  White 
(2006,  p.  272)  underscores,  "[i]f  provincial  legislatures ...  seem  impervious  to  genuine 
reform," it  is  "because cabinets  are  notoriously  unwilling to  give  up  any  of their extensive 
powers and because too many  members are unwilling or unable to  imagine alternatives to the 
prevailing political order." 
However, "[n]o society ...  is  immune  to  the strategie opportunism  and  moral  hazards 
engendered by the Faustian bargain" that provides "instruments of evil to real ize the corn mon 
good ... [The]  critical  issue  ... is  whether  the  principles  of rule-ordered  relationships  can  be 
extended to  place limits on  those who  exercise governmental  prerogatives, by  recourse to  a 
constitutional  leve!  of choice" (V.  Ostrom, 1997, p.  141). Limiting opportunism  in  systems 
that  grant  a  monopoly  over  the  prerogatives  of  rulership  requires  lawful  institutional 
arrangements  that  are  beyond  the  reach  of governments,  citizens  that  are  aware  of the 
normative  bounds  of authority,  and  low  cost  monitoring,  sanctioning,  and  adjudication 
procedures that can help enforce such rules (Ibid. ; see also Hayek,  1979, p.  129). The overall 
structure of political order in Canada may have gotten more complex si nee the early eighteen 
hundreds,  but the  extent to  which these  institutions have  evolved  in  any  way  that can  help 
sustain more  productive rule-ordered  relationships or support communities at  various scales 
of aggregation  to  cope  with  the  exigencies  of complex  social-ecological  problems  are 
questions worthy of sorne reflection. 
3.4  Conclusion: The Special Case ofNatural Resources 
In  light of the  preceding sections, it  is  worth  restating here the  principle argument of 
this thesis, namely  that the struggle  to  develop and apply more sustainable patterns of forest 
resource use in  Québec  is fundamentally tied to the constitution of rule-ordered relationships 
within the province. Such a hypothesis, though bold, is not unfounded. As this chapter shows, 
the theoretical  underpinnings of constitutional  choice rules  and  the consequences that might 
be expected to flow from different models of social order are substantial, and neatly affect the 117 
ability of communities to fi nd durable solutions to problematic situations, including complex 
social-ecological  problems.  Understanding  how  realms  of ideas  inform  choices  that  are 
constitutive of rule-ordered relationships  in  hum an  societies  is  crucial  (V.  Ostrom,  [1991] 
2012).  "Diagnostic  assessments"  of  "problematical  situations"  in  human  relationships 
requires "a critical awareness about how social realities get constituted in  ...  societies" as weil 
as an ability to either draw on reflection and choice to derive theories applicable to alternative 
rule-ordered arrangements, or access to alternative models of social order that can be used as 
intellectual resources to critically scrutinize the "sources of perceived difficulties" in a given 
social order (Ibid., pp. 290-291 ; see also V.  Ostrom, 1997). Institutional choices should thus 
be  regarded  as  theories  informed  by  ideas  and  knowledge,  or  shared  communities  of 
understanding,  that  express  tentative  causal  relationships  between  institutional  facts  and 
observable  realities  (i.e.,  deeds,  actions  and  outcomes  in  social-ecological  systems).  By 
providing  "the  basic  rules  for  political  arder  and  political  decision-making"  (Buchanan, 
[ 1981]  2001, p.  44 ),  constitutional choices affect not only the ru les of the game but its  very 
nature (V.  Ostrom,  [1979]  2009,  p.  15).  They are the governing structures of society that 
frame the conduct of  government (V. Ostrom [1982]  1999), defi ne  the rights and freedoms of 
a polity, and provide assurances for adjudication and due process (Thomas, 2010, p.  169). 
Awareness of the importance of the constitutional leve] of analysis for the diagnosis of 
problematic  situations  in  rule-ordered  relationships  and  the  consequences  that  can  be 
predicted to follow from alternative arrangements provides a critical framework for assessing 
the  nature  of rule-ordered  arrangements  within  the  Canadian  provincial  context.  As  the 
following  chapters  intend  to demonstrate,  the  path  of forest  resource  use  in  Québec,  the 
problems that succeeding generations have had to  confront, and  the challenges that can be 
predicted to occur in  the future - ali  directly or indirectly relate to the constitutional choices 
that were used  to  establish the  terms and  conditions of natural  resource governance in  the 
Province. 
Of particular significance to this thesis is  the constitutional convention that informed 
the  nature  of  the  relationship  between  the  executive  government  of  Québec  and  the 
province's natural resources. The right to use, manage, allocate and alienate natural resources 
within the Canadian provincial context is  derived from a  residual  prerogative of the Crown 118 
that is  constitutive of a "discretionary authority" granted  to "the executive government" to 
lawfully act "without the authority of [an]  Act of Pari iament" (Di ce  y, [1915]  1982, pp.  24 7-
248). Residual prerogatives refer to the "discretionary power left at any moment in the bands 
of the Crown, whether such power, is  in fact exercised by the [Sovereign] himself or by  his 
Ministers"  (Ibid.).  As  a  convention  of the  constitution,  that  is,  a  "rule for  governing the 
exercise of prerogatives"  (Ibid.), the right to  use and dispose of Québec's natural  resource 
assets  was  granted  on  the  condition  that  revenue  should  be  used  to  defray  the  costs  of 
government and support the general  interests of the province (see Chapters IV and V). As 
long as  resources are exploited for the benefit of the province (however defined), the right to 
determine  the  terms  and  conditions  of natural  resource  governance  in  Québec essentially 
constitutes  an  executive  function.
38  Whether  the  government  chooses  to  consult  the 
population or not,  invite the input of members of the legislature through the instruments of 
parliamentary or legislative committees, and whether it  decides to actually use (or not) su ch 
information are ali subject to the discretionary authority of cabinet. In short, by  virtue of the 
constitutional convention principle, the executive council  in  Québec (as  in other provincial 
jurisdictions)  holds  an  exclusive  monopoly  position  over  what  Ostrom  calls  the 
"instrumentalities of  collective action" (1997, p.  111). And as Hicks (20 10, p. 25) reminds us, 
"the only means of enforcing constitutional  conventions in  the absence of access to a court 
are  extra-legal:  pressure  of public  opinion,  passive  and  active  resistance,  and  ultimately 
revolution." Regardless of whether the issue pertains to mines, minerais, timber, fish,  water, 
hydropower,  inshore  oil  and  gas,  or  the  public  investments  that  are  made  to  support 
exploitive and extractive industries, and the operation of public corporations - ali decisions 
rest in the hands of an executive government wh  ose chief constraint is  primarily electoral. 
The constitutional choices that inform our body poli tic and the sovereign rights of the 
executive  to  direct  the  administration  of  public  forests  in  accordance  with  its  own 
prerogatives are issues that have so far solicited very little interests from social scientists. But 
without a  theory  of constitutional  choice,  efforts  to  explicate  institutional  change and  the 
38  In  virtue  of Sections  91(2)  and  91(12)  of the  BNA Act  (1867), the  Federal government  maintained  rights over  trade and 
commerce and  fisheries respectively, and following a  1967 Supreme Court Decision, it gained the  rights offshore resources, 
including oil  and gas. Since then, Section 92A of the Constitution Act, 1982, provides greater flexibility to the provinces, in 
tenns  of  their  ability  to  tax  and  negotiate  trade  agreements  relevant  to  their  natural  resources.  However,  none  of  these 
fundamentally  changes  the  ownership  of land  and  resources  (Section  1  09)  and  the  ability  of  provincial  legislatures  to 
determine the management and sale of natural resources on both public and private lands (Sections 92(5) and 92(13)). 119 
factors  that  affect  collective-action  in  social-ecological  systems  can  only  lead  to  pa1iial 
accounts  of problematical  situations.  The  evaluative  concern  of constitutional choice  rests 
with the need to consider whether the results produced by  a given set of decision rules yield 
end-state patterns that may  be considered desirable from  the standpoint of normative beliefs. 
If we  assume that politically generated results depend upon the rules that constrain political 
action, then the  positive analysis of the working properties of constitutional order acquires a 
more  fundamental  character for  long term  reform  than  does  the  typical  policy  advise  of 
alternative arrangements under an existing framework of social order. The search for a better 
fit  between  existing  rule-ordered  relationships  and  the  exigencies  of diverse  multivariate 
social-ecological  environments  clearly  suppo1 is  the  need  for  a  new  science  of politics, 
grounded  in  the  positive  analysis  of normative  constraints. One  must  indeed  look  on  ail 
institutions as  potentially improvable (Buchannan [198 1]  2001, p.  49;  [1990]  1999, pp.  383-
384). 120 
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For a detailed summary of the  history of common law, as  it pertains to the Crown's entitlements to land as weil  as 
casual and  territorial revenues, see La  Forest (1969) and  Martin (1920);  For a discussion on forestry on  public lands  from  the 
medieval period to the modern era, particularly as  it applies to North American colonies, see Scott (2008, Ch.  Il). GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
With  the  Treaty  of Paris  of  1763,  the  King  of France
40  rightfully  ceded  "the 
sovereignty, property, possession,  and al! rights acquired by treaty" to the "countries, lands, 
islands, places,  coasts, and their inhabitants"- including the territory known as "Canada" -
to the Crown of Great Britain. The colonial character of Québec and the prerogative rights of 
the English Crown over al!  unappropriated lands, timber, fisheries, and mineral wealth were 
subsequently confirmed by  the Royal Proclamation of 1763, the Québec Act (1774) and the 
King's instructions to the appointed governors ofthe province ofQuébec/Lower Canada until 
the Union act of 1840. In effect, the Crown's royal prerogative over territories acquired by 
cession or conquest gave the  Sovereign  unimpeded authority  over al!  ungranted  lands  and 
entitlement to the territorial and casual revenues derived therefrom.
41 
While  parliamentary  appropriation of the  Sovereign's ordinary  (casual &  territorial) 
and hereditary (excise on beer, eider, and spirits)
42  revenues in  exchange of a civil list (i.e., 
civil government) was fully instituted in England by George IIf,
43  comparable measures were 
not adopted  in  the  colonies  until  William  IV
44  and  the  accession  of Queen  Victoria.
45  In 
Canada,  control  over the  Crown's colonial  revenues  remained  firmly  in  the  hands  of the 
British Parliament (through the appointed Governor-in-Council) until  1840. With the passing 
of the Union Act
46
,  the newly formed Province of Canada gained control over nearly al!  the 
consolidated  revenues of Lower and  Upper Canada (section 50)  in  exchange of a  civil  list 
(sections 52 and 54) and  payment of an annual sum of f75,000 to the Crown to defray  the 
salaries  of the  governor,  lieutenant  governor,  judges,  and  other  government  officiais. 
However, the  Legislative Assembly of Canada quickly contested the partial surrender of the 
-10  As in  the case of the  English Crown, the King of France exercised prerogative rights over ali  ungranted lands and  resources 
prior to  the conques! of 1759 and capitulation of Montreal in  1760. See St. Catherine's Milling and  Lumber Co. v. The Queen 
(1888) 14 A pp. Cas. 46 (J.C.P.C.); Whyte ([1899]  1907); Bouffard, (1921). 
41  The constitutional position of the Sovereign and  prerogative rights over conquered terri tories was made clear in Campbell v. 
Hall  (1774) 1 Cowp. 204, EC vol 98, 848, EC vol 98, 1045. Such rights over territorial and casual revenues were reiterated in 
the Québec Revenue Act:  (1774) 14 Geo lll, c. 88, s. VI (lmp.). 
42 An excise granted to the king, his heirs, and successors forever: (1660), 12 Car. II, c.24 (lmp.) 
43  (1 760), 1 Geo.lll, c.l (lmp.). 
44 (183 1), l Wi ll. IV , c.25 (lmp.). 
45 (1 837), 1 & 2 Yict., c.2 (lmp.). 
46 (1840), 3 & 4 Vict., c35 (lmp.). 134 
Queen's revenues and  in  1846, the province was granted full  control over ali  territorial and 
cas ua!  revenues.
47  By  1852, any lingering doubt over the right of the colonial government to 
the moneys arising from the sale or disposition of colonial Crown lands was finally putto rest 
with the passing of Crown Revenues Act,
48 thus ensuring that ali  Crown revenues could be 
used by the colonies for public purposes. With these final Acts, and the passing of the British 
North American Act
49 and in particular sections 92(5), 102, 109 and 126: 
"the entire control, management, and disposition of  the Crown lands, and the proceeds 
of the provincial public domain, and casual revenues ar ising in  these provinces were 
confided  to  the  Executive  administration  of the  provincial  government  and  to  the 
legislative action of  the provincial legislatures so that Crown lands, though standing in 
the  name of the  Queen,  were with their accessories and incidents, to  all intents and 
purposes the public property of  the respective provinces in which they were situate. "
50 
Hence, the struggle to control the revenues arising from the sale or leasing ofQuébec's 
public (Crown) lands and natural resources lies at the heart of Canada's constitutional history 
and the subsequent development of centralized resource governance institutions in  each of 
the  provinces.  The following  two  chapters  (VI  and  V)  consider how  these  constitutional 
arrangements came to affect the evolution of forest res ource institutions in Québec during the 
period of the representative government (1763-1839) and following the unification of Upper 
and Lower Canada, between 1840-1866). 
•7  ( 1846), 9 Vier., c.ll4 (Can .). 
48  ( 1852). 15 &  16 Vi ct., c.39 (lmp.). 
•
9 
( 1867), 30 & 31 Vict., c.3  (lm  p.). 
50  Comments of Ritchie CJ. in Mercer v. Attorney-General of Ontario [(1903) A.C. 73, p. 79]. 1t should be noted that the term 
'public  property'  has a specifie  meaning  in  the Canadian  context.  As  Lord  Watson  put  it  in  his  ruling over St. Catherine's 
Milling & Lumber Co. v. The Queen  [(1889), 14 A.C. 46, p. 56]: "wherever public land with ils incidents is described as 'the 
property of or as 'belonging ta' the  Dominion or a Province, these expressions mere/y importthatlhe rightto ils beneficia/ 
use,  orto ils proceeds,  has been appropriated to the Dominion or the Province,  as the case may be,  and is  subject ta  the 
control of  ils legislature, the land itself  being vested in the Crown." 135 
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4.1  Introduction 
The development of the timber tracte  in Eastern Canada has  been thoroughly discussed 
by  sorne  of Canada's  most  prominent  historians  and  political  scientists.  To  be  sure,  the 
exhaustive  works  of A.M.R.  Lower  (Lower,  l936ch.  13,14  and  pp.  422-434  in  pa11icular; 
1938, 1973), Creighton (1937),  Gillis and  Roach  (1986), and  Ne11es  (1974), to  name  but a 
few,  certainly  limit the need  for further inquiry. However, one fundamental  story  remains to 
be  told.  As  Creighton  ( 1937)  rightly  perceived, the  development  of earl y  forest  resource 
institutions  in  Canada is  crucially  tied  to  the  country's constitutional  foundations. And  1n 
order to  appreciate  how  and  why  forest  resource  institutions  in  Québec  and  elsewhere  m 
Canada developed the way they did, one needs to  understand how constitutional choice rules 
and collective-choice rights over natural  resource assets jointly evolved in  Lower and Upper 
Canada at the  onset of the  !9th century. This chapter investigates the linkages between earl y 
forest  resource  institutions  and  the  development of centralized  (i.e.,  executive-dominated) 
decision-making authority in the  province. 
Although  the commercial  exploitation  of Québec's forests  began  during the  French 
colonial  period, somewhere around  the middle of the  1  ih century (Fauteux,  1927, pp.  172-
173),51 the high costs of transatlantic  shipping made the expansion of the tracte prohibitive 
and  until  the  end  of the  18
1
h  century,  its  development  remained  relatively  marginal.52 
Consequently,  the  on set  of the  British  regime  is  used  here  as  the  point  of entry  for 
understanding  the  development  of early  forest  resource  institutions  and  the  influence  of 
51 The earliest known set of  rules  regarding forests  in  Québec was  adopted on September 2, 1670.  Intendant  (i.e., governor) 
Talon sanctioned an ordinance declaring that ali  oaks, elm, beech and  birch should  be preserved until  the King's master ship 
builders selected ali  the wood required for naval construction (see Fauteux, 1927, p. 230; Bouffard, 192 1). 
52  According  to  Lower  (1 973, p. 37), the  manufacturing  of  potash, derived from  the  hardwoods cleared for land  cultivation 
started  in  1767 and  by  1770, fifty  tons  or  more  were  shipped  annually  to  Great Britain.  By  1771,  213,000  oak  slaves 
manufactured from timber harvested along lake Champlain was exported from Québec City, and  English market quotations for 
Québec yellow pine (Pinus Strobus, or white pine as it is known today) began around the year 1770. 138 
constitutional  choice  rules  over  their  use  and  management.  The  chapter  ends  with  a 
discussion on the consequences of the 1839 Repoli by  Lord Durham and the breakdown of 
the Constitution Act of 1791, which in turn led to the unification ofLower and Upper Canada 
in 1840. 
4.2  Laying the Foundation:  Institutional Development Under British Rule 
By the time New France was officially ceded to Britain in  1763, the basic  institutional 
structure of what would eventually become Canada's defining approach to  natural  resource 
governance was already  weil  established (lnnis,  [1930]  1999,  pp.  390-391).  Under French 
rule, the King's  prerogative over territories and resources acquired by  cession or conquest 
was absolute; land and resources were administered in the name of  the King by the appointed 
Governor;  appropriation rights  were granted  by  way of charters or licences;  and  duties or 
taxes (i.e., ground rents) were imposed on those who held territorial or concessionary rights 
to  specifie  resource  assets  (Bouffard,  1921,  pp.  5-13; Innis  [1930]  1999,  pp.  106-109).
53 
Further, since the prosecution of tracte  within the mercantile economies of the 1 i" and  18
111 
centuries  was  channelled  ihrough  monopolies  in  Europe  (Ekelund  and  Tollison,  1984; 
McPherson, 2007) with agents  in  the New World  that required access to large supplies of 
goods  to  subsidize  the  high  costs  of trans-Atlantic  shipping,  not to  mention  the  need  to 
control  ever  Im·ger  territories  to  counteract  the  effects  of  overexploitation  and  rent 
dissipation,  5
4 the formation of monopolies in Canada was as  inevitable in  the case of the fur 
tracte  (Innis,  [1930]  1999) as it would later be for the timber and lumber trades of the  19
111 
century (Lower, 1938, 1973).
55 
Following  the  principles  of the  broad  arrow  policy  (Albion,  [1926]  1965;  Scott, 
2008)
56  and the system of naval  reserves  initiated  under the French regime (White,  [1899] 
1907, pp.  148-154  ),  the first colonial regulations to be enacted by the British parliament for 
the management of Québec's forests  centered  on  the  preservation of timber for  the  royal 
53  See also "Report of the Attorney General to Mil  nes" (180 1) in  Doughty and  McArthur (1914, pp. 274-277). 
5-l  See Bouffard ( 192 1, pp. 6-12). Exarnples of such monopolies in  elude: "La compagnie des cents associés," "La Compagnie des 
Indes Occidentales," and later, the Hudson's Bay Company and the North-West Company. 
55  See McPherson (2007, p. 61) for an explanation of the monopolies granted to British subjects. 
56  Heraldric deviee used by the British imperial government to mark its property. The practice of marking trees intended for ship 
building, using three axe strikes that resembled an  arrowhead and  shaft, was initiated in the american colonies during the late 
1600s and later adopted in  the marilime provinces during th  1700s. 139 
navy.  As  specified  in  the  royal  instructions  handed  to  the  appointed  governors  of the 
Province: the (i) waste lands
57  of the Crown were to be surveyed prior to any grant or sale; 
(ii) Crown reserves of pi ne and oak established in every township and in  ali terri tories where 
such timber should be found in abundance; (iii) the cutting or injuring of trees committed in 
trespass was punishable by law; and (iv) a license from the colonial government was required 
to  operate  a  sawmill.
58  With  minor  changes,  these  instructions  were  reiterated  for  every 
succeeding Governor until the Union Act of 1840.
59 
Prior to the renewal of hostilities between France and En  gland in  the last decade of the 
18
111  century, the forests of Québec attracted 1  ittle interest and whatever timber transited from 
the  port  of Québec  City  to  England  usually  came  from  the  Lake  Champlain  watershed 
between Upper New York State and  Vermont (Lower,  1973,  p.  37).  As  the  winds  of war 
spread across Europe in the mid 1790s, the priee of Bal tic timber rose sharply and with it, the 
incentive to exploit the vast reserves of Britain's North American colonies (Ibid. , pp.  46 & 
52). 
Nearly a  decade after the British Parliament adopted differentiai  tariffs  to  reduce its 
dependency  on  foreign  timber and  encourage  the  use  of colonial  stocks,  the  first  known 
contract  to  supply  the  royal  dockyards  with  timber  from  Québec  was  awarded  in  1804. 
Following  the tradition of the navigation and  trade acts  of the  17th  and  !8th centuries, the 
rights  to  Québec's  forests  were  licensed  to  mercantile  houses  in  England,
60  who  then 
authorized their agent(s) in the province to contract locallumbermen to eut and transport the 
requested timber and lumber to Québec city, where it would  be sorted and loaded onto ships 
bound for the United Kingdom. Licenses were usually valid for one year and could be issued 
to  more  than  one  contracter  (i.e.,  licenses  were  non-exclusive)  (Scott,  2008,  p.  404). 
57 The concept of"waste land" is generally attributed to Locke ([ 1691] 1824) who equated waste with unproductive land held in 
"common" (i.e., open access): "land thal isle  ft wholly ro nature, thar harh no improvemenl of  pasturage, Tillage, or planting, is 
cal!ed, as indeed il is, waste; and we shallfind The benefit ofit amountlo li11le more rhannothing (p. 235). 
58  For example, sce: Article 54 of Instructions to James Murray, September 7, 1763; Additional Instructions to  the Governor in 
Chief of the  Province of  Québec, July  2,  1771 ;  Instructions  to  Guy  Carleton, January 3,  1775;  Extracts  of  His  Majcsty's 
Instructions  to  Lord  Dorchestor  dated  September  16,  1791;  Rules  and  Regulations  for  the  Conduct  of  the  Land  Office 
Department, February 17, 1789- Available in Shortt and Doughty (1918). 
59 The Royal  Instructions to Charles Poulet! Thompson (7 Sept. 1839) are the last set of instructions to a Governor General that 
reserved  timber fit  for  the  Royal  Navy.  See "Copy of the  royal  instructions to  the  Right  Hon. C.  Poulett Thomson when 
appointed Governor General of Canada", CIHM no. 9  _0 1287. 
60  Scott, !dies  and  Company held exclusive  rights  to  naval  contracts in  Canada between  1804 and  1814, and  then  gradually 
shifted towards a monopoly that was held by Henry Us borne, Benson and Company from 1818 to  1822. See "Usborne, Henry" 
ln Dictionary of Canadian Biograpfly On fine:  [http://www .biographi .ca/009004-119 .0 l-e.php?&id_nbr=3704] 140 
However, other than granting "leave and permission" to enter into the woods of  the Provinces 
of Upper and Lower Canada "to fel! and eut so many good and sound trees as  may answer 
the  number  and  dimensions  mentioned  in  the  said  contract,"
61  the  requirements  and 
obligations of license holders were rather non-specifie. Save the authority of the surveyor of 
Woods and Forests or his deputy to mark the trees reserved for Crown use (an improbable if 
not impossible task)
62  and the exigencies of the British market regarding the mensuration and 
quality  of the  articles  to  be  expo1ted,
63  those  engaged  in  the  early  trade faced  few  if any 
constraints in their effotts to capture available rents (Lower, 1973, p.  197). 
In response to  the favourable market conditions of the day,
64  the nascent timber and 
lumber trades of British North America grew  exponentially during the first  decades of the 
19
1 11  century.
65  And  as  demand  increased, so did  the  quantity  of wood  being  taken  out in 
excess  of what  was  actually  licensed.
66  Taking  advantage  of the  near  limitless  demand, 
middlemen in  Québec soon began diverting shipments from  the royal dockyards to the more 
lucrative  civilian trade (Lambert and  Pross,  1967,  p.  31) and  with  the  tacit permission to 
appropriate more resources than granted came the incentive for unauthorized entrants to take 
part  in  the  flourishing  timber development.
67  Collectively,  the  inefficiencies  of the  naval 
contracts  and  muted  efforts  by  colonial  officiais  to  monitor  and  enforce  the  basic 
requirements of the admiralty li censes meant th at un til  the 1820s, the forests of British North 
America were essentially dominated  by  open access conditions (Lower,  1973, p. 60). And 
since  the  terms  of the  trade  we.re  no  different  than  the  conditions  that  prevailed  in  the 
neighbouring province of New Brunswick, one may safely posit that to the detriment of the 
61 Extracts of the Royal Warrant and  license issued to Scott, ldle and  Company on October 2, 1807 ln White ([1899)  1907, pp. 
156-57). 
62 Ibid. 
63  See cullers and measurers acts: (1808) 48 Geo3, c. 27; (18 11) 51 Geo.3, c. 14; (1 819) 59 Geo.3, c. 7 (lmp.). 
"' Dulies on colonial timber were repealed from 1806 (46 Geo.3, c. 117) to 1820 (1  Geo.4, c.52) (Jmp.). 
65 Timber from Québec (compared to Baltic sources) for the years  1793-1802 accounted for  1.2% of total British imports. The 
ratio rose to7% between 1803-1807 and an impressive  169% between 1808-1812 ((Ouellet, I980, p. 196). By  1810, the timber 
tracte became the province's most important economie activity (Ibid., p. 195). 
66  Memorial  by  Mr.  C. Shirreff to  Lord  Dalhousie, 28  August,  1828, ln  Brymner, D.  1901.  Report on Canadian  Archives. 
Sessional Paper no. l8, Victoria 64. Ottawa: Printed by S.E. Dawson, pp. VI-X. 
67  Bccause the tracte  was lucrative and enforcement was weak, many lumbermen operated  without specifie contracts (sec Reid, 
1990, p. 50; Lower, 1973, p. 197). Sorne, such as Henry Usborne and Company wcre already operating in  Québec and selling 
supplies to the Royal Navy bath  before and  after the first official warrant was issued in  1804 (Gillis and Roach, 1986, p. 5). 
Others, such Philemon Wright, petitioned the colonial government to ob  tain  land grants, contracted with selliers to obtain  their 
timber, acted as settlers themselves, or simply trespassed in the absence of any legal authority. See First Report of  the House of 
Assembly, 1821 , CIHM no. 21102; and  Lambert and Pross (1967, p. 31). 141 
socio-economic well-being of the colony itself, the distribution of benefits likely  swayed  in 
favour ofthe timber merchants,  as Fisher acutely observed in 1825: 
" ...  the  capital  of the  country  has  be en  wasted,  and  no  improvement  of any 
consequence  made  to  compensate  for  it,  or  to  secure  a  source  of trade  to  the 
inhabitants when the  lumber shall fail. lnstead of seeing towns built, farms improved 
and the  country cleared  and stocked with the  reasonable returns of so great a trade; 
the forests  are  stripped  and nothing  left  in  prospect,  but the  gloomy apprehension 
when timber is gone, ofsinking into insignificance and poverty. "
68 
As  the  number  and  temerity  of lumbermen  began  to  grow,  so  did  the  threat  of 
enforcement and  seizure  by  colonial  authorities (Gillis  and Roach,  1986,  pp.  15-18; Reid, 
1990,  pp.  50-51 ).
69  In  Upper  Canada  and  along  the  Ottawa  river  more  specifically,  the 
depredation committed by  operators acting without the warrant of a  licensed contractor was 
rival led only by the abuse of privilege perpetrated by those acting under the "cl  oak" of an  ill-
defined  licensing  instrument.
70  Combined  with  the  absence of a  designated  and  qualified 
authority to  monitor and enforce rules pertaining to Crown forests  and the King's privilege 
on ceded land (i.e., the preservation of white pi ne for the royal navy), colonial officiais in  the 
early  1820s  were faced  with increasing  reports  of arbitrary  seizures  by  local sheriffs  and 
complaints by  licensed contractors regarding the actions perpetrated by  illegal operators and 
over zealous Crown agents?  To bring  an  end to  the  alleged  interference of privilege and 
what was widely viewed as an "embarrassment to the trade," the then Secretary for War and 
the Colonies, the Earl of Bathurst sent a dis patch on July 22, 1825 to the Lieutenant Go  vern  or 
of Upper Canada urging him to find an agreeable solution to the problem at hand so that "the 
trade might be placed with advantage to  the province and without injury to  the Country."
12 
Y et, however wasteful the situation was in  Upper Canada, the relative absence of similarly 
documented  evidence  in  Lower  Canada  (e.g.,  petitions  from  interested  parties,  official 
correspondences,  or  discussion  within  the  Legislative  Council  and  Assembly  of  the 
68  Fisher, P. [1825]  1921 . History of New Brunswick, St. John:  The Society, lA [historyofnewbrunOOfïsh], p. 73. 
69  Proclamation  issued  under  Craig  (Governor  1807-1 8 11),  24  December,  1808  (Québec  Gazette,  29  December,  1808) 
forbidding unauthorised persons from trespassing on Crown reserves for the purposes of cutting and removing pine and  other 
timber under penalty of law. 
70  "Report  of  the Upper Canada  Execu tive Council , 2  November  1825"  In  Upper Canada  Executive  Council , State  Book  H 
[microform], Ottawa: PAC, pp. 121-124. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Upper Canada Executive Council , State Book H [microform], Ottawa:  PAC, p.  100 142 
province)
73  suggests that up  until this point, the naval contracting system largely operated to 
the satisfaction of those interested in  the trade. However, just as operators began cal ling for 
changes in the rules governing forest resource use in  the Upper province, Lower Canada was 
itself caught in an ongoing political struggle that would ultimately have a direct and profound 
effect on the way natural resources are governed in  Canada, leading to a dramatic change of 
po licy that ultimately benefited the concerns of both licensed and uni icensed operators. 
4.2. 1  The Struggle for Self-Government 
Prior to the unification of Lower and Upper Canada in  1840, the colonial government 
was accountable only to  the British Parliament and the Governor held exclusive veto rights 
over ali  the affairs of the colony.
74  However, displeasure with the administration of colonial 
affairs  grew  steadily  during the  first  few  decades  of British occupancy 
75  and  in  order to 
appease mounting tensions with the inhabitants of the province (both French and English), a 
revised  constitution  was  adopted  in  1791.  Of specifie  interest to  the  evolution  of natural 
resource governance institutions in Québec and Canada more broadly was the creation of an 
elected lower house to  provide a counterweight to  the appointed Legislative and Executive 
Councils.  The  Legislative  Assembly  was  vested  with  the  authority  to  pass  laws  (1791 
Constitution Act, s.  2) and to direct the use and application of duties levied in the Province's 
interest by  way of advice and consent to the law(s) made for such purposes (Ibid.,  s. 46 & 
4  7). But nourished as  it was by the republican ideals of the ti me (Kennedy, 1918, p.  14 7), 
76 
the Assembly followed the letter of the law to a fault and took advantage of the position so 
granted to push the spirit of the revised constitutional arrangements to heights that went weil 
beyond the  intentions of the  imperial  government.
77  Thus  was  born  the struggle for  self-
government and  although  many  issues of contention arose  between appointed  and  elected 
members  of the  House,  none had  as  great  an  impact on  the  evolution of natural  resource 
73 A review of the Journals of the Legislative Council and Assembly of Lower Canada for the years  1791  to  1830, as weil  as  the 
Minute Books of the  Executive  Council  and  Land Council  for the  same  period  revealed  no  specifie  demands, petitions or 
grievances relative to the  state of the carly lumber !rade in  Lower Canada, other than  the necessity to maintain  preferential 
tariffs and anecdotal mentions of fines collected for illegally cutting Crown timber. 
74 See the Québec Act of 1774 ( 14 Ge  o. 3 c. 83) and Article 30 of the Constitution Act of 1791  (31 Geo. 3. c.3 1  ). 
75  For a detailed analysis of this period see Ouellet (1980) as weil as Short! and Doughty ( 1918). 
76  Namely  the  American  constitutional  experiment of representative  government  and  assembly  rule.  See  Kennedy's (1918, 
p.l47) explanatory notes on the period between 1774-1791. 
77  As explaincd  by  the  Sccrctary for War and  the  Colonies, Lord  Liverpool: "ft  is much to  be  regretted thal the Constitution 
estab/ished for the Province of  Lower Canada ...  slwuld appear to have so entirely disa.ppointed the  expectations of  those who 
introduced it." Liverpool to Craig, 12 Sept., 1810, in Kennedy (1918, p. 276). 143 
institutions  than  the  question of revenue,  and  the  struggle  to  control  both  the  sources  of 
supply and the means of  appropriation. 
By  virtue  of the  Sovereign's  prerogatives  over  territories  acquired  by  cession  or 
conquest,
78  revenues derived from  casual and  territorial sources were constitutionally vested 
in  the  Crown and  granted  by  order to  the  king's government to  defray the civil  expenses of 
the province.
79 Further, because the Sovereign was legally designated as the residual claimant 
to  all  territories acquired on  its  behalf, entitlement to  the  permanent revenues of the Crown 
was considered exclusive and thus  unalterable by the actions of the provincial legislature. As 
interpreted at the time, 
"the charge of  carrying into effect the system of  management  ...  are functions so strictly 
of an  Executive  and  administrative  character,  that  they  can  only  be  properly 
discharged  by  those,  in  whose  hands  al!  sùnilar  powers  are  lodged  by  the 
Constitution. "
80 
Concretely, this  meant that  until  unification, the Governor held  exclusive  rights  over 
the  management  and  use  of territorial  revenues,  thus  allowing  the  Executive  Council  to 
appropriate  such  supplies  for  the  benefit  of the  province  without  interference  from  the 
provincial  legislature. 
81  Y  et,  in  spi te of su ch  privileges, the actual  authority of the Governor 
to  make  unilateral decisions was  quite limited since most supplies were legally tied  to fixed 
and permanent charges (Buckner, 1985, pp. 56-57). To finance exceptional services, pay new 
administrative charges, dispense patronage, or even reduce the province's debt, the Governor 
had to work with the elected members of the Assembly to obtain their financial or legislative 
assistance  (Ibid.).  However, after  years  of acrimonious  debates  between  the  Executive 
Council  and  the Assembly, relations  grew to  a standstill  in  the mid-1820s amidst mounting 
78  See General Introduction to Part Il above. 
79  Lord  Dorchestor, 19 April, 1794, JHALC  1794, p.230; Quebec Revenue  Act (14 Geo 3, c.88); and "Report of the Receiver 
General to  Mil  nes  Baronet,"  15  May  1801, in  Daughty  and  McArthur (1 914, pp. 274-277). The Receiver General's report 
provides a detailed account of the constitutional and legal foundations of the Crown's prerogatives over terri tories conquered 
or acquired. 
80 Despatch from Glenelg to Bond,30thJanuary, 1836, p. 25, CIHM no. 34765. 
81  Receiver General to Mil nes Baronet, 15 May  1801 , in  Daughty and  McArthur (1914, pp. 274-277); Liverpool to Craig, Sept. 
12, 1810, in Kennedy (1  918, p. 276); and  Bathurst to Burton 4 June 1825, in  Kennedy (1  918, pp. 339-340). 144 
evidence  of corruption  in  the  management  of Crown  lands,
82  the  growing  debt  of the 
provincial treasury, embezzlement of public funds by a prominent member of the executive, 
83 
and  the  Assembly's  refusai  to  grant  further  supply  bills  without  debates  or  votes  on 
appropriation priorities (see Buckner, 1985, pp. 111-119). 
Following a slew of prorogations and  dissolutions of the Assembly, efforts to bring the 
Lower House under the executive's control only helped to fuel  the Assembly's intransigence 
vis-à-vis  colonial  administrators,  leading  to  a  series  of petitions  and  resolutions  to  the 
Governor and home country for a greater say in  the management of public affairs, including 
the control of ali provincial revenues (Creighton, 193 1  ).  At the ti me however, the very notion 
that the  House of Assembly  should  have  command  over the  permanent  revenues  of the 
Crown was considered "contrary to law  ... and subversive of  al! the princip/es of  constitutional 
government." In short, the "rights and prerogatives of  the  Crown for the due  exercise of  the 
royal and Executive authority over al! or any of  [its] Provinces" were unconditional. 
84  Put 
differently, the task of upholding the prerogatives of the Crown lay squarely in the bands of 
the King's government: 
"The appropriation of  the permanent revenue of  the Crown will a/ways be laid by his 
Majesty's command before the house of  assembly, as a document for the  ir information 
82  Inquiries into alleged corruption in  administration of Crown Lands were carried out by the Lower Canada House of Assembly 
between  1821 and  1824. ln ali, 9  reports were produced, detailing strong evidence of  corruption  and  cronyism  within  the 
provincial  executive,  including  the  allocation  of sorne  2,203,709  acres  to  a  handful  of  individuals  with  close  tics  to  the 
Executive Council (many of  whom resided outside of the province itself), and  instructions from  the  King to  the  governors 
requesting that a  revenue  be  raised from  the sale of Crown lands for the  benefit of the province.  Both of these  facts  were 
evaded by the colonial government and hidden from public view. Consequently, between  1797 and  1821, not a single shilling 
was raised from the sale of Crown lands and not a single petition for land, from a French inhabitant, was answered favourably 
by  the  colonial  administrators.  See  "Lower  Canada,  House  of Assembly  Committee  on  that  Part  of the  Speech  of His 
Excellency the Governor in Chief Which Relates to the Settlement of the Crown Lands," CIHM no. 21102. 
83  The case of Receiver General Caldwell  is an  excellent case in  point. See "Report of the Select Committee on the State of the 
Civil  Government of Canada", in  Kennedy (1918, pp. 345-351). 
s. "Huskisson's  Speech on  Canadian  Aff  airs",  1828, in  Kennedy (1918, p.  343). See also:  "Opinion  on  the  Privileges of the 
Ho use of Assembly", 30 Dec. 1815, (Ibid., p. 297-299); Portland to Simcoe, 20 May  1795, (Ibid., p 234); Liverpool to Craig, 
12 Sept.  181 0, (Ibid., p 276); Chief Justice Monk's Remarks on "Memoire .. . des Habitans"  1814, (Ibid., p. 287); Dalhousie's 
Speech  proroguing  the  Legislature  of Lower Canada,  9  March  1824,  (Ibid.,  p338);  Dalhousie's  Speech  proroguing  the 
Legislature of Lower Canada, 1827, (Ibid., p.341 ). 145 
and ...  will  exclusive/y and invariably  be  applied, under  the  discretion of  the  king's 
government,jor the bene  fit of the province. "
85 
The solution therefore to Lower Canada's growing financial difficulties was to secure 
the independence of the executive by ali  necessary means (see Buckner, 1985, pp. 123-125). 
And  save the  politically  unfeasible  prospect of changing  the  constitution  itself,
86  no  other 
source of supply provided as ideal  a set of conditions for raising a revenue exclusive of the 
Assembly's legislative action than the Crown forests of early  19
111  century Québec. 
Renee, the primary  motive for change did not emerge because of the di stress it caused 
but rather from an acute realization that the status quo left potential gains uncaptured. For al i 
sources of territorial revenues were, by ancient custom, reserved for the expressed pleasure of 
the  Crown  and  made  unalterable  by  the  legislative  action  of colonial  assemblies.
87  In  a 
context  where  the  independence of the  appointed  representative  of the  King's  government 
was  increasingly challenged by the popularly elected members of the legislature, the struggle 
to secure exclusive sources of revenue for the maintenance of the executive's independence 
was  of vital necessity  to  the pursuit of British colonial interests  (Buckner,  1985,  pp.  111 -
127). 
4.2.2  Control Over Resources and Revenues 
When opportunity came to better regulate the timber trade in  the Ottawa Valley, it was 
the potential to generate "a very  considerable revenue  ffor] the Crown" that  served as  the 
85  Bathurst to Burton, 4 Ju!1e  1825, in Kennedy (19 18, pp. 339-340). ln an address dated 22 Fe b. 1837, a re ply from the Ho use of 
Commons to the  grievances expressed by  the  Lower Canada Assembly stated that  "The Governor, Lieutenant  Governor, or 
persan administering the Government of this Province, is entrusted wirh the exercise of  the Royal Prerogative within the same, 
and thal he, (and not the Executive Council) is constitutionally re!>ponsible, as  weil to the Sovereign as to the people of  this 
Province, for the  impartial and  upright  performance  of  the dulies  of his  office ...  and thal any  al/empt to  tramjer  ... this 
responsibility,  and  as  a  necessary  consequence  the power  and patronage  vested by  law  in  the persan  administering  the 
Government,  is in derogation of  the Constiturional Charter, and would be dangerous to the liberries of  the people- injurious 
to the stability of our social and political lnstitutions - and  uT/er/y destructive  of the lies which allach this Co/any  ro the 
British Empire." See 'To the Honorable Hou se of Assembly:  your comminee, to whom was referred .. . the letter of the Speaker 
of the Ho  use of Assembly of Lower Canada ... " CIHM no. 21605. 
86 An attempt by the Colonial Office to passa Union Bill between Upper and  Lower Canada in  1822 fai led in the 3'd  reading of 
the  Bill  by  the  House of Commons due to concerns regarding the proposed  redistribution of power (see Bukner  1985:  116-
199). 
87  This  point was  confi rmed  by  Lord  Aylmer  in  an  address  to  the  Legislature of Lower Canada, dated  25  Feb.  1831. With 
reference  to a  message delivered on 23  Feb. 183 1 in  which the Governor confirmed  the  King's willingness to surrender ali 
Crown revenues  Jevied  through acts of the British Parliament  in  exchange for  a civil  list, the  Governor reaffinned  that ali 
territorial and casual revenues were exempt from the proposed arrangement, incl uding the land fund and  timber fund. In ci ting 
the  authority  under which  such  resources  fall,  Aylmer  writes:  "They  are  enjoyed  by  the  Crown.  by  virtue  of the  Royal 
prerogatives, and are neither more nor less than the proceeds of  Landed Property. which legal/y and constitutionally be long to 
the Sovereign on the Throne." See Appendix AAA, Vol. XL, JALC 183 1. 
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underlying rationale for change.
88  With the advice of local timber merchants Charles Sherriff 
and  George  Hamilton,  the  Upper  Canada Executive  Council  recommended  that  standing 
timber be  priced  to  place the tracte  on fairer and  more equitable terms,  impose "a salutary 
check:'  on  past  abuses  and  ensure  that  government  receives  its  full  share  of dues.
89 
Recognizing that the cutting of timber on the waste lands of the Crown may just as weil "be 
regulated and turned to advantage since it cannat be prevented,"
90  the Executive Council of 
Lower Canada approved  the  proposed  regulatory  scheme,  adding  that  in  future  years,  it 
would  be expedient for the Crown to consider the right of the  provinces'  to  issue  licenses 
direct! y for specifie quanti ti es of timber, within identified territoriallimits and at fixed priees, 
so as  to  discontinue the  inefficient practice of issuing such  licenses  in  England.
91  With this 
endorsement, a joint proclamation was issued on May 3'd and June 24t
11
,  1826  by  Upper and 
Lower Canada respectively, to the effect that hencef01th, "it shall and may be lawfulf or al! 
Our Subjects ... to enter into Our Woods and Forests [within the greater Ottawa Valley}  ...  to 
Cut  and  carry  away  such  Oak  and  Pine  Timber  as  may  be  fit for  the  purposes  of 
Exportation," provided always that certain rates and duties be paid to the said provinces (see 
Table 4.1  below). Smaller diameter trees  were summarily protected  by  the  imposition of a 
double duty on  square timber that was Jess  than eight inches at the small  end (which only 
encouraged  operators  to  eut off the  end  portion  of squared  trees);  those  licensed  by  the 
Admiralty maintained their privilege and were exempt from paying the duties specified in the 
proclamation;  and  activities  related  to  monitoring,  en  forcement  ( duty  collection  and 
seizures),  and  reporting  (for both provinces) were  handed to  a single officer (i.e.,  Charles 
Sherriff) to be stationed at a narrow straight (Chaudière Falls) of the Ottawa  river where ali 
timber harvested from  either side (Lower or Upper Canada) must pass on route to Québec 
City. 
88  Upper Canada Executive Council, State Book H, 2 Nov.  1825, pp.  119-120. ln subsequent writings, the system devised  by 
Sherriff was referred to as "the plan for raising a revenue" for the Crown. See Committee of the Whole Council Report, 9 Dec. 
1826, Lower Canada Executive Council Minute Books, p.l 89 [microform], Ottawa: Public Archives of Canada. 
89 Sherriff and Hamilton to Major Hillier, 18 Aug. 1825, Upper Canada Executive Council, State Book H, p.  101. lt is interesting 
to observe thal as sawmill owners, Sherriff and Hamilton strongly advised colonial authorities to place an exemption on deals 
(i .e., planks)  due to  the  up-front costs  of production and greater competition from  Lower Canada. In  response, the  Upper 
Canada Council recommended a nominal fee of 1 penny per log, compared with  1 penny per frl for square timber. 
90 Dalhousie to Maitland, 26 Feb. 1826, Upper Canada Executive Council, State Book H, pp. 214-216. 
91 9  February 9, 1826, Lower Canada Executive Council , Minute Books, pp.l37-139 [microform], Ottawa: Public Archives of 
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Table 4.1 Upset Priees for Timber
92 
DESCRIPTION  1816 PROCLAMATIONS  1826 TREASURY  1828 LICENSE RATES 
INSTRUCTIONS 
Square Oak  f6 , 5s (1 000 fi') or 1  ~  d/f oot  f4,3s,4d  1  ~  penny/foot 
Square Red  Pine  f4 ,3s, 4d ( 1000 fi') or Id/foot  f3, Os, Od.  1 penny/foot 
Square White Pine  f2 , ls, 8d (1000 fi') or 1-2  d/foot  fl,IOs,Od.  1-2  penny/foot 
Saw Logs for Dcals  2d  /log  2d 1  log  4d (white pine) & 2d (spruce) 1 log 
1000 Standard Staves  f4 , 1s,8d  f4, O s, Od.  f4, ls, 8d 
1000 fi' Hardwoods  - f2, 10, Od.  f4, ls,8d 
Red Pi ne logs  7~  d. each (1837 onwards) 
Note:  f i (pound)= 20s (shtllmgs) = 240d (penmes), and  1  s =  12d. 
Sources:  1826 Proclamation, see  copy of original  in  Reid  (1990, p.  92);  1826 Treasury  Instructions  contained  in  Lowcr 
Canada Executive Council Minute Book (1827) pp. 201-209; 1828 License  Rates specificd in Québec Gazette No. 36, on 26 
June 1828. 
Needless to say, given that severa( million cubic feet oftimber was by then being taken 
out of the  Valley  each  year,  the  appointment of only  one  officer to  monitor  and  ensure 
compliance with the newly devised set of rules was unlikely to  produce convincing results. 
Following the initial trial season of 1826, the duty collector at Chaudière Falls hired his son 
(Robert Sherriff), a clerk and  severa!  men to  measure the timber passing through, while he 
(Charles Sherriff) stationed himself at Québec to collect payments from those who  relied on 
promissory notes to gain  safe passage. The overall efficacy of the revised approach was not 
much better. For instance, in  1827, duty collectors at Chaudière Falls measured some 300,000 
fe of timber,
93  but the overall amount of pi ne, oak, and hardwoods exported from the port of 
Québec City al one was 8,284,114 fe, with an  additional  1,621,648 pieces of deal, boards or 
planks, 1,318,133 st:tves, 1,999 spars, and 938 masts or bowsprits (see Table 4.2 below). 
92 The term "upset priee" refcrs to  the base priee for selling crown timber, the priee at which bidding was to be initiated. 
93  lnspector General's remarks  on accounts provided by Robert Sherriff for timber duties collected in  1827.  19  Feb.  1828, in 
Upper Canada Executive Cou neil State Book H, pp. 443-446. [microform], Ottawa: PAC 148 
Table 4.2Gross Timber Revenues (Sterling) and Timber Exports from the Port of 
Québec from  1827 to 1836 
Tïmber Revenues{!]  Timber Exportsfrom the P«tDt Q1Jebec Ctty[ 2) 
Y ear  BGWSJtJrts/  Spars  Hardv;oods  De~,  boards, 
Timber Re~enue{LCJ Tïmber Revenue(UCJ 
Masts(psj  (ps) 
Oak(cf)  Pine(ct) 
(cf) 
Staves{ps) 
p!anks (psj 
182.7  f52:2  'Ys  7d  f2,7S4  9s.  3d  933  1,999  859,440  1,443,600  345,800  1,318,13,3  1,621,648 
1828  f1,193  17s  9d  f4,176  19s  2d  627  2,070  9&7,800  4,431,160  409,160  1,584,758  1,49'9,156 
1829  f1,249  lOs  lOd  f3,997  2s  3d  973  1,679  976,440  4,940,400  451,200  1,.315,471  953,645 
1830  f3,19S  17s  7d  0 ,672  Os  2d  252  1,458  474,880  4,631,080  401,840  1,133,478  9œ,850 
1&31  f1,714  lOs  9d  f'9,652  Ss  2d  881  1,250  671,040  5,875,520  499,040  955,113  1,062.,113 
1832  0,846  12s  Sd  f6,577  12.s  Sd  1,242  851  736,550  5,958,280  741,520  723,486  1,088,925 
1&33  f1,48:2  Ss  6d  i1,928  12s  3d  776  3,104  945,400  7,472)>20  :d7,750  885,171  2,185,241 
1834  f4,332  14s  Od  B .. 059  9s  9d  1,331  3,849  842,9&0  9,545,710  931,950  1,698,742  2,501,927 
1835  f5,369  ls  2d  f8,583  Os  3.5d  .502  2,190  708,3&0  10,243,540  739,,040  1,552,250  1,482,287 
1836  f3,975  19s  7d  f4,285  17s  Ud  :3-75  1,734  331,.040  10,708,880  848,480  1,366,514  1,7&6,787 
Sources:(lJ Trnber Re>~ enues . for 1827 drawnfrom UpperCënadaExecuttveCounci!State Book H, p. 445  .. AU Otl-,erhguresv,•ere deri\led 
from ''Generai Comm ision Dt Enq  uir'l for C  rcr.un Lënds and Emigration" {1839) Quebec. CIHM no. 9c. 01960; {2) Export data draun from 
Appendices to  JALC. Figures.fDr Pine, Oëk and Hadwoods{EITI, Beech, Ma  pi~  Wa!nut,. Brch, etc) were cooverted from "tons" tocubic fea 
{cf) usingthestënda dof40cub:icfeet /ton tha  wasthen i1 usee 
While the colonial government sought to  take things  into its  own hands and regulate 
access to Crown timber in the ungranted lands of the province, the Colonial Office in London 
issued  its  own  directives  but  a  year  later.  By  order of the  Lords  Commissioners  to  the 
Treasury,  John  Davidson  was  appointed  Surveyor-general  of  Woods  and  Forests  on 
November 13
1 11  1826.
94  While Davidson's appointment respected the colonial government's 
recommendation  that greater  specificity  be  given  to  actual  rights  of license  holders  (i.e., 
licenses were to  be issued for specifie  quantities and kinds of timber within predetermined 
areas for no more than 12 months), London's reluctance to do away with the system of naval 
reserves meant that in  theory, Davidson could  only selllicenses to eut "timber notfitfor His 
Majesty 's Navy. "
95  However, such a privilege was neither realistic nor enforceable. Davidson 
was instructed to auction licenses for no more than 2000 fe (per license).  Public notices were 
94 Complete details of  Davidson's appointment and instructions are provided in  the Lower Canada Executive Council  Minute 
Book,  1827, pp. 201-209 [microform], Ottawa:  PAC.  A similar appointment was given to W.G. Felton as Commissioner of 
Crown Lands in  Lower Canada. 
95 Ibid, p. 209. 149 
to  be  posted  in  June or July of each year,  and licenses were valid for  nine months only.
96 
Moreover,  licentiates  were  required to  enter into  a  bond,  measurers  were  to  be  posted  in 
every  district  to  monitor  and  report  both  the  quantities  and  descriptions  of  timber 
appropriated, general accounts transmitted to the receiver general, and a yearly report handed 
to the Commissioners of the Treasury. 
However, competition along the more accessible reaches of  the Ottawa valley was high 
and  fearing  the  dissipation  of resource  rents,  George  Hamilton  again  made  a  series  of 
recommendations to  the Governor of Lower Canada in  order to  place the  trade within the 
"hands of  capitalists" and prevent "men  of  no  means" from entering the trade and "destroy 
the market, the quality of  the product, and the stability of  the revenue" (quoted in  Gillis and 
Roach, 1986, p.  18). Instead of applying for a specifie amount of wood within a given area, 
Hamilton  succeeded  in  putting  the anus  on  applicants  to  specify  the  actual  districts  and 
quantities of wood for which li censes were sought, and if no other party  made advances for 
the  same  area,  resource  rights  were  granted  to  the  original  applicant.
97  But  the  caveat 
Hamilton managed to introduce was that henceforth, a quarter of the purchase money would 
have to be paid at the ti me of sale with the rest due on October 1  st the following year. And in 
the absence of accessible or affordable credit, few could afford such an upfront payment at a 
time when ali available resources were needed to supply harvesting operations for the coming 
winter. 
Regard Jess of the pretentions that were placed upon the revenue generating potential of 
the timber trade, the income amassed by  the system of dues and licenses remained relatively 
modest prior to unification in 1840. On  average, nearly twice as much revenue was produced 
through land sales in any given year and  compared with Upper Canada timber revenues in the 
Lower province were seldom more than  half of the  receipts collected in  its  sister province 
96 The proclamations of May and June  1826 are  usually  referenced as  the tirst licensed timber sales in  Québec and Ontario. 
However, neither of these proclamations makes such daims. The proclamations made provisions for the  right  to appropriate 
timber on the conditional payment of certain duties only. The first advertised sale of timber (li censes) appeared in the Québec 
Gazette (No. 39) on July 5, 1827, but the sale was.delayed  until  the following year due to the inadequacy of existing surveys 
(Lower Canada Minute Book, 24 June 1827, p.244)- see postponement notice in  Québec Gazette (No.52) dated October 4, 
1827. The first 1icenses were sold the following year (advertisement appeared in  the Québec Gazette No. 36, on 26 June 1828. 
The tirs! colonial  government to former) y adopt soch a Jicensing arrangement was New Brunswick in  1816 (Gillis and Roach, 
1986, p. JO). 
97 Testimony of John Davidson, in  Buller and Durham (1839, p. 52, paragraphs 208-209). 150 
(see Table 4.2 above)
98
.  But in  either case,  the sums  gathered  paled  in  comparison to  the 
actual amounts of timber th at was exported. Supposing that on! y a penny was extracted from 
every foot of oak, pi ne and hard woods, and for every piece of mast, bowsprit, spar, deal and 
stave, the amount of revenue that would have been collected in  say  1834, would have been 
weil over .f64,885 (as opposed to the .f7,392 that was generated for both provinces). Given 
that the actual rates were considerably higher than our example (see Upset Priee for Timber 
in  Table 4.1), and that colonial export data does not include ali  of the wooden articles that 
were actually  exported from  Québec, nor that which was exported from  Gaspé or St.  John 
(St-Jean-sur-le-Richelieu),  evidence suggests  that the  system  was at best inefficient  if not 
inordinately wasteful. 
As a prominent member of Lower Canada's timber trade put it to the 1835 Committee 
on timber duties,
99  the colonial government received a "mere trifling" for the timber granted 
under license. Wh ile this was obviously to the advantage of lumbermen and timber merchants 
alike,  how  could  such  arrangements  be  of benefit  to  a  government  faced  with  chronic 
financial  difficulties? At the time, the forests  of Upper and  Lower Canada were generally 
viewed as being "nearly inexhaustible"
100 and the value of standing timber was considered no 
greater than the labour costs associated with cutting, squaring, milling and ferrying loads to 
Québec  where  they  could  theo  be  exported.
101  Yet,  Crown  lands  and  forests  were  also 
regarded  as  the  primary  economie  assets  of the  province  and  therefore  critical  to  the 
maintenance of imperial order within a largely recalcitrant colonial dependency. As detailed 
in  the numerous petitions sent to the home government in  favour of the preferential duties, 
not only  was the timber trade  the  principal  source of currency  in  the colony,  it  helped  to 
subsidize the importation of British goods and the emigration of tens of thousands of British 
subjects, in addition to  serving as an important nursery for seamen and the only viable means 
98  On this point, it  is interesting to note thar in spi te  of Upper Canada's relative success in  terms of capturing rents (compared to 
Lower  Canada),  a  Commission  on  the  performance  of  the  Crown  departments  of  the  province  in  1839  found  serious 
deficiencies in  the collection of timber revenues, resulting in the dismissal of Charles Sherriff and his son, and a restructuring 
of the entire department. See "Report on the Public Departments of the Province ... of Upper Canada,"  1839, pp. 21, 156-1 62, 
and 305-31  1, CIHM no. 9  _0090 1. 
~es tim on y of John  Nielson (paragraph 2025), in "Report  from the  Select Committee  on Timber Duties"  1835, Parliament, 
London. CIHM no. 9_01807. 
100  See  minutes of  the  Upper Canada Executive  Council , State  Book H, 2  Nov.  1825  [microform], Ottawa: PAC; Shirreff, C. 
1830. "A few reasons against any change in the system of our coloniallumber trade." CIHM no. 21 354. 
10 1 As John  Hamilton put it bef  ore the  1820 Committee on Timber Duties: "ft becomes valuablefromthe labour thal is bestowe.d 
upon it"  (see Reid,  1990, p. 83);  See also the  minutes of evidence presented in  the "Report from the  Select Committee on 
Timber Duties" 1835, paragraphs 2025 and 2696. ------ -----------------------------------------------, 
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of generating  an  income  within  a  largely  poor  and  subsistence-based  rural  economy.
102 
Moreover, in a province dominated. by French-speaking inhabitants wh  ose popularly elected 
Assembly  largely  rejected  the  ascendancy of British  interests  in  the conduct of public and 
economie affairs,  any  instrument that could help  minimize such a  disadvantage was to  be 
encouraged  and  supported  by ali  necessary  means.
103  Hence,  any  attempt to  increase  the 
colonial government's share of revenue from timber would have both hindered those engaged 
in the trade and ultimately inconvenienced its own attempts to even out the balance of power 
within  the  Legislative  Assembly,  by  creating  a  disincentive  for  the  mostly  English 
commercial class to settle in the province and take part in the most important economie sector 
ofthe day. 
4.2.3  Favouritism, Corruption, and Rent Seeking 
Moreover,  the  persona!  interest  of early  colonial  authorities  regarding  the  natural 
resource  wealth  of  Canada  was  undoubtedly  greater  than  what  could  be  openly 
acknowledged. For instance, most members of the Legislative Councils in  Upper and Lower 
Canada were also prominent businessmen with landed interests,
104  and maintained close ties 
to the imperial trading system which, as  in  the case of Sir John Caldwell in  Lower Canada, 
usually implied considerable investments in  the timber and  lumber trades. As such, relations 
between the commercial and merchant classes and the appointed heads of government were 
necessarily close and supportive. The fact that Lower and Upper Canada turned to prominent 
timber producers and lumber manufacturers to  advise them  on the  best course of action to 
regulate the trade in  forest products  is  certainly indicative of the  leve!  of  trust that existed 
(and since remains) between the captains of industry and government. Although the proposed 
system was to the advantage of the colonial governments (a source of revenue exempt from 
the  legislative action of the Assembly),  a  key  incentive for devising  a  more effective and 
equitable set of rules was to provide legal  legitimacy to a  number of firms and  individuals 
whose  economie  progress  was  increasingly  compromised  by  the  illegal  character of their 
unclertakings.  Given that the motives  of those in  power were not dissimilar to  the "useful 
102  "Memorial of the Québec Committee of Trade to the Lords Commissioners of Trade and  Plantations", 28 Jan. 183 1, CIHM 
no. 9_01 671 ; Aylmer to Goderich, 8 Jan. 1831, CIHM no. 9_01 663. 
103  "Address to the Inhabitants of British America,"  1836, Kennedy (1918, pp. 427-431 ). 
l!» Minutes of Evidence by J.  H.  Kerr and Appendix no.  li for Upper Canada, in General Commission of Enquiry for Crown 
Lands and Emigration, 1839. CIHM no. 9_01960. 152 
class of  men" who stood to gain from the introduction of "arder and obedience,"
105  one can 
more easily appreciate the positive response of the colonial government to the demands that 
were placed upon it  by  the burgeoning economie interests of the day and  the corresponding 
permissiveness  of those  officiais  who  were  tasked  with  monitoring  and  enforcing  the 
Treasury instructions of 1826. So wh en  William Priee cal led upon the Governor in  1831  to 
intervene on behalf of the Québec Committee of Trade "to represent the extreme anxiety and 
consternation" of its members concerning proposed changes to the imperial policy on trade 
duties, Governor Aylmer swiftly endorsed the plight of Priee and his associates, and  called 
upon  the  home  government  to  maintain  existing  conditions. 
106  Similarly,  when  George 
Hamilton requested that a twenty five percent down payment be imposed on any one seeking 
a timber license in  order to reduce competition (see above) or demanded exclusive rights to 
the major tributaries of the Ottawa along with a handful of other large firms (in exchange for 
various improvements to  facilitate the movement of timber, such as si ides and dredging), the 
colonial government promptly obliged the interests ofQuébec's nascent forestry lobby. 
107 
The favouritism,  corruption, and  abuse of privilege,  which largely characterised  the 
early licensing arrangements, did not go unnoticed by those acquainted with the trade and the 
workings  of the colonial administration. 
108  The  problem, as  understood by  a wide range of 
contemporary observers, was inherently constitutional. By vestingcollective choice rights in 
a single body of men, unaccountable to the people or an independent judiciary and y et safe in 
the  prosecution  of the  Crown's  unalienable  prerogatives,  members  of the  Executive  and 
Legislative  Councils  were free  to  pursue  strategies  that  supported  their  interests  or  close 
affiliates  and this, to  the detriment of any objectifiable social  welfare measure.  As  Charles 
Buller (1840, p.  10) would later recall, after heading the 1838 Commission on Crown Lands, 
105 Lower Canada Minute Book, 6 dec. 1826 [microform], p. 189. 
106  E.g., Letter from W. Priee to L. Aylmer (8 Jan. 1831) and Aylmer's immediate despatch to Goderich, Secretary of State for 
the Colonies on the same day.ln "Memorial from certain gentlemen engaged in the timber trade in Lower Canada." CIHM no. 
9_01663, 
1 07  See Minutes of Evidence by J. Davidson (paragraph 212), in Buller and Durham (1839); Gillis and Roach (1986, pp. 19-20); 
Reid (1990, pp. lvi-lvii) and Gillis (1975: 97-98). Under the administration of Sir James Kemp! (1828-1830), virtualmonopoly 
conditions su ch as the Gatineau Privilege were given to a handful  of lumbcrmcn at the ex  pense of smallcr opera  tors who were 
obliged to travel further up river, thus occasioning greater costs for the shipment of supplies in addition to the payment of tolls 
or fees for the privilege of using what ever improvements were made. The privileges were maintained until  1843 but as shown 
throughout the remainder of this thesis, the tradition of supporting larger operators at the expense of smaller enterprises never 
withered. 
1œ  Members  of the  Executive  and  Legislative  Councils  did  not  have  exclusive  rights  over the  abuse  of privilege  and  the 
allocation of rent seeking opportunities. ln  his  Report on the Affairs of British North  America, Lord  Durham noted that the 
Assembly was likewise involved in "wasting fize surplus revenues ojtlze Province in jobs for tlze increase of  patronage, and in 
pel/y peddling in parochial business" (see p. 99). 153 
as  pa11  of Lord  Durham 's inquiry  into the affairs of British North America, "the  miserable 
inefficiency of  the irresponsible Executives of  the North American Colonies" and the ~ 'the way 
in  which they have mismanaged and wasted the resources of  the fine countries submitted to 
the  ir rule" was, by the end of  the 1830s, as self evident as the ruinous state of agriculture and 
widespread poverty that was by  th en afflicting the rural population of Lower Canada. 
109 
Although  the  grievances  expressed  by  the  Legislativè  Assembly  during  the  1830s 
regarding the  mismanagement of Crown resources may  have appeared overly  boisterous to 
contemporary  observers,  they  were  not  unfounded.  Consistently,  they  argued  that  the 
"territory and best resources" of the province were made "the subject of  unfair speculation 
and monopoly" by the Ki!!g's Government. 
110  They accused the "Executive Government" of 
abusing its authority by disposing Crown land and timber to "the persona! advantage of  the  ir 
members ... the ir  friends  and  subalterns"
1  11  and  of  "endeavouring  to  crea  te  for 
itself. .. resources  independent of  the control of  the representatives of  the people."
1  12  Though 
summarily  dismissed  by  Crown  officiais,  the  issues  raised  were  not  dissimilar  to  the 
problems that were later  uncovered in  Upper Canada,
113  nor were they  discordant with the 
concerns voiced by pro  minent members of British establishment in Lower Canada: 
"[T]he Legislative Council ...  contains too many persans holding dependent situations 
under the  Crown  and fiable  to  be acted upon by undue  influence ...  The  irresponsible 
manner  in  which  the  Land  Granting  Department  is  conducted,  the  salary 
109  See Ouellet (1980, ch.  13,14  and  pp.422-434 in  particular). Ouellet and even  more  contemporary students of  19'h  century 
Québec (e.g., Egnal , 1996) contend that the failure of agricultural productivity in  Lower Canada, and especially in  the poorer 
districts of  the  province  was  due to  poor land  use  practices,  the  deficiencies  of  seigneurial land  holdings  and  the  largely 
uneducated inhabitants. In  this sense, French canadians were viewed as being ignorant, simple in  custom and  ill  prepared for 
political  innovation  (Ouellet,  1980b, p. 4I8, n.  34). Yet, little  consideration  is  given  to  the  fact  that from  1786 to  1838, 
practically no land was sold  or granted to the  poorer inhabitants of the province, th us limiting their ability to lay fallow  land 
under cultivation or convert new area;  towards agricultural purposes to support the growing population. For detailed inquiries 
into the failures of the colonial land policies, see Buller and Durham ( 1839); and "Reports by  the Committee of the House of 
Assembly on the Settlement of Crown Lands" (182I-I824), CIHM no. 21102. 
110  See "Petition of the  Ho use of Assembly of Lower Canada to  the British Parliament", 26 Feb. 1836, CIHM no. 21568, p. 4. 
From  the  earliest  days  of the  British regime, members  of the  Executive  and  Legislative  Council  took  advantage  of their 
position to bestow generous land grants to one another, their friends, and their families. Sec "Lctter from Joseph Howe to Lord 
John Russell, Kennedy (1918, p. 505): "Address by  the Constitutionalists of Montreal to Men of British or Irish Origin", 1834 
(Ibid., p.396).  . 
111  See "Petition of the House of Assembly of Lower Canada" CIHM no. 21568, pp. Il, 17, and  18. 
112 Resolution 66, "Ninety-Two Resolutions", 2! Feb. 1834, Kennedy (19I8, p. 38I). 
113  See "Seventh  Report from the SelectCommittee of the House of Assembly of Upper Canada on Grievances" I835, CIHM no. 
25940~ "Report on the Public Departments of the Province ... of Upper Canada,"  1839, pp. 2I, 156-162, and 305-3 11 , CIHM 
no. 9_0090I; and  Buller and  Durham ( 1839). 154 
disproportioned  to  the  duties performed,  which  is  attached to  the  office, and other 
abuses connected with the Woods and Forests, demand revision. "
114 
4.2.4  Challenging the Status Quo 
However  sensitive  were  the  various  classes  of citizens  to  the  mismanagement  of 
Crown resources, what distinguished key  opposition groups to  the government's handling of 
its administrative and fiduciary  responsibilities were the means by which the situation ought 
to  be  remedied.  For  members  of the  Legislative  Assembly, the  Executive  and  Legislative 
Councils should be composed of elected representatives and  both they, and the various heads 
of departments, should  be  rendered  responsible to  the Lower House.
115  But,  as  observed  in 
the  conclusions  to  the  second  report  of the  Commission  on  the  Grievances  of Lower 
Canada, 
116  it  was  considered "impossible to  devise any fair and impartial form  of  election, 
through  which  the  great  majority  of a  Council  elected  by  any  constituencies  in  Lower 
Canada could be other than of  the party which dominates in the Assembly. " Su ch  a change, 
they  argued, would  be  "deprecated  in  the most earnest and solemn  manner by almost the 
whole of  the commercial class  in  the Province, and by incomparably the  largest number of 
persans  of direct British  descent. "
1  17  Moderates  represented  by  the  1  ikes  of the  Québec 
Constitutional  Association  viewed  the  Assembly's  efforts  with  distrust  and  believed  that 
adoption  of the  elective  principle  would  inevitably  lead  to  "the  concentration  of  political 
power" within the hands of persons who were decidedly against the ''just subordination of  the 
colony to the parent state."
1  18 In their view, the efficacy of the colonial administration would 
be best achieved through the conti nuance of the Crown's exclusive right to appoint members 
of the  legislature "subject to  such regulations as  may  be deemed proper for ensuring the 
appointment of  Jully  qualified persons."
119  However, given  that such  a measure  would  not 
prevent  the  Assembly  from  controlling  the  various  sources  of revenue,  nor  its  eff01ts  to 
perpetuate what the Constitutional Association described as "anti-commercial polic[ies]," an 
"adverse  disposition...  to  works  of acknowledged  public  utility",  and  the  retrograde 
114 See "Address by the Constitutionalists of Montreal to Men of British or Irish Origin", 1834, Kennedy ( 1918, p. 396). 
115 See "Resolutions of the House of Lower Canada" , 1836, Kennedy ( 1918, pp. 425-427). 
116 See "Reports of the Commissioners Appointed to lnquire into the Grievances Complained of in Lower Canada, 20 Feb. 1837. 
CIHM no. 9_05197. 
117 Ibid., Second Report, paragraph 8. 
118 See "Declaration of the Constitutional Association of Québec" in Kennedy ( 191 8, p. 389). 
119  Ibid, p. 391. See also "Report of the Commission of lnquiry on the Grievances of Lower Canada", General Report, Sect.  1, 
paragraphs 25 to 33. 155 
"institutions of  [a} feudal Europe," an appeal was made to "Sis  ter Colonies" for the adoption 
of "a  Congress  of Deputies from  al!  the  Provinces  of British  North  America"  who,  by 
"strength from  union"  would  counterbalance the  reformist  ideals  of the  Assembly  and  its 
injurious  effects  upon  the  shipping  and  mercantile  interests  of British  North  America. 
120 
Hence, although proponents of  the colonial trade were not above the problems engendered by 
the government's inefficiencies and poor handling of Crown land and natural resources, they 
could  at !east  find  sorne  comfort in  the  fact  that existing  institutional  arrangements  were 
slanted in  their favour.  In  contrast, the proposed alternative of control by  the people for the 
people  appeared  to  promote  ideals,  which,  by  mere  coïncidence  of  proportional 
representation, threatened to shift not only the asymmetrical distribution of the political and 
economie powers that heretofore benefited their ranks  but also the very future of Britain 's 
other  colonial  dependencies  in  North  America  due  to  the  strategie  location  of the  St. 
Lawrence and  its primordial importance in the colonial trade. 
121 
Sensing that relations within the political structure of Lower Canada were at impasse, a 
series of decisive measures were instituted by the British Parliament in  1835  to  prevent the 
escalation of further tensions.  The firm  stance of Lord Aylmer was  replaced  by  the  more 
conciliatory  hand  of the  Earl  of Gosford,  with  instructions  that  he  should  not "advocate 
British interest" or "secure selfish ends" but seek to "maintain the peace and integrity of  the 
Empire,  and to  mediate  between  contending parties  by  whom  those  blessings  have  been 
endangered."
122  As  Governor  General  of British  North  America  and  head  of the  Royal 
Commission
123  for the Investigation of ali  Grievances Affecting His  Majesty's Subjects  in 
Lower Canada, Gosford was tasked with implementing the King's resolve to remedy ali such 
grievances,  "especially  with  regard  to  disputed  question  of revenue."  By  the  King's 
command, Gosford was ordered to communicate the Crown's willingness to "place under the 
control of  the  Representatives of  the People all public manies payable to His Majesty, or to 
His  Officers  in  the  Province,  whether  arising from  taxes  or from  any  other  Canadian 
120  "Address to the Inhabitants of British America by the Montreal Constitutional  Association", 1836, Kennedy (1918, pp. 428-
430). At the ti111e, Québec's timber trade and ship building industry were considered by the Patriote party to  be the sole basis 
of its permanent connections with the Empire (Ouellet, 1980b, p. 400). 
121  On the strategie nature of the St. Lawrence, see "Petition from lnhabitants of Kingston ...  for Union", Kennedy (1918, p 335); 
"Address to the lnhabitants of British North America", 1836, Kennedy (1918, pp. 427-429). 
122  See despatch by Glenelg, 17 July 1836,JHALC, 22 Sept. to 4 Oct. 1836, p.  100. 
123  "Reports on tbe Grievances of Lower Canada", 20 Fe b. 1837. CIHM no. 9_05197 156 
source," pending the payment of arrears due to public servants and the result of his inquiries 
into  "the  conditions  that must be  most maturely  considered."
124  White  the  Commission's 
findings tended to corroborate the allegations advanced by both the House of Assembly and 
members  of Lower Canada's commercial class, its recommendations offered little in  the way. 
of substantive  change.
125  As  summarized  in  the  Assembly's  address  to  the  Provincial 
Parliament in August of 1837: 
"We  are  bound  especially  to  notice  in  the  reports  in  question  one  essential  and 
paramount contradiction, which pervades every part of  them, and for  ms the ir essence. 
ft  is,  that,  white  they  admit  the  reality  of the  greater  portion  of the  abuses  and 
grievances of  which we  have complained, the Commissioners do  not recommend the ir 
removal and the destruction of  the causes wlûch have produced them."
126 
With England's refusai to grant "the essential and constitutive reforms which we[re] 
demanded, and especially the application of  the elective principle to the Legislative Council, 
the  repeal  of all  undue  privileges  and  monopolies,  and  of injurious  laws, .. .  and  the 
establishment of  a popular and responsible government,"
127 the tense political climate of the 
spring and summer of 1837 - made worse by  the coercive language of Lord John Russell's 
Ten  Resolutions 
128  and  the  threat  of a  growing  economie  cri sis  in  En  gland  and  North 
America- soon coalesced with the past, only to give voice to the more radical faction of the 
Patriote party,  leading to  rebellion and various acts of sedition at the close of 1837 and the 
winter of 1838.
1 29  ln the months that followed the failed  insurrection of Lower Canada, the 
British Parliament suspended the constitution and  the  legislature of the province, and  gave 
extensive  powers  to  the  newly  appointed  Governor  General,  the  Earl  of  Durham,  to 
124 /bid. 
125  Ibid. For example, the commissioners recognized that wild lands and natural resources "shou/d not be disposed of  solely, or 
even principal/y, for  the  sake of revenue, and still  /ess for  the  sake  of a  revenue  with  which  to  make  ... the  Executive 
independent of  the Local Legislature" but should in fact "be applied to the use of  the Province, and  .. .placed under the control 
of  the Local Legislature" (General Report, Section III, paragraph 7). However, given that such revenues should first be applied 
to  the  permanent  expenses  of the  Executive  Government  (i.e.,  civil  list)  and  related  operational  costs  (Ibid.);  that  the 
management of Crown resources was an entirely Executive function (First Report, paragraph 6); and that the concentration of 
such  responsibilities  was  better  than  their  division  (General  Report, Section  III,  paragraph  39),  the  Legislature's  actual 
authority over such entitlements was at best questionable. Similarly, in regards to the possibility of administrating the aff  airs of 
the  Province  through  responsible  ministers,  accountable  to  the  people  of the  Province  and  the  elected  members  of the 
Assembly, the very concept of "an Elective CowJCil  removable at the  will of the Assembly"  was considered by  Sir Charles 
Gray to be simply "incompatible with the subordination of  the province to the Empire" (See Statement on Third Report). 
126  See "Address of Assembly of Lower Canada", Aug. 1837, Kennedy (1918, pp. 438-439). 
127  Ibid., p. 441. 
12l!  See "Lord John Russell's Ten Resolutions", 6 March 1837, Kennedy (1918, pp. 434-436). 
129  For detailed analyses of the political and  economie events leading to  the failed  uprisings of 1837 and  1838, see  Buckner 
(1985) ch. 5 and 6; and Ouellet (1980b. ch.  Il and 12). 157 
investigate the underlying causes of the problems arising in  its N01ih American colonies and 
to draft a  plan for the future  government of that part of its  possessions (Buckner,  1985,  p. 
241). 
4.3  Crown Resources Under British Rule: The Buller Inquiry 
Because the  management of Crown lands  had  played  such  an  important role  in  the 
recriminations that led  to  the  rebellious acts of 1837 and  1838, a separate commission was 
handed to Charles Buller to "inquire into the past and present methods of  disposing of  waste 
lands, woods, forest and other domains  and hereditaments, property  of  the Crown"  in  the 
British  colonies  of North  America.
130  While  Buller's  inquiry  largely  corroborated  the 
assertions  made by  the Lower Canada Assembly,  little  was done afterwards to correct the 
inherent flaws that permeated the entire Crown Lands management system in both Lower and 
Upper  Canada.  If anything,  the  Buller  Inquiry  provides  a  stark  reminder  of the  vested 
interests that  lay  at the  heart of Crown resource  management, and  the  paradoxical  role of 
go  vern ment, as  regulator and  primary beneficiary of  forest resource use. 
Specifically, Buller found that the revenue that could have been obtained from  a "wise 
and careful system of  management"  was "needlessly sacrificed by the practices adopted  in 
the disposai of  public lands."
1 31 The priee of a government issued license was up to ten times 
greater than the cost of obtaining legal title to both the land and the timber growing upon it, 
and to the buyer's advantage, only the first instalment of the purchase money was required in 
order to  take possession of the said  land.  Before the second payment was due or could  be 
enforced, the timber was most often eut down and the land  itself abandoned. As noted in  the 
1837 Report on the GrievaJJces ofLower Canada,
132 
"parties  who  wish to  eut timber are  enabled to bid at the auctions and pay a first 
in.stalment,  then eut the  timber, and give  themselves no jurther concern about either 
the land or the instalmen.ts. In  this manner, they get the timber at about a shilling an 
acre, andfind it answers better than to buy a license." 
13°  Commission to  Charles Buller, p.3, in Buller and  Durham (1839). 
131  See page 34. 
132  General Report on the Grievances of Lower Canada, Sect. III, paragraph  15, 1837, CIHM no. 9_05197. Further, James Kerr 
(paragraph 357 in Buller and Durham, 1839) asserted that the average priee of a 1icense to eut timber in  1838 was roughly 6s. 
8d. per acre while the proprietary value  attributed to the land  and timber by  the Land Department was little more than 3s. 2d. 
Moreover, Stayner mentions (paragraph 403) that the value of a forested acre of land  in  the US fetched as mush as  u: 5s, or 
more than eight times the value esrimate that was used in Lower Canada in  1838. 158 
In  cases where  licenses  were actually  issued,  the  absence of proper  monitoring and 
enforcement meant that large quantities of timber were often taken in  excess of what was 
actually licensed. Further, thanks to  "a perf ect understanding among the buyers," the upset 
priees of government sponsored timber auctions were  seldom exceeded, thus depriving the 
Crown of sales th at could have neared the act  ua!  market value of  timber.
133 
To make matters worse, the complex system of land grants, which could take anywhere 
from  six  months  to  eight  years  to  navigate  through  meant  that  in  order  to  achieve  any 
likelihood  of success,  buyers  were  often  forced  to  rely  on  specialized  agents.
134  Hence, 
parallel to  the  legal  licensing system, there arose a  system  of speculators and  agents  who 
actively  sought to  purchase Crown land  purely  for speculative reasons,  such as  seizing ali 
merchantable timber at  reduced  priee  and/or selling the  rights  thereof for  a  profit.
135  And 
si nee land surveys were woefully inaccurate, double grants of the same land were common, 
and insecurity over land titles prevailed throughout the Colonies.
136  Further, given that timber 
in  British North America (particularly in Lower Canada) was severely underpriced compared 
with market values in either the United Kingdom or the United States,
137  observers noted that 
the Crown (i.e.,  public)
138  was necessarily deprived of the revenues to which it  was legally 
entitled.
139  In  fact,  British  dependency  on  colonial  stock  and  evidence  of  dwindling 
commercial supplies (pine, spruce and oak) in  eastern United-States created a scarcity value 
that was not reflected  in  the market priees of Canadian timber and the licencing or timber 
133 See paragraphs 350 to 353 in Buller and Durham ( 1839). 
134  See testimony of James Kerr in Buller and  Durham (1 839);  and testimony  of John  Nielson, paragraph 2018 of the "Report 
from the Select Committee on Timber Duties,"  1835, CJHM no.  9_01 807. 
135  See Durham ([1839)  1912, pp. 34-35), and  paragraph  1254 in  Buller and  Durham (1839). Land purchases  through agents 
were often made at the request of speculators residing either in  Montreal, Québec or in the United Kingdom for the purpose of 
making a profit on the true market value of the acquired land or timber. The controversy surrounding one's ability to gain tille 
to the land and ils resources as opposed to the purchase of a costlier timber license was never resolved, thus giving rise to the 
compound  problems  of  (1)  "pseudo-selliers" who proceeded  to  obtain  tilles  (i .e., location  tickets)  for the  sole  purpose  of 
extracting timber at a fraction of  the cost of  a license  to  appropriate  the same - a  problem thar  persisted  weil  into the  20'h 
century with the advancement of the colonization movement (see Chapters V to VII); and (2) the issue of monopoly by timber 
interests whose privileged access to land and commercial timber deprived poorer settlers of the only resources they disposed of 
for construction purposes or  to  generale supplemental income in  a  subsistence-based rural  economy  (see  paragraph 464 in 
Buller and Durham, 1839). 
136 Durham ([1839]1912, pp. 232-242). 
137  Paragraphs 354  and 355 in  Buller and  Durham  (1 839); Letter from J. Neilson, enclosure 5, No.  1,  10  July  1835, p. 27 in 
"Correspondences Relating to Grievances in the Canadas," CIHM no. 9_01469. 
138  Reference to the Crown's revenue or resources, either prior to Confederation or after, should al  ways be considered as a proxy 
for the "Public's" revenue or resources. Since ali  sources of Crown revenue were, since George the III (see Introduction to Part 
11)  appropriable  by Parliament for defraying the expenses of civil  government, and therefore administered by government in 
the public's interests, they are in essence, public property. 
139 Durham ([1 839)1912, p 34); paragraph 350 in Buller and Durham (1 839). 159 
dues  themselves.
140  However, the terms of the colonial  trade could only  be  altered  by  the 
British Parliament and  until  the adoption of free trade by the government of Sir Robert Peel 
and  the progressive transfer of Crown prerogatives during the  l840s,  any attempt to adjust 
the priee of standing timber toits true market value would have been strongly contested. Y et, 
even after unification and the surrender of  all territorial and cas  ua!  revenues in exchange for a 
civil  list, the value of standing timber in  early Québec never wavered from  the underpriced 
optimum that was supported by those whose economie prosperity depended on their ability to 
access cheap and abundant supplies of  forest resources (see Chapters V and VI). 
4.4  Conclusion 
At the  close  of the  1830s,  the  constitutional  provisions  that  had  sustained  British 
Imperial  rule  for  nearly  a  cerrtury  were no  longer  viable.  The concentration  of decision-
making authority within the ranks of an unaccountable and irresponsible executive
141  led to a 
long streak of abuses, which only  helped to  fuel  the resentment of the French and Engl ish 
inhabitants  of Upper  and  Lower  Canada  and  their  demands  for  a  greater  say  in  the 
governance of political and economie affairs in the co  tony.  As Joseph Howe wou id  later put 
it to Lord Russell: 
"looking  at  the  Executive  Council,  or  Cabinet,  as  it  exists  in  any  of the  North 
American Provinces at present, we find a smalllot of  individuals,  responsible neither 
to the Queen, the Secretary of  State, the Governor nor the people; who owe their seats 
to neither, but to theirrelatives andfriends through whose influence and intrigues they 
have  been appointed; and  who,  while  they  possess  among  them  some  of the  best 
salaries  and nearly  ali  the  patronage  of the  country,  have  a  common  interest  in 
promoting extravagance,  resisting eco no  my, and keeping  up  the  system exactly  as it 
stands." 
142 
White change in  the ensuing decades eventually brought  about a graduai shift in  the 
seat of power,  including the adoption of responsible  government and the  signing of a  new 
constitution in 1867, the many resource policy failures that characterized this early period of 
140 On the diminishing resource stock of the United States, see paragraphs 355 and 403, in Buller and  Durham (1839). 
141Though Durham considered that the source of the problems in Lower Canada was tied to mutual  distrust between French and 
English ([1839] 1912, pp. 17-24), he attributed the failure of government to  solve such  problems to  the irresponsible nature of 
the colonial Executive and the absence of accountable ministerial heads by whose ad vise the Governor should be guided (Ibid., 
pp.  108-1 09). Durham concluded that "disorder [was] produced by !he working of  an ill-contrived constitutional system, and 
the practicalmismanagement which these fimdamental defects !zave generated in every depart ment of  Governmenf' (Ibid., p. 
260; see also pp. 277-282). 
142 Kennedy, 1918, p. 505. 160 
Québec's nascent forest sector were never completely resolved and thë  problems raised  in 
Buller inquiry on the management ofCrown lands persisted weil into the 20
111  century. 
As evidence considered thus far suggests, initial changes in the institutions governing 
forest resource use in Lower Canada were initiated for two basic reasons. First, the system of 
admiralty contracts provided nothing Jess than a monopoly on the colony 's forest resources. 
If illegal entrants were to  safeguard investments made under the duplicitous consent of past 
colonial administrations, and  partake in the most profitable sector of the colonial economy, 
then the trade  needed to  be  placed  on  a  more equal  footing,  so  as  to  allow those without 
admiralty contracts to participate in  its development. Second, colonial administrators in both 
Upper and  Lower Canada were  faced  with  increasingly  recalcitrant legislative  assemblies 
who insisted on their rights to vote on ail money bills and spending measures passed before 
their  respective  legislatures.  However,  if the  King's  representatives  were  to  maintain  the 
independence of their councils .and control over ali colonial dependencies, they also needed 
to sec  ure sources of revenue that were beyond the reach of the provincial legislatures. In such 
a context, no other supply provided as strong a constitutional authority for the pursuit oftheir 
aims than the Crown's unalienable hereditary and customary rights to ali casual and territorial 
revenues. 
In either case, the  principal  motive for change was  clearly tied to the possibility  of 
generating payoffs over and above the opportunity costs faced by  the appointed heads of the 
colony and the burgeoning class oftimber and lumber operators. In the end however, benefits 
accrued most distinctively to those who held interests in colonial land and timber. For in spite 
of the fact that the management of Crown resources was regarded as  such a highly executive 
function that it  could only  be discharged by  those in  whose bands ali  similar powers were 
lodged  by  the  Constitution,  it  remains  that  very  little  was  done  to  actually  enforce  the 
requirements ofthe 1826 Treasury instructions.
143 
Until revisions were instituted in the 1840s, the rents captured through the issuance of 
timber  licenses  remained  of marginal  benefit  to  colonial  administrators.  While  such  an 
observation  cannot help  but  raise  the  more  perplexing question  of why  indebted  colonial 
143  With respect to the failed enforcement of the 1826 Instructions, see "Report on the Public Departments of the Province ... of 
Upper Canada,"  1839, CIHM no. 9_00901 , pp. 21 , 156-162, and 305-3 11. 161 
governments would allow the perpetuation of such wasteful circumstances, evidence suggests 
that  the  more  probable  answer  to  this  riddle  lies  in  the  constitutional  choice  rules  that 
ultimately favoured the concentration ofrulership prerogatives. By 1830, the management of 
Crown resources was vested in the hands of a  single individual who answered only to the 
Governor. Moreover, the custom of using the privilege of office to secure benefits to self and 
others  was,  by  the  time  the  timber  and  land  funds  were  created  in  1828,  practically 
institutionalized within the colonial  administration. As Lord Durham ([1839]  1912, p.  222) 
observed, regarding the widespread "practice of  rewarding, or attempting to  reward, public 
services by grants of  public land': 
"ln  both  the  Canadas,  not  only  has  this  principle  been  pursued  with  reckless 
profusion, but the local Executive governments have managed, by violating or evading 
the instructions which they received from the Secretary of  State, to add incalculably to 
the mischiefs that wou/d have arisen at ail events." 
Consequently, the systern essentially favoured the pursuit of rent-seeking interests by a 
limited  number  of players  who  relied  on  their  position  or  status  to  accrue  benefits  for 
themselves  at the  expense  of  broader social  or ecological  considerations.  As  long  as  the 
manoeuvrings of political and economie entrepreneurs did not interfere with imperial control 
over British colonial dependencies, or the remnants of its  mercantile economy, the system 
was allowed to perpetuate itselfwith ali the impunity of  an irresponsible administration. 162 
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5.1  Introduction 
Amidst  the  struggle  for  constitutional  control  over  the  Crown's  resources  and 
revenues, the actual exploitation of forest resources during the first half of the 19
111  century 
was  conditioned only  partly (if  at ali)  by  the political  debates  of the  day  and  the  limited 
regulatory requirements of the  1826 Treasury Instructions. However beneficiai  were the first 
set of rules in  controlling access  to the province's forests and in bringing order to  this most 
prosperous  sector of the  colonial  economy,  it  remains  that  the  rate  and  extent of forest 
exploitation in  British North America was essentially driven by the preferential tariffs of the 
home government. By providing an  incentive for the investment of private capital  and  the 
development of colonial trade  relations,  preference effectively begot tracte  (Lower,  1973, p. 
95). Over ti me, protection became coveted as a matter of national security and arguments for 
the  maintenance of colonial relations,  the  transit of British  goods,  the  immigration  of its 
'surplus population', and the training of British seamen became the arsenal of th ose wh ose 
interests lay  in  maintaining and capturing the surplus rents associated with the last remaining 
vestiges of Britain's  mercantile  policies.
144  As Creighton  (1937,  p.  150)  put it, the  timber 
tracte  was "born of the war and  blockade; [and]  it was maintained and continued by  ali  the 
deviees  of a  reanimated  and  intransigent commercial  imperialism."  As  long as  the  rules 
governing  forest resource  rights  were made relatively clear and  duties  kept to  a  minimum, 
lumbermen  and  timber  mercllants  gave  scarce  attention  to  the  institutional  arrangements 
under which they conducted their operations. 
Eventually,  the  commercial  imperialism  Creighton  referred  to  did  come  undone 
towards the end of the 1840s. Responsible government was instituted and British control over 
the affairs of the United Province of Canada was tost in  favour of locally  elected officiais. 
'""  Key arguments for the maintenance of  the prefercntial duties are presented in "Copies and  ex  tracts of communications from 
the Governor-General and Lieutenant Governors of the North American colonies relating to an alteration of the timber duties," 
31 May  1842,CIHMno. 9_01 865. 166 
Henceforth,  government  would  be  placed  in  the  hands  of those  who  commanded  the 
confidence of the elected house - as  members of the Parti Canadien stubbornly demanded 
for the better part of four decades. The interesting question this raises is  whether or not the 
theory of self-government espoused by  early French nationalist, such as Pierre Bédard and 
Louis-Joseph Papineau, effectively changed the weaknesses and inefficiencies of  the (British) 
representative  system.  In  other  words,  to  what  extent  did  self-government  and  the 
responsibility  principle improve forest resource management? Reduce waste? Create a more 
equitable access to Crown lands for settlement purposes? Or secure a greater share of benefits 
for society through more remunerative employment opportunities and greater returns to the 
public  treasury?  The  purpose  of  this  chapter  is  to  investigate  how  changes  in  the 
constitutional provisions of the united Province of Canada, between 1840 and  1866, affected 
forest resource use outcomes and the development of  forest resource institutions in  particular. 
5.2  Adapting Durham's Plan 
With the insurrectional crises of 1837-38 and ensuing investigations by Lord Durham 
into  the  affairs  of British  North  America,  the status  quo  was  no  longer  a  viable  option. 
Among the  many  problems  facing  Upper and  Lower Canada was  the  worrisome state of 
public finances in  either province. While Upper Canada was indisposed by a massive public 
debt,  attributable  to  the  expenditures  it  incurred  through  various  public  works  (  e.g., 
construction of the Rideau Canal), Lower Canada was grappling with a surplus that stemmed 
from  its  own political struggles, leaving the province with little to  show for, other than the 
decrepit state of public infrastructures and the want of any functioning public services. As 
Durham explained, with the Assembly's refusai  to  grant money bills and the government's 
general  inability  to  ensure  the  discharge  of its  administrative  functions  arose  a  general 
"immunity from  taxation,"  which only helped to deprive the people of Lower Canada from 
the "institutions, which every civilized community ought to possess (Durham, [ 183 9]  1912, p. 
144)." The result, as Durham (Ibid.) put it, was a province aftlicted by: 
"a  rude and imperfect administration of  justice,  hardly  the semblance  of  police,  no 
public provision for education, no lighting, and bad pavements in its cilies, and me  ans 
of communication so  imperfect,  that the  loss of time, and wear and tear caused  in 
taking any article to  market, may probably be estimated at ten times the  expense of 
good roads." 167 
In  short, Durham found  the entire apparatus of government and  the administration of 
colonial  affairs  to  be  wanting  and  deficient  in  some  respect  or  another,  and  no  other 
department  faired  worse  nor was  more  important to  reform  in  order  to  secure  the  future 
prosperity and  wellbeing of the country than the Crown Lands Department (Durham  [1839] 
1912, pp.  203-242).  Although  the  reasons  invoked  for the  unification of Upper and  Lower 
Canada differed for the two provinces, the idea of placing both jurisdictions un der the control 
of a common administrative unit had  the advantage of solving two distinct sets of problems 
with the aid  of a single  institutional  remedy.  By  recalibrating the  Legislature with an  equal 
number  of seats  between  the  two  provinces,  providing  for  the  free  conveyance  of goods 
across territorial  boundaries, and  giving sanction to  the civil  list principle, the  Union Act of 
1840 provided the necessary instruments to subsume the influence of the  French  majority  in 
Lower Canada,  progressively 1odge  ali  Crown  revenues  in  the  hands  of the  executive, and 
allow Upper Canada to more fully  exploit its natural resources for the purpose of generating a 
revenue equal to  its  cumulated  debt. As defended  by  the newly appointed Governor General 
Poulett Thomson  in  1839,  union  between  the  two  Canadas  represented  an  "indispensable" 
means of affording a "safe and practicable return ta  a constitutional government" in  Lower 
Canada and  a "no less necessary" process of "enable[ing}  the Province [of  Upper Canada] 
to  meet her jinancial embarrassments,  and ta  proceed in  the  development of her natural 
resources."  Because  of the  strategie  nature  of the  St.  Lawrence  Seaway,  Thomson  (later 
raised to the peerage of Baron  Sydenham) believed that Lower Canada effectively held  "the 
key to  the development of  those  great natural resources  which providence has so  lavishly 
bestowed on this country." 
145 
However,  before  any  improvement  in  the  administration  of public  affairs  could  be 
considered yet alone implemented, Sydenham first needed to deal with "the defective system" 
that was in  place and the "deep-rooted abuses that pervade[d] every department of  the public 
service" (Durham,  [1839]  1912, p.  101). The problem, as  Lord Durham bad  defined  it, was 
th at the executive government of Lower Canada harboured no effectuai power. Tt was thought 
to  be  only  "slightly  responsible"  in  consequence  of its  subordination  to  the  Colonial 
Department  in  London  and  the  absence of responsible  heads  in  the  provincial  departments 
145 Thomson to Legislature of Upper Canada, 7 Dec, 1839, Kennedy (1918, pp. 529-531} 168 
(Ibid.,  pp.  101-111). The permanent clique of public functionaries who abused the privilege 
of office (Ibid. , pp.  77-81)  and  the  Assembly's refusai  to  acquiesce  to  the  demands of a 
government  that  lacked  any  semblance  of popular  representation  (Ibid., pp.  72-77)  only 
helped to  make things  worse.  Given that the situation  in  the  public departments  in  Upper 
Canada was far from better, 
146 the conditions were indeed ripe for a complete overhaul of the 
apparatus of government within the united province. 
Though  the  full  weight of responsible government and  the allegiance of Council  to 
parliamentary representatives would take another decade to unfold, Sydenham succeeded in 
introducing  departmental  reforms  that  have  since  become  part  and  parce!  of Canada's 
political structure. By rendering ali  department heads responsible primarily to the Governor, 
Sydenham was  able to  strengthen  sunity  of command within and  across departments,  and 
consolidate the Governor's power over the whole of his council (Hodgetts, 1955, pp.  27-28, 
and  34).
147  With  these  changes,  ali  public  functionaries  (including  department  heads,  the 
Colonial  Secretary,  Receiver-General,  Solicitor-General,  etc.)  were  hereafter  deemed 
accountable to the Governor of the province and could be called upon to "retire from public 
service  as  often as  any sufficient motives of  public policy may  suggests  the expediency" of 
d  .  148  omg so. 
With the establishment of more effectuai  departments  in  every  branch of the  public 
service,  ali  matters  related  to  Crown  lands  and  natural  resources  originating  from  either 
Upper or Lower Canada were placed under a single ministerial head, thus making the newly 
reformed Crown Lands Department the largest and most diversified administrative agency in 
the Province (Hodgetts, 1955, p.  32). However, given the size of the Department, the nature 
of its business, its centralized decision-making structure, the huge territorial expanse un der its 
care, and utter absence of any effective means of communication, it was nearly impossible to 
provide an effectuai means of coordinating the Department's work orto monitor the activities 
of Crown agents.  Consequently,  Crown land agents continuously faced strong incentives to 
shirk  their  duties  or abuse the  privilege of their title  to  broker favourable  conditions  for 
146 "Report on the Public Departments of the Province of Upper Canada," 1839, CIHM no. 9_0090 1. 
147  Responsibility to the legislature was introduced by Elgin in 1848. 
148 Russell  to Thomson, 6 October 1839, Kennedy (1 918, pp. 524-525); see also Hodgetts (1955, pp. 24-34). 169 
lumberers and  themselves.
1 49  Despite such shortfalls, the revenue-generating purpose of the 
Department was pursued with vigo  ur and if the management of natural resources yielded but 
little benefits to  provincial coffers  during the  1820s and  30s, the future was to  become far 
more lucrative. Because Crown revenues played such an important part in  defraying the cost 
of civil  government and  the development of essential  public works  for the  conveyance of 
economie progress (i.e., canals, locks, harbours, slides, railways, etc.), the revenue generating 
potential  of Crown  resources  and  their  contribution  to  Canada's  economie  development 
ultimately became the underlying rationale for legislative action throughout most of the 19
1
h 
century. 
5.3  Revenue Enhancement 
The  first  significant  step  in  the  government's  attempt  to  extract  greater  financial 
dividends  from  Crown  forests  came  in  1842  with  the  first  of two  controversial  orders 
regarding "Licenses to eut Timber off  the Waste Lands ofthe Crown."
150 Henceforth, licenses 
would be issued for one year and, at the discretion of the Crown Lands agent handling  the 
request, a timber limit could be renewed to  the original holder provided that the terms and 
conditions  applicable to  the said grant were satisfactorily  met.  If two or more applications 
were  made  for  the  same  limit,  the  disputed  berth  would  be  granted  through  public  sale 
(auction) to the highest bidder,  provided always that the recipient complied with the costing 
arrangement of the timber licenses (i.e., one fourth of the total value of the  li mit due on the 
date of purchase, along with a sufficient security for the remaining three-fourths payable by 
the following  August  1 
51
).  While duties  on eut timber (i.e., stumpage fees)  and  methods of 
measurement  remained unchanged,
151 the conditionalities of the revised rules  spelled a clear 
break with the past. For "eve1y mile in length,"  license holders were  instructed to "take out 
5, 000 fee  t" of timber and a  party could hold no  more than ten miles in  frontage in  any one 
1 ~
9 This issue is discussed in great  er depth 1  at  er in this chapter. 
150  Instructions dated 30 March, 1842, in JLAC, Appcndix T 
151 Measurements were based on the customary average of 70 fil to the piece of white pi ne, 38 fil for red pi  ne and 34 ff  for oak 
(see JLAC, 1841-42, Appendix T). Du ties adopted in 1828 (see Table 4.1  above) were le  ft unchanged un til after 1850. 170 
location. 
152  In other words, to maintain the privilege of cutting timber upon the waste lands of 
the  Crown,  licentiates  were  required  to  meet  minimum  manufacturing  requirements 
regardless  of market  conditions,  operational  costs,  or the  availability  of suitable  timber. 
Fwther, in  addition to minimum production quotas, lots within licensed limits could be sold 
for settlement purposes at any time during the year with  no advanced  notice to the  license 
bolder, thus rendering the latter's rights to eut and remove timber from such  parcels nul!  and 
void upon sale.
153  In short, the rights of  a bonafide operator were decidedly limited and made 
revocable at the Crown Agents' pleasure. 
The changes introduced with the Instructions of 1842 were broadly denounced by both 
small and  large operators but for very different reasons. Taking up  the  interests of smaller 
entrepreneurs, sorne  155 lumbermen operating in the Ottawa valley opined that the new rules 
gave unprecedented powers to Crown land agents stationed at Bytown. 
154  By granting them 
leave to discriminate among applicants for  timber licenses, the petitioners  alleged  that the 
surveyor and collector of timber dues on the Ottawa favoured the interests of banks and large 
lumber establishments in Montreal and Québec City at the expense of local lumbermen. As a 
result, they  indicated, the larger operators of the time held exclusive rights to  nearly ali the 
best territory on the Ottawa and its  major tributaries, which in  turn forced smaller producers 
to contract with large limit holders under less than favourable terms. On the other hand, large 
deal  manufacturers such as Hamilton and Low observed that extension of the size of timber 
limits to  100 square miles from  the previous norm of nine square miles was instituted as  a 
way to compensate the exhaustion of merchantable stocks on the more accessible reaches of 
the  province's navigable waterways, and the sheer costs of establishing a  logging operation 
(e.g.,  surveys, the provision of wintering supplies and infrastructure such as  ramps, slides, 
roads, bridges, piers, and  housing arrangements). 
155  In  their view, the maintenance of large 
timber berths  provided a critical means of dealing with the ongoing dissipation of resource 
152  Early annotations  regarding  the  size  of timber limits  were  somewhat confusing.  However, contrary  to  the  interpretations 
provided in  Lower (1973) and Gaud reau ( 1999), the amou nt of timber to be manufactured was not 5000 fil per square mile but 
per mile of  frontage, the  actual  depth of the limit being subject to the  owners ability to find  the requisite timber within  the 
range covered  by  the  limit, which  by convention was placed at  10  miles. An  interesting discussion on the issue  of frontage 
versus square denominators to timber limits is  presented in Tlie Canadian  Economists, Vol.  2, no. 2, 8 May  1847, CIHM no. 
8_05050_54-5. See also discussion on this issue further in this chapter. 
153 "General Instructions to District or Resident Agents of the Crown Lands Department." Appendix EE, JLAC, 1846. 
IS<  See petitions in JLAC, 1844-45, pp. 173-175. 
155  See copy of "Lener from Hamilton and Low to Hon. D.B. Papineau, Commissioner of Crown Lands,"  12 Dec. 1844, in  Reid 
(1990, pp. 146-148). 171 
rents (due to the diminishing size of remaining timber and the rising appropriation costs of 
having to  travet further inland or upriver) and the general insecurity that limit holders faced 
relative to the revocable nature of the  ir rights. In su ch a context, regulatory provisions needed 
to strive towards larger territ<Jrial  holdings and more definitive forms of tenure, not smaller 
and less formai arrangements. For although sorne government estimates suggested that there 
remained  sufficient  quantities  of red  and  white  pine  in  the  Ottawa  valley  to  maintain 
production levels equal to thal produced in  1845 for another 50 or more years,
156  reductions 
in  terms  of the  quantity,  si2e  and  value  of remaining  stocks  was  undeniably  occurring 
throughout the region. As tes  ti fied  by a memorial to Go  vern  or General Lord Elgin in  184  7, 
lumber  merchants  connected  with  the  Ottawa  trade  contended  that  the  country  was 
effectively "denuded of  marketable timber" within any "reasonable distance" to the ri vers, 
that the standard of measurernent was too high for ali that remained, and that due allowance 
ought to  be  made for  the  manufacture of smaller size timber such  as  those  required  for 
railroads.
157 Demand for larger limits and more accommodating conditions was predicated on 
these observations. 
The response of the Crown Lands Department came in  1846 with a revised set of ru les 
that did  little  more than change  the appearance of the problems at hand.
158  Henceforth, the 
size of ali new limits was reduced to 25 square miles, holders of existing limits were allowed 
to extend their privileges uncil  1849 (upon compliance with applicable rules), licenses were 
made non-transferable, and a minimum manufacture of 1000 fe per square mile granted was 
imposed.  Although the change  in  production  requirement from  5000 to  1000 ft
3  has  since 
been interpreted by  leading scholars and historians
159  as  an admission of policy failure and 
the  government's attempt to curtail  the amount of wood  that was  being taken  out of the 
forests, the reality is  that the Crown Lands Department had actually doubled the amount of 
wood  that  operators  were  now  obliged  to  eut.  Whereas  the  1842  instructions  imposed  a 
minimum intake of 5000 ft
3  per mile of frontage (equal to  one mile in  front by  ten miles in 
depth,  or 500 ft
3  per square mile),  the  1846  ruling  called for  1000  ft
3  per square  mile.
160 
156  Report of T .C. Keefer, Appendix LL. JLAC, 1846-47. 
1 57  See copy of "Petition from the Lumber Merchants to the Governor-General ," in  Reid  (1 990, pp. 152-154). 
158 Canada Gazette, Crown Lands Department:  Notice to Applicants for Timber Licences, 24 June 1846, p. 2938. 
159 For example, Lower (1 973), Gaudrea.u (1 999), Gillis and Roach (1 986). 
1 60  See The Canadian Economist, 8 May  1 847, vol. 2, no. 2, p. 12, CIHM no. 8_05050_54-5. 172 
Despite  being  misinterpreted  by  most contemporary scholars, the subtlety  was  not !ost on 
those  who  depended  on  Crown  forests.  As  the  Québec  Board  Trade  would  Jater  report, 
"remonstrance on the part of  severa! of  the leading houses in  the  trade "
161  was immediate 
and  the  government  had  no  other  choice  than  to  bring  its  minimum  manufacturing 
requirement back  clown  to  500  ft
3  per square  mile.
162  In  other words,  limits  were  simply 
distributed  differently  and  proprietors  of timber  licenses  were  required  to  eut  the  same 
amount of wood as  before, th us allowing the colonial administrators to maintain  the revenue 
imperative oftheir resource policies, while seemingly showing themselves responsive to calls 
for increased competition, reduced risks of monopoly, and to a more limited extent, requests 
from larger firms who wished to retain the privilege of their existing limits. In tru th however, 
very little was clone to accommodate the demands of smaller operators. A non-transferability 
clause was added in  1846 that made it more difficult for those without financial backing togo 
into timber making since government-issued limits could not longer be used as collateral for 
credit. Combined with the stricter regulations and high costs of licences (a quarter ofthe total 
value of the limit plus securities for the remaining sum payable on the day of purchase), the 
new  rules  had  the  combined  effect of concentrating the  industry  into  fewer  hands  and of 
stimulating overproduction. 
As  evidence  from  the  period  shows,  the  effects  of the  revised  rules  on  the  timber 
harvest yielded predictable results. In less than three years, timber and lumber exports nearly 
quadrupled, jumping from  a  total  export volume  of 6,372,575  fe  in  1842  (hard  and soft 
woods combined) to  more than 24 million fe in  1845, with a slightly  less dramatic rise  in 
revenues from  f15,090 to  more than ±:38,656 for  the same years (see Table 5.1  below).
163 
However, if one considers the actual amount of wood counted in  1845 by the Supervisor of 
Cullers (see numbers listed under "Culler Reports"  in  Table 5.1), evidence suggests that the 
surge in  production was nearer to a six-fold increase. Needless to say, such a sudden increase 
in  production  would be  precarious even  in  the  best of times, but to  pursue such strategies 
1 61 Report by the Québec Board ofTrade, The Canadian Economist, 10 April  1847, vol. 1, no. 50, p. 397. 
1 62  Canada Gazette, Crown Lands Department: Notice to Applicants for Timber Licences, 15 August 1846, p. 3038. 
1 63  The timber eut  on Crown Lands (as detailed in  the various reports of the Crown Lands Department, cul ling statements and 
Export data) was inconsistently reported from year to year, making it difficult to obtain reliable estimates of the total  harvest. 
Moreover, as detailed in Table 5.1 , the actual amou  nt of timber harvested and exported remains diffïcult to assert. For instance, 
in  the columns indicating the amount of timber harvested during the years  1845 and  1846, the total amount of square timber 
culled during those years grea  tl y exceeds the stated a mount presented bef  ore the Select Committee on the Timber Trade. The 
absence of export data for those years makes it impossible to confirm the numbers provided for total exports. 173 
amidst growing threats of trade reform by the sole market upon which one's entire enterprise 
depended was nothing Jess than a recipe for disaster. 
Table 5.1 Comparative overview oftimber production and revenues from  1841  to 1848 
YEAR  DUES COLLECTED
1  QUANTITYOF  CULLER  EXPORTS 1  DEMAND
2 
TIMBER2 (ft3)  REPORTS3 (ft3)  (fl3) 
1842  [15,090  7s  6d  ...  .. .  6,372,575 
1843  [40,399  13 s  5d  ...  ...  ... 
1844  E27,764  3s  Od  28,049,963  ... 
1845  [38,656  2s  7d  27,702,344  41 ,298,974  24,223,000 
1846  E51 ,164  7s  9d  37,300,643  49,312,686  24,242,689 
1847  E37,008  5s  2d  44,927,253  ...  19,060,880 
1848  [23,885  Os  4d  39,447,776  21,715  17,402,360 
Sources:  (1)  Appendtx  YY, JLAC,  1849-50;  (2)  Ttmber  Supply  and  Exports  drawn  from  the 
tes  limony of W.W. Dawson in Answer to Question 68 of the Select Committee on  the State of the 
Lumber Trade,  Appendix P.P.P.P, JLAC, 1848-49; (3) Annual Statements from the Supervisor of 
Cullers,  JLAC,  available  for  1845,  1846  &  1848  and  square  timber  production  only.  Masts, 
bowsprits,  deals,  planks,  and  other  articles  equal  to  millions  of additional  cubic  fee!  are  not 
considered. 
Warnings that a change  in  duties would spell  havoc for the colonies of British North 
America and negatively impact Britain's economy grew in importance when the conservative 
government of Sir Robert Peel  took  over the  reigns  of the  British  Parliament  in  1841.
164 
Nevertheless, the Corn Laws of 1821  were sequentially repealed starting in  1842 and  1843 
with the backing of the free trade movement and again in  1846 as  part of the government's 
attempt  to  bring  relief to  famine  stricken  Ireland.
165  But as  the  aforementioned  evidence 
suggests, the first set of reductions produced little or no  effect on the trans-Atlantic timber 
trade,  thanks  in  large part to  Britain's nascent railway  industry. In  fact, the confidence of 
timber entrepreneurs was so great that many invested heavily in  sawmills, river slides, dams 
and timber limits throughout the  first half of 1840s (Ouellet,  1980a, pp.  503-504). Positive 
returns and excessive optimism  in  prevailing market conditions  inevitably  led  operators to 
overestimate the longer term stability of  British demand and by the ti me news of an ongoing 
164 For example, see "Le Canadien", July 14, 1841 and the 1842 petition bearing the names of sorne ni ne thousand supporters in 
Ouellet (1980a, p. 494). 
165  Importation Act 1846 (9 &  10  Vict., c.  22). In  1821, dulies on foreign timber were set at 55s. per load and  !Os.  per load on 
colonial  sources.  In  1842, the difference was dropped to 29s in favour of colonial timber (30s 1 ls), 24s in  1843 (25s 1 L s) and 
l4s in  1846 (15s 1 1  s). The complete repeal of the differentia! tariffs occurred in 1860. 174 
recession in England reached the shores ofNorth America, the timber surplus in the booms of 
Québec  City  had  already  reached  dangerously  high  proportions.  As  the  near  record 
production of the winter of 1845-46 began trickling into the port of Québec, priees tumbled, 
demand lay at a standstill, and operators with extended credit began to fold, thus plunging the 
colonial economies of  Upper and Lower Canada into their worst financial crisis ever (see also 
Lower, 1973, p.  198). 
During  this  time,  the  then  commissioner of Crown  lands  and  acting deputy  Prime 
Minister for Canada East, Denis-Benjamin Papineau, was increasingly criticized for the poor 
management of the department un der his care. A committee charged with looking in  the state 
of the  Crown  Lands  Department
166  in  1846  found  widespread  inefficiencies,  including: 
"expenditures that were out of  proportions ta  its revenues;" a system of local agents whose 
value, "as far as  the general interests of  the public are concerned,"  was thought "extremely 
questionable;"  evidence  of revenue  defalcation;  inadequate  decentralization  of decision-
making  authority;  and  a  systematic  recourse  to  the  Executive  Council  to  direct  the 
Department's  business.  So  strong  was  the  perceived  influence  of  politics  over  the 
management of Crown resources that some observers even  went so far  as  to  suggest that 
control over the Crown Lands Department should be made independent of any public office 
and thus confided to a competent and impartial individual who could uphold the interests of 
ail Canadians.
167  White Papineau did oversee the worst debacle of the timber trade since it 
first  arose  during the  Napoleonic wars,  it  would  be  an  exaggeration of available  facts  to 
suggest that he  was  in  any  way culpable of the  failures  that led  to  the  breakdown of the 
system.  To try  to  mitigate the  situation,  obligatory  production  quotas  and  the  payment of 
Crown dues were temporarily remitted until  1849, but the changes proved too little too late. 
As the head of the Department that was disapproved for its failure to recognize the injurious 
effects of existing regulatory measures on the stability of the trade, the economie wellbeing 
of the province and the requisite long-term perspective that was recognized even then as  an 
166  See Appendix EE, JLAC, 1845-46. lnterestingly, Papineau is cited on record for his dissent to the changes recommended by 
the commissioners. 
167  Rankin, C., Letter to the Governor-General on the Subject of the Crown  Lands Department, 20 May 1847, CIHM no. 22084 175 
essential  pa1t  to  any  effective  management  scheme, 1 68  Papineau  resigned  from  office  m 
November 1847. 
5.4  The Legal Foundations ofQuébec's Forest Institution 
The "downward progress of  events" that followed,  as  Lord  Elgin put it  in  1848, Jess 
than  a  year  after  taking  over  the  governorship  of the  Province,  was  indeed  substantial: 
"Property in  most of  the Canadian  towns ...  has fallen fifty per cent in  value within the fast 
three years [and} [t}hree-fourths of  the commercial men are bankrupt, owing to free-trade" 
(Walrond,  1872, p.  70).  Yet, the  social  havoc  that  was  brought  about  by  the  commercial 
depression that engulfed ali  of the colonial possessions of British North America also created 
opportunities for change and  in  March  1848, the want of confidence in  the administration of 
the  united  Province forced  the  remaining members of the  Executive Council  to  resign  in  a 
single body, opening the door for Lord Elgin  to ask the opposing members of the legislature 
to  form  a new  cabinet.1 69  Faithful  to  the  principles of responsible  government by  which  he 
mode led his  conduct, 
170  Elgin  helped sec ure  the first elected  cabinet,  entirely  composed of 
members of the Assembly in whom Parliament had  bestowed its  trust. By Confederation, the 
move  towards  responsible government was  essentially  complete and  the  balance  of power 
was  irrevocably  held  by  those  who  controlled  the  plurality  of votes  in  Parliament,  thus 
bringing  unity  of power  to  those  who  held  the  unity  of  command.  However,  political 
allegiances  were  notoriously  fickle  during  these  first  few  decades  of  the  Canadian 
experiment, and the administration of the Province of Canada changed no  Jess than ten times 
between  1848  and  1867.  As  the  struggle  for  solidarity  and  cohesiveness  amongst elected 
officiais  gradually  increased, the  functions  and  authority  of the  Governor  progressively 
waned  in  favour of the elected  body of'ministers that collectively constituted the executive 
government, thus  paving  the way  for  the  formation  of the  modern  cabinet  (see  Hodgetts, 
1955, pp. 80-86). 
168 The Canadian Economist, 8 May 1847, vol. 2, no. 2, p.  12, CIHM no. 8_05050_54-5. 
169  Elgin to Grey, 1  1 March 1848, p. 6, in  "Correspondence relative to  the introduction of responsible government," CIHM no. 
55139. The fïrst ever responsible govemment in British North America was achieved a month earlier in Nova Scotia (February 
1848) by Joseph Howe. 
170  Elgin to Earl Grey, l847, Kennedy (1918, pp. 577-578). 176 
Curious1y,  the move from  representative to responsible government, a transition that 
was  sparked  by  the  need  for  greater  legitimacy  and  accountability  at  the  leve!  of the 
executive,  also  brought  about  a  much  greater  concentration  of power.  Effectively,  the 
centralized means of control  that lay  at the heart of the British Colonial experiment never 
wavered.
171 The reigns of command were sim ply transferred from the King's government to 
the  appointed  ministerial  heads  of the  elected  representatives.  By  Confederation,  the 
privileges vested  in  the British Parliament and the Crown's representative became those of 
the Prime Minister and his  cabinet, 
172  th us  providing the constitutional template that would 
come to define relationships between provincial and territorial executives and their respective 
legislatures.
173  Far from  rejecting  the  monarchy,  colonial  leaders,  once  in  control  of the 
legislature, seized the Crown
1S prerogatives and centralized ali legislative powers in the hands 
of the political executive, th us  perpetuating, sorne would later argue, the colonial order within 
which Canada was established (Mali ory, [1974) 2011; Smith, 1991; Sprou1e-Jones, 1984). 
Among  the  more  important  concerns  that  awaited  the  newly  created  Baldwin-
Lafontaine administration, following the election of 1848, was the need  to  redress the dire 
economie circumstances that were in  part precipitated by  the failure of the timber trade. To 
remedy  the  situation,  officiais  first  needed  to  understand  its  causes  and  in  early  1849,  a 
Committee was assembled to  inquire into the state of the lumber trade, and the factors that 
contributed  to  the  ruinous  conditions  in  which  it lay.
174  Among other things,  the  inquiry 
confirmed that the cri sis of 1846 to 1849 was largely triggered by the economie cri sis of the 
British Market and the repeal of preferential tariffs, but was ultimately made worse by  over 
production, which left the port of Québec City with a price-shattering surplus. As shown in 
Table 5.1  above,  what began  as  a  surplus  of 3,479,344  ft
3  in  1845  eventually  grew  to  a 
staggering 25,866,373  ft
3  in  1847,  thus  creating a  dead  weight stock that  u1timately  pre-
17 1  As Hodgetts (1955, p  110) summed it up:  "The Assembly soon discovered ...  that its victory over the fïnancial independent 
representative of the Crown had merely shifted the battle ground. Charges of irresponsibility former!  y levelled at the colonial 
Governor and his distant su peri ors were now transferred to the colonists' own ministerial heads." 
172  Sections 63 and  135 of the British North American Act of 1867. 
173  As  discussed  in  Scott  (1918), Cabinet  within  the  Canadian  context is  understood  to  represent  a  committee of  heads  of 
departments  thal  is presided  over  by  the  Prime  Minister (p.  123), an  arrangement  thal is  reiterated at the  provincial  leve! 
between the Premier and  his Executive Council  (p.  129). And though the power thar determines the existence and  destruction 
of Cabinet progressive! y moved from  the Crown to  the legislature, and eventually to  the  electorale, it  is Cabinet that defïnes 
the  political  agenda, sets  policy  and  affects  the  allocation  of resources within  the  Canadian  parliamentary system, not  the 
legislature nor the public (p. 124). 
174  First and Second Report of the Select Committee on the Lumber Trade, Appendix PPPP, JLAC, 1849. 177 
empted any  possible short-term recovery. Severa! factors were believed to have contributed 
to the demise of the timber trade. First, it was observed that the surplus of 1846 was in  part 
triggered  by  the  enormous  profits  of the  previous  seasons and  the  widely  held  belief that 
demand  would  continue  to  rise  because  of projected  railroad  construction  in  Britain  and 
elsewhere in  Europe. Second, rules obligated limit holders to manufacture minimum amounts 
of timber or el se face the threat of forfeiture. And third, lumbermen believed that their timber 
limits offered  little  in  the way  of security, due to the vagaries of arbitrary changes in  rules 
and the inherently  revocable nature of resource  rights  to  answer the changing priorities of 
government or satisfy the settlement imperative. Consequently, to mitigate the  risk of Joss, 
lumberers and limit holders faced strong incentives to extract the maximum value from their 
berths in the shortest amount oftime possible. Other issues were however at stake. 
As  A.J.  Russell  (Crown  Timber Agent)  and  W.W.  Dawson  (lumberman  and  mill-
owner) underscored in  their respective testimonies, the factors alluded to in  the Report of the 
Select Committee only  accounted  for about a  third  of the  over production  that  led  to  the 
demise of the  colonial  timber  trade.  For  them,  the  principal  cause of distress  lay  in  the 
increased levels of production from privately held land. As A.J. Russell  put it, "the glut in the 
market was  occasioned chief/y by the rush  of  small  dealers, country storekeepers, farmers 
and even  tradesmen, into  the business, and not sa  much  by the  regular lumberers  holding 
limits  in  Crown  Lands. "  White  agreeing  in  principle  to  this  assessment,  W. W  Dawson 
furthered  that in  his  opinion, the  amount of timber produced  on  private  land  was  simply 
disproportionate and that at !east half of that volume must have been produced fraudulently, 
thus depriving the public of appreciable revenues and the government of any effective means 
of control ling timber production. Regardless of whether titles were obtained fraudulently or 
with the consent of the Crown Lands Department, the practice of evading higher production 
costs by extracting timber from privately held land (i.e., dues were applicable to timber from 
public sources  only)  had  in  fact  changed  very  little  since the  problem  was  first  noted  in 
Charles  Buller's  report  on  tfte  management  of Crown  lands  in  1839  (see  Chapter  IV). 
Moreover, most witnesses objected to the use of fixed  scaling measures to calculate timber 
dues as opposed to the actual measurements of the eut timber. By considering ali  pieces of 
timber to be of equal value, the system in  place penalized lumberers for taking anything short 178 
of the  standard measures, 
175  forcing the  extraction  of only  the  largest and  best timber the 
country  had to  offer,  which  in  turn promoted the needless waste of higher end timber for 
pw·poses that could just as weil be answered by  smaller sized trees. In other words, the rules 
in  use  essentially  promoted  high  grading and  the  dissipatiqn  of resource  rents.  As  W.W. 
Dawson observed, the  requisite  mensuration of merchantable timber forced  lumbermen to 
seek out and extract only the very best and largest timber they could find,  resulting in a high 
grading effect that simultaneously rid  the country of its  best trees and  increased operating 
costs for everyone by  forcing  lumbermen to  expend ever higher levels of effort to  achieve 
comparable outputs from one year to the next: 
"The supply of the large sizes of timber are  indeed falling back year by year to  more 
and more  remote  localities,  where  greater  investments  of capital are  necessary  to 
carry  on  lumbering  operations....  l  see  no  reason,  wh  y  the  lumberer  should  be 
compelled to  sacrifice the  large timber, of which the  country possesses but a limited 
supply,jor railroad or other purposes for which small timber is equally weil or better 
adapted, and which supply is unlimited. "
176 
Further, lumbermen deplored the weak legal value of timber licenses for dealing with 
trespass and illegal appropriation, the adjudication of disputes over boundaries !ines, or loss 
due  to  settler  encroachment.  The  lack  of clarity  on  the  boundaries  of timber  limits  or 
institutional coherence between licensing instruments and the distribution of patent letters to 
settlers led to  much confusion and frustration amongst lumbermen, violent confrontation in 
sorne  instances  (see  Gillis  and  Roach,  1986,  pp.  16-17) and  invariably,  a  race  to  deplete 
available resources before other claimants did. Finally, lumbermen cautioned that the loss of 
colonial  preference negatively  affected  returns,  which  in  turn  made the  sector even  more 
susceptible to eut timber on private land in order to offset their increased production charges. 
Although the  Committee could  not fathom  the  existence of any  effectuai  means  by 
which the rates of appropriation could be  kept at near market levels, due to the "unlimited 
extent  of the  lumbering  country"  and  the  low  skill  requirement  needed  to  manufacture 
175  Each piece of white pi ne was reckoned as containing 70ft', 38cf for red  pi ne, and 34ft' in  the case of oak, elm, ash, birch, 
bass wood, and cedar. Railroad timber taken at actual measurement. 
176 See answers of W.W. Dawson to questions 77, 92, and 96, in Second Report, Appendix PPPP, JLAC, 1848-49. 179 
timber, 
177  its  recommendations largely affected the development of forest institutions in  the 
years  to  come.  Specifically,  the  committee  suggested  that  timber  licenses  ought  to  be 
replaced by a ground rent system that would generate as  much, if not more, revenue for the 
State. To place a check on the risk of monopoly, ground rents were to double for every year 
of non-occupancy, but in exchange, lumberers should be alleviated from the responsibility of 
having to assume the start-up costs of operating a timber limit (i.e., one fourth down payment 
of the estimated timber value),  this limiting incentives to eut timber quickly and recklessly. 
To  control  overall  output to  near  market thresholds  and  generate  stable  public  revenues, 
duties  on Crown timber should be replaced with an  export duty  applicable to timber from 
both public and private sources. To increase equity amongst limit holders, capture additional 
gains  and  prevent  the  needl ess  waste  and  destruction  of the  Province's  best  timber,  the 
method of collecting dues should be based on the actual measurement of each piece produced 
(as provided by cullers). Furtller, the size oftrees that could legally be eut should be reduced 
to  turn  the  vast  stretches  of mature  but  smaller sized  timber  into  a  commercially  viable 
resource  for  lumbermen,  a  profitable  source of revenue for  government,  and  a  means  of 
reducing  pressure  on  larger  sized  timber.  And  finally,  the  Committee  suggested  that 
additional  savings  might  be  found  in  the  reorganization of certain  offices  and  procedures 
within the Crown Lands Department, including the methods used for collecting timber dues 
and fees from those who use public works (e.g., slides on the Ottawa). 
While  the  Committee's  proposais  were  meant  to  support  the  interests  of  both 
government and lumbennen, severa! years and a complete change of administration would be 
needed  before the  latter suggestions  were ever seriously  considered.  In  the  meantime,  the 
government acted to  alleviate sorne of the pressures felt by lumbermen by withdrawing the 
threat of subdivision of existjng berths, by reducing the standard of occupation (i.e., the size 
of berths), and by postponing minimum manufacturing requirements until after 1850. 
5.4.1  The Search for Viable Institutional Solutions 
In  the  aftermath  of tlle  crisis  of 1846-49,  succeeding  governments  engaged  in  an 
ongoing process of institutional experimentation that led to the  Crown Timber act in  1849 
m  Other than the condi tions attached t<> the sale of li censes, there were no  specifie constraints on the number of entrants thal 
could ob tain such a title, nor werc they limited in tenns of the maximum amou  nt of timber they cou  id take out. 180 
and the adoption of a slew of  amendments and regulations that more or Jess correspond to the 
equally  rapid  change  of governments  during  this  period.  The  need  to  clarify  the  legal 
character of timber  licencing arrangements,  as  recommended  by  Select Committee on the 
Lumber Trade, eventually led to the adoption of the Crown Timber Act that was to  provide 
the legal  foundation for the development of forest resource institutions in  Quebec until  the 
1970s. On May 30
111
,  1849, the licensing of forest resources was finally embedded into  law 
(Act 12 Vi ct., c.  30). The sale of timber growing upon the public lands of the Province was 
officially  sanctioned  and  provisions  to  limit  the  depredation  of  such  resources  from 
fraudulent  or  illegal  means  were  introduced.  Building on  the  precedent of past orders  in 
council,  licenses  were  formerly  adopted  as  the  instrument of choice  for  the  issuance  of 
resource rights. The public nature of Crown lands and forests was officially sanctioned, and 
the authority to establish the rates, conditions, and regulations applicable to the said licenses 
was placed firmly in the hands of the executive government (Section I). Henceforth, licenses 
would be granted for twelve months and baring the possibility of mistakes in  the accuracy of 
surveys or of a  limit being  previously sold to  another lumberer or claimed for settlement 
purposes,  licenses  became  null  and  void  and  the  government  absolved  itself  of any 
responsibility or obligation to indemnify the holder of  the cancelled license. 
The  remainder of the  act  focused  explicitly  on  the  rights  of license  holders,  their 
responsibilities,  the  lien  of the  Crown  on  granted  timber and  the  obligations  of ali  other 
parties  regarding  licensees and the  unlawful  appropriation of trees from  any  of the Public 
lands  (including crown, clergy or school  reserves) of the Province.  Specifically,  licentiates 
were given  ali  rights  of property  to  the  trees, timber,  and  lumber eut or found  within the 
limits oftheir license. Any timber eut by the license bolder, persons operating under contract 
from  the latter or under illegal  pretences (e.g., trespass) belonged to the licentiate, could be 
seized if unlawfully obtained, and damages suffered were redeemable by action or suit at law 
(Section II).  In  return,  license  holders  were  required  to  provide a  sworn statement of the 
number  and  kinds  of trees  eut,  the  amount  of  saw  logs  produced  and  the  number 
manufactured square pieces of timber,  and  to  pay  ali  applicable dues or else face  possible 
seizure and detainment of timber for non-payment (Sections III to V). The remainder of the 
law (Sections VIto XIV) dealt with issues of illegal entry and unlawful appropriation. 181 
To  operationalize the Timber  Act, an  order  in  council  was  passed  on  September 5
1h 
1849. Timber be1ths  in  unsurveyed lands were not to exceed ten miles in  length by five miles 
in depth (i.e., 50 sq. miles) and halfthat size for surveyed townships. Ail  licences expired the 
30th of April following.  A single party could hold consecutive limits. Written requests for the 
transfer of proprietary rights were accepted after a full  year of occupation, and  improvements 
(  e.g.,  roads,  bridges,  booms,  housing,  cultivation)  were  considered  sufficient  proof  of 
occupation,  provided  the  expended  amount  was  not  Jess  than  f24.  However, timber  dues 
were left nearly  identical  to  the rates  used for the  past two decades,  1 78  as  were the  standard 
measures  applicable  to  their  calculation ~  Minimum  production  levels  equal  to  500  ft
3  per 
square mile (or a minimum of 2000 ft
3 for  the  smallest limits) were  maintained (but made 
binding after  1850  only).  The  discriminatory  payment schedule, consisting of an  advanced 
payment at the moment ofpurchase (equal to a quarter of the expected harvest plus securities 
for  the  remaining  sum)  was  maintained.  Finally,  license  applicants  were  now  required  to 
determine  the  exact  location of their  proposed  limit  and  any  error  in  the  description  or 
sketches furnished by the applicant or subsequent failure to conform to the conditions of sale 
could  result  in  the  revocation  of  privileges  without  indemnification  or  possibility  of 
submitting a future bid. 
In  sum, operators were more or Jess  forced  to  comply with the same basic set of rules 
that were thought to have contributed to the commercial depression that was still affecting the 
Province  at  the  time.  While additional  securities were  provided  to  deal  with  encroachment 
and  improve access to  credit, the Timber Act did  little more than  set in  stone the rules that 
were  applied  since  the  1820s and  in  the  process,  managed  to  evade  nearly  every  lesson 
learned  or  recommendation  that  had  since  been  pronounced  by  either  commission  or 
lumbermen.  Compounding these problems further stiJl  were the preeminent rights of settlers 
over ali other forms of ownership. 
178  Per cu  bic foot- white pine (square) =0.5 d.;  red pine, elm, birch, ash, tamarac =  Id., basswood, cedar, spruce = 0.5 d.; oak & 
walnut = 1.5 d.,  Id.; Per Cord- hard wood &  lath wood= 8d., soft wood= 4d.; Per saw  log (12 foot)- red  pine = 7d., white 
pi  ne  = 5d., spruce = 2.5d. Ali  planks, boards and deals measured  ad  valorem.  Licence holders were obligated  to  produce a 
sworn statement of products manufactured and as a deterrent againstfree riding. Rafts or cribs could be measured at random. 182 
As specified  in  the  revisions to  the Crown Lands Ad
79  of 1849, settlers could  now 
purchase land by  means of instalments in  a bid  to facilitate land access. Prospective settlers 
were given five year from  the date of purchase to  acquit the first of four instalments, thus 
making it more compelling than ever for bogus  settlers to  acquire land rights and  to denude 
the  property  of  ali  valuable  timber  before  the  first  instalment  was  ever  issued.  The 
consequences were predictable.  As  explained by  one officer of the Crown Lands Office in 
Québec, until  land sale conditions were again changed  in  1852,  sorne  3000 sales  had  been 
made in Lower Canada, ofwhich only 350 orso had made a payment.
180  The reason for such 
low  performances in  the sale and  upkeep of land  for  settlement purposes was  clear.  Most 
would-be settlers were primarily interested in  the timber, not the land. Rules were tightened 
in  July and August 1852 to reduce the risk of speculation, 
181 but land ru les were rendered so 
overly complex that their application was impracticable.  Years elapsed  before a  registry  of 
land  sales  was  ever  developed,  and  thanks  to  weak  enforcement  measures,  anyone 
sufficiently motivated to defraud the government of its valuable timber could do so with little 
impunity.
182  The struggle to find an agreeable balance between the progress ofsettlement and 
the needs of  the timber industry took decades to resolve. In fact, antagonism between the two 
groups  persisted  weil  into  the  20
1 11  century,  as  did  its  detrimental  effects  on  the  forest 
resources  due  to  the  insecurity  created  by  the  persistent  Jack  of institutional  fit  between 
settlement and forest exploitation (see Chapters VIto VII). 
Following y  et another change of government in  1851, the interests of lumbermen were 
fin ally  met with a  more receptive ear.  By an  order in  council passed August 8
111
,  1851, the 
system of instalments with  its  probative requirement of a deposit equal  to a quarter of the 
estimated value of the  berth  was  dropped.  In  its  place,  authorities  followed the advice of 
lumbermen and imposed an annual ground rent that was set at two shillings and six pence (2s. 
6d., or 50 cents)
183  per square mile, with a minimum charge of one pound for the smallest of 
179 Public Notice, 2 March 1849, Canada Gazette, no. 389, p. 6227. 
180  "Report on the Present System of Management of the Public Lands,"  Evidence  by  W.F. Collins, 12 April  1855, CIHM no. 
9_01485, p. l37. 
181 E.g., see notice passed on 6 Aug. 1852, Canada Gazelle, no. 586, p. 13175. 
182  For a detailed explanation of the stratagems used by would be settlers to co-opt li cense holders from their timber, see "Rights 
of Purchasers of Public Lands and  Necessary Reservations," in Report of the Commissioner of Crown Lands of Canada for the 
Year !856,Appendix No. 25,JLAC, 1856-57. 
183  The transition from English pound to the dollar was initiated during this period, and  progressively introduced in  government 
documents. The value of 2s. 6d., was equal to 50 cents (period currency), or $4.00 to f 1.00. - -----------------------------, 
183 
limits.
184  Ground rents were made to double for every year of non-occupation but revert back 
to original values once a minimum production of 500 ft
3 oftimber (or 100 saw logs) per mile 
was  initiated.  Although the  new  system helped to reduce the upfront costs associated with 
lumbering activities, it nevertheless increased the overall costs of  operating a timber berth. In 
effect, only the largest and most successful firms were able to maintain limits in reserve, thus 
helping  to  concentrate  the  !Jade  into  still  fewer  hands.  Two  additional  alterations  were 
introduced.  First,  in  what appears  to  be  a  surprisingly  early  recognition  that the  sale  of 
unprocessed goods left some potential gains uncaptured, saw logs destined for export were 
hereafter charged double the applicable duties.
185  Second, limit holders were now required to 
declare  upon oath  the  quantities  and  types of articles  contained  in  each  raft  or parce!  of 
timber produced and any discrepancy in  the amount declared versus exported was subject to 
the  payment of applicable duties  or forfeiture  and  the  Joss  of future  privileges  if attempts 
were made to evade obligatory declarations. Finally, on June 5
1
h,  1852, notice was given that 
timber duties would hereafter be levied according to the actual cubic contents of each log (as 
determined  by  the  measurements of government appointed  cullers),  and  not the  estimated 
standards of  old.
186 
Elsewhere  in  the  province,  the  government  experimented  with  other  forms  of 
arrangements. In the Mauricie  area for instance, the Shawinigan falls  bad  placed a  limit on 
the expansion of the timber !rade and an alternative arrangement was  needed to defray  the 
costs  of overcoming  this  natural  barrier.  To  render  the  region  commercially  viable  and 
productive of revenues, a channel  was created at the public's expense and on October 15
1
h, 
1852,  notice  was  given  in  the  Canada Gazette
187  for  the  sale of timber berths  to  amortize 
public investments. Hence, entry  into the tracte was rendered more competitive by auctioning 
timber berths on the bases of  a premium to be offered in  lieu of higher an nuai  rents, with the 
first year's instalment payable  in cash on the day of sale. Moreover, licentiates were required 
to defray the costs of Crown appointed surveyors to delineate their berths and an  impost of 
IB-l  Canada Gazette, 8 Aug.  1851 , no. 532,  pp.  11216-11218. 
1 85 The doubling of duties on exported saw logs was, according to White ([1899]1907, p. 214), introduced to protect the interests 
of Canadian mill  owners who alleged that American manufacturers were purchasing licenses to  eut timber only to ship the 
produce whole to the U.S where it would then be processed. 
• 186 Canada Gazene, 5 June 1852, no.  575, p. 12714. 
187  Notice from the Crown Lands Department, 15 Oct. 1852, Canada Gazene, no. 593. 184 
ten pounds currency (or $40, as specified in the notice) for every berth of 50  square miles in 
size, which was then applied to roadwork in the region. 
The initiative  however,  soon  faltered  as  buyers  got  ahead of themselves  and  nearly 
everything was purchased by a few  bouses at above market prices.
188 After severa! years of 
unsuccessful  attempts  to  obtain  favour  from  the  government  in  the  form  of a  reduction, 
unoccupied berths were forfeited for non-payment in  1855. The system was altered slightly to 
reduce the consequences of speculation and offered again by  public auction at the standard 
rent  of two  shillings  and  six  pence  (2s.  6d.)  per  square  mile,  the  competition  being the 
addition of a simple bonus over and above the ordinary ground rent that was payable (along 
with  the  first  season's  rent)  at the  time of sale.
189  The positive  results  of this  experiment 
eventually led toits being applied throughout the Province by  1859.
190 
With  these  additions,  the  founding  principles  of Québec's  future  forest  resource 
institutions were thus firmly  established. Although the overall framework was continuously 
adapted or modified to suit the emergent needs and interests of political and economie actors, 
the central tenets of  the province's forestry regime (i.e., centralized governance structure, fee-
based allocation of resource  rights,  and fixed-term  tenures) remained  largely  unchallenged 
untillate in the twentieth century. 
5.4.2  Public Pressure and Political Interference 
While the basic framework of forest institutions changed very little in the decades that 
followed, the operational rules that governed its application remained the subject of ongoing 
manipulation.  For reasons that had more to  do with the constant change of leadership than 
any genuine search for improved operations and resource use outcomes, the rules regulating 
forest  use  in  Québec  were  changed  with  near  clockwork  regularity  throughout  the  19
111 
century.  As  the  Financial  and  Depmtmental  Commission 
191  and  Report  of the  Select 
Committee on the State of  the Lumber Trade of Canada of 1863 would later reveal, the public 
188  See "Woods and  Forests Branch,"  in  Annual Report of the Commissioner of Crown Lands for the  Year 1855-56, Appendix 
25, JLAC, 1857. 
189  See "Woods and  Forests," in  Report of the Commissioner of Crown  Lands of Canada for the Year  1858-59,"  Appendix no. 
12, p. II,Sessional Papers, 1860. 
190 Notice of the Woods and Services branch, 15 June 1860, Canada Gazette vol.  19, no. 25, p.  1735. 
191 "First Report of the Financial and Departmental Commission," May 1863, Québec: J. Blackburn, CIHM no. 9_00964 185 
interest was for years defined by the politically appointed head of the Department of Crown 
Lands. And since the  interests of Commissioners wavered continuously between settlement 
and the lumber trade, so did the rules and ordinances that were adopted in  favour of one or 
the other - assistant commissioners and other senior-leve!  public servants being asked only 
sparingly to provide advice with little chance of it ever being considered. 
An  example of the growing influence of the _ forest sector on the decisions of elected 
officiais and the somewhat dysfunctional workings of the executive during these earl y years 
of responsibility is  found  in  the govemment's decision to  reduce the charges  levied on  red 
pine in  September 1852.  In a report prepared  by  the then  Commissioner of Crown Lands, 
John  Rolph, the  minister summarized the demands expressed in  a  series of petitions  from 
lumbermen and  municipal  officiais  from  the Ottawa region.  The memorialists argued that 
after the collapse of 1846, which they attributed to the repeal of the preferential tm·iffs, the 
branch of the trade that was reliant on red  pi ne witnessed a steady and permanent decline of 
exports (by about twenty percent per annum) with a comparable Joss  of value (estimated at 
around thirty percent) from  1847  to  1851.
192  In consequence, it was alleged that the duty on 
red  pine  (one  penny/ft
3
)  represented  a  considerable  disadvantage  to  those  who  were 
economically dependent on such stocks. In defence of  the claims submitted by petitioners, the 
Commissioner  cited  what  would  eventually  become  the  mantra  of ali  future  industry 
demands.  In  the  opinion  of  the  Commissioner,  three  distinctive  reasons  warranted  a 
favourable  response from  government. Red pi ne  entai led  (1)  high manufacturing costs (the 
smaller sized red  pine required more labour to square a volume equivalent to  that of white 
pine), (2) high extraction costs (red pine being generally found at higher elevations and thus 
further away from  navigable waterways), and (3)  high transportation  costs (red  pine being 
found further in-land  and thus further from  markets). As  for the  inevitable  Joss  of revenue 
that would  result from  such a  change, the  Commissioner added  that a  sum  equal  to,  and 
perhaps  even  greater  than,  the  projected  )osses  would  be  found  through  "a  more  strict 
observance of the Law."  For  much  of the timber produced at the time, the  Commissioner 
openly admitted, 
192  See "Memorial of the Inhabitants of the Ottawa Country," Appendix AAA., JLAC, 1852. 186 
"fraudulently  escaped  [applicable  duties]  under  the  false  pretence  of being from 
private  lands, an  evil which,  however much  to  be  regretted,  [could] not be entirely 
cured wh ile so much scope for (and direct inducement to) corrupt practices exist[  edf, 
as under the ... pernicious system and imperfect law." 
Yet,  however critical  was the Commissioner's admonition, nothing was ever done to 
correct this recurring weakness in  the administration of Crown Lands. A similarly perceptive 
act of reasoning, which the Commissioner failed to carry to  its logical conclusion is  captured 
in  the  latter's  allusion  to  the  sudden  change of status  which  white  pine  enjoyed.  Rolph 
ex plains that abundance and years of preferential treatment forced the priee of white pine to 
be maintained aJtificially low (one halfpenny per cubic foot), which in turn induced markets 
to  consider  such  supplies  as  being  of an  inferior  quality.
193  "But  when  left  to  a  fair 
competition," the commissioner observed that the value of white pine had actually "risen in 
the estimation of  the consumer to  an  extent equivalent to  the loss sustained" following the 
repeal  of the differentiai  duties.  Put differently, the willingness to  pay  in  market situations 
depends on the expected value or benefit that a product will provide over and above existing 
opportunity  costs.  But  in  the  case of red  pine,  the  Commissioner  opined  that  the  rates 
applicable to  the said timber probably exceeded  its  true  market value.  Fortunately  for the 
Minister and the petitioners, institutional memory tends to be selective and runs only so deep 
as  those who are called upon to exercise the responsibility of collective choice rights at any 
given point in  ti me. Renee, in none of the documents requesting a reduction in  duties on red 
pine  is  there  mention  of the  problem  of over  production  that  was  occasioned  by  the 
speculative spirit of lumbermen on the eve of the repeal, the backlog of supplies it created, 
and the long-term negative effects this had on demand and priee. 
The order to  reduce the tariff on  red pi ne was passed after a few months of discussion 
on  the  subject.  However,  the  decision  to  change  this  key  payoff rule  was  not  without 
controversy. In the months that followed the change of duty, a committee was established to 
investigate  the  circumstances  connected  with  the  tariff  reduction.
194  White  agreeing  in 
principle to the petitioners'  demands, some members of the Executive Council were of the 
opinion  that any  alteration  of existing duties  needed  to  be considered  in  the context of a 
193 John  Rolph, Report dated 24 July 1852, Appendix AAA, JLAC, 1852. CIHM no. 9_00955. 
194 See Report, 9 Nov. 1852, and related Minutes of Evidence in Appendix AAA, JLAC, 1852. 187 
change of the system as  a whole, based on the  1849 recommendation that an export tax be 
levied on ali  sources (i.e., private and public) of timber. However, for those holding red pi ne 
liabilities,  time  was of the essence and although an  export tax  would have created  a more 
levet  playing field, the process for achieving such  a change was necessarily longer. Pending 
the arrivai of  the past season's harvest in the Port of  Québec- at which ti me applicable duties 
would be  levied  (i.e.,  August-September) - the frequency of persona!  interactions between 
lumbermen  and  members of the  executive suddenly  increased.  Though everyone  involved 
would  later deny  that any  undue  traffic  of influence helped  to  precipitate the  decision  to 
accommodate  lumbermen,  the  ease  with  which  business  leaders  were  able  to  cali  upon 
individual members of the executive and the attention they received pointed to a much closer 
relationship than what could publically  be admitted. Moreover, because the proceedings of 
the executive were conducted in  secrecy (as they remain to this day), it is  impossible to  tell 
who  decided  what,  when  and  how.  Consequently,  responses  to  the  inquiry  tended  to  be 
vague. Sorne members of  the executive could not recall when the decision to reduce the tariff 
was  made,  others  were  unsure  of  their  presence,  and  none  could  explain  how  the 
Commissioner of Crown Lands could arbitrarily decide to  apply the reduction retroactively, 
and at a great Joss of revenue for the Province. 
In  spite  of such  changes,  the  set of amendments  introduced  in  1851  and  1852  did 
improve  the  government's  share  of resource-related  dividends.  Receipts  from  the  sale of 
Crown timber slowly  edged upwards  from  f22,270  in  1848  to  f30,318  in  1851 ,  and  then 
jumped to .f53,013 in  1852 following implementation of the ground rent system.
195  Similarly, 
cullers reported counting 19,707,792 ft
3 of squared timber originating from  (or near) Canada 
East (i.e., Québec) in  1850 and 34,966,454 fe  in  1852. As these numbers reveal, the worst of 
the economie storm was now over and a new wave of optimism was slowly taking hold. But 
more important)  y, the figures show th at the lowering of the preferential tariffs had few if any 
long-term  effects  on  the  timber  trade.  This,  according  to  Lower  (1973,  pp.  93-95),  is 
attributable to two key factors. First, transportation costs were reduced to a bare minimum by 
employing mostly old, worn-out ships that were manned by poorly paid crews; and second, in 
comparison to the United States or the Baltics, timber supplies in British North America were 
195  See Reports of the Commissioner ofCrown Lands for 1851  and  1852 respective!  y, JLAC. 188 
relatively cheap. In effect, Canadian timber had been (Buller, 1939) and effectively remained 
notoriously undervalued. As the Supervisor of Cu  liers would later reveal, after having visited 
the major commercial ports of Europe, Baltic timber rose by 44% in value between 1838 and 
1860, while during the same period, the value of Canadian supplies increased by only  17%. 
The reas on  was "mainly due to  over-production," as  the Supervisor of Cu  liers put it, which 
meant that the Province of Canada was "merely  denuding the country of  [its}  best timber, 
without benefitting any one."
196  Instead of extracting the maximum amount of benefit from 
each tree, as  customarily  practiced  in  the privately  owned forests  of the  Baltic region,  the 
timber trade in Canada was established as a volume-based industry, which meant that profits 
were generated  through  large-scale  production of relatively  unprocessed  commodity goods 
(Ross, 1995), instead of more remunerative and  less  resource intensive  modes of production 
associated with higher-end goods. 
5.4.3  Inquiry on the Management of Crown Forests 
For those  who  were  actively  involved  in  the  trade  during this  period,  the  renewed 
stability and prosperity of the forest sector was primarily attributable to the resource policies 
that  were  subsequently  adopted.  At  least,  such  was  the  opinion  of the  lumbermen  who 
testified  before a  Select Committee on the  management of the  Public  Lands
1 97  in  May of 
1855.  According to  lumbermen  and  mill  owners  such  as  David  Roblin,  James  H.  Burke, 
William Hamilton, George, Hamilton, Allan Gilmour and long-time Crown timber agent at 
Bytown, A.J. Russell, the set of institutional arrangements that were then in use offered near 
ideal  conditions.  Providing  the  best possible returns  to  government and  lumbermen  alike, 
forest  resource  rules  prevented  the  needless  waste  of timber  and  the  monopolization  of 
available stocks, offered settlers a nearby market wherein they could offer their produce and 
labour,  and  helped  to  improve  public  infrastructures  (e.g.,  roads  and  bridges)  for  the 
advancement of  agriculture and the seUlement of the country. As such, any change that might 
affect  the  nature  of licensed  tenures  (e.g.,  land  sales)  or  impose the  production  of more 
refined articles (e.g.,  sawn lumber) would necessarily imperil the commercial interests of the 
province and the revenues upon which government depended. Further to the ruin that would 
1 96  See "Report of the Supervisor of Cullers on the Lumber Trade," September 10, 1861 , in Sessional  Papers (No.  Il), Appendix 
No.33, 1862. 
1 97  See "Report of the Select Committee Appointed to Enquire and  Report upon the Present System of Management of the Public 
Lands," Ordered, by the Legislative Assembly, to be Printed, 12'h April , 1855. CJHM  no. 9_01485. 189 
be occasioned amongst th ose who had invested the ir capital, advocates of the existing system 
warned that any alteration of rules would place the trade in  the hands of speculators, cause 
monopoly and bring a11  end to trans-Atlantic shipping from Québec. 
However,  important changes  were afoot and  if the  lumbennen who  were  called  to 
testify either deliberately  or unwittingly failed to recognize the emergent reality within which 
they operated, others were not as  shy in voicing their opinions on the state of affairs. In his 
capacity as the Commissioner of the British American Land Company of Lower Canada, the 
chair of the  Committee,  Alexander T.  Galt,
198  vouched that the trade in  square timber was 
nothing short of a "projligate waste of  one of  the greatest sources of  Provincial wealth." In 
Galt's view, "the value of  our Forests" in the Province of Canada, "is precisely in proportion 
ta  the amount of  labour expended in preparing the timber for market, and that the  re  fore the 
more crude and raw state in which it is exported, the less value the trade is to the Province." 
Put differently,  Galt recognized that the trade  in  Canadian  wood  products was  essentially 
volume-based and that those who engaged in it limited their expenses by  ali  possible means. 
If  the system was to change and produce greater value, incentives would be needed.  As such, 
in order to "cause capital, skill and labour to be ... embarked in the trade," there needed to be 
"greater  inducements  ta  manufacture  [timber  J into  sawn  lumber."  Galt  argued  th at  the 
production of  square tim ber tended to "waste the fin est portion of the wood" at the ex  pense of 
those  investments  that  could  potentially  further  the  prosperity  and  social  welfare  of the 
Province. If incentives to invest in  value added production are insufficient or non-existent, 
then few will  be tempted to risk their capital into such ventures. As already mentioned in the 
case  of white  pine,  when  a  pool  of resources  is  undervalued,  those  who  engage  in  its 
exploitation will  likewise  be  induced to  minimize the  investments  needed to  extract value 
from  each unit of resource. Hence, the problem Galt contended was  not the lack of specifie 
inducements  but  rather  that  the  rates  chargèd  for  Crown  timber  were  simply  too  low  to 
campel  operators  into  producing  more  refined  articles.  Recognizing  that  the  market  for 
Canadian  wood  products  was  undeniably  shifting  towards  the  United  States  and  "in  the 
direction of sawn lumber," Galt urged the need for "an immediate and considerable advance" 
in  the  rates  charged for  the  privilege of  cutting  trees  on  public  lands.  In any  event,  such 
1 98 /bid. , Evidence by Mr. AlcxandcrT. Galt, pp. 26-33. 190 
production would invariably contribute to "the more rapid seulement and prosperity" of the 
country. However, this being said, it would be unjust to portray ali  lumbermen as being only 
interested in short term gains. As those who testified before the Committee clearly illustrated, 
timbering during the early days of  the trade was in no way cheap and substantial investments 
were  required  before a  single stick could  be gotten  out of the woods.
199  In  concluding his 
assessment of the  current state of forest  resource  use  in  the Province,  Galt alluded  to  the 
"absolute monopoly oftimber limits"
200  that was "enjoyed by afew large operators" and what 
he considered to  be the ultimate impediment to change in this most important sector of the 
colonial economy: 
"Of ali  the  varied  branches  of the  Crown  Lands  Department,  which  imperative/y 
demand  inspection  and  revision,  there  is  none ...  that  exceeds  in  importance  the 
disposai of timber; and that it has not met with the attention it deserves, can only be 
attributed ta  the fact, that from this source atone, has the Department been enabled ta 
ob  tain any available revenue." 
Evidently, Galt was  not alone  in  his assessment of the  inefficiencies associated with 
the management and use of forests in the Province. For William Spragge, Chief Clerk of the 
Crown Lands Department,
201 the squaring of timber was an eminent!  y wasteful process that 
rendered  the  greatest  portion  of the  tree  useless  and destined  to  rot  on  the  ground.  The 
slightest defect or bend in  the tree consigned everything above the imperfection to the same 
fate as  the pieces removed through squaring. But with the  manufacture of saw  logs, deals, 
boards,  or  planks,  Spragge  estimated  that  up  to  three-fourths  of the  wood  !ost  through 
squaring  would  find  its  way  to  the  market.  In  addition  to  reducing  the  amount of waste 
199As reported by Perry (1862, p. 33), the timber trade required substantial investments on the part of limit holders.ln addition to 
the procurement of license, the lumberer had to establish a lumber camp - a log building (30 by 60 feet) and clear land for a 
farm capable of producing oats, potatoes and  hay; operators  typically needed 20 horses,  10  or  12  oxen, cattle; roads  to the 
nearest streams and  bridges. ln  other words, sorne  f SOO  to  f 5,000 (roughly  $2000  to  $20,000 dollars)  of groundwork was 
needed bef  ore a  single stick of timber could be  taken  off the  li mit. The rafts sent to Québec consisted  of 70  to  80 cribs or 
75,000 to  100,000 ff of timber and had to travel an average of 500 miles bef  ore arriving at the port of Québec. As for the pork 
consumed in the camps, it had to be imported from the United Sates and travel nearly  1700 miles. On the Ottawa River alone, 
it was estimated that sorne 25,000 men worked in the timber trade, consuming over 26,000 tons of agricultural produce every 
year. 
2lllJ  Allusions to monopoly conditions were frequent during the  19'"  century, but difficult to ascertain on the basis of available 
evidence. According to the testimony provided by A .J.  Russell  (p. 165- 166 of the Report on the Management of Public Lands), 
sorne 900 timber licenses were issued annually in the Province, which were held by  nearly  600 parties. Russell  did however 
concede that there was a concentration of large timber berths in the more productive regions of the Province. Further, if one 
considers the  high costs of entry, the fact that smaller operations often acted  under con tract from larger firms or for various 
saw mi lis, then the relative number of parties who were decidedly in control of the trade was undoubtedly more restricted th an 
the 600 parties alluded to by Russell. 
201  See "Report on the Management of Public Lands," Evidence provided by William Spragge, pp. 101-102. 191 
produced, the production of sawn  lumber could potentially  increase the amount of revenue 
taken in  by the Province, contribute to more stable employment opportunities, and encourage 
the  establishment of more  permanent and  economically  viable communities.  The position 
expressed by  Spragge was in  sharp contrast to the views held by the lumbermen who were 
called to testify. The trade in  square timber, as  they pointed out, existed because consumers 
in  Britain  and  elsewhere  command  it  and  because  the  Crown  dues  associated  with  the 
production of such timber was twice the amount exacted from saw logs. Needless to say, no 
allusion was made of the fact that the reduced rates on saw logs stemmed from  nearly three 
decades of lobbying efforts  by  those engaged  in  the sawn lumber industry or the petitions 
submitted by  the very same actors for more flexibility  in  the standards applicable to square 
timber since  large sized  trees  were  becoming  increasingly  scarce.  ln  Spragge's view,  the 
Province  had  reached  a  threshold  and  the  wasteful  exploitation  of forest  resources  could 
neither be sustained nor economically condoned. As he put it, 
"it is, unfortunately, to mucha matter of  certainty that what used to be designated our 
inexhaustible  supplies of tùnber,  are  rapidly  disappearing  and sound policy  would 
suggest that inducements should be offered for economising that which still stands in 
the forests." 
With uncanny foresight Spragge advanced that the vast amounts of British capital that 
were by then being engulfed in the construction of railways, the maintenance of provincial or 
municipal  funds,  or in  support of military  expenses would  ultimately  drain  the  Provincial 
economy with debt and interests. Devising more efficient ways of extracting value from  the 
Province's  natural  resources  was,  for  Spragge,  as  much  a  necessity  as  a  matter of sound 
economie policy. While contested by others who were called to testify before the Committee, 
Spragge would eventually be proven right.  In effect, the scenario he alluded to is  precisely 
what occurred in Québec following Confederation (see Chapter VI). 
In  his concluding remarks, Spragge reiterated the sentiment shared by  Galt regarding 
the negative effects of political  influence on the  management of the Department. In  calling 
attention  to  the  problem  of political  change  and  the episodic appointment of leaders who 
believe that it was "incumbent upon [them]  to distinguish  [their] advent to office," Spragge 
advocated for nothing less than  a change in the rules governing public decision-making. In 192 
short,  the  ability  of elected  officiais to  alter or change  rules,  to  suit political  motivations, 
should  be  constrained.  As  he  put it,  "Political heads of the  Departments  must hold their 
political  levees."  For  Spragge,  "the  working  out of a  good  system"  entails  an  a  priori 
agreement  on  what  should  constitute  such  a  system.  Implementation  would  require  the 
appointment of two  competent functionaries  with "unimpeachable  integrity"  to  direct the 
eastern and western divisions of the Province respectively, and "lest the office should become 
one with which to reward political services", neither "should be paid extravagant/y." In this 
way, 
"the party holding [Office] should be made responsible for the  whole  business, and 
accoun.table  so  that  the  principles  upon  which  the  Department  is  required  to  be 
con.ducted,  shall  be  faithfully  and  in.variably  observed,  and  rigid  economy  in  its 
various branches carefully practised." 
In other words,  the way  in  which  public  lands  and  resources  ought to  be  managed 
should be framed by a common set ofprinciples, established at the constitutionallevel, which 
would  make it iteratively in·elevant who held the reigns of the executive government, since 
responsibility  would  be  informed  by  administrative  rather  than  political  accountability. 
Regardless of the practicability oL such_a system, it is  clear that the status quo left potential 
gains uncaptured and likewise created opportunities for political interference. 
ln spite of the fact that members of the 1855 Committee were "unanimous"  in  "the  ir 
opinion that important modifications of  the ... system [were} imperative/y required," the Jack 
of  agreement on the nature of the problem at hand prevented the formulation of more specifie 
recommendations. Remarkably, other than Galt and Spragge, none of the witnesses who were 
called  upon  to  testify  seemed  to  have  any  sense  that the  forest  sector  and  land  granting 
division of  the Province were, by the middle of the 1850s, at the cusp of the most significant 
change to arise since the Napoleonic blockade of 1806. 
5.5  Reciprocity, Resource Rights, and Early Environmental Awareness 
The 1850s mark an  important transition in  the evolution of forest resource institutions 
within the greater Canadian context for at !east three fundamental reasons. The fi rst of these 
concerns the advent of American influence on the management and use of public forests. The 193 
second relates to the struggle for resource rights and access to land that pitted the interests of 
lumbermen against those of settlers.  And the third  concerns the  realisation that lumbering 
activities and deforestation in  particular, were producing harmful externalities to  settlers and 
agrarian  communities,  leading  to  a  surge of interest  for  the  protection  of forests  and  an 
acknowledgement of the environmental services that forests  provide. The following sections 
sequentially address these three  factors. 
5.5.1  American Influence 
Following the repeal of  the corn laws
202  and the depression that followed,
203 free trade 
suddenly gained widespread appeal  amongst politicians  and the commercial  class.  For the 
problem  occasioned  by  the  removal  of colonial  preference  did  not  lie,  as  Lord  Elgin 
understood it,  with the introduction of free trade per se  but with the commercial restrictions 
that were left in  place: "it is the inconsistency of Imperial legislation, and not the adoption of 
one po  licy rather  than  another, which  is  the bane of the  colonies.  "
204  To redress  the dire 
economie  situation  that  threatened  the  commercial  interests  and  political  stability  of the 
Province, advocates from  ali  sides of the debate pressed for the repeal  the navigation laws 
that gave British vessels a virtual monopoly over the conveyance of Canadian goods, and the 
adoption of a reciprocal trading arrangement between Canada and the United States. Wh ile of 
no  direct consequence to  the timber trade  per se,
205  remonstrance by  the government and 
nearly  every  board  of trade  of the  Province  ultimately  forced  the  British  Parliament  to 
relinquish its navigational policies in June of 1849,
206  thus removing one of  the major irritants 
that  was  by  th en  threatening  the  connection  between  Canada  and  the  mother  country. 
However, distrust over the local government's capacity to  secure economie recovery within 
the Province ran high and when Lord Elgin assented the controversial Rebellion Losses Bill 
on  April  25,  1849,  as  a  sh<Jw  of faith  in  the  principles  of responsible  government,  the 
situation took a turn for the worst. Rioting in  Montreal erupted, its Parliament House burned 
202 "Correspondence with  the colonies respecting differentiai duties and  the navigation laws", London: HMso : 1847. CIHM no. 
9_01911. 
203  "Correspondence between the Govemor-General of Canada and  the Secretary of State for the Colonial Department upon the 
operation of the navigation laws," London: W. Clowes, 1848. CIHM no. 9_01920. 
2
0-l  See Walrond (1872), Letters and Journals of  James, Eighth Earl of Elgin, p. 60. 
205 Timber ex ports from Québec City were "carried on by British ships especially employed in thal branc/1 of  the /rade," which 
is  "neither  malerially  ajjecled  nor  does  il materially  influence  the  commerce"  of  Canada's  other  export  trades.  See 
"Memorandum of the Executive Cou  neil on the subject of the Navigation Laws," No. 54 in Appendix C, JLAC. 1849. 
206  12 &  13 Vi  ct., cap 29 (Imp.). 194 
down,  and  talk  of annexation  with  the  United  States  gained  widespread  popularity.  An 
alternative solution was at once required.  In  Elgin's view, the loyalty of Canadians and the 
pursuance of a constitutional government could only be maintained by placing the produce of 
Canadian labour on an equal footing with that which was produced in  the United States. As 
Elgin put it to Prime Minister Lord John Russell: 
"the  disaffection  now  existing  in  Canada, whatever be  the forms  with  which  it may 
clot  he  itselj,  is  due  mainly  to  commercial  causes.  1 do  not say  that  the re  is  no 
discontent on political grounds.  Powerful individuals and even classes of men are, 1 
am well aware, dissatisfied with the conduct of  affairs. But 1 make bold to affirm that 
so  general  is  the  belief that,  under  the  present circumstances  of our  commercial 
condition, the colonists pay a heavy pecuniary fine for the ir fidelity to  Great Britain, 
that nothing but the  existence to  an unwonted degree of  political contentment among 
the masses has prevented the cry for annexation from spreading, like wildfire, through 
the Province. "
207 
The  pace  of  commerce  neve1iheless  picked  up  after  1850  and  the  annexation 
movement  withered  away  by  its  own  accord.  Yet,  efforts  to  secure  a  reciprocal  trading 
agreement between the United States and Canada failed, year after year, to arouse even the 
slightest interests from the American Congress.  Finally, after more than six years of aborted 
negotiations, Lord Elgin himself was sent to  Washington in the spring of 1854 with the hope 
that his  persona! attendance would  bring the matter to a successful close.  Within days,  an 
agreement was reached on the terms of a treaty. In exchange for the free admission of certain 
American  products,  legal  entry  in  the  colonial  herring  and  mackerel  fisheries,  and  equal 
rights to the St.  Lawrence seaway and  system of canals,  the Canadians gained a  duty free 
access to  the  rapidly  expanding American  economy  for  nearly  ali  of their most important 
staple products, including: grain, flour, fruit, meats, coal, timber and lumber. 
However significant this achievement was for Elgin,  it was  undoubtedly  not as clear 
th en as  it  would la  ter become, as  Lower ( 1938, p.l 02) pointed out, th at by "giving value to 
Canadian natural resources, " reciprocity ultimately resulted in a "more or less uncontrolled 
American  exploitation  of Canadian forests"  (at  !east  with  regards  to  Ontario).  Or as  he 
framed it in  the title to his  1938 classic account of the  history of the lumber trade between 
Canada and  the  United  States,  the  Reciprocity  Treaty  practically  paved  the  way  for  the 
'rn See Walrond  1872, Letters and Journals of James, Eighth  Earl  of Elgin, p.l03. 195 
"North American Assault on  the  Canadian  Forests."  In  effect,  free  trade  with  the United 
States  and  its  need  for  lumber  of ail  sizes  and  qualities  made  for  near  perfect  market 
conditions.  Wood  was  required  to  sustain  the growth of American  industries and  whether 
timbers were sent whole or roughly eut into variously sized boards and planks mattered little. 
208  Y et,  change was  graduai  and  what some characterised  as  a "bonanza for industry and 
government alike" (Gillis and Roach, 1986, p.  29), developed much more unevenly than what 
some scholars  suggests  (  e.g.,  Gaudreau,  1999).  With  regards  to  the  Province of Canada, 
American  investments  primarily  flowed  to  the  Upper  province  due  to  its  comparative 
advantage (canals & railways linking the Ottawa Valley to the Great Lakes), while the bulk 
of Québec's timber and  lumber  production continued to serve the British Market weil  into 
20
1
h century (Lower, 1938). As  result, by  1869, over 99% of Ontario's forest-related exports 
were destined for American markets, whereas on average, Québec exported only  14% of its 
overall  production  to  the  United  States  between  1869  and  1879  (Hough,  1880,  pp.  464-
465)?09 Nevertheless, the importance of the American market only grew over ti me, and as its 
purchasing  power increased, so  did  its  ability  to  influence  the  course of Canadian  public 
policy. As  Lower aptly put it:  "no storehouse of raw materials needed by the outside world 
can have much mastery over its destiny" (1973, p.119). 
5.5.2  The Struggle for Resource Rights 
The other major factor that seems to have eluded the grasp of the  1855  Committee 
charged  with  looking  into  the  management of Public  Lands  (see  Section  5.4.3)  was  the 
availability of land itself. As the Commissioner of Crown Lands asserted but a year after the 
1855  inquiry,  "Government has  now no  more land to  offer  to  settlers  in  that part of the 
Province  considered  the  most favourable  for  seulement ....  What  have  we  remaining  is 
therefore now more than  ever  an  important question, and one thal practically presses itself 
upon us. "21 0 A very important question indeed, for from  this point onwards, the interests of 
lumbermen  and  settlers  would  invariably  become intertwined  in  a  common struggle over 
rights to  the public domain. According to observers at the time, the best arable  land  in  the 
2œ Lower ( 1938, p. 46) described these conditions as follows: "North America  ... wanted a mass-production article: trees  had to 
be eut down and eut up at lightning speed and no one cared whether a board was longer of shorter than it ought to be, wh ether 
it was made with non-rectangular edges or carried the marks of the saw on its si  de." 
209 Hough, F.B., 1880. Report Upon Forcstry. Washington: Government Printing Office. 
210  See "A  General View  of  Public  Lands,"  in  Report of the  Commissioner of Crown  Lands of Canada for the  Year  1856, 
Appendix No. 25,JALC, 1857. 196 
province had  been disposed of and the settlement frontier was now the forest frontier, or as 
Commissioner Joseph  Cauchon  put it,  "ail  the lands Government now has for sale are  in 
lumbering countries."
211  However, after years of neglect, the problems that were occasioned 
by  the preeminent rights of settlers over those of limit holders remained entirely unresolved. 
As  written,  the  law allowed settlers to  pUI·chase land  rights  under licensed  occupation and 
claim  not only the trees  that were left standing  but in  fact  other investment that  a  license 
holder might  have consented to,  including  efforts to  improve access and  removal  of forest 
timber (e.g., roads,  slides, dams and booms). "By  this simple process," Cauchon states, "an 
unscrupulous man might become owner of  a raft of  timber worth  a thousand pounds by a 
trifling outlay in  the course of  a few weeks; besides,  he might keep  the land if  it were worth 
having."
212 Further, since works designed to facilitate timber removal were legally transferred 
to  the  purchaser  of any  lot,  in  which  such  improvements  might  be  located,  it  was  not 
uncommon for such settlers to "campel the lumberers  to pay [a} toll for making use of  the 
works  they themselves  have constructed at considerable cost," causing obstruction  in  some 
cases, or obliging the lumberer to remove his timber by  sorne alternate and generally more 
costly arrangement?
13 
Y  et, the decision to alienate timber while withholding the actual rights to the soi! made 
sense for  government,  lumbermen, and  settlers alike.  In essence, the  licencing of resource 
rights allowed the government to collect revenues from  two distinct sources: (1) the ground 
rent extracted from concessionary sales of Public Lands (i.e., timber berths or limits) and the 
dues  received  for  each  tree  that  was  appropriated;  and  (2)  the  proceeds  generated 
(theoretically  thereafter)  by  the  sale  of such  lands  to  settlers.  Similarly  to  the  transition 
experienced  by  nearly  every  agro-based  society  in  the  world  (Williams,  2003),  these  two 
considerations rendered the conversion of fores tl and not only possible but in fact essen  ti al  for 
the expansion of settlement. As a contemporary observer put it: 
"[t]he wild lands or Crown Domain possess as fiscal elements, two distinct values -
the first of their  natural productions,  such  as forests  and minerais,  are  legitimate 
211 Ibid, see section titled "Rights of Purchasers of Public Lands and Necessary Reservations." 
212 Ibid. 
213  Ibid. 197 
abjects from which revenue may and ought to be derived; the second is the value of  the 
sail, and how that value should be employed in promo  ting immigration. "
214 
By improving access to the remote parts of the Province, and  clearing the land of its 
timber,  the  lumberer  answered  the  needs  of the  settler  for  unoccupied  lands,  and  by 
establishing their homesteads within reach of  the lumbering country, the settler found a needy 
market in  want of his  industry?
15  In sum,  "[t}here could not possibly exist a state of  things 
more favourable to colonization."
216  Until that is, the struggle for land and resources became 
a contest over rights to the very  same assets. 
In a  context dominated by the square timber industry, annual  licensing arrangements 
and  ground  rents  were weil  suited  to the  needs of lumbermen whose interest  in  land  was 
limited  to  the  extraction  of rnarketable  timber.  Although  imposts  on  Crown  timber were 
regularly  contested  as  a  burden  for  the  legitimate  producer,  the  standard  rate  of one  half 
penny per cubic foot (as charged on white and red pine in the mid 50s) represented little more 
than one-tenth of the  total  capital  needed  to  manufacture and  transport squared timber to 
market.
217  In fact, the rates charged on timber taken from public lands changed only modestly 
between  1828  and  1867.  For  the  American  lumbermen  who  eventually  ventured  north 
following the adoption of free trade, the advantages of such a system were undoubtedly clear, 
but for those engaged in more capital-intensive forms of production, requiring the use of saw 
mills and a permanent work force, the system offered a  more limited security. As the shift 
towards  sawn  lumber  furthered  the  critical  weight of that  portion  of the  industry  which 
favoured longer term and less  costly tenure arrangements, government slowly retracted from 
its staunch opposition to leaving any "portion of  the timber lands wholly unproductive, either 
· 
214  Perry 1862. The staple trade of Canada. CIHM no. 23012, p. 38. 
215  Lumbermen required substantial amounts of agricultural produce to  support the ir activities. Small  ( 1884, p.6) described  the 
needs of one firm  in  the Ottawa  Valley as follows: "750 tons of hay, 25,000 bushels of oats, 5,000 bushels of turnips, 6,000 
bushels of potatoes, 1,000 barrels of  pork, 9,000 barrels of flour, 2,000 barrels of oatmeal, ... or in  round figures 2,400 tons of 
agricultural  produce."  Small , H.B.  1 884.  Canadian  Forests:  Forest Trees, Timber and  Forest Products. Montreal:  Dawson 
Brothers. CIHM no.  13683. 
216  Sec section "Public Works on the  St. Maurice,"  in  "Report of the Commissioner of Crown  Lands  of Canada for the Year 
1856," Appendix No. 25,JALC, 1857. 
217  See "Memorial of the 1nhabitants of  the Ottawa Country, interested in  the timber !rade of the Province of Canada, January 
13'\ 1852, in  "Return  to  an Address from  the  Legislative  Assembly to  His  Excellency, the Governor-General."  Appendix 
A.A.A,JLAC, 1853. 198 
in  ground rents or duties,  "
218 allowing for the graduai  integration of more flexibility  in  the 
allocation of resource rights during the 1860s.  . 
For in spi te of  the idea that it was "a well established principle of  public policy, that in 
no  case can  the  Government properly  interf ere  to  the  advantage of individuals  by  setting 
aside princip/es  or  abrogating  laws  or  regulations  by  which  the  community  at large  is 
governed," it remains that the weight of externat political-economic influence only increased 
over time, as did the Department's willingness to corn ply with the wants and needs of various 
sets of actors. As the Commissioner of Crown lands admitted in his Report for the year 1856, 
"There  is  perhaps  no  other  Department  of the  Government  through  which  such 
preserving efforts have been made to  secure special advantage to particular interests 
as has been the case in relation to the Woods and Forests. "
219 
Given  that  the  "executive  government  of the  Province  holds  in  its  power  the 
administration ofall the waste lands ofthe Crown, and also their final disposa/,"
220 it is little 
wonder that elected officiais should bear the brunt of soli citation from settlers and lumberers. 
However, thanks to its obstinate reluctance to appear in  favour of one group over another, or 
to advocate policies that could potentially ~set  either positions, inconsistencies in the rules 
governing  forest  and  land  resources  were  either  maintained,  or  simply  left  unenforced, 
depending on whose attendance such discretionary authority feil.  ln any event, office tenures 
were so short during the formative years of the Canadian experiment, that ministerial heads 
were  sooner  replaced  than  allowed  to  carry  out any  plan  of consequence.  But whenever 
change was  allowed to  proceed,  the  focus  was  decidedly  geared towards special  interests, 
rather th an any objectifiable search for grea  ter allocative efficiency or distributional equity. 
As one observer noted, 
"Governments  have  be  en  a/ways  in  the  habit of treating  the  [timber]  trade  as  a 
subordinate agent, useful in a political point ofview [and subject} to such a multitude 
of  regulations [as may be] issuedfor its own benefit."
221 
218 See section "Woods and  Forests Resumed," in "Report of the Commissioner of Crown Lands of Canada for the Year 1856," 
Appendix No. 25,J.A.L.C, 1857. 
219 Ibid .. 
220 Perry 1862. The staple tracte of Canada. CIHM no. 23012, p. 38. 
221  Ibid., p. 41. 199 
So in  spite of the virtues that Commissioner Cauchon professed to instil in  the Woods 
and  Forest division,  one of the  very  first  concessions he  made following  the  adoption of 
Reciprocity was a  repeal by  order (July 17, 1856) of the surcharge imposed on the export of 
unprocessed saw logs (as perthe third clause of  the timber regulations of August 7, 1851) - a 
tax which had been adopted to  favour local  investments in  the sawn lumber industry, better 
employment conditions and a more productive use of available resources. More puzzling stiJl, 
is  the fact that the decision to remove the saw log preference came just over a year after a 
Report  on  Trade  and  Commerce
222  Iamented  Canada's  very  dependence  on  foreign 
manufactured  goods,  its  commodity  driven resource  economy  and  the  Jack  of foresight or 
legislative  encouragement to correct the exploitive  inefficiencies of Canada's economy.  A 
more telling (and contradictory) policy stance could scarcely be imagined. 
Obviously,  the  struggle  to  achieve  a  balance  between  lumbering  interests  and 
settlement did  not dissipate over time. In  Iate  1859,  a series of inquiries  conducted by  the 
newly  appointed  Commissioner  of  Crown  Lands,  P.M.  Vankoughnet,  reinstated  the 
importance of public forests as  a source of revenue for the country and of remuneration for 
industry.  As  long  as  "resources  are  properly  developed  and husbanded," Vankoughnet 
asserted, "and the great destruction arising from fire and other causes, which annually takes 
place,  can  be checked,"  the forests  of Canada will  provide "a source of a/most constant 
wealth."
223  However, achieving such ends required immediate action on the existing causes 
of abuse  and  a  change  of attitude  in  the  administration  of the  Department  itself.  While 
Vankoughnet undoubtedly did  more than any of his predecessors to highlight the exhaustible 
nature of forest resources and  the dynamics that Iead to overexploitation, his efforts were not 
without controversy, nor were they completely distilled ofself-interest. 
In  his  report  for  the  year  1860,  Vankoughnet  found  "a  large  accumulation  of 
indebtedness ar ising from  the  non-payment of  dues from previous years" that invariably Ieft 
the  door  open  for  fraud.
224  Two  specifie  conditions  were  thought  to  ·have  induced  this 
unenviable state of affairs.  First, "Government," the Commissioner observed, had been in the 
222  See "Manufacturers," under "General  Remarks," in  the "Report on Trade and Commerce," Appendix DDDD, JLAC, 1856. 
223 "Report of the Commissioner of Crown  Lands" for the year 1859 ," Sessional Pa pers no. 12, 1860. 
224  Sec Report of the Commissioner of  Crown Lands for the  Year 1860, in Appendix no. 15, Section on  Woods and  Forests, 
Session  al Papers, 1861. The remainder of the quotations uscd in  this section are laken from this section of the report. 200 
habit of giving "al! possible facilities, credit,  etc., to the lumberers, in  arder to  encourage as 
large an export as possible." The problem is  that production tended to exceed demand, thus 
forcing  ali  parties  to  sell  their timber for  less  than  its  true  value.  But since such articles 
"cannat be produced again short of  150 or 200 years," the waste was thought incalculable.
225 
"ft is true," the Commissioner added, that Canada has "a large supply of  raw material, but we 
must  bear  in  mind that  our forests  are  not  inexhaustible.  ft  is  well  known  that  over-
production is  one of  the greatest ev ils to which the trade is subject, and this very practice of 
allowing timber  dues  to  get into  arrear  encourages  this  over-production."  Complicating 
matters  even  further  were the de facto  open  access  conditions  that  allowed  unauthorized 
entrants  to  take  part  in  the  timber trade  when  conditions  appeared  favourable.  "In  some 
sections of  the Province," Vankoughnet argued, the forests are treated "as if  they were public 
commons, where everybody might enter, and eut and slash as [they] pleased." Consequently, 
whenever "seasons  of partial prosperity  ...  arrived,  a  great rush  into  the  manufacture of 
lumber,  and  particularly  of hewed  lumber,  ..  .followed,  nearly  always...  [by]  over-
production" and of "badly manufactured articles"  at that.  Having no  timber berth of their 
own, those engaged  in  such superfluous  production  tended to  rely  on  "trespassing in  the 
public forest, or in fraudulently obtaining timbered lots out of  a lumberer 's license." 
The second  problem  was  that "so  long as  the  lumber  lies  within  the  Province,  the 
owner, producer or exporter, may be considered as having his timber in bond," and thus pays 
only as  per the amount exported. This, the Commissioner argued, arose from  the erroneous 
conception that timber dues were akin to a duty on exports. As explained by Vankoughnet, 
timber dues and ground rents represent the value attributed to standing trees. It is the cost of 
raw  material,  the  market value of trees  which, "when  eut on  public lands,  the  lumberers 
purchase from  the  Government,  and when  eut on  private  lands,  they purchase from  the 
owners." Consequently, the purchase of raw materials from which lumber is produced exacts 
a priee that cannot be differed for an ulterior payment such as an export tax that could only be 
imposed at the moment of sale and upon the amount sold.  In this sense, dues were seen as  a 
precondition to ownership and entitlement to benefits. 
225 "Report of the Supervisor of Cu liers on the Lumber Trade," September 10,  1861 , Appendix no. 33, Sessional Pa pers, 1862. L 
------------------------ ----- --, 
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To remedy the situation,  the  Commissioner sought to reinforce laws  against trespass 
and  further  legitimise the trade  by  "directing the  attention  of those  engaged in  it ta  the 
importance of  economising the public forests, and of  producing a weil manufactured article." 
A  fixed  date was adopted for the payment of timber dues and accumulated arrears (30th  of 
November) in  the absence of which, a six percent per annum interest would  be charged and 
exports prohibited until ali  dues were paid in  full. Collectors of Customs at ports throughout 
Upper Canada were given auth.ority  to refuse clearance to  any  vesse!  carrying lumber from 
Canada  to  the  United  States  without  prior  certification  from  a  Crown  Timber  Agent. 
"[D]iscriminating  and descriptive  surveys" were to  be  conducted to  assign  land  use  rights 
according to the arable qualities ofthe soi!, allowing for the identification of  th ose portions of 
the  territory  that  could  support  cultivation  (i.e.,  settlement)  versus  those  that  should  be 
maintained as forests. To a  void the needless waste of timber in areas destined for settlement, 
rules that prevented  the  sale of such supplies  in  the  past were changed  to  give  settlers an 
interest in  the trees  growing on  their lots. Provided  basic  settlement duties  were complied 
with,  and  a  license for  cutting timber was purchased, settlers were allowed to  eut and  sel! 
their timber to  pay  for  their land  purchase.  Finally,  in  order to  better  protect  timber  and 
safeguard entitlements to  resource rights on private land, two separate acts were assented to 
in  May  1860.  The first  dealt  with  the  illegal  appropriation  of standing timber on  private 
prope1iy  (Act  23  Vict.,  c.  37),  and  the  second  focused  on  the  protection  of private  and 
communal  forests  in  Lower Canada,  which were used  to supply  firewood,  produce maple 
sugar or serve as  reserves for native Americans (Act 23  Vict. c.  63).
226 Notices were given to 
remind inhabitants that anyone caught unlawfully cutting, destroying or stealing trees or parts 
of trees from  such lands, or having acquired, purchased or received the same was liable to 
punishment at the discretion of  the Courts, by either a fine not to exceed one hundred dollars, 
imprisonment  for  up  to  six  months  or both.  However,  as  we  shall  see  in  the  following 
sections,  the measures adopted by the Crown Lands Department had little or no effect on the 
behaviour of settlers operating under false  pretences.
227  By maintaining existing legislation 
226  lt is interesting to note th at the curting of timber on lndian Reservations or the purchase of timber from an individual Indian 
eut on Reservations was strictly forbidden by Law, un der penalty of a fine and imprisonment. See Notice in  Canada Gazette, 
dated 31" of October, 1861  . 
227  Report of the Select Committee appointed  to  enquire into and report on  the state of the lumber trade in  Canada,  12  May, 
1863, in Appendix no. 8, Sessional Papers, 1863. 202 
relative to the issue of free grants on newly opened public roads,
228 scarcely enforcing its own 
rules  regarding the fultil lment of settlement obligations,  and  persisting  in  the  sale  of lots 
unsuited for agriculture or located within existing timber berths, Vankoughnet's efforts did 
little to improve the management of public resources. In fact, if the staunch criticisms voiced 
in  the  inquiry  on  the  State  of the  Lumber Trade  and  the  tindings  of the  Financial  and 
Departmental  Commission  of 1863  hold  any  meaning  (see  Section  5.6  below),  then  the 
situation appears to  have gotten worse in  the years that followed Vankoughnet's initiatives, 
not better. 
5.5.3  Externalities and Early Environmentalism 
The push to economise public forests and ascertain the rights of  priva  te landholders did 
not emerge from  fortuitous  circumstances but from  the  growing realization  that Canadian 
forests were not inexhaustible and that the depletion of such resources produced a wide range 
of negative  externalities.  From  mid-century  onwards,  references  to  the  rapid  pace  of 
deforestation and the consequent dissipation of environmental services begin to appear with 
greater regularity. Already, trees suitable for the pUI-pose of squaring were becoming scarce 
and lumbermen had to travel ever further to  tind adequate supplies or else invest heavily to 
overcome the physical barri ers that prevented the past exploitation of harder to reach groves. 
But where the problem of deforestation was most acute, was within the settled communities 
of the Province. Though the importance of maintaining sufticient reserves of standing timber 
to  address  local  needs  (i.e.,  fuel and  raw  material  for  construction  purposes)  was  a  basic 
settlement princip  le of the older French and English regimes, the incentives actors faced from 
the end of  the 18
111  century onwards ac  tu ally tended to incite the conversion of residual forests 
rather than promote their preservation. As discussed in  Chapter IV,  governments under the 
old representative system were prone to obfuscate the rules governing Crown lands to serve 
self-regarding interests, whereas after unification, the sale of land and forest rights to  Crown 
and  Clergy  Reserves  became  part  of the  revenue  generating  apparatus  of responsible 
government.  Yet,  whether land  was  acquired for speculative reasons or sold  for  legitimate 
purposes  made  little  difference  for  in  the  end,  the  forests  were  felled  just the  same and 
converted to cash or agrarian purposes wherever sui table tracks existed. 
228 Act 16 Vict., c.  159, s. 9 &  10. 203 
Settlers and the various agricultural societies of the colony were th us  among the first 
Canadians to  recognise the intrinsic value of trees and of forests more broadly. Building on 
the  experience  of their  neighbours  south  of the  border,  "[t]he  imperious  necessity  of 
providing some means for the preservation of  ... forests "
229  quickly gained currency amongst 
those who faced rapidly diminishing resource pools along with the Joss  of benefits that were 
heretofore  taken  for  granted.  As  awareness  of the  problems  associated  with  deforestation 
broadened, so did the realization that forests  provide more than mere appropriation utilities. 
By the  early  1860s,  a  much more  complex  understanding of the  role  of forests  began  to 
emerge  and  appeals  for  the  preservation of forest  and  even  their "artificial"  propagation 
irrevocably shifted towards the  maintenance of forest-related ecosystem services. The notion 
that forests could affect local weather patterns, soi! fertility, the quality and regularity offresh 
water streams; provide assurances against the erosion of soils and the desiccation of crops in 
agricultural  landscapes; and control  water runoff and snow melt along catchment areas,  are 
but sorne of the services th at were recognized by the earl  y 1860s?
30  As one observer put it in 
the Fanner's Journal of Lower Canada in  1858,  "it is  only by considering the properties of 
trees, and the part played by forests in the economy of  nature, th at we can see and apprecia te 
their value. "
231 In addition to providing ''food and sustenance to living creatures," timber for 
the manufacture of "beams  in  our houses and masts for our vessels, " forests were regarded 
as  having  "other properties, and  ... other purposes, " such as "direct and beneficia! effects ... 
upon  the  atmosphere. "
232  l'he  notion  that  forests  likely  played  a  role  in  the  "gaseous 
exchanges"  that  affected  the  atmospheric  moisture  content  or that they  influenced  mean 
temperature  variations,  thermal  radiation,  precipitation  and  humidity  were  the  subjects  of 
formai  inquiry  as  early  as  the  1840s
233
•  As  a  result of the  extensive  deforestation  in  the 
Eastern half of the United States,  "[i]t is  easy to prove, " wrote the previous observer to the 
Farmer's Journal,  "that the climate  along our seaboard and the  interior has  undergone a 
material change  during  the last seventy years,  and is  changing year by year,  through  no 
229 See Letter by Hector L. Langevin, in  Agricultural Journal and Transactions of the Lower Canada Agricultural Society, Vol. 5, 
no. 3, p. 89, March 1852, CIHM no. 8_04880. 
23°  For example, see "Our Forests- Their Importance,"  pp. 497-499, in Journal and Transactions of the Board of Agriculture of 
Upper Canada, Vol.  14, no.  16, Aug . 1862, CIHM no. 8_04016_196; Clavé (1862), Études  sur l'économie forestière; and 
Marsh ([1864]1965), Man and Nature. 
23 1 See The Farmer's Journal and Transactions of the  Lower Canada Board of Agriculture, Vol.  5, no. 12, pp. 290-294, Aug. 
1858, CIHM no. 8_06434_60. 
232  Ibid. 
233  Humboldt (1845), Cosmos: A Sketch of the Physical Description of the Uni verse. 204 
assignable  cause  except  the  destruction  of our  forests. "  But  beyond  the  interests  of 
agriculturists  and  the  need  for  such  basic  essentials  as  fresh  water,  fuel  and  construction 
materials, the ever expanding scope of the Province's timber and lumber operations were also 
beginning to affect the resilience of other valuable resource systems. 
Nearly  every  major  tributary  of the  St.  Lawrence  River  was,  by  the  mid  1850s, 
obstructed in  sorne way or another by an artifact of the timber trade. Dams and slides were 
constructed  to  tàcilitate  the  conveyance  of eut  timber to  processing  facilities,  ports  and 
markets,  and  mills  were  increasingly  being built to  supply  the growing demand for  deals, 
planks, and other sawn lumber articles. Together, these obstacles created formidable barriers 
to the spawning grounds of the Province's prized salmon stocks, which in  turn affected the 
prospects  of establishing  and  maintaining  a  viable  commercial  fishery.  The  response  of 
government was  however swift, thanks to the estimated  returns that a  commercial  salmon 
fishery would bring in terms of revenue for the Province, the Fishery Act
234  was adopted in 
1857. As specified under article 26, ali owners or operators of saw mills, timber slides, and 
other such deviees were hereafter summoned to  facilitate the passage of salmon by "a fish-
way"  or  any  such  instrument  that  may  be  considered  appropriate  by  the  Governor  in 
Council.
235  Additional ordinances were adopted from  time to time, such as those enacted in 
December 1858 to bring an  end to the discharge of milling refuse such as  "slabs or edgings 
or  other  mill  rubbish ...  into  any  Salmon  and  Sea-Trout  Rivers  or  streams  in  Lower 
Canada,"
236  or in  1860, as specified under section 15 of an Act respecting abuses prejudicial 
to  Agriculture, which f01·bade  anyone from  depositing or causing to  be  deposited any  farm 
related "filth  or dead animal  in  any river, stream  or water-course."
237  Again however,  no 
matter how progressive such measures may have appeared at the time, enforcement varied 
over the  years  and  as  we  shall  see  later,  other  more  serious  pollution  problems  would 
ultimately develop. 
234 20Vict., c. 21 , 1857 (Can)/ 22 Vict., c. 86,1858 (Can). 
235 The details of the first broad assessment of the state of fresh water fisheries in Lower Canada are provided in  Appendix U of 
the "Report of the Commissioner of Crown Lands of Canada for the Year 1857." ln addition to serious depredation of fisheries 
by  various  illegal means, the  report  demonstrates  the value  thal  was  placed  upon the  preservation of existing fisheries  for 
future generations (Appendix U)  and of the technological advances in the construction or temperature controlled hatcheries to 
maximize the survival of fish eggs and fry (Appendix U(2)). 
236  See  Report  of the Commissioner of Crown  Lands for the  Year  1858, under Appendix T  to  the Report, Appendix  no.  17, 
.ILAC, 1859. 
237  1860 23 Viel., c. 26 (Can). ~-~~-~~-----------
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Hence, the perplexing questions that confronted policy makers during this early period 
were not altogether different from  the resource dilemmas that challenge  us  today.  As one 
observer summed it  up,  "[w je do  not,  as  a people, appreciate the  value of  our forests. "
238 
The realization that the forests of Canada were not inexhaustible and that their exploitation 
and eventual depletion produced a wide range of externalities marks an important transition 
in  the way forests were considered, how they ought to be managed and on what terms such 
interventions should be evaluated.  Of particular significance to this period  is  the perceptual 
change in  public discourse and the referents used to give meaning to the ideas and  realities 
that  were  then emerging.  To  convey  the  notion  that  more  or  less  large  masses  of trees 
constituted a complex who  le, capable of inducing effects that were greater than the sum of its 
parts, the conversation began to shift from the commercial utility oftrees as "timber," "logs", 
"lumber"  and  "sticks" to the more holistic conception of trees  as  constitutive elements of 
"forests."  Although  far  from  our  modern  conceptualisation  of systems  and  the  sti ll  more 
recent consideration of forests  as  ecosystems, the  change in  terminology  from  the strictly 
utilitarian standpoint of an  aggregate concentration of resource units  ("timber") to the  less 
divisible but no Jess functional unit of a "forest" represents a fundamental change in  the way 
actors discussed, rationalised and argued the legitimacy of their actions. If "clearings" were 
still  regarded  as  "necessary to  permit the indus trial operations of  man,"  such  imperatives 
were  now  tempered  by  the  realization  that "the  clearance  of  forests  is  not  an  unmixed 
good. "
239  In a context of growing scarcity and increasing externalities, the sequential logic of 
timber appropriation and forest conversion no  longer appeared to  be  a viable model. Other 
non-use benefits needed to be considered. As the preservation idea gained wider appeal, the 
concept eventually etched its way in the discourse of politicians and lumbermen. But as we 
shall  see  later  on,  the  motives  underlying  the  eventual  integration  of preservationist  (and 
eventually conservationist) ideals by political and economie agents were altogether different 
from tho se of the agriculturalists. 
238  "Preservation of Forests,"  in Journal and  Transactions of the Board of Agriculture  of Upper Canada, Vol.  13, no. 3, 1861. 
CIHM no. 8_04016_159. 
239  Address delivered by Dr. Lawson, p. 237 in The Canadian Agriculturist and Journal  of the  Board of Agriculture of Upper 
Canada, Vol. 9, no.  JO  (Oct. 1858), p. 232-240. 206 
5.6  Competing Rights and Differentiai Interests 
At  the  onset  of the  1860s,  lumbermen  and  agriculturalists  had  different  but  not 
dissimilar preoccupations regarding the future of forests  in  Canada.  With settlement at the 
doorstep of the forest frontier, the privileges of lumbering interests were no longer sec  ure. As 
lumberers sought to contain the expansive reflex of settlers to those portions of the terri tory 
that were better suited to the  purpose of agriculture,  the discussion shifted from  private to 
public  interest  and  the  need  to  assign  land  use  rights  according  to  prevailing  biophysical 
conditions  and  the social costs  and  benefits of land  use  change (Perry,  1862, pp.  40-43). 
Painting to  the "vast sums of  money expended to  establish permanent improvements" (e.g., 
mi lis, roads, bridges, farms  and other investments for the conveyance of logs) "in the faith 
that  they  would  be  protected  by  the  Government, "  operators  began  demanding  greater 
assurances  regarding the maintenance of timber supplies and  immunity  from  the threat of 
settlement.
240  However, government, it seems, had other priorities. 
Worry  over the  future  of the  lumber trade  began  in  April  1858,  when an  Order in 
Council was issued to  the effect that licenses to eut timber would  no  longer be renewed as 
provided for by the eleventh clause of the General Timber Regulations
241  of 1851, but would 
in fact be retained "to such time as the Commissioner may deem proper. "
242  Lumbermen were 
not alone  in  their consternation  regarding the  government's  decision  to  withhold  renewal 
rights.  In  a  Circular  that  was  issued  but  a  few  weeks  prior  to  the  latter  ordinance,  the 
Department of Crown Lands informed its timber agents that it was likewise withdrawing the ir 
own  authority  to  issue  licenses  to  lumberers  for  vacant  grounds,  as  established  by  the 
regulations.
243  Since no explanation was ever given for the change of rules, the only reason 
that seemed to  fit  the general course of action pursued  by  government at the time, as  the 
Crown land agent A.J. Russell understood it, was that it ''facilitate[d] the seulement of  such 
townships by protecting and preserving  the timber as an  inducement for actual settlers  ta 
2""' See "Petition of the undersigned, manufacturers of timber, merc hant~, and  others interested  in  the timber trade of Canada," 
1858, CIHM no. 61618; Petitions and  Memoria1s in  the Report on  the State of the Lumber Trade in  relation to  Seulement, 
(Appendix  no. 8, Sessional  Pa pers,  1863) and  particularly, the  Memorial of  the  Lumber  Manufacturers  of  the  Ottawa  to 
Governor-General Monck, December, 1861. 
241  "Licentiates who have complied with ali  the regulations will  be entitled to renewal of the li cense for their berths in preference 
to others ....  " See Notice, 8th August, 1851, in Canada Gazette, no. 531, p. 11216. 
242 SeeNotice,29thApril, 1858,CanadaGazette, Vo1.17, no.l8, p.793. 
243  See response to Question 169 in Minutes of Evidence to the Report of the Select Committee on the State of the Lumber Trade 
in Canada, Appendix 8, Sessional Papers, 1863. ----- - ·-----------
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purchase land. "
2
-1-1  The evidence in favour ofRussell's assertions was compelling. Settlement 
had always  been  considered essential  to  the future  prosperity of the  Province and featured 
prominently  in  the  policy  priorities of succeeding governments.  But as  the availability  of 
known territories with arable soils  began to diminish, the incentive to discover new tracts of 
land  fit  for  agriculture  proportionally  increased.  To amend the  situation,  an Improvement 
Fund was created under the Land Act of 1853 to facilitate the development of Colonization 
Roads in  the more remote sections of Lower and Upper Canada?
45  Much to the delight of 
government, surveyors tasked with the responsibility of laying out such roads and identifying 
lands fit for agriculture were tinding suitable conditions with near consistency and by the end 
ofthe 1850s, hundreds ofmiles ofColonization Roads (a.k.a., "free-grant roads") were being 
built  each  year  and  hundreds  of thousands  of  acres  of  land  were  thrown  open  for 
settlement.
246  But as this expanding system of roads and land grants started to intrude more 
and  more  extensively  in  the  timberlands  that  were  then  under  occupation  by  licensed 
lumberers or reserved for their use through the payment of annual ground rents, lumbermen 
began  organizing  to  advance  their  common  interest  and  safeguard  those  portions  of the 
territory that were considered unfit for the general pursuit of agriculture. Admittedly, the ease 
with which settlers were able to obtain land rights in  the valuable pinelands of the Province, 
for a mere fraction of the cost of obtaining a li cense to eut tim ber, was denounced year after 
year, but the apparent inability of succeeding governments to deal with this chronic situation 
was more or Jess  accepted si nee  lumberers also profited from the inadequacies of the system 
in  place.
247  However,  the  süuation  came  to  head  when  it  became  clear to  everyone  that 
elected  officiais  and  their  intermediaries  were  knowingly  selling uncultivable  lands  under 
false pretences while correspondingly changing the rules governing forest resource use to fit 
interests  and  priorities  that were  inconsistent with  the  nature  of the  resource  system,  the 
existing rights of lumbennen, and the public interest as a who  le. 
244  Ibid.  A.J.  Russell  was  the  Crown Timber Agent for  the  Ottawa district and  brother to  the  then  Assistant  Commissioner, 
Andrew Russell. 
245 See "Colonization Roads," in "Report  of the Commission er of Crown Lands for the Year 1856,"  Appendix 25, JLAC, 1857. 
246  For exemple, see sections on Lower and Upper Canada Colonization Roads, in Report of the Commissioner of Crown Lands 
for the Years 1859, Appendix no. 12,Sessional Papers, 1860. 
247  As reiterated in  nu merous instances throughout this chapter, ev er si nee Charles  Buller first documented in  1839 the practice 
of purchasing  land  for  1umbering  purposes  at  a fraction  of the  cost of a  licensed  berth, lumbermen  were  known  to  take 
advantage of such loopholes. 208 
Political  interference  in  the  administration  of public  affairs  had  reached  a  critical 
threshold  at the onset of the  1860s.  Charges of malversation  and  the  misappropriation of 
funds  were  not  limited  to  the  Crown  Lands Department but were  in  fact  being preferred 
against ali of the Public Departments of the Province. To investigate the matter more fully, a 
public inquiry was convened in the fall  of 1862 and what it uncovered, regarding the interest-
driven administrative workings of the Crown Lands Department, tended to give reason to the 
growing angsts of lumbermen?
48  In its review of the sa id Department, "the evidence obtained 
by the [Finance  and Departmental} Commission  abundantly establishe[d} the  necessity of 
amendment in  every part of  the system." Not only did the Department Jack a  "well-ordered 
distribution  of labour  and  re_sponsibility, "  but  the  absence  of  anything  resembling  a 
"systematic  inspection  seem[ed}  ta  afford a premium  ta  negligence  and dishonesty. " The 
frauds  committed for  the purposes of inducing settlement on  lands  unsuited  to  agriculture 
were particularly revealing of the power vested in  the political Head of the Department and 
the Executive Council as a whole:  "How far the political influences which usually enter into 
the appointment of  Surveyors are charge  able with the errors and imperfections which exist in 
the surveys, is a question on which there is room for an unfavourable opinion. "
2
-1
9 
Contrary to the princip  les of responsibility by which elected officiais were enjoined to 
measure  their  conduct,  the  succeeding  Commissioners of the  Crown  Lands  took  on ever 
increasing liberties in  the exercise of their duties to the point of disregarding the most basic 
precepts of accountability. In recent years, it was pointed out, the Department had taken to 
the habit of appointing surveyors on "the recommendation of  members of  Parliament, without 
consulting the officers who are supposed to be responsiblefor the management of  the surveys 
in  their respective sections."
250  Since favourable survey reports were needed to justify public 
investments in the development of colonization roads and any surveyor worth his title would 
scarcely risk his reputation or the strife of lumbermen by assigning value to lands that were 
otherwise  unfit  for  agriculture,  other  more  responsive  candidates  were  tasked  with  the 
provision of supportive land  assessments. Contrary to  the advice of the Department's most 
2-18  First report of the Financial and Departmental Commission, Québec: J. Blackburn, 1863. CIHM no. 9_00964. 
249 Ibid.,  p. 19. 
250  Ibid., p. 20. Such "poli ti cal influence" in the attribution of patronage was also a problem thal existed with the appointment of 
cullers and other commissioned employees of the Department. See the Fourth finding of the Report of the Select Committee in 
relation to the Supervisor of Cullers' Office (22 April , 1863), in Appendix no. 4, Sessional Papers, 1865. 209 
senior officers, Commissioners regularly sanctioned and approved the discredited reports of 
politically appointed surveyors,  along with the substantially higher wages and expenses by 
which they were compensated.
25 1 But perhaps even more alarming, was the recognition that 
the Crown Lands Commissioner suffered from  no  real  limits  in  the exercise of the powers 
vested  in  him.  For  instance,  unfavourable  land  claim  decisions  that  were  passed  in 
accordance  to  the  law  but  under  the  guise  of previous  and  oft times  opposing  political 
administrations were routinely "re-opened" and "reversed when the Commissioner [chose] to 
exercise the great discretionmy power vested in  him  under the system  ...  in force." ln fact, 
Commissioners often believed it  "advisable [for the good of  the public] ta  act at variance 
with  the  strict letter of  statutory provisions." Orto put it  more bluntly, it is "the will of  the 
Commissioner for the time being [that] forms the system."
252  The very fact that government 
could  pursue  settlement strategies  that  were  so  often  considered  suboptimal  by  farmers, 
lumberers and the Department's most senior staff suggests that the ties  between  lumbering 
interests and government had yet to congeal into any tangible nexus, as  sorne scholars have 
posited (e.g.,  see Lower, 1938;  Ouellet, 1980; Howlett and  Rayner, 2001). And since timber 
licenses  produced  a  higher  and  more  sustainable  source  of revenue  than  what  could 
reasonably  be achieved through  land sales,  government actions were clearly  not consistent 
with the expressed desire or need to generate revenues in support of the public's iriterest. 
With  respect to  the management of the Woods and  Forest division  and  government 
efforts to  limit abuses  related  to  the  illegal  appropriation of forest  resources,  the  issues of 
concern  had  Jess  to  do  wi1h  political  interference  than  political  apathy.  In  none  of the 
agencies tasked with the monitoring and enforcement of Crown timber regulations was there 
a complete and effectuai check of the quantity of timber eut, of the reliability of the records 
kept, nor of the actual size ofthe limits that lumberers professed to occupy. Sworn statements 
by  lumberers  with no  effectua] means of verifying their accuracy provided the only means of 
securing the public's interests.  However, since government (i.e., the  principal) exercised no 
251 Ibid.,  p. 21. In  one particular instance, no  Jess than three commissioners, including the future Prime Minister of Canada John 
A. Macdonald (who was acting as interim Head), knowingly bent  existing rules regarding the appropriation of public funds to 
satisfy the interests of such a politically appointed surveyor who was shown to be both incompetent and overpaid. 
252  Ibid, p.  21, To  this end, the  Report  goes on  to state  that "Decisions of the  Department have  been  repeatedly  reversed  in 
Council, and  the  Department  itself.  This  want  of fi nality  is  a  fruitful  source of intrigue, of bargaining, of injustice, and 
corruption. lt affords scope to the e:urcise of individual and  political influence to which no Commissioner should be exposed, 
and further in numberless cases the public interests have suffered." 210 
control over the dealings of its agents, the system was utterly dependent upon the honesty of 
crown officers and lumberers, thus generating strong incentives to free ride or shirk assigned 
duties and responsibilities.
253  By the end of 1861, arrears occasioned by the non-payment of 
timber and slide dues amounted to more than $250,000. Sorne of the missing dues were so 
old that the Department simply stopped reporting them, white others were made the subjects 
of lengthy disputes. Effectively, "[c}utting timber in  trespass," was regarded as "a common 
offence which had grown  up  into  a system, the only penalty  exacted being  the payment, if 
detected, of a certain  percentage  upon  the  rate  established for  timber  eut under  license, 
though by law  it was subject to seizure and sale."
254  And despite the Department's repeated 
threat that it would  no  longer tolerate such depredation, "parties  continued  to  eut timber 
without authority  and compromises  were  made  with  them  in  the  [same}  manner  [as] ... 
previously obtained. "
255  Moreover, sin ce compromises were arranged by  local Crown timber 
agents, "a good many parties appealed to the Department" whenever such negotiations failed 
to  secure  the  interests  of lumbermen,  thus  aggravating  the  Department's  administrative 
burden.  Finally,  the  idea  of fairness  and  equity  in  the  application  of rules,  which  the 
Depa11ment  fully  embraced  as  an  overarching  principle  of public  policy,  was  no  more 
respected than the  rules  it  professed to  enforce. The practice of exempting operators from 
their obligation to  pay  increasing ground rents on unused berths was consistently exercised 
by  the  Commissioners  ever  since  the  rule  was  first  adopted  in  1852,
256  white  in  other 
instances, government interference could just as weil be used to secure special  reserves for 
the benefit ofprominent lumbermen.
257 
Despite  the  recognition  that "the present system  tends  to  great waste  ...  and the 
revenue and the material interests of the Province seriously suff er"
258  from the way in which 
the  timber  and  settlement  concerns  were  administered  in  the  Crown  Lands  Department, 
253  Ibid, p.30. The want of any accuracy in the quantity of timber eut and the amount of dues owed to the were further hampered 
by "The expensive mac  hi  nery connected with the office of Supervisor of  Cullers al Québec. [S]o jar as concerns the protection 
of  the Crown Timber revenues" the Commissioners believed that the system in place was a  "delusion in many respects" si nee 
the  government had  no  control over cullers employed  by  third  parties  (pp. 32-33). But as referenced  in  the "Report  of  the 
Select Committee  in  relation to  the Supervisor of Cullers'  Office"  (see Appendix no. 4, Sessional Papers,  1865), the whole 
system of culling lumber was in fact "defective and unsatisjactory" and in need of substantive change. 
2-" Ibid, p. 31. 
255 Ibid, p.  109, Question 708. 
256 See "First Report of the Finance and  Departmental Commission," Question 690, pp.  102-103. 
257 Ibid, p. 32. 
258 Ibid, p. 33. 211 
nothing ever came of the findings contained in the Finance and Depmimental Commission. 
For lumbermen however, this was  not the end of the  ir remonstrations. In the spring of 1863, a 
Select Committee of the Legislative Assembly was tasked with inquiring into the State of the 
Lumber Trade of Canada, in  relation to the settlement of the country, and the actions of the 
government  in  dealing with these  interests?
59  What the  Select Committee found  not only 
confirmed the  results  of the Finance  and  Departmental  Commission,  it  also  laid  bare  the 
strong dissension that existed within the Department relative to the Commissioner's ability to 
pursue prerogatives that were either contrary to public interest or the accumulated knowledge 
and experience of  the most senior officers of  the Department. Of particular significance to the 
officiais who  were called  upon to  testifY  was  the  fact that changes in  the rules  governing 
forest  resource  use  were  often  arbitrary  and  seldom  were  they  published  in  the  Official 
Gazette, as  required by  the Statutes  in the way of an  Order in  Council.
260  Specifically, the 
Committee  concluded  that  the  "law,  under  which  the  lumber  trade  of  the  Province  is 
governed, has for severa! years  back been continuously and systematically violated in  the 
Crown Land Department, and  an  uncertain  and ever-varying action substituted for a fixed-
and definite  provisions  of  law  under  the  Statute."  Applications  to  eut  timber  could  be 
"accepted or rejected at the discretion of  the Department, but on no published rule available 
to  ali.  "
261 Asked wh  ether su ch  changes were demanded by,  or satisfactory to  the trade, the 
Crown Timber Agent for the Ottawa District, A.J. Russell, responded in  unequivocal tenns: 
"None of  them were in  any way or degree demanded or desired by the trade,  and they gave 
very great dissatisfaction."
262  Departing from a "system of  fixed and unif ormly administered 
regulations  ...  to one which is  not so,  without better securing the  interest of the Crown" 
Russell  added,  has  "had  the j urther detrimental e.ff ect of  producing an  impression  on  the 
minds of  the lumberers th  at the re is a constant risk of  dangerous incapacity on the part of the 
department to deal just/y or successfully with the interest of  the trade and the public. "
263  As 
Perry  (1862,  pp.  43-44)  observed,  inconsistency  in  the  application  rule  inevitably  led  to 
insecurity  amongst lumberers,  and  uncertainty  over the future  led  to waste in  the use  and 
management of  available timber: 
259 See "Report of the Select Committec on the State of the Lumber Trade of Canada, Appendix no. 8, Sessional Pa pers, 1863. 
260 Ibid, see response to Question 174. 
261 Ibid, see rcsponse to Questions 173  and  179. 
262 Ibid, see response to Question 175. 
263  Ibid, see response to Question 178. 212 
"The  Lumber  Merchant  [needs  to  have]  an  interest  in  his  Lùnit,  beyond  that  of 
dependence on the fiat of  an Order in Council [ .. .]. As the manufacturer has no direct 
interest in preserving this tùnber, and as he is frequent/y in dread of  having his lùnits 
divided and put up for sale,  in  the an.xiety to  take the greatest amount of value out of 
them, he destroys jully as much growing tùnber as he takes to Québec." 
With  respect to  the impolicy of affording inducements to  settlers  who  accepted  less 
than  perfect  soi!  conditions,  the  Select  Committee  concluded  "that  seUlement has  been 
unreasonably pushed in  sorne localities quite unfit to  become the permanent residence of  an 
agriculture population."  At  the  very  !east,  the  Committee  continued,  government should 
ascertain whether or not lands are fit for agriculture before opening any new area or road to 
settlers.  Echoing the  views  expressed  during  the  Finance and  Departmental  Commission, 
Allan Gilmour (a prominent lumber merchant of the Ottawa Valley) explained that surveyors 
and  land  agents  were  in  the  habit  of providing  incorrect  and  unreliable  reports  of land 
conditions because it supported the government's position relative to settlement and because 
surveyors and road constructors depended on reports saying so:  "it was the interest of  those 
employed  about  this  business  to  report  in  such  a  way  thal  their  services  should  be 
continued.  "
26~ Moreover, Gilmour added, since towns and cities were themselves becoming 
increasingly "dependent upon the lumber trade," the "consequence of  settlers  being unduly 
encouraged to  enter the pine lands" meant that increasingly  large proportions of the territory 
were needlessly being exposed to the risk of fi re (thus threatening the economie security of 
th ose who depended on the maintenance of su ch stocks) due to the use of su  ch indiscriminate 
methods as slash and burn to clear undesired brush or timber. By encouraging settlers to use 
the proceeds from timber eut on private lands as a means of perfecting their ownership title, 
A.J. Russell stressed that the government's land granting policy had the effect of affording a 
bounty or inducement to the settler to pick the very best timbered lands (i.e., Pine stands) for 
purely exploitive reasons, without any consideration of the actual qualities of the soi!.  What 
temporary  advantage the  legitimate settler gained  ultimately  turned  to  dust,  with  both  his 
profits and toils !ost with nothing to show for except barren landscapes and increased levels 
of poverty. But even when settlement at or near the footsteps of lumbering operations were 
condoned by  the  industry for the short term benefits it provided  in  tenns of accessible and 
264  See copy  of the  letter dated 9'"  February  1863  in  "Report of the  Select Committee  on the State of the  Lumber Trade of 
Canada,Appendix no. 8, Sessional Papers, 1863. 213 
Jess  costly  produce  to  support  their  operations,  the  fundamental  problems  of poor  and 
unsuitable soils were left largely unresolved. Since much of the forest lay on barren grounds 
th at were un fit for agriculture, " a great deal of  very unwise settlement" occurred and once an 
area was cutover, farmers were left stranded in  the middle of a marooned landscape with no 
possible outlets to recoup theirinvestments (Lower, 1938, p.  30). 
Though senior officers had  warned the Department of the ultimate consequences of its 
land policies, the system was pursued without the slightest modification until Confederation 
in  1867,  leading to  a  trail  of abuses that was  made worse  by  the absence of any  effective 
monitoring  and  enforcement of settlement activities?
65  For the  timber trade  as  a  whole, 
uncertainty over whether one's investments would sooner or later be taken up by a settlement 
claim or consumed by  the many  runaway fires  that were initiated for such  purposes  meant 
that  lumberers  consistently  faced  strong  incentives  to  overharvest.
266  As  John  Langton 
observed,  the  mismanagement  of forestlands  was  attributable  to  the  perverse  incentives 
settlers  and  lumberers  faced. "The  cheapness of the  land,  and ignorance  of what can  be 
profitably  worked,  together  with  the  facility  of access  by  the  new  roads  opened  by 
Government and by the lumberers" inevitably attracted newcomers seeking their fortune. But 
in  the  process, "they  destroy much"  and  incite "the  lumberer  who  has a  license  over  the 
land" ... "to  scramble for  anything  he  can get,  before  it passes  out of  his  hands."  Timber 
regulations. were not much better. "At present," Langton lamented, 
"a license is  issued renewable from year to  year at a moderate rent at first,  but the 
rent rising rapidly if the  license is  not occupied, and the  license lapses  immediate/y 
upon the  land being sold. 1 cannat imagine a  system more complete/y  calculated to 
denude  the  country  of tùnber.  Every  license  ho/der  has  an  immediate  intefest  in 
making  everything he can off his limits, as rapidly  as possible,  utterly  regardless of 
what  may  become  of  it  ten  years  hence."  "We  complain  of [lumbermen]  as 
improvident [but it is] our legislation that has made the bulk of  lumberers into a band 
of marauders, whom we have perverse/y excludedfrom ail hope in the future. "
267 
265  Ibid, see response  to Question  186. ln  effect, the incoherence of the  Department's land  granting rules were  never amended, 
thus  giving  legal  protection  to  any speculator or "pretended  settler"  to  enter into  any  well-timbered  lot or allocated  limit, 
regardless of  ils  suitability for cultivation, and  to take  possession of  ali  marketable  timber for a  profit over and  above the 
payment of any instalment for the land i tself (and if paid at ali). 
266 Ibid, see responses to questions 13,30 and 33. See also. 
267  Langton, John  1862.  On the  Age  of Timber  Trees,  and the prospects  of a  continuous supply  of Timber  in  Canada,  in 
Transactions of The Literary and Historical Society of Québec, Vol. 5. 214 
With the excess production arising from  newly  settled land, the combined surplus of 
timber and lumber supplies helped to  maintain the notoriously  low  priee of Canadian wood 
products in the European market, which in  turn "mere/y denud[ed] the country  of  {ils}  best 
timber,  wilhout benefiting any one. "
268  But the cause of overproduction was  not entirely the 
fault of selfless speculators hoping to cash-in  on  variable market conditions,  the problem as 
Perry  (1862,  pp.  44-45)  noted,  was  as  much  due  to  the  absence  of adequate  regulatory 
measures to maintain production levels within a more realistic framework: 
"it is as much the interest of the people of  Canada to  conserve this trade,  as il would 
be of a private  individual to  preserve a  single  plantation at  his  disposa!; and it  is 
perfectly ridiculous  to  allow 30,000,000 cubic feet of timber to  be produced  in  one 
season,  when the demand would be supplied by 15,000,000 cubic feet. The  producers 
may injure each other by competition, but the Province, the real owner of  the property, 
is irretrievably injured without a chance of  compensation." 
While lumbermen and farmers both agreed that the activities of  the legitimate settler on 
weil  suited land  could not be more complementary  to the progress of the timber trade,  they 
attributed  the  strife over incompatible land  use  claims to "the  indejinite,  complicated and 
continued changes made in the Crown  Lands Department." Accordingly, the situation could 
only  be  remedied by  clearly  delineating "the advantages ...  of  the lumber trade  and actual 
settlement" and by establ ishing "such regulations ...  as would clearly and permanent/y dejine 
the rights of  bath." 
269  The urgency of coming to terms with the threat of forest conversion 
from the improper allocation of forest resources to settlers lay in  the granting of longer term 
tenures
270  and  a  certain  degree  of permanency to  existing forest  land, as  suggested  by  the 
268  Report of the Supervisor of Cullers on the Ti rn ber Tracte, Appendix no.ll , Sessional Pa pers, 1862. 
269  Report  of  the  Select  Committee  on  the  State  of  the  Ti  rn ber  Tracte  in  Canada,  1863,  see  response  to  Question  121. 
Complicating matters further still  was the  complex reliance on sorne fifteen  different forms thal needed to  be  completed in 
order to  obtain  a  license  to  a  lot for  settlement  purposes  - giving  rise  to  an  administrative  burden  thar  was  considered 
disproportionate to the benefits (see responses to Questions 196-197). 
270  With  regards  to  efforts  to  preserve  the  valuable forest assets  of  the  Province,  A.J. Russell  was  of the  opinion  thal "the 
substi/ulion of a longer lease for the annual one  would be  productive of great economy. The present system tends lo grea/ 
waste." See First Report of the Finance and Departmental Commission, Question 572, p. 83. 215 
princip  le of forest reserves.
271  This, at any rate, appears to have been one of the conclusions 
reached by the Select Committee: 
"it would be advisable for the protection of the public forests of the  Province, that a 
character  of greater stability  be  given  to  the  tenure  of timber limits,  providing,  of 
course, against it being  made any barrier to  the  actual settler on  lands adapted for 
cultivation." 
5.7  Return to Business as Usual 
As is often the case with unfavourable assessments, results of the inquiries of 1862 and 
1863  were  neither  mentioned  nor  alluded  to  until  the  presiding  government  was  again 
changed in  the spring of 1864. While private bills were introduced (and sorne even adopted) 
to correct the cri  ti cal sho1tage of forests within the older settlements of Lower Canada,
272  the 
government's willingness to provide greater security to lumberers by differentiating land use 
rights  according  to  the  arable  qualities  of the  soils  was  maintained  as  a  rhetorical 
commitment only.  "Though much of  this country has been denuded of  its valuable timber," 
conceded Alexandre Campbell, the Commissioner of Crown Lands in  his annual  report for 
the year 1865, a large part of  the pi ne country remained intact and if "set apart" and properly 
husbanded by  way of "a system of  rotation such as  is  now adopted in  Norway and Sweden, 
and in  many  of  the German States, ...  pine growing  might be continued and preserved for 
ages ta  come. "
273  But in  these final  days of the united Province of Canada, such ambitious 
considerations  were  never  acted  upon  and  the  results  of previous  investigations  were 
conveniently shelved with no further ado. 
271  One of the earliest legislative efforts to  assign land  use rights according to  the arable qualities of the soi!  was submitted to 
Parliament in  1858,  under the  tille of a "Bill an Actto make belier provision for the Düposal and Management  of  Public 
Lands." The  Bill , which aimed  to  improve the  management of public  lands, included a section on  Woods and  Forests that 
called for the creation of  timber reserves  to "preserve and ensure a permanent supply of  fuel and timber necessary for the 
various requirements and interests of the Country" - such  tracts to  be  known  and  designated as the "Forests of the Public 
Domain." The Bill was never sanctioned by Parliament. See p.  14, CJHM no. 9_07615. 
272  See for exarnple, "Bill  an Act for the Preservation of Standing Timber in  Lower Canada" (1863) Québec : Hunter, Rose & 
Lernieux, CIHM no. 9_02692; "Bill  an act to provide for the preservation [of]  standing tirnber,"  1863, Québec:  Hunter, Rose 
&  Lemieux, CIHM  no. 9_03033.; "An act to Provide for the Preservation of Standing Timber"  1865,29 Vict., cap. 53, which 
provided  for  the creation  of forest reserves  in  ali  new  townships  in  Lower Canada. Unfortunate1y,  the  Act  was  approved 
without  the progressive self-governing structure that was advanced in the original Bill of the same name, preferring instead to 
place the control and  management of such  terri tories in the hands of the Cornrnissioner. The original Bill  was rnandatory for ali 
municipalities in Lower Canada and cal  led for the local governance of such reserves (at the rnunicipallevel), a supra-rnajority 
voting scherne that gave ail  attending residents an equal share  of the voting franchise, along with a clearly set out process for 
adjudicating disagreernents over allocative decisions. The voluntary nature of the Act that was voted into law was never given 
any serious consideration. 
273  See "Report of the Comrnissioner of Crown Lands for the Year 1865," p. xxi, Appendix no. 3, Sessional Papers, 1866. 216 
The final effort to  better regulate  the  extraction of Crown timber came on June  13, 
1866  in  the  form  of yet  another  ordinance  that  more  or  Jess  captured  the  numerous 
amendments of the  last  fifteen  years  within  a  single  regulatory  instrument.
274  lt was  thus 
confirmed  that  annual  licenses  to  eut timber  would  hereafter  be  offered  through  public 
auction  and  made  renewable  pending  the  fulfillment of established  conditions.  The  upset 
priee for the bonus to be paid  by the highest bidder at the ti me of sale was set at four dollars 
per square mile and  annual ground rents were left unchanged at fifty  cents per square mile 
(500 feet of square timber or 20 saw logs  to the mile being considered as due occupation). 
The maximum size of a timber berth was maintained (i.e., 50 sq. miles on surveyed land and 
half as  much in  surveyed areas) and  the general  rates applicable to timber eut under license 
were  left  nearly  identical.
275  Transfers  were  admitted  as  long  as  these  were  "not found 
objectionable  by  the  Crown  Lands  Department  or  Agent."  The  rights  of Crown  Timber 
Agents to  grant or renew licenses were  reaffirmed and registers of their proceedings  along 
with the plans of licensed areas were to be made "open for public inspection." Arrangements 
for adjudication or arbitration in case of disputes followed previously established procedures, 
as  were the obligation to submit sworn  statements of the quantities of timber manufactured 
from  public lands. In  short,  nothing  of consequence was changed nor added  beyond  what 
already existed. 
By  the  end  of 1866,  the  total  annual  revenues  accrued  by  the  Woods  and  Forests 
division amounted to  $428,958, up from  $376,574 dollars  in  1860,  whereas the area under 
license  increased from  27,413  square  miles  in  1860 to  34,940 square miles  in  1866.
276  But 
given the government's failure to correct the legalloopholes and weak enforcement measures 
that allowed operators to extract value from  newly settled lands at a fraction of the cost of a 
timber license, as much wood was being taken from private lands in the 1860s as there was in 
1840s. At )east, this is the picture that emerges from the multiple (but not always conforming) 
data sets showing the amount of timber and lumber taken from Lower and Upper Canada in 
1866  (see  Table  5.2  below).  According  to  the  estimates  provided  by  the  Supervisor of 
274  See "Crown Timber Regulations," in Canada Gazette, 1866, vol. 25, no. 26, p. 2150-52. 
275  Oak and Walnut =  1.5  d ./ f~;  Elm, Ash and Tamarac =  Id ./  f~; Red and White  Pine, Birch, Basswood, Cedar, Spruce, &c = 
0.5dJ ft'; Pine saw logs of  13  ~  feet long & 20 inches at !east diameter = 6d. or ten cents cach; Spruce saw logs  13  ~  feet = 
2.5d.; Cord wood (hard) per cord = 8d., Soft cord  wood= 4d .. Where measure could not be obtained, White pine was estimated 
to con tain 70ft'; Red pi ne 38ft'; Other kinds at 34ft'. 
276 Report of the Commissionner of Crown Lands for the Year 1866, Appendix no. 6, Sessional Papers, 1867. 217 
Cullers'  Office,  the combined  production  in  square timber (pine and  timber)  for  the  year 
1866, 38,970,938 ft
3
,  was nearly three times greater than the amount upon which duties were 
actually charged (12,984,494 ft\ Although much of the available data is  relatively difficult 
to decipher in  terms of actual values (especially with regards to  the amount of manufactured 
products cullers reportedly measured and  counted), official export records make it clear that 
more than twice as much wood was being exported from Canada than what was liable for the 
payment of Crown dues. Even if one assumes that ali of the 1,983,431  saw logs reported by 
the  Woods  and  Forest Branch for  1866 were converted  into  boards,  planks and  deals, the 
official  quantity  of saw  logs  appropriated from  public  lands  would  stiJl  be  insufficient  to 
produce  the  622,727,000  board  feet  (a sum  equal  to  more  than  58  million  re)  that  was 
exported from  the Province in  1866 (see the combined exports for boards, planks and deals, 
third  row,  Table  5.2).  Moreover,  in  comparison  to  declared  exports,  every  other  figure 
provided  by  the  Woods  and  Forest division  was  dwarfed  by  the  impressive  quantities  of 
wood  exported.  Whether its  railroad  ties,  shingles, staves,  or firewood,  roughly  a  hundred 
times  more  wood  was  being exported  from  the  Province than  what was  liable  for  Crown 
dues.  Given that thousands  more feet of staves,  masts, spars, sleepers, oars,  lathwood,  and 
various  other  articles  were  annually  exported  from  the  Province  or  consumed  by  local 
shipbuilding industry, it appears quite clear that the production emanating from private lands 
was either equal or greater than that which was taken from the public domain.
277  Since older 
settlements were reportedly 1umbered out by the end of the 1850s, it would be fair to assume 
that most of this "private production" was in fact occurring within the newly "settled" lands. 
2n The exact quantity of wood that was being ta ken out of the forests of the Province prior to Confederation is near impossible to 
confirm.  Other than  the  fact thal the  records  of cullers were  known  to  be inexact, large  timber and  lumber manufacturers 
employed their measurers and since  it was impossible to tell  whether the figures they provided were in  fact true, many were 
tempted  to  bias  their reports  in  favour  of  thcir employer.  Exports  through  the  Great  Lakes  to  the  United  States  were  not 
consistently recorded (as was the case for the year  1866) and  no distinct correlation seemed to exist between the amount of 
wood thal was counted versus that which was culled. 218 
Table 5.2  Production and Export Data for 1854 and 1866. 
Source of Data 
Sq.  Pine  Sq. Hardwoods  Sawlogs  Boards 1 
Deals(bf) 
Firewood  Railroad  Shingles  Standard  Other 
(ft')  (ft')  (ps)  Planks (bf)  (cards)  Ties(ps)  (ps)  Slaves (ps)  Staves (ps) 
Woods & F  orests 
1  12,681,152  303,342  1,983,431  2,080  7,387  105,000  22,153  52,950 
Superviser of 
32,054,925  6,916,013  2,490  ND  ND  ND  ND  1,332,000  1 ,557,000 
Cu liers' office 2 
Trade & Navigation 
Export Tables  21,463,520  4,662,400  128,236  465,812,000  156,915,000  240,193  146,770  77,848,000  2,417,000  8,441 ,000 
(1866)3 
Trade & Navigation 
Export Tables  13,814,840  2,405,320  54,094  221,109,000  76,169,500  29,098  84,056  1 2,023,000  1,320,000  2,737,000 
(1855)4 
Sources: 
1 General Statement ofTimber for the Year 1866, Appendix No.  20(b ), Sessional Papers (No.6), 1867 
2 Abstracl of the Number ofPieces and Cubic Feel of ... Timber Measured and Cul  led for the Year 1866, Appendices No. 20(g), (h),(i), Sessional Papers (No.  6), 1867 
3 General Statement of Experts for the Year ending June 1 866, Trade and Navigation Tables, Sessional Papers (No. 1) 1 867-68 
'General Statement ofExports for the Year ending June  1855, Trade and Navigation Tables, JLAC (Appendix no. 29), 1856 
Expott data from 1855 and 1866 show that within the span of a decade, the quantity of 
wood exported from  the Province roughly doubled and sawn lumber irrevocably superseded 
square timber as Canada's chief export. Markets were also more clearly delineated, both  in 
terms of geography and production. Nearly ali  of the Province's production in  terms of saw 
logs, boards, planks, firewood, railroad ties and shingles was destined for the United States, 
whereas  squared  timber,  deals,  staves,  masts,  bowsprits,  and  other assorted  articles  were 
essentially  prepared for  markets  in  Great Britain and Europe.  While Reciprocity did create 
new opportunities and avenues for Canadian wood products, its influence over the productive 
output of the Province was  evidently  greater in Upper as  opposed to  Lower Canada.  With 
increasing demand  for  sawn  lumber,  the Reciprocity Treaty  ultimately  opened the door to 
even  more extensive levels of appropriation,  leading to  what Lower called the birth of the 
"migratory  industry" that moved its  operations and  processing facilities along the retreating 
plane of the forest frontier, "leaving derelict, or semi-derelict, the cut-over regions" (Lower, 
1938, p. 139). 
5.8  Forests Under Unification- Discussion & Conclusion 
As  the  productive  output of the  forest  sector steadily  increased,  so  did  the  overall 
complexity  of the  system.  Production  became  more  diversified,  the  number of saw  mills 
operating in  the Province nearly doubled, and the share of manufactured goods destined for 
markets in the United States now rivalled the quantity of wood sent to Europe. Consequently, 219 
timbering and  lumbering operations  were extended over an  even greater proportion of the 
territory,  which  in  turn  limited  the  capacity  of the  Crown Lands  Department to  maintain 
effective  oversight.  Following  Hodgetts  ( 1955,  ch.  1  0),  evidence  drawn  from  available 
records suggests that in  the final days of the Union Government, the Department of Crown 
Lands  was  beset  by  at  )east  three  key  problems:  (1)  the  problem  of  administrative 
decentralization  that  was  occasioned  by  the  incessantly  sprawling  business  of  the 
Department, and the need to ensure local 1 regional  compliance without compromising the 
centralized  span  of control;  (2)  the  principal-agent  problem  that  stemmed  from  the  vast 
resource wealth under the control of the Department and  its  limited capacity to oversee the 
dealings of its agents, which in turn created strong incentives for free riding and the shirking 
of fiduciary  responsibilities; and finally, (3) the problem of heterogeneity that was fostered 
by  the  incompatible demands that were placed upon the Crown lands  (i.e., agrarian  versus 
forest-dependent land uses), the lack of horizontal  linkages across the separate branches of 
the Department, and the  changing or conflicting policy  priorities of succeeding ministerial 
heads. Put differently, the Department was in  fact struggling with problems of fit, scale, and 
interplay  (Young,  2002).  Such difficulties  however,  were not unique to  the  Crown  Lands 
Department. As the Financial and Departmental Commission of 1862 to 1864 made clear, the 
ever-expanding  scope  of  governmènt  action  evidently  created  opportunities  for 
mismanagement to  occur throughout the  system.  By  the  end  of the  1850s,  the  diverging 
interests  of Upper  and  Lower  Canada  were  made  manifest
278  and  instead  of calls  for 
improvement  in  the  administration  of  government  came  demands  for  change  in  the 
underlying constitution of the Union itself. In short, rather than showing signs of progress in 
the  management  of public  affairs,  the  Province  appeared  increasingly  dysfunctional,  thus 
hampering public trust and paralyzing legislative action. The provisional constitution of 1840 
seemed to have outrun its  course and as the need for institutional reform gained widespread 
appeal, political attention inexorably reverted back to Lord Durham 's untried proposition of 
establishing a federated union of  British North America.
279 
278  On the issue of the growing dissatisfaction with the union of the two Canadas, see  "Question of federation of the British 
provinces in America,"  1858. London:  Foreign Office, CIHM no. 22673. 
279  See Durham, Report on the Affairs of British North America, Volume Il, pp. 304-305. 220 
/ 
Never1heless,  between  1841  and  1866,  Canada's  burgeoning  forest  sector  showed 
remarkable resilience and continuous growth des pite the repeal of preferential duties and the 
rising  costs  of timber  on  public  lands  (both  in  terms  of government  imposts  and  the 
increasing  leve!  of effort  required  to  access,  eut,  and  process  resource  units).  The timber 
licensing system was perfected and made more profitable for government through legislative 
and  executive rulings.  Reciprocity created new  opportunities for the exploitation of smaller 
and  more abundant resource  stocks for  the  manufacture of sawn  lumber,  and  although the 
yearly  production of squared timber remained relatively stable at 20 million re orso until the 
end  of the century  (Québec  and  Ontario combined),  sawn  lumber became Canada's chief 
export during the  1860s  and  it  remained  as  such  until  the  advent of the  pulp  and  paper 
industries  at the  turn  of the twentieth  century.  While  the  Reciprocity  Treaty  ended  when 
negotiations  towards  Confederation  were weil  underway,  the  struggle to  secure  access  to 
Canada's  forest  wealth - fought  with  the familiar  weaponry of duties  and  tariffs  (Lower, 
193 8,  p.  148) - proceeded  unabated  weil  into  the  20th  century.  Moreover,  des pite  initial 
fears, the end of Reciprocity and the addition of  a 20% duty on Canadian imports did not spur 
widespread  recessionary  conditions.  In  fact,  US  demand  for  Canadian  lumber  and  wood 
products remained strong weil  into the 20th century despite periodic downturns, changes in 
applicable  tariffs, or variation  in  the overall value of wood and timber products (Ibid, pp. 
148-159). 
On the eve of Confederation, the central tenets of what was to become Québec's forest 
governance  structure  were  essentially  established  and  revolved  around  four  fundamental 
propositions that have since  withstood the test of time.  They included (1) a  concessionary 
approach to  the allocation of resource rights; (2) centralized decision-making authority; (3) 
the pursuit of direct (e.g., revenue) and indirect (e.g., employment and positive trade balance) 
economie returns, and ( 4) the  right to defi ne collective and operational choice ru les and affect 
the  distribution  of benefits.
280  While  the  revenue  motive  was  never  Iost  on  those  who 
commanded the progress of forest  resource use in  Québec, government  interventions in the 
management of Crown  lands and  resources demonstrated a far broader range of interest than 
a mere penchant for revenue en  han  cement, as Howlett and Rayner (1995, 2001) emphasize. 
280 Or as Crawford and Ostrom (1 995) put it, the rules thar determine the participants, positions, actions, outcomes, information, 
control and costs/benefïts of both collective and operational choice situations. 221 
The case of forest governance during the era of unified  legislatures  points to  a more 
complex  relationship  between  political  motives,  the  management  of the  Crown  Lands 
Department and the use of forest resources. To be sure, succeeding governments were indeed 
motivated  to  increase  their  share  resource-based  revenues  but  the  pursuit  of such  an 
imperative  was  moderated  other considerations  and  priorities.  Chief among these  was  the 
desire  to  promote  and  enhance  settlement,  and  the  pursuit of this  goal  resulted  in  land 
management strategies that supported neither the interests of lumberers, settlers, nor those of 
the broader public. For in pursuing this middle range strategy, governments and their agents 
(willingly  or  not)  turned  a  blind  eye  to  the  constant  threat  of encroachment  by  settlers 
(whether legitimate or not). They nourished feelings of insecurity amongst lumberers, which 
in  turn created strong incentives to liquidate timber limits as quickly as  possible, leading to 
overproduction and  below  market valuation of Canadian timber. They caused the needless 
waste of well-timbered territories by encouraging settlers to take up land that was otherwise 
unfit  for  agricultural  purposes.  They  reduced  the  revenue-generating  potential  of Crown 
Lands by  creating an incentive to extract an equal if not greater amou nt of timber through the 
simple expedient of private land hold, which was either free from the obligations of Crown 
dues  or  the  subject  of  weak  enforcement  by  corruptible  land  agents.  And  finally, 
inconsistency  in  the actions of government helped to reinforce public apathy and distrust in 
the administration of public affairs,  thus paving the way for corruption and the disregard  of 
regulatory  provisions.  In  sum, even though the  need  for revenue continued to  be  of prime 
necessity after unification, the pursuit of colonization strategies at the very edge of the forest 
frontier ultimately  resulted in  confrontations that promoted the waste of valuable resources, 
diminished overall  returns  for government, and  left  both  lumbermen and  settlers worse off 
than what any foreseeable alternative might have reasonably produce. 
Forest resource institutions under the united Province of Canada offered no shortage of 
opportunities  for  operators  to  circumvent  existing  rules  and  reduce  their  private  costs. 
Resources were underpriced, enforcement was either hegligible or negotiable,  and  the ease 
with which lumberers could petition the Crown Lands Department or the Governor in council 
offered strong incentives to  engage in  beneficiai  rent seeking activities.  While recognizing 
that forests  are  inherently  difficult to govern due to  the high  costs of exclusion costs  and 222 
substractable nature, the  evidence discussed  in  this  chapter suggests that the  government's 
quasi monopoly over the instrumentalities of collective action invariably led to abuse and the 
pursuit of politically  motivated priorities or policies that resulted in  sub-optimal outcomes. 
By granting government sole custody over the right to determine the "conditions, regulations 
and restrictions" applicable to  the use of Crown resources  (Act 12  Vict., cap. 30), the line 
between intra  and  ultra vires choice was blurred, and the evaluative frontier for ministerial 
responsibility  shifted  from  a  purely  positive mode of inquiry  to the  Jess  tangible world of 
normative  considerations.  For  under  the  cloak  of parliamentary  confidence,  government 
gained  the  legitimacy  it  lacked  in  the  previous  representational  system,  which  in  turn 
provided the authority to defi ne the private choices of the executive as the public choices of 
government. As such, failure to act in  the public's interests became harder to decipher, and 
because  the  power  to  amend  resource  institutions  "as  required"  rested  with  Cabinet, 
government could  potentially exceed  its  authority  or abuse the privilege of office (from  a 
purely  normative  standpoint)  without  necessarily  violating  any  legal  precedents.  Hence, 
inefficient or counterproductive policies, such as the building of colonization roads in  areas 
unsuited  for  agricultural  purposes or held  under license to eut timber,  were  conspicuously 
pursued despite contradictory advice from  senior civil servants, the ire of lumberers, or the 
acknowledged waste that such strategies tended to produce. 
The presomption that an electoral requirement would be sufficient to maintain a check 
on  inappropriate  behaviour  did  not,  in  the  end,  prevent  members  of the  executive  from 
abusing the privilege of office. The governments that succeeded each other after unification 
were  no  more encumbered  by  the  constitutional  constraint of responsibility  than  were the 
appointed officers of the Crown in  the previous representation system. If the administration 
of public affairs changed hands as often as it did during the period ofthe union, it was merely 
because the principle of party politics bad not yet fermented and votes on any particular issue 
were  more  or  Jess  equally  divided  along  the  Ottawa boundary that separated  Lower  from 
Upper Canada.  The impossible task of  securing stable majorities under such conditions was a 
key  factor  in  the  dissolution  of the  joint  legislature  and  the  push  towards  a  federative 
arrangement. 223 
Imperfect  as  it  was,  the  responsibility  principle  nevertheless  became  the  core 
constitutional  principle  for  the  establishment of fair  and  accountable  institutions  following 
Confederation.  While  the  sufficiency  of  responsibility  as  a  safeguard  against  the 
objectionable conduct and pol ici es of future governments was questioned by a few discordant 
voices,
281  the  principle  was  staunchly  defended  by  the  likes  of John  A.  MacDonald, 
Alexander  T.  Galt,  George  Brown  and  George-Étienne  Cartier  during  the  constitutional 
debates that were held in Halifax and Québec City in  1864 and 1865 respectively.
282  With the 
American Civil  War fresh  in  the minds of Canadian politicalleaders, which.many attributed 
to  the  absolute  powers  of a president presiding over an  irresponsible executive of his  own 
choosing, the defend ers of the draft constitutional framework for a federative union of British 
colonial dependencies. As one delegate of  the 1865 convention in Québec City summed it up: 
"Under [the  institutions  given  by] the  British  Constitution.  we have  kept sacred  the 
great principle  of responsible  government  which  we  now  enjoy,  and  under  which 
ministers of  the Crown hold he ir seats in and are responsible to the Legislature. WeiL, 
we want no change of  the principle,jor  ... it is the greatest safeguard to liberty ... in the 
world."
283 
The  path  of institutional  change  under  the  unified  legislature  of Upper  and  Lower 
Canada was  primarily conditioned by  the want of revenue to defray the costs of government, 
but eff01ts to  achieve such an  end  were strongly moderated by  the no  less  important priority 
of promoting  colonization  and  the  settlement  of its  vast  territorial  domain.  While  forest 
governarice  institutions  were  adopted,  modified,  or  changed  to  increase  or  maintain  the 
government's share.of potential returns, reduce the  risk of monopoly and  render unoccupied 
sections  of the  Province  productive  of revenue,  policy  interventions  became  much  more 
conciliatory  after the collapse  of 1846  and  the severe economie  depression  that  followed. 
Significant changes were no longer adopted without prior consultations. A  fier 1849, inquiries 
were  periodically  conducted  to  assess  the  state  of the  lumber trade  or  the  management of 
Crown  lands  more  broadly.  Prominent lumbermen  and  senior civil  servants  were  regularly 
281  For example, see  "Letter  addressed  to  the  Earl  of  Carnarvon  by J. Howe,  W. Annand, and  H. McDonald:  stating  their 
objections  to  the  proposed  scheme  of  Union  of  the  British  North  American  provinces,"  London:  G .E.  Eyre  &  W. 
Spottiswoode, 1867, CIHM no. 04679; "Speech delivered in the Legislative Assembly, by C. Dunkin, ... during the debate on 
the subject of the Confederation of the British North American provinces," Québec, 1865, CIHM no. 23230. 
282  See "Parliamentary debates on the subject of the Confederation of the British North America," and in  particular, the address 
by Attorney General MacDonald (February 6th, 1865), pp. 32-35. 
283  See Address by Burwell , February 24'", 1865, in  the "Parliamentary debates on the subject of the Confederation of the British 
North America," p. 447. 224 
invited to take part in  such proceedings, share their experiences, and make recommendations 
as required. However, the elements that percolated through such proceedings and the overall 
receptiveness  of governments to  the tendered  information  varied  considerably.  Alternative 
solutions to costly and counter productive arrangements (e.g., minimum production quotas) 
were often proposed and sorne (e.g., ground rents) were eventually adopted, but seldom were 
such  inquiries  and  changes  carried  forth  by  the  same  executive  administration.  Finally, 
despite  repeated  references  to  such  problems  as  encroachment  by  would-be  settlers,  the 
underpricing of standing timber, overproduction, the lack of enforcement, and the wasteful 
exploitation of timber on  land acquired for  settlement purposes (to name but a few),  nearly 
every government that took hold of office between  1840 and  1866  faced  a similar slew of 
defects  without ever seriously  attempting to amend the  underlying  conditions  that tended 
towards such failures.  Monitoring and enforcement of existing regulatory  provisions varied 
over  time  but  remained  ostensibly  weak  throughout  the  period,  and  despite  repeated 
affirmations that rules ought to be applied with impa1tiality, the evidence brought fo1th  by the 
various  inquiries  suggests  that  discretionary  oversight  in  the  application of rules  was  the 
norm rather than the exception. 
Y  et,  despite  recurrent patterns of weak enforcement and the pursuit of land  policies 
that were contrary to the long term sustainability of forest resource use, evidence shows that 
the progress of institutional change was cl earl y non-path dependent. Succeeding governments 
showed a strong penchant for institutional innovation that brought variety and complexity to 
rule-ordered relationships, a willingness to treat policy as experiments, and modify or change 
strategies on the bases of !essons learned. The problem, as  subsequent chapters will attempt 
to show, is  that non-inclusive unitary control over any vast storehouse of natural resources-
especially  in  monocentric  systems  of  governance  that  fail  to  achieve  a  proportional 
representation of voice, integrate deliberative decision-making procedures, or integrate clear 
and enforceable constitutional safeguards - inevitably creates opportunities and incentives for 225 
the  pursuit  of  more  narrowly  construed  interests  (e.g.,  Ascher,  1999;  Eggertsson,  2005), 
whether consciously or purposefully pursued or not.
284 
2&>  A clear distinction should be  made here between the theory of limited constitutional constraints and the propensity of actors 
to use such powers to their advantage. Far from suggesting that the succeeding commissioners (and eventually ministers) of the 
province consistently acted in  a selfïsh or self-regarding way, the point 1 wish to emphasize here is  that limited constitutional 
constraints invariably benefit those in  whose trust power lies, whether their actions are considered harmful or beneficiai  to the 
public's interests. 226 
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and scale. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press PART III: PROVINCIAL SELF-GOVERNMENT GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
After severa! decades of forced collaboration, the joint legislature of Upper and Lower 
Canada  had  grown  into  a  relative  stalemate.  The  even  distribution  of votes  that  was 
established at the ti me of unification no longer reflected the differentiai population growth of 
the  two  provinces.
285  With  time,  policy  preferences  became  more  pronounced  and  the 
challenge  of maintaining  the  confidence  of two  distinct  legislatures  became  untenable. 
Ministries  invariably  followed  one  another  to  defeat,  political  and  ideological  divisions 
rendered  the  conduct  of public  business  nearly  impossible,  and  the  fate  of any  given 
government  literally  rested  on  the  vote of one or two  individuals.  As  social  and  political 
differences  between  the  two  provinces  became  more  obvious,  appeals  for  change  in  the 
provisional constitution of 1840 began surfacing.
286  In the words of  John A. MacDonald, 
"men of  ail parties and ail shades of  politics became alarmed at the aspect of  affairs. 
They fou nd that such was the opposition between the two sections of  the province, such 
was the danger of  impending anarchy,  in consequence of  the irreconcilable differences 
of opinion,  with  respect to  representation by population, between  Upper and Lower 
Canada, that unless  some  solution of the  difficulty  was  arrived at, we  would suffer 
under a succession ofweak governments, - weak in nwnerical support, weak in force, 
and weak in power of  doing good  .. ..  Parties were so equally bala1~ced ,  that the vote of 
one member might decide the fate of  the Administration, and the course of  legislation 
for a year or a series of  years. "
287 
Y  et, despite the belief that "some step  must be taken to  relieve the country from  the 
dead-lock and impending anarchy thal hung over [it}, "
288 the provinces of  Nova Scotia, New 
Brunswick and Prince Edward Island considered the overall  scheme premature and in  need of 
285  By the Jate  1850s, the population of the Upper Province exceeded that of Lower Canada by sorne 250,000 heads, Jeading to 
demands for greater proportional representation within the body poli tic. 
286  While the need to forma! ize the tics between ali British colonial  possessions was first proposed in  the wake of the economie 
depression that followed the repeal of the corn  Jaws, the first serious effort to give meaning to the idea of a federal union was 
submitted in  1856 by the Liberal Party  of Lower Canada (see Parliamentary debates on the subject of Confederation, pp. 214-
216). However, it wasn't until  the Cartier-Macdonald administration was sworn  to office in  the fall  of  1858 (after no Jess than 
four different  governments were prorogued in  Jess than a year)  thal the Governor of Canada, Sir Edmund Walker Head, and 
key  members of his Council  officially engaged the Imperial government on the necessity of revising  the  serious defects that 
were attributed to  the joint legislature. See "Question of Federation of  the Bri tish Provinces  in America,"  London: Foreign 
Office. 1858, CIHM  no. 22673. 
287  See Address by J.A. MacDonald, February 5th, 1865, p. 26, in "Parliamentary debates on the subject of the confederation  ...  " 
CIHM no. 9_01461. 
288 Ibid. 232 
further  reflection  if not  a  more  convincing  rationale.
289  On  this  account,  demands  for  a 
meeting of delegates were rejected by the British Secretary of State in  1858  but upheld in 
1866 at the request of the new MacDonald-Cartier government. In fact, it was not until the 
imperial  government took things  into  its  own  hands  that a  deal  could  finally  be brokered 
between Britain's colonial dependencies. By then however, the conversation had shifted from 
a debate over the political rationale for ceding power to a federal  unit to the more pressing 
issue  of preserving  the  political  and  economie  viability  of British  North  America.  The 
problem  was  that in  order to  maintain jurisdictional authority  and economie progress  in  a 
geographically  dispersed  hinterland  such  as  Canada,  the  provinces  required  a  central 
governing body to coordinate trade and other related economie concerns, leverage political 
and economie commitment to  undertake large infrastructure projects such as the building of 
rail ways, bridges and canals, and protect the shared political commitment of the provinces to 
the  British  monarchy  in  the  face  of increasing  political  and  economie  aggression  by  the 
United  States?
90  In  essence,  if British  colonial  possessions  were  ever  to  become  self-
sustaining  and  self-governed  political  entities,  they  required  a  common  institutional 
framework  to  bind  their  collective  interests  and  develop  perennial  channels  of 
communication and  transportation  to  ferry  increasingly  bulky  staple commodities  (mostly 
grain, lumber, timber and minerais) across the continent to market destinations in Europe and 
elsewhere, and facilitate the exchange of ideas, goods and services across the provinces and 
territorial possessions of British North America. As  Smith (1991, p.  457) explained it, "[t]he 
impetus  for  Confederation  lay  in  the  need  for  greater  public  works  as  much  as  it  did  in 
providing increased security or an escape from political instability in the United Canadas. For 
this reason the scheme adopted in  1867 can best be described as  purposive federalism, whose 
object was to achieve practical rather than representational or philosophical ends." 
As  in  the case of the  Union  Act in  1840,  the  prospect of a  revised  constitutional 
framework was again  conditioned by the political and  economie sureties of Canada's natural 
289  See despatches by J.H.T. Manners Sutton (Lieutenant-Governor of New Brunswick) in "Question of Federation of the British 
Provinces in America." 
290  New technologies were needed to connect untouched resource reserves to seaports on either side of the continent. As Lower 
(1938, p.  13) put it:  "The railroad ...  was mothered by the desire of the consuming centres for contact with  the interior and 
fathered  by  the  industrial  revolution. Every  seaboard  city  wanted  to  tap  the  interior, to  tap the resources of  the interior " 
(emphasis in original). "[B]y enlarging the hinterland of particular centres of demand" (Ibid.,  p. 14), the railroad th us provided 
access to areas that were heretofore considered unreachable. 233 
resource  wealth.  For the  success  of the  Confederation  scheme  ultimately  hinged  on  the 
capacity of participating provinces to secure a stable and exclusive source of revenue, which 
at the ti me, could only be found in the respective resource wealth of each province.
291 In fact, 
the revenue issue was a major stumbling block during the Québec City convention of 1864. 
Since it  was  understood that central  government would  retain  the rights to  what was  then 
considered the chief sources of revenue, namely the customs and excise duties, an alternative 
solution  for  the  provinces  was  needed.  Sin  ce  none of the  latter (  except for  Ontario)  had 
municipal  levet  institutions through  which public goods and  services could be  charged for 
and dispensed with, delegates felt that if direct taxation was adopted as the primary means of 
supporting the business of provinèial government, the federation scheme would be  doomed. 
Jt was thus  decided that the provinces  should possess  ali  rights to  the lands and resources 
within their respective jurisdictions and that the central government should allocate general 
funds  on a  per capita basis  and  relative to  other financial  considerations such  as  debt and 
public  investments  (Bourinot,  1895,  pp.  211-212).  Consequently,  the  incentives  and 
prerogatives that  led  to  the  creation  of Québec's  initial  set of forest  resource  institutions 
never withered, and  whoever control led the  reigns  of the province's staple  trade, as  it was 
then called, ultimately held the key to  its political future. 
The importance of the Constitution Act, as  a decisive moment in  the development of 
provincial natural resource institutions, cannot be overstated. As indicated in the introduction 
to Part II, the passing of the British North American Act
292  (particularly sections 92(5), 102, 
109  and  126)  ultimately  placed  the  control,  management,  and  disposition  of ali  Crown 
resources in the hands of provincial executive governments, subject to the collective action of 
their  respective  legislatures.
293  Hence, the residual  prerogatives of the  Crown,  which were 
vested  in  the  Governor in  council  both  prior to and following the Unification Act of 1840, 
were  never  dissipated.  Power  over  the  public  domain  was  simply  transferred  to  the 
Lieutenant-Governor,  which,  under  responsible  government  implies  that  the  power  of 
administration  and  control  should  lie  within  the  purview  of those  who  command  the 
291  See also the  discussion  on  the  source  of provincial  revenue  presented by  A.T. Galt in  the  Parliamentary Debates on  the 
Subject  of  the  Confederation  of  the  British  North  American  Provinces,  3rd  session,  8th  provincial  Parliament  of 
Canada. Printed by  order of the legislature [Microform, CIHM no.  23230], 1865, Published by Hunter, Rose &  Co.: Québec, 
pp. 68-70. 
292  (1867), 30 & 31 Viel., c.3 (lmp.), now refered to as the "Constitution Act of 1867." 
293  See comments of Ritchie CJ. in  Mercer v. Attorney-General of Ontario [(1903) A.C. 73 , p. 79]. 234 
confidence of the elected cham  ber (i.e.,  the Executive Council) (La Forest, 1969,  p.  167)?
94 
The  implications  of such  prerogatives  are  extensive,  for  the  Constitution  Act  and  the 
subsequent judgments of the highest court of appeal -the Judicial  Committee of the Privy 
Council  - made  it  unequivocal  that  "a  provincial  government  may,  without  legislation, 
exercise in  respect of its  prope1ty  the same  rights  as  a  private owner"  (lbid.).
195  In  other 
words, elected governments could manage, control and allocate the natural resource wealth of 
the public domain as if su  ch resources were its property, to use and dispose of in the public's 
interest.  Secure  in  the  precedent  established  by  Canada's  colonial  heritage,  provincial 
governments  were  now  free  to  exploit the resource  riches  of their respective jurisdictions 
with  few  if any  constitutional  impediments.  In  continuity  with  the  past,  Crown  resources 
were vested in  the provinces to provide them with the necessary means of controlling their 
respective social, political and economie destinies, defray the costs of civil government, and 
support the production of public goods (La Forest,  1969, p. xii; Smith, 1991 , p.  457).
296  Only 
this  time,  natural  resources  were destined  to  become the  primary  source of internai  (i.e., 
discretionary) revenue for those provinces that formed the initial federative union of Canada. 
Renee, not only was provincial control over territorial resources a necessary entry condition 
into the federation scheme,  it  was the principal  security for ensuring  the jurisdictional and 
legislative autonomy of provincial governments following Confederation. 
Save the limited safeguards of periodic elections and ministerial confidence, the power 
of Cabinet members to define public policy  (i.e.,  determine collective choices),  raise local 
revenues
297  and  allocate resources (White, 2006, pp.  256-257) only increased over time. As 
emphasized  in  Chapter IV,  "rather  than  rejecting  the  monarchy,  colonial  leaders  once  in 
control of the  legislature seized the Crown's  prerogatives  so  as  to  centralize power in  the 
:rn  Provincial powers of administration and  control do not, however, ex tend to lands reserved for lndians, which is vested in the 
Federal government by virtue of section 91  (4) of the BNA Act. 
295 See The Queen v.  Robertson (1882), 6 S.C.R. 52, p. 136; Smylie v. The Queen (1900), 27 O.A.R. 172; Attorney-General of 
Canada v. Higbie, ( 1945) S.C.R. 385, p. 430 
296  See speech by Hon. George Brown (February 8, 1865), Confederation Debates 
m  The  1867  constitutional arrangements, as  interpreted  by  the  courts,  recognize  provincial governments as  sovereigns  with 
broad legislative competencies, including "powers over property and civil rights in section 92(13) of the BNA Act, along with 
ownership of natural  resources and public property noted in  sections  109 and  117 and reinforced in section 92A."  Moreover 
"[s]ection 92(2)  gives  provinces  the  authority  to  raise  Direct  Taxation within  the  Province  in  arder to  raise  Revenue for 
Provincial Purposes"  (Hale, 2006, p. 385, emphasis in  original). However, provincial  governments were highly reluctant to 
impose any form  of  taxation  during  the  carly  years  of  the  Confederation. ln  Québec, federal  subsidies  and  the  raising  of 
revenues through the sale of natural resources (i.e., timber) provided the main sources of revenue for the government between 
1867 and  1897 (Gow, 1979). 235 
hands  of the  political  executive"  (Smith,  1991,  p.  471).  But  as  Sproule-Jones  (1984) 
contends,  they  went  even  further.  For  the  constitutional  limitations  on  the  exercise  of 
parliamentary sovereignty (specifically, the independent authority or veto rights of  the Lords 
and the reserve powers of the Crown to prorogue, dissolve, and summon Parliament), which 
were  part  and  parce!  of the  Westminster  system,  never  existed  in  Canada  where  upper 
chambers  were  made  subservient  to  the  government  in  power  and  the  exercise  of the 
governorship  function  was  customarily  emasculated  to  a  figurehead  role  soon  after 
Confederation. 
In  accordance  with  the  Constitution  Act  of 1867,  the  general  structure  of public 
administration  in  the  federated  provinces  followed  the  architecture  set  forth  by  central 
government. The head of the province's executive government was vested in  a Lieutenant-
Governor who possessed within his constitutional sphere ali  the authority of the Governor-
General prior to 1867 (Bourinot, 1895, p.  147). The Executive Council was maintained as the 
principal  governing  body  of the  provinces,  so  long  as  they  retain  the confidence of their 
respective legislatures, and until 1967, Québec was ruled by a bicamerallegislature that was 
composed of a  lower elected house and upper council whose members were appointed for 
!ife. Election and appointment franchises to the lower and upper houses were conditional to 
property qualifications, and councillors could commence or amend ali  classes of legislation 
except  money  and  taxation  bills,  but nevertheless  held  the  power to  reject  the  same.  In 
essence, Confederation brought the strength of united interests and allegiance to a  common 
institutional heritage but the basic rules of government remained unchanged. Other than the 
division of legislative authority and revised jurisdictional boundaries for Québec and Ontario, 
the  supremacy  of the executive (whether provincial  or federal)  in  directing the course of 
public  policy  differed  little  from  the  system  that prevailed  during colonial  rule  (Sproule-
J  on  es,  1984  ). 
As  a  constitutional  monarchy, the  ultimate source of power in  Canada lies  with the 
Crown, and it is only through the Crown that governments (whether federal or provincial) can 
act. In legal parlance, political authority is thus reserved to the highest political organ that can 
advise  the  Crown  on ali  matters of public policy,  which  under responsible  government is 
attributed  to those  who command the confidence of Parliament.  With the growth of party 236 
politics, confidence was equated with  majoritarian rule and by  convention, the privilege of 
advising  the  Crown  came  to  be  assigned  to  whatever  political  formation  held  the  most 
number  seats  in  the  elected  chamber.  Hence,  the  so-called  executive  dominance  of the 
Canadian political system (see Bernier et al. , 2005; Dunn, 2006; Savoie, 201 0; White, 2006) 
largely stems from the fact that those who monopolize "advice on policy and patronage at the 
top ... [can also]  expand their base of control at the bottom" (Smith,  1991, p.  460). Power is 
derived  from  and  exercised  through  the  legitimacy  of  the  monarchical  system  and 
government, within the historical context of Canada, is constitutionally rooted in  the office of 
the Governor-General. 
That the  institutional  structure  of the  provincial  political  arena  closely  follows  the 
executive-centred  mode!  of the  federal  government has  already  been  discussed  elsewhere. 
However, the fact that the provinces owe much of their powers to the empire that had for so 
long  thwarted  their  claims  to  self-government  merits  further  consideration.  Provincial 
sovereignty over matters of legislative authority was not achieved because of the BNA Act, 
but  in  spite of it.  In  contrast to  the  highly  centralized  federal  scheme that the  Fathers of 
Confederation had  hoped to  establish,  power tended to migrate away  from  the  centre and 
towards provincial legislatures. Smith ( 1991) underscores se  veral reasons wh  y this happened. 
First, prior to confederation, the loci of control resided in  the provinces themselves, and not 
in  any central governing body.  Since the Union Act of 1840, matters of local  interest were 
essentially  handled  by  local  assemblies,  with  the  role  of the  Governor-General  becoming 
progressively centred on matters of Imperial interest (e.g.,  trade and  defence). As  such, the 
provinces were able to develop their own social, political and economie heritage. Drawing on 
more or Jess distinct patterns of  seUlement that helped to con  geai cultural referents, they were 
able  to  develop  relatively  stable  political  formations  and  majority-led  governments  long 
before the ir federal counterparts.
298  Second, instead of reinforcing the authority of the central 
government,  Canada's  ceaselessly  expanding territory  and  localized  patterns of settlement 
tended to further socio-political isolationism, thus focusing provincial legislative attention on 
more  local issues.  Third  and  most crucially,  despite  having fought an  obstinate  empire for 
more than half century for the right to self-government, the provinces could now count on the 
298  See also Morton, W. L. (1 943). "The Extension of the Franchise in  Canada: A Study in  Democracy," Canadian Historical 
Association Report, page 79. 237 
legal  precedents established  by  their  forebears,  and  the  British court of final  appeal  more 
specifically,  to  challenge  the  centralizing  arrangements  of the  BNA  Act.  In  fact,  the 
provinces owe much  of their current-day sovereignty and  legislative authority  to  the  more 
than 170 decisions handed down by  the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council on matters 
related  to  the  Constitution  Act of 1867.  Among some of the  more  cri ti cal  rulings  of the 
Judicial Committee are  those that recognized provincial legislatures as  co-sovereigns in  the 
Confederation and thus equal in  power and authority to the central government.
299  By ruling 
that the Lieutenant-Governor is  "as much a representative of His Majesty for ali  purposes of 
Provincial  Government  as  is  the  Governor-General  for  ali  purposes  of  Dominion 
Government,"
300  the subservient relationship prescribed by the Constitution Act, between the 
Governor-General  and  the  federally  appointed  provincial  Lieutenant-Governors,  never 
materialized.  Instead,  provincial  autonomy  was  guaranteed  through  the  same  governing 
principles  under  which  the  federal  government  operated.  lt  is  in  fact  through  the 
instrumentality of this legal artifact that provincial executives, as ad  vi sors to the Crown, owe 
their powers. 
Institutional  precedents  thus  run  deep  in  the  constitutional  makeup of the  Canadian 
confederacy. The warrantability of executive-centred collective choice arenas at the federal 
and  provincial  levels stems not from  an  effort to  improve representational  democracy,  but 
from the legal and political legitimacy of the constitutional princip  le embodied in the idea of 
a compound monarchy (Smith,  1995). Whether federal or provincial, the sovereign rights of 
Canadian  governments  remains  constitutionally  vested  in  the  Crown (Hicks, 2010,  p.  10). 
Consequently,  other  than  the  adoption  of a  somewhat  flexible  division  of powers,  the 
administration of public affairs in Québec continued along the same centralizing path as it did 
under colonial rule. The small clique of imperial officers who administered the province prior 
to  unification was replaced with a slightly larger circle of elites following the introduction of 
responsible  government,  but  executive  dominance  was  maintained  with  few  if  any 
impediments  both  before  and  after  Confederation  (Sproule-Jones,  1984,  p.  97).  As  such, 
instead  of  moderating  the  overbearing  ambitions of Prime Ministers or Premiers and their 
299  Hodge versus The Queen ( 1883). ln Toronto Electric Commissioners v. Sni  der (1925), the Judicial Committee went even so 
far as to suggests thal the provinces were "in a sense like independent kingdoms with very little Dominion control over them" 
and "should be autonomous places as if they were autonomous kingdoms" 
300  Liquidators of the Maritime Bank v.  Receiver-General of New Brunswick (1892) AC. 437. 238 
Cabinets, constitutional conventions tied to the reserve powers of the Crown (as  interpreted 
by  the courts) have nearly always been used to advantage the executive over the legislative 
bran  ch (Hicks, 2010, pp. 8 and 18; Sproule-Jones, 1984, p. 98).
301 
Although  enforcement of the  Crown's  reserve  powers  (especially  in  the  absence  of 
courts  to  adjudicate  constitutional  trespass)  may  require  wh at  Hicks  (20 10,  p.25) 
euphemistically refers to as "extra-legal" action (i.e., "pressure of public opinion, passive and 
active  resistance,  and  ultimately  revolution"),  the  executive's  dominance  in  provincial 
legislatures  is  not boundless  nor  without remedy. The Constitution  Act of 1867  foresees, 
among  other things,  that provincial  legislatures shall  have  the  legal authority  to  alter their 
constitution  (except for the Office of the  Lieutenant-Governor)
302  and  parliamentary  rules 
require,  in  of themselves, that adequate opportunities for  legislative scrutiny and  debate  be 
provided  for.  The proverbial  constraint of responsible  government has  obviously  evolved 
over time (especially after 1960s in  the case of Québec) to take on the much more nuanced 
meaning of accountability, be  it  in  terms of information disclosure,  increased consultations 
and  debates,  or more meaningful  participation  in  legislative  committees  (e.g.,  review  and 
amend  bills,  discuss  spending  and  policy  measures  or assess  various  components  of the 
government) (Dunn,  1988, 1990).  Yet, governments  in  the  Canadian  parliamentary system 
have always maintained a fair amount of discretionary power over the information that gets 
disclosed  and the issues  that  get discussed. In contexts where votes carry economie value, 
legislative committees are liable to become political markets wherein  elected representatives 
essentially assume the role of political brokers for specifie interest (Buchanan and  Tullock, 
1962, pp.  91 -92).  But given the high costs of organizing and aggregating preferences within 
large communities (Oison, 1965), the supply and demand process of legislative action tends 
to  favour  "well-organized  and  concentrated  groups  at  the  expense  of diffuse  interests" 
(Tollison, 1988, p. 343). Hence, the extent to which such measures are truly used to enhance 
public scrutiny and executive accountability is debatable. Ifthere is one constant theme in the 
writings of both past and present political scientists and constitutional scholars,  it is  that the 
301  Reserve  powers  refer  to  the  prerogative  rights  of  the  Governor-General  or  Licutcnant-Governor  to  interfere  in  the 
administration of public aff  airs, should the interests of the Crown (i .e., public) be transgressed. 
302 Section 92, Class 1 of the Constitution Act, 1867, la ter repealed and  replaced with Section 45 of the Constitution Act, 1982. 239 
powers of executive within the Canadian context never waned nor has it ever been impeded 
by  institutional constraints of one ki nd or another. 
How  the  underlying  rules  of the  game  affected  the  evolution  of forest  resource 
institutions from Confederation until the end of the 1980s will be addressed in the next three 
chapters.  Chapter  VI  focuses  analytical  attention  on  the  first  four  decades  of provincial 
autonomy, the rise of the  pulp and  industry,  leading to  the adoption of conservation-based 
regulatory measures. Chapter VII discusses the factors and events that compelled government 
to  rid  itself of the limitations of forest conservation and adopt a more flexible management 
approach that would help answer the ever expanding resource needs of the pulp and paper 
industry. Finally, Chapter VIII provides a brief overview of the key events and institutional 
changes that led to the 1986 forest reform, which is  widely regarded as the primary source of 
the  crisis  that  led  to  this  investigation.  Throughout,  the  struggle  to  achieve  sustainable 
outcomes  is  fraught  with  remarkably  consistent  patterns  of recurrent  appropriation  and 
provisioning problems, increasing externalities, and  a  progressively complex understanding 
of forest systems. 240 
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6.1  Introduction 
At the onset of Confederation, the problem of  forest resource use was no longer limited 
to the expediency of approximating politically defined rates of exploitation. After sixty years 
of steadily increasing levels of appropriation from the province's most valuable pineries and 
along the accessible reaches of the greater St. Lawrence watershed, the diminishing leve!  of 
merchantable  timber  was  no  longer  a  conjectured  possibility  but  an  empirical  reality. 
Moreover, in addition to  having to contend with the cumbersome issue of a diminishing pool 
of resources,
303  the other problem that dogged officiais, weil into the twentieth century, was 
the competing land use cl ai ms of an increasingly vocal and powerful colonization movement 
that was itself driven by  a no  less  powerful Catholic Church. Together with Québec's need 
for revenue and the growing demands of industrialisation, the stage was set for a series of 
confrontations that would eventually  lead to the adoption of yet another single institutional 
remedy to cure the multiple ailments it now faced, i.e., forest conservation. 
To  understand  the  dynamics of forest  resource  use  in  late  19
111  century Québec,  one 
must necessarily consider the role of government, as the sole purveyor of resource rights and 
arbiter  of  institutional  selection  and  replication.  Three  distinct  but  mutually  inclusive 
necessities moderated the choice-sets of political-economic actors during this  period:  1)  the 
need  to  generate  revenues  to  defray  the  costs  of government,  including  the  provision  of 
public goods and services; 2) the need to instil favourable investment conditions that would 
both attract and retain investments by large capital holders (e.g., abundant resource supplies, 
303  A distinction needs to be made here regarding the diminishing levels  of timber fit for squaring or other purposes for which 
large sized timber might be preferable. Québec's boreal forest was still untapped and incursion into the mixed forest habitat of 
the  Laurentian shield  and  lower St.  Lawrence region  had  only begun.  Reference to diminishing resource stock during this 
period is intimately tied to the growing scarcity of large sized trees (particularly pi ne) from the province's southern frontier. 244 
low energy costs, a stable work force); and 3) the need to provide long term assurances (e.g., 
supply guarantees and fixed priees) to would-be investors. 
This  chapter considers  how  the forest  sector and  the administration of public  lands 
evolved between  1867 and  1906  to address the recurrent dilemmas of competing land-uses 
and  diminishing  resource  stocks,  as  weil  as  the  need  to  address  the  novel  problem  of 
industrialization and  the distinct supply and energy requirements of  the pulp and paper sector. 
The chapter is  divided into three sections that are reflective of the changing yet interrelated 
foci and strategies of  government in late 19th century Québec: revenue enhancement, resource 
conservation, and  industrialisation. 
6.2  Revenue Enhancement 
The  importance  of "Woods  and Forests"  in  Québec,  as  a  "source  of the  national 
income" was firmly established at the onset of the very first report from the newly appointed 
Commissioner of Crown Lands.
304  "Under  the  new  Constitution"  Commissioner Beaubien 
indicated,  Québec  "should possess  in  the  public  domain  her  chief source  of revenue," 
provided  that "a  reform  of the  numerous  abuses  which  then  hindered operations  in  the 
forests"  was  undertaken  to  make  sure  that  the  "timber  trade"  would  in  fact  be  able  to 
"contribute more liberally ta the public revenue."
305  To this end, a "SeleCt Committee" was 
appointed  "ta consider the question of  cutting timber on public lands."
306  The Committee 
made four  broad  recommendations.  First, "the plundering of  public lands of  merchantable 
timber," had to be suppressed by  means of improved supervision. Second, the needless waste 
of hemlock trees  for  the  sole  purpose of extracting  its  bark  for  use  in  the  tanneries - a 
problem that had yet to receive any attention in  the writings and correspondences of Crown 
Lands Department under the Union government - had  to be brought under control.
307 Third, 
public lands had to be better surveyed and ali areas unsuited for agricultural purposes should 
be  maintained as  permanent forest reserves.  And fourth, given that "public forests form[ed] 
the principal wealth of  the Province and one of  its chief  sources of revenue," the Committee 
304 Quebec Sessional Papers, No. 1 (1869). 
305 Ibid, p. ix 
306 JLAQ, Vol.  1, Session 1867-68, Appendix 9, Second Report, dated,20 february, 1868. 
307  The Comminee urged the need  ta  increase duties, in order to  compel  appropriators  to  make use of both  the  bark and  the 
timber of harvested hemlocks. The Committee estimated that sorne ten thousand acres of hemlock forest stands were annually 
eut and stripped of their bark, the wood itself being left to rot on the ground. 245 
recognized  that "merchantable timber [was]  disappearing with  alarming rapidity,  and the 
profits  which  the  Province  and the  timber  trade  derive[d}  therefrom,  [were]  very  much 
inferior to  what they should be." To amend the situation, the Committee urged the need to 
extend  leases  on  fixed  terms  of  10  to  15  years,  provided  such  leases  did  not  obstruct 
settlement.  This,  the  Committee  argued,  would  give  "lumberers ...  an  interest  in  carefully 
preserving the timber on  their limits,  ... working them systematically and economically .. .[to] 
derive ... more profit,  [for which}  the government,  without prejudice,  might exact  ... higher 
dulies,  [and] increase the public revenue." In sum, the evidence gathered by the Committee 
helped confirm growing apprehensions regarding the state of the province's pi neri es  and the 
need to  better manage such stocks for the future. Past interventions had  not produced their 
desired effects and  the newly established provincial  government was determined to change 
the situation, particularly if such changes might help increase the province's share of benefits. 
Changes were swiftly implemented in the form of two separate orders-in-council (17 
July and 2 October, 1868)
308  and a complete overhaul  of the legislation affecting the sale and 
management of the Public Lands.
309  The first order slightly raised the timber dues applicable 
to  eut timber  from  the  last  revisions  (13  June,  1866  - see  Chapter V)
310  and  the  second 
established a 21  year licensing agreement for ali  existing licenses, thus giving limit holders 
the right to  annually renew their titles until April 30
111
,  1889 (government reserving the right 
to change the tariffs on dues once after September 1878). Ground rent was increased from 50 
cents to  $2.00/year per square mile and the purchase (or trans  fer) bonus was set at $8.00 per 
square  mile.
311 Limit holders were hereafter allowed to  pledge their limits as  a security  to 
fund  their operations and  ali  sales were to be conducted through  public auction, except in 
situations where it was deemed "advisable in the interest of  the Government to grant limits by 
private sales." And perhaps most famously, the government of Québec imposed the first ever 
diameter restriction on timber in Canada, which was set at 12  inches at the stump for red and 
white  pine.  White  this  oft-cited  change  of  policy  is  generally  regarded  as  a  major 
308 Quebec Sessional Pa pers, No.  1 ( 1869), pp. 45-47. 
309 32 Vi ct., c.  Il , An Act respecting the sale and management of the Public Lands (Assented to 5th April, 1869). 
310 Oak & walnut per cubic foot (frl) = 3cts; Elm, ash & tamarack = 2 cts/ frl;  Red/white pine, birch, basswood, cedar, spruce = 
1.25 cts/ frl;  Pine logs (13.5 ft  &  more than  17 inches at !east diameter) =  15  cts/each; Pine logs less than  17  inches at !east 
diameter = 10 cts/each; Spruce logs 13.5 ft= 5 cts/each; Cord wood (hard) 16cts/cord; Cord wood (soft) 8 cts/cord. 
3 11  The transfer-bonus of $8 per square  mile was introduced to  reduce speculation as  much as  to  bring in  extra  revenue to the 
state in the event that such transfers would proceed. See RCCL, 1872. 246 
development towards  the conservation of pine  timber, the new  regulation actually  made it 
profitable to eut smaller sized trees, since prior to this revision, white pine was reckoned to 
contain 70 fe of timber and red pi ne was charged at a rate of 38 ft
3
.  With this change of rule, 
it was now possible to profitably eut trees that contained as little as 15 or 20 ft
3 of  wood fibre. 
When considered in  light of the province's notoriously weak ability to enforce its own rules 
(Drummond,  1879,  p.  16), the significance of this change quickly withers away.  As  for the 
other  recommendations  raised  by  the  Select  Committee  of  1869,  the  suggestion  that 
government should put an end to timber squaring on account of its wastefulness and minimal 
contribution  to  social  welfare was  altogether avoided or neglected.  Provisions  to  promote 
local industry (e.g., ship building and a ban on saw-log exports) were likewise dismissed, as 
were recommendations dealing with the need to reduce pressure on eastern hemlock.
312 
ln truth, the changes introduced  in  1868  were just the beginning of a  long streak of 
regulatory experimentation that was driven by the need for  public revenue, the demands of 
the colonization movement, and the necessity of securing the supply needs of lumberers and 
the privileges of long term tenures.  As  such, the first formai  legislative effort to affect the 
sale and management of the Public Lands came in  1869 (32 Vict., c.  11). Among the more 
notable  changes  that  the  new  law  introduced,  provisions  _ were  made  to  divide  the 
administration of  the public domain into seventeen agencies, charged with overseeing the sale 
of public  lands,  the  granting  of timber  licenses,  and  monitoring  and  enforcement efforts 
relative to  the  duties  and  obligations of settlers and  timber limit holders  (Section 9).  The 
Lieutenant-Governor in  council  (i.e., the  Executive Council) retained  exclusive rights  over 
the  entire  public  domain,  including  the  right  to  add,  amend  or change  rules  as  required 
(Sections 10, 20 & 21). It alone exercised the right to sel! or dispose of nearly any parce! of 
312  According to  Joly  (1 878, p. 16), production of hemlock extract rose from 23,000 barrels in  1868, to 29,000 barrels in  1876, 
requiring sorne 43,000 cords of bark, fïve-sixth of which was derived from the Eastern Townships of Quebec. Similarly, Small 
(1 884,  p.  63)  lamented  the  "indiscriminate  destruction of hem./ock foresls  lo  supply  bark for  m.anufacturing  extracl for 
exportation, ... /eaving the limber !hus stripped /o decay." The fïrst real attempt to curb the wasteful practice of bark-stripping 
came in  the Revised Regulations of 3'd February, 1888, which set the cord of  hemlock bark at 32~ per  128 fr3. However, the 
inadequacy of this measure  was bluntly spelled out  by Kirkwood  (1893, p. 25): "the lùnber is allowed /o  roi on the ground, 
and squal/ers, as a rule, either burn or al/ow itto rot if  nol close /o a markel. ln some districts the bes/ is sawn into lumber or 
cul inlo /athwood for export/a En  gland, the balance for railroad lies or cordwood. Where a far  mer makes bark on his own 
land, he culs the peeled lrees inlo saw logs and clears the land.  Where lrespassers peel bark they leave the lrees /o rot." For 
Kirkwood (Ibid.), the reasons for this were obvious:  "An acre of good hemlock land wou  id produce from len to twelve cards of 
bark, worth from $30 ro $36 ...  , al a cos!  ... of  $1 per cord for fe/ling and  $1 per cord for carling.  The cord of  hemlock 
/athwood  (1 28 cubic fee!) is  worth $8 al Montreal or Quebec. The  conclusion arrived at from this  evidence  fis] tlwt our 
hemlockforests are being and have been rapidly depleted and des/royed ... And the remedy seems 10 be thal active measures be 
resorted lo for select cu/ling, na tura/ re  forest  at  ion and planling, and ;yslematic foreslry management." 247 
land  of its  choosing (Sections  12 to  16), including the  right to "set apart ...  as  timber land, 
such portion or portions of  the public lands  .. .[which} may be found to  be valuable for its 
timber,  but  generally  unfit for  purposes  of  colonization"  (Section  10,  Article  3)  - th us 
instituting the  very first legislative effort to  set up forest reserves in North America. Finally, 
with regards to the near permanent problem of settler encroachment on licensed timber limits 
and  related  practice of acquiring land  rights  for  the  mere purpose  of extracting timber at a 
fraction of the cost of a license to  do the same on  public lands, a number of measures were 
introduced to  limit speculation and  the  purchase of land  under false-pretences.
313  However, 
given the size the province, the limited number of  agents, and the inherent lack of control that 
the  Department could  reasonably  exercise over its  subordinates, the  incentive to  evade the 
law was at best subdued, not removed.
314 
Nevertheless, the government did manage to substantially increase its share of revenue. 
During the  last year of the joint legislature (1867-68),  the  total  income arising from  timber 
dues, bon uses  and ground rents had attained its highest leve! ever at $369,800, out of which, 
only  $95,116  belonged  to  the  future  province  of Québec.
315  In  the  hands  of the  newly 
established provincial Crown Lands Department, this figure more than trip led  to $331,751  in 
1869, before increasing to $444,752 in  1872.
316 However, as the then leader ofthe Opposition 
and  staunch  conservation  advocate  Henri  Joly  recognized  in  December  1872,  the  figures 
offered  by  the  Crown  Lands  Department told  only  part of the  story.
317  Between  1867  and 
1872, the government sold  off no  less  than  17,624  square miles  in  timber  limits, sorne  of 
which sold for as  little as  $4.00 per square mile.
318  Between December 1871  and November 
1872, Joly estimated that the Conservative government sold no less than  11 ,200 square miles 
3 1 3  Under 32 V., c.  Il , li mit holders retained the right to eut timber on any parce!  of land  sold for settlement purposes (section 
16). To prevent  the purchase of land  by  third  party agents acting on behalf of lumbermen, the registration of land sales was 
rendered compulsory  (Sections  18, 34,35 & 36). And to bring an end to the practice of claiming that timber was eut on private 
land  in order to evade the payment of crown timber dues, an order-in-council  was passed on March 29, 1870 (Que bec Official 
Gazette, 1870, No. 16, Vol.  Il) to the effect that affidavits or sworn statements would no longer be accepted as sufficient proof 
of the origins of the eut timber.  Only by close examination of a Crown Lands Agent and concurrent certification of available 
facts, including the fui filment of seulement duties or possession of land title or letters patent, would  timber, saw  logs or other 
wooden articles be declared exempt from such duties. Needless to  say, the administrative and logistical burdens highlighted in 
these measures rendered their application improbable if not impossible. 
3 14  As in  the past, the problem of would-be settlers seeking tille to the best timbered lands of  the province remained a constant 
theme in  the an nuai reports of the Crown Lands Department (e.g., RCCL, 1874, p. vii-viii; JLAQ, 1887, Vol. 21 , p. 277-279). 
ln fact of acquiring land under false pretences lasted weil  into the 1920s. 
3 15 RCCL, 1881 , p. 7 1. 
316 RCCL, 1869 to 1872 
317 DALQ, 1872, pp.l59-1 60 and  193-199. 
3 1 8 Ibid. 248 
of the  finest  timberland  in  the  province (through  public and  private sales)  for  an  average 
ground rent bonus of only  $8.27 per square mile, while in  Ontario, the average was $113.96 
per square mile for the same period. In fact, the government was so heavily criticized for its 
disposai of public lands for a mere trifling of existing market values that it had little choice 
but to  amend the existing legislation (36 Vict., c.9) in  favour of public auctions.
319  The idea 
that  resource  rights  should  be  sold  on  a  competitive  basis  was  maintained  as  a  basic 
administrative principle (though  easily  manipulated - see discussion  in  Chapter VII)  until 
Maurice Duplessis reinstated the privilege of the Lieutenant-Governor in council to sel! any 
portion of  the public domain via private sales in  1937.
320 
6.2.1  Dealing with Emerging Threats 
In spite of the government's relative success regarding its  increased shares of revenue, 
the  precarious  nature  of such  results  and  the  ever  present  threat  of overproduction  and 
exhaustion  loomed  high  in  the thoughts of Québec's first  Commissioner of Crown Lands, 
J.O.  Beaubien.  Y  et,  though  he  believed that restoring ''forests  denuded  by  the  axe  of the 
lumberer or by the  oft-recurring fires," whether  "by sowing or  by planting, " would be the 
surest signs of a "wise economy and foresight," Beaubien considered that the costs of doing 
so,  without  "sorne  assurance  that  an  attempt of this  nature  would  meet  with  success," 
rendered the idea impracticable within the Canadian context.
321  Of course, Beaubien was not 
the first to consider the need to moderate ongoing rates of appropriation or the necessity of 
investing  in  forest  maintenance  activities,
322  but  his  concerns  do  highlight  the  fact  that 
decision-makers were at !east aware that the system in  place was not sustainable, and that it 
tended to offset costs to future generations. As Beaubien put it, 
319  RCCL, 1872 
320  The princip1e of public auctions has only  recently been reintroduced for only 25% of the  estimated  maximum sustainable 
yield, under the Sustainab1e Forest Development Act, Bill 57 (L.Q., 2010, chapter 3). 
321  Ibid. 
322 RCCL, 1873, pp. xiv-xv. ln considering the ongoing threats posed by overexploitation, land use change, and forest fires, yet 
another newly appointed Commissioner of Crown Lands again raised  the issue of restocking public forests in  1873. 1-lowever, 
other than suggesting that the province ought to encourage the establishment of "large nursery grounds in different parts ojtlze 
province," no credible effort was ever made to actually change the situation. 249 
"The constant!  y increasing value of this source of  wealth ... ought to make us think of 
the precautions which should be adopted  ... so as to not expose ourselves to see it some 
day exhausted." 
323 
To his credit, Beaubien did introduce legislative measures to attenuate the risk of forest 
tires  in  1870 (Act 33, Vict., c.  36) and  further the Department's ability  to  enforce its  own 
rules  by  appointing forest rangers  in  1873. While early enforcement measures did appear to 
have a sobering effect on the activities of lumbermen,
324  the threat of sanctions never actually 
succeeded  in  putting an  end to  abuse.  As  with similar efforts  in  the  past,  rules  were  so 
. generally permissive and enforcement negligible, that regulatory provisions made little if any 
difference to the way  forests  were  used  or exposed  to  tire hazards (Drummond,  1879,  p. 
14).
325  In fact, human-induced forest tires were widely believed to have increased during the 
1870s, leading to a situation where more forests were reportedly being consumed by fire than 
degraded or eut through direct human intervention (Drummond, 1879, p.  13; Joly,  1878, pp. 
5-9; Morgan, 1886, p.  16). The reasons for such meagre success were relatively clear. Forest 
rangers and timber agents  were poorly paid;  possessed little or no training; and  worked  in 
isolated conditions  in  remote areas that made it tempting or at ]east easier to  negotiate side 
agreements  with trespassers  and  offenders. Moreover,  since forest  rangers  were  employed 
during the winter months only (i.e., the lumbering season), operators quickly understood that 
if they  hired the same men during the rest of the year, they would invariably  secure more 
lenient and  favourable  inspections  during winter operations. In  other words, the system  in 
place  provided  lumbermen  with  many  opportunities  to  co-opt  field  officers  to  suit  their 
interests (Gillis and Roach, 1986, p.  111). 
As far as lumbermen were concerned, the rising value oftimber and the newly adopted 
21  year leasing arrangements created a long term perspective that had so far been absent from 
the management of public forests. As such, operators were no  longer prone to discount the 
value of future returns and from  1870 onwards, lumbermen began hiring watchmen to keep 
an  ever  present  vigil  over  their  limits,  prevent  forest  tires,  and  protect their  berths  from 
323  See Woods and Forests, in RCCL, 1871. 
324  RCCL,  1874, pp.  vii-xiii. Fines  in  the first years of operation  increased from  $3,186 in  1872-73  to  $32,906 in  1873-74. 
However, the amou  nt of moncy collected after 1874 dropped sharply to an annual average of $10,000 (see RCCL, 1881, p. 74). 
325 As specifïed in Act 33, Viel., c. 36, land clearing  was permitted year round except for the months of July and August (scct. 2), 
and  ail  other uses (i.e., cooking, heating, or industrial purposes)  remained unaffected (sect. 3). Hence the use  of fïre for land 
clearing was permilted in the dryist months of the year (i.e., April and May). 250 
trespassers or would-be timber thieves.
326  The decision of the Crown Lands Department to 
hire dedicated forest rangers to monitor and enforce its own rules was largely stimulated by 
the willingness of lumberers to bear the costs of protecting their own timber assets.
327 
Revenues from the sale of Crown timber continued to increase during the earl  y  1870s, 
reaching  a  high  of $532,735  in  1874  before  dropping  below  the  four  hundred  thousand 
dollars mark until  1881, due to the collapse ofthe American and European financial markets 
in  1873 and the world-wide economie depression that followed.
328  When the economy picked 
up  again at the  start of the  1880s, the context within  which the forest sector operated had 
taken a decisive shift. The ideas, values, and  beliefs  that informed both the state of North 
American forests  and  their management had  irrevocably changed. Conservation, and forest 
conservation more specifically,  provided the new  paradigm within which forests  out to  be 
managed, and the norm by which success ought to be measured. 
6.3  The Case for Forest Conservation 
The receding forest cover of Eastern Canada had  become painfully obvious to  most 
observers  at  the  onset  of the  1870s.  Even  the  first  Prime  Minister  of Canada,  John  A. 
MacDonald, could not help but reflect on "the sight of  immense masses oftimber passing by 
the windows" of Parliament, in  1871, and "the absolute necessity for loo king into the future of 
this great trade." For as MacDonald observed,  "we  are recklessly destroying the  timber of 
Canada and there  is scarcely a possibility of  replacing it ...  ft occurs to  me  th at the subject 
should be  looked  in  the face  and sorne  efforts made for the preservation of our  timber.
329 
Others were more blunt in the ir assessment of the situation. In a letter to U.S. National Board 
of Trade  in  1872,  lumberman  turned  conservationist  James  Little  complained  of the 
"astonishing want of  foresight"  that  is  leading  lumbermen everywhere "to  build new and 
more capacious  mills,  and increase  the manufacturing  capacity of the  old  on  es,  as  if ... 
326  RCCL, 1871. 
327 There is sorne confusion in the reports of the Commissioner of Crown Lands regarding the hiring of forest rangers. While the 
1871 report points to the use of forest rangers to monitor the acti vities of lumbermen, the 1874 report indicates that the rangers 
were only formerly appointed in 1873.  · 
328 RCCL, 1881 , p. 74. 
329  MacDonald  to  John  Sandfield  MacDonald, 23  June  1871.  National Archives of  Canada, Sir John  A. Macdonald  papers, 
MG26A, vol. 51 8 pt.4, LB15, p. 963. timber could be grown like a crop ofweeds."
330 And by their ceaseless need of revenue, Little 
(1876, p.  4) later commented, the governments of Québec and Ontario had done "ali in  their 
power to  hasten the striping of  the country of  its invaluable timber resources ... by throwing 
them  on  the market, year after year, without any reference whatever to  the requirements of 
the  trade"  or  the  availability  of supplies.
331  In  truth,  the  Hon.  G.H.  Joly  (1878,  p.  4) 
reckoned, 
"Men are the same all over the world. They never set much value upon the free gifts of 
Providence, and disregard them in proportion ta  their abundance. Timber, fish,  and 
game  have been destroyed everywhere in  the  same way.  When  what appeared to  be 
inexhaustible becomes exhausted,  it then begins to  be  valuable and we  must pay for 
our experience." 
By the  mid  1870s, forestry  operations in  the greater Ottawa Valley  had  reached the 
head waters of its  major tributaries, working three to  four hundred miles inland, and as  far 
north  as  Lake Témiscamingue (Joly,  1878,  pp.  3-4).  Elsewhere  in  Québec,  the  best  pme. 
reserves of St. Maurice, Saguenay and Lower St. Lawrence were largely decimated: 
The  "huge  tract of lumber  country,  between  the  Ottawa  and the  St. Maurice  that 
separated  (or  rather  appeared  to  separate)  the  lumbermen  working  on  those  two 
rivers,  by  what seemed  an  inexhaustible  and endless forest,  [was  now]  ... tapped 
through and through" (Ibid). 
While  a  vast  storehouse  of spruce  and  some  "second-rate  Pine"  remained  ''for 
generations to come" (Ibid., p.  2), the worry then was over the growing scarcity of  "the real/y 
fine Pine" that was "required to keep up [Canada 's} great timber export trade" (Ibid., p.  4). 
After more than  half a century of indiscriminate felling,  timber squaring, and  uncontrolled 
land  clearing, "[t}he results stares us reproachfully in  the face " Joly (Ibid.)  remarked,  and 
nowhere was this more evident than in  "the Province of  Québec,  the· oldest Province of  the 
Dominion": 
"The  old settlements  are  painfully  bare  of trees;  you  sometimes  go  miles  without 
seeing a tree  worth looking at, and the passing stranger fancies  himself in a country 
330  Little, James.  1872. The Timber Trade and  Reciprocity:  A letter to  the National  (U.S.) Board of Trade Meeting (Oct. 22, 
1872), in William Little (1890, pp. 32-33). 
331  Little, J.  1876.  The  Timber Supply  Question  of  the  Dominion  of  Canada  and  the  United  States. Lovell  Printing  And 
Publishing Company, p.4 252 
more denuded of  trees than the older parts of  Europe. The re  is a large district of  good 
agricultural Land south of Montreal, where the scarcity of  firewood, which is a matter 
of  !ife and de ath in a climate like ours, has compelled many a far  mer to sacrifice a fine 
fann  and  Leave  the  country.  There  are  many  other  parts  n.early  as  bad,  and, 
unfortun.ately,  the  process of destruction  is  going  on  even  now  in  more places than. 
one" (Joly, 1878, p. 4).
332 
The situation in  Québec was far from  unique. Everywhere in Eastern North America 
and  in  the United  States  in  particular, the  pace of deforestation  and  land  use  change was 
proceeding at alarming rates and con  cern over the impending shortfall of timber supplies, and 
related  effects  on climate,  watershed  maintenance,  pollution,  and  the economy  in  general 
preoccupied  political  and  economie  leaders  on both  sides  of the border (e.g.,  Drummond, 
1885; Hough, 1880; Kirkwood, 1893; J.  Little, 1876; W. Little, 1890; Morgan, 1886; Phipps, 
1883; Small, 1884). Discussion on the services that forests provide and the inherent nature of 
appropriation  a~d  provisioning  problems  in  the  United  States
333  and  Canada
334  were 
documented, and the search for solutions drew on the experience of nations and regions from 
around the world. For as Morgan (1886, p.  11) keenly observed, other th an, 
"revenue to our treasury ...  there are otlur and more ali absorbing interests that should 
impe!  us  to  protect and conserve  our forests,  such as  climatic  changes  consequent 
thereon, our public health,  our agricultural prosperity,  our exposure  to  floods  and 
torrents- in fact, our very existence as a great people." 
Even though forestry was widely regarded as Canada's most important staple trade and 
a  key  contributor to  its  economie wellbeing, second only to agriculture, Drummond (1879, 
p.l3) posited that such  progress was  largely  achieved at the  expenses of eastern Canada's 
most prized forests. In the case of Québec, Drummond (1879, p.  16; see also  1885) argued 
that the principal  failure of the system  lay  in  the  use of concessionary grants (i.e.,  timber 
332  In a Memorandum on !Ize Crown Timber Forests of  the Province of Que  bec submitted to the American Forestry Congress, at 
Montreal, in August 1882,1ong ti me timber Agent A.J. Russell  advanced thal "the valuable timber of  our [Quebec's] forests is 
being  rapidly destroyed by tlze  commercial demand for il and by desolating fires." Scarcity of wood for fencing, building and 
fuel  "lzas  long  been feil  in  the  ole/est  settlements,"  contributing  to  the  "increasing  difficulty  of living,  and  consequently 
diminishing tlze value offarms." ln Reports on the Forests of Canada to the Parliament in Great Britain  (1885), p.23. Published 
by Eyre and Spottiswood. Available at [http://www .archive.org/details/reportsonforestOOcanagoog]. 
333  See Report of the American Association for the Advancement of Science to the U.S. House of Congress, 1874, "Cultivation 
of Timber and the Preservation of  Forests," Report  no. 259, 43'd Congress,  l" Session; Hough, F.B.,  1878-80. Report Upon 
Forestry,  prepared  under  the  direction of  the  Commissioner of  Agriculture, in  pursuance  to  an  Act of Congress  approved 
August 15, 1876. Volume 1 (1878) and II (1880), Washington: Government Printing Office. 
334 In particular, see Phipps (1883) and Kirk wood (1893). An earl y example of pollution by sawmill effluent is provided in  Ratté, 
A  and  R.J. Wicksteed,  1886. The Saw-Dust  Nuisance  in  the  River Ottawa: Memorandum.  Evening Journal Print, Ottawa. 
CIHM no.  12367. 253 
limits).  He  opined  that  timber  berths  provided  nothing  less  than  a  de facto  open  access 
system, regulated by user privileges instead of user requirements or constraints: 
"[T]he  grave  objections  of this  system  are  that  it  subjects  the  public  lands  ta 
unrestricted waste for just such length of time  as  the  lumberman finds  it profitable, 
without any regard ta  the future; and, on the other hand, it places the Government in 
the position of an owner desirous of making  the  largest possible  immediate  return, 
regardless of  the impoverislunent of his possessions in the ne  ar future." 
Drummond called for  more clearly stated and  enforced diameter size restrictions on 
harvestable trees; sufficiently  long fallow  periods (i.e.,  25  years) to  allow younger trees to 
grow and seedlings to establish; an end to the production of square timber; an adjustment of 
sawmilling capacity to that of the available pools of resources, such that operations could be 
maintained indefinitely within any given area; the levy of a special tax or duty to invest in the 
surveillance  of forest  resource  use  and  the  general  maintenance  of forest  productivity 
(Drummond, 1879, pp.  16-17; 1885, pp. 5-7). 
One of the most co  gent if not powerful arguments to have been formulated at the ti me, 
concerning the causes of Québec's growing forest resource problems, lies in  the 1878 report 
of Hon. H.G. Joly de Lotbinière. To consider the full  breadth of his argument, it is  necessary 
to  recall  substantial  portions  of his  repoti. "Lumbermen,"  Joly  (1878,  p.ll) noted, "know 
[that1 the on/y remedy [to the waste of timber in the public forests  1 is to decrease production; 
they acknowledge it in  the  ir Conventions." However, "with few exceptions, the lumbermen of 
Canada, as a rule,  cannat stop the  ir production of  timber;  they can scarcely curtail it." As 
such, lumbermen were not "free agents." They depended  "on the will and caprice of  others, 
from  the obtaining of  timber berths to  work upon them, the hiring of  men, the supplying of 
provisions,  ...  dawn  to  the  cutting,  squaring,  hauling,  ...  and shipping"  of merchantable 
articles. Their relations  "with the advancers ofmoney, the banks,  the brokers,  the purchasers 
in En  gland,  [were  1 of  such a complicated nature that it [was  1 difficult for them to re  alize at 
any time what their jinancial position [was]. " They were "dependent upon others, they have 
been so from the beginning" and could do little to "shake off  ail connexions with the trade." 
Hence, if lumbermen were indeed aware of the "remedy for over-production," as Joly 
(Ibid.,  p.l 2)  insisted, they could "only  apply  it successfully  with  the help  of  the Provincial 254 
Governments," which have both the right and duty to interfere. They have a "right, because 
the timber be longs to the Province" and they  have a "duty,  because they are answerable for 
every stick." While nearly any lumberman would  be willing "to admit that he (or  rather his 
neighbour)  is  cutting too  much  timber, and that he  would make  more profit with  a  fesser 
quantity"  by  increasing  the  marginal  benefit  of every  unit of wood  and  correspondingly 
decreasing  their  leve!  of effort  in  the  field,  the  rules  in  place  neither  promoted  such 
behaviours nor provided lumbermen with the necessary means to change the structure oftheir 
situation. Should there be "an inexhaustible supply of  timber," Government might have been 
excused for not interfering  "to protect the lumberman against himself," if for no other reason 
than the  "larger amount of  timber dues " it would otherwise receive. But the pi ne forests that 
were  the  primary  concern  of lumbermen  were  becoming "rapidly  exhausted,  and  their 
produce [mere/y] sacrificed" for the benefit of an  inefficient system. Fundamental changes 
were needed in  the way forests were considered, and how the costs and  benefits of existing 
rules affected outcomes over the  long term  for  lumbermen, government, and society  itself. 
While a "decrease in  the production oftimber, in sofar as the Government [was} concerned 
would  [mean}  a  corresponding  decrease "  in  the  returns  that  Crown  lands  provide,  Joly 
argued that citizens and governments had to understand that what the system generated were 
"receipts,"  not "revenues."  For  the  idea of revenue  implies  an  "incarne  or  annual profit 
received from lands or other property. [Y  et}  it is  nothing of  the kind in  this case." As Joly 
expounded,  "We have not been spending the incarne or annual profits of  our forests,  but the 
forests themselves- not the interest,  but the capital." 
While governments certainly cannot be expected to fully control any tracte, provincial 
governments  were  uniquely  privileged  in  the case of public forests,  since  they  were (and 
rem ain)  constitutionally vested as "parties to  the trade," both as "owners,  and se liers of  the 
standing timber"  (Ibid.).  Hence,  "ifwe wish  to  save our forests,"  Joly  (1878,  pp.  12-13) 
stressed,  then  "the  quantity  of timber  eut  every year  must  be  considerably  reduced ... to 
balance the yearly cutting of  our forests with  their annual growth." And in  like proportion, 
"the revenue of  our Crown Lands must shrink  ... , but [instead of  spending the capital},  it will 
become a bona fide revenue upon which [the province  J can permanent/y rely." 255 
The  very  persistence  of wasteful  practices  such  as  timber  squaring  can  only  be 
answered by  the fact that succeeding governments considered that it was not in  their interest 
to change the incentives resource users faced. As Joly (1882, p.  1  0) later pointed out: 
"Many people say that Government ought to take up forest tree culture, because man's 
life  is  too  short for  such  work ... [B]ut,  unfortunately,  Governments'  lives  are  even 
shorter  than  men 's  lives,  and  they  don 't  appear  to  have  time  to  devote  to  the 
cultivation of  forest trees." 
Y  et,  after more than  forty  years of evidence showing how such  production not only 
robbed the province of its  very best trees, but did so at the expense of improved social and 
economie prosperity  is  puzzling to say the !east.  While square timber makers were prone to 
argue  that  it  pays  them  and  the  government  to  make  such  articles,  Joly  (1878,  p.  14) 
countered that the  more  important question  is  whether  or  not  such  production  pays  "the 
country at large?" In other words, the private benefits of square timber manufacturing might 
have been substantial, but the social costs of producing such timber were considerably higher 
(as  undoubtedly were the ecological  costs).  Squaring resulted  in  the net loss of nearly  one 
fourth of every tree,  in  addition to  !ost wages and opportunities arising from the wholesale 
shipment of squared timber to  the United Kingdom, where it was then eut into various sized 
planks, boards and other wooden articles that could have been manufactured in  the province 
and sold at a profit (Ibid.; see also Kirkwood, 1893, p.  159). As the Commissioner of Crown 
Lands for Ontario put it: 
"[S  ]aw-milling is ...  a factor in the seulement of  the country, from the fact that many of 
the employees, from the ir steady habits and value as workmen, are kept in permanent 
employment  swnmer  and  winter  in  connection  with  the  establishments,  and  are 
induced in  consequence to  take up  lands  in  the  vicinity,  which are  improved by the 
families of  tho se havin.g grown-up children, and by hired help in the case of  unmarried 
men., till  ultimately  considerable  sections  in.  the  neighbourhood of the  mills  would 
become settled and cleared, with comfortable homes on the  locations;  while,  on the 
contrary, the men employed in  getting out square timber are generally without fixed 
homes or continuous employment.  Their engagements terminale  in  the  spring; in  the 
interim, until they re-engage for the following winter, they too frequently remain idle, 
and spend their earnin.gs  in  a  reckless man.ner,  and are penniless and often.  in  debt 
when they return to the woods." 
335 
335 RCCL for the Province of Ontario for the Year 1879, cited in Kirkwood (1893, pp.  168-172). 256 
To address the situation, Joly (1878, p.14) suggested that provincial governments could 
either increase the dues exacted  (per cubic foot)  to  make the  production of square timber 
more onerous/
36  or the federal  government could place a uniform export duty to discourage 
production, should the provinces fail to "agree on some joint action."
337 
Still, other aspects of Québec's forest governance institutions tended to favour waste 
over efficiency and the degradation of existing supplies, as  opposed to the creation of more 
productive  forests.  The  Montreal  Board  of Trade  and  Corn  Association  for  instance, 
"repeatedly called attention ta  the great and needless waste that was continually going on, 
and have suggested the propriety of  compulsory regulations ta enforce economy in lumbering 
operations.  The  custom of  levying dues  upon  logs  by number, without reference ta  quality, 
naturally leads  the lumbermen ta select only the best leaving the poorer grades ta  rot in  the 
woods.  But if these  dues  were  imposed  on  the  basis  of quality ... collect[ed}. .. by  an  ad 
valorem  rate  on  the  timber sawed and exported,"  then  the  province  would  have  at  ]east 
encouraged  lumbermen  to  take  out  lesser  quality  timber,  and  thus  help  maintain  more 
productive and healthy stocks to supply future needs.
338  As Benjamin Hough (1880, p.  518) 
recognized in  his second report on forestry to the United States Congress, one of the principal 
tlaws of Canadian provincial  forest  institutions  was (and remained weil  into  the  twentieth 
century) that they  provided no  remediai  measure to foster the maintenance of public forest 
resource  systems.  Institutions  were  unidirectional  and  limited to  defining entry  conditions 
and payoff ru les for resource appropriation activities - policy objectives that were consistent 
with the interest of a growing economy and the revenue needs of provincial governments, but 
not the  achievement of sustainable  resource  use.  The idea of limiting consomption to  the 
actual  reproductive  capacity  of forest  systems  (i.e.,  the  interests  and  not the  capital)  was 
altogether  inconsistent  with  the  motives  of either  government or  industry.  Consequently, 
instead of investing  resources  to  maintain or even enhance the  productivity  and  long term 
viability of the province's public forest assets, succeeding governments consistently found it 
336 In  1879, the commissioner of Crown Lands in Ontario submitted the problem timber squaring to his counterpart in  Quebec as 
part of an  effort  to  develop a joint  strategy. However, nothing was ever done to curb this  wasteful  practice (see Kirkwood, 
1893, pp. 169-170). 
337  Competition  between the  provinces  to  attract investors and  private  capital has  historically  been quite  fearce and  counter-
productive to the mu tuai interests of the provinces them selves. Reference to the need to main tain timber dues and ground rents 
near, but just slightly  bellow  the fees  charged  by  Ontario  (Quebec's chief competitor)  is a  recocuring theme in  the annual 
reports of Québec' s Commission  er of Crown Lands. 
338 Statement referenccd in  Hough (1880, p. 453) Report on Forestry, Volume Il. 257 
in  their interest to focus on the immediacy of short term (financial and political) returns. As 
one of  the leading foresters of  the day put it: 
"[T]he  exigencies  of the  present are  often  an  overwhelming  superior argument as 
against the needs of  the future. ft takes ...  a high degree of  farseeing statesmanship to so 
manage the affairs of  the present that the future shallnot suffer, and its needs be taken 
care of, especially in a government which is  built on popularity, on direct support by 
the  present day  masses,  the  politician,  be  he  ever so farseeing  is  bound to  let  the 
present day considerations weigh the most. "
339 
In economie terms, government and forest resource user groups simply discounted the 
interest of future generations for the benefit of immediate and nearly costless returns. This, at 
any  rate,  is  what  Errol  Bouchette  (1906,  p.  251)  and  many  others  concluded  in  their 
assessment of public forest resource governance in Québec: 
"Dame, ... l'avenir fera ce qu'il pourra .. .[P jour tout dire, nous vivons dans le présent 
et nous n'avons que faire  des  théoriciens et des  rêveurs. Si  vous  savez concilier les 
réformes  que  vous prônez  avec  les  besoins  urgents,  les  intérêts  divers  et  les  droits 
acquis qui se  coudoient, vous  êtes assurément plus habile que  nous et que  tous nos 
devanciers." 
Abundance has never been the mother of invention or that of change. In a context were 
go  vern  ment heavily indebted itself in  the pursuit of politically motivated rail ways that largely 
benefited the political-economic elite at the expense of the provincial coffers and the public 
in  general, the idea of restraining the use of forest resource assets was decidedly not in  the 
interest of succeeding governments (Drummond, 1885, pp. 3-4; Gow, 1979, pp. 594-598; J. 
Hamelin  and Roby,  1971, p.  130; Joly,  1878, p.  12). Revenue generation was the principal 
focus ofthe Crown Lands Department during the last quarter of  the l9
1
h century (Gow, 1979). 
As Drummond (1885, pp. 3-4) indicated at the time, in contrast to the healthy public finances 
of  Ontario, which allowed it to make more sustainable choices, 
"the  province  [of Quebec] has a  very  heavy junded debt,  the  interest of which,  in 
addition to  ordinary expenditure, has had to  be provided for, and as a consequence 
every possible source of  revenue has been made available to the utmost." 
339 Fernow, B. E., 1909. What We Want, Tenth An  nuai Report of CFA. Toronto: Warwick Bro's & Rutter, ltd, p.74. 
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lt is  by no  mere co incidence therefore, that Hough ( 1880, p.  518) should observe in his 
0  d  340  h  . extensive stu  y  t  at: 
"a/most no  attention has been given  in  Canada  to  the reproduction  of timber upon 
lands from which it has once been eut off; but ali the  laws and regulations that have 
been established have  reference  only to  the  native forests of the  country and to  the 
securing of  a revenue from the existing supply." 
Building on  initial  set conditions of resource abundance,  evidence suggests  that the 
need  for  revenue  ultimately  conspired  against  the  development  of a  more  sustainable 
relationship between resource users and the systems upon which they depended. And in spite 
of diminishing  resource  stocks,  the  dynamics  that  were  thus  established  and  the  power 
relations that resulted were  never weakened by  the ongoing pace of overexploitation. In  a 
sense, the graduai disappearance of pi ne  did not diminish the fact that the rest of the forest 
continued to grow more or Jess un-interrupted underneath it. 
Though Québec was the only province to have instituted a diameter size restriction on 
pine following Confederation, such a  policy did little to  ensure the reproduction of pine or 
limit  changes  in  the  structure  and  composition  of forest  ecosystems  (see  Chapter  VII). 
Admittedly,  "questions  of  conservation  and restoration"  were,  by  the  time  Hough (Ibid.) 
submitted  his  report "beginning  to  attract notice. "
341  But the  idea of "conservation"  was 
taken  up  in  much  the  same  way  that  "sustainable  development"  would  later  be 
instrumentalized to  serve various political-economic ends. As for the concept of restoration, 
it was relegated to questionable voluntary measures that scarcely addressed the fundamental 
problem of overexploitation. In other words, by adapting the language of virtue and societal 
imperatives,  conservation  became  an  instrument of sound  economie  reasoning,  limited  to 
rhetorical applications that largely failed to link "ideas to  deeds," as Vincent Ostrom (1997) 
would  put  it.  The  challenge,  as  Benjamin Hough  (1880,  p.  518)  understood  it,  rested  in 
340  The second volume of Benjamin Franklin Hough's Report on Forestry  (1 880) arguably contains the most extensive critical 
study of the day, on the origins and development of Canadian provincial forest resource governance. His insights were widely 
referenced by Canadian analysts, politicians, and foresters in the decades thal followed its initial publication. 
341  Joly  (1878, pp.  16-18)  was one  of the first to  discuss  the  issue  of reforestation  in Canada, including  the  development of 
incentives to campel Jandowners to plant trees, and criteria thar  could be  used for restocking depleted forests such  as retum 
values on timber, the rate of growth, ease of reproduction, and comparative immunity  from fire. He even discussed how Jower 
valued but faster growing trees such as poplar could be  used in  a shelter wood strategy  to quickly re-establish a forest cover 
that could  then  be  used  to  grow  higher  valued  timber, while  providing  carly  returns  to  fanners  and  land  owners  through 
selective Jogging.  See also Brown, W. 1884. 'The Scientific and  Practical Arboriculture to Canada:  Synopsis of a Paper read 
bef ore the British Association for the Advancement of Science, Montreal, August, 1884." CIHM no. 04367 259 
developing  more  "eff ectuai  measures for  [maintaining provincial forests],  before  vested 
rights  have  been  established  to  embarrass,  and before  the  need for  these  measures  has 
become urgent." From a historical perspective, the extent to which Québec ever successfully 
heeded this warning is a question that cannot be answered in favourable terms. 
To cite but one more example of the inherent weakness of forest resource institutions 
in  Québec, as elsewhere in  Canada during this crucial period, respondents to an 1878 inquiry 
by the Select Standing Committee on Immigration and Colonization observed that in  relation 
to provincial forest institutions: 
"ft is difficult to understand how sorne steps in [the] direction [of  forest maintenance] 
have not been taken. ln the Provinces of Ontario and Québec,  the local governments 
derive a handsome revenue from the  timber-lands, and yet they seem to  regard their 
disappearance with perfect indifference." 
342 
To  amend  this  unsustainable if not irresponsible  pattern  of forest  resource  use,  the 
provinces ·could: 
"[Either] lease such lands for long ter  ms, on condition of  keeping up  the supply, and 
restricting the eut according to  the growth and species of tùnber on the  limit, or ... 
resum[e] possession of  those lands which have been cleared of  the ir pine, and placing 
them under the charge of  practical foresters, replace the pines by varieties th.at would 
repay the cast of  culture ... [White] the mere mention of  forest-culture se ems something 
far fetched and ùnpracticable to Canadian ears, " ... [it] does not alter the fact that, of 
all descriptions of  cultivation, it is the most profitable." 
Commenting on  the position of provincial  governments,  one witness  to  the  Inquiry 
conceded  that  such  a  long  term  policy,  the  advantage  of which  could  "scarcely  be  ... 
appreciated for one or two generations,  ...  is not likely to enlist the sympathy of politicians, 
but  this  very  reason  should  decide  a  patriotic  statesman  to  undertake  it  with 
342 Cited in Hough (1880, p. 447). 260 
determination."
343 However, patriotic statesmen,  like benevolent despots, are rare, and even 
if such a  breed  existed,  the absence of adequate constitutional  safeguards  meant that any 
effort to adopt a  more sustainable course of action could  always  be ove11urned  by  future 
governments, with little or no regard to the actual intent of  the original political artisans. 
Collectively, the  combined effects of the government's unwillingness to address the 
cri  ti cal issue of  forest resource maintenance and the ease with which lumbermen could obtain 
additional berths once they liquidated the limits they possessed resulted "in an industry [that 
was] notoriously migratory, ... drawing in new regions, moving mi lis back cl oser to supplies 
and  leaving derelict, or semi-derelict, the cut-over regions"  (Lower,  1938,  p.139).  In  other 
words,  the activities and  behaviour of lumbennen were conditioned by  the incentives they 
faced, and the structure of  the situation that emerged from the fifty plus years of exchange in 
the  timber trade.  But whether  the  recurrent and  growing  resource  problems  that  Québec 
confronted at the end of the 19
111  century could be addressed ultimately depended on the will 
of government,  which  in  the  Canadian  parliamentary  system  is  the  sole  custodian  of 
collective-choice rights over public natural resource assets.  Whether concerns related to the 
wasteful process of timber squaring or the problems generated by fi re, settler encroachment, 
or over production, it remains that these and other related resource problems occurred within 
a  political  economie  context,  as  Bates  (1995)  emphasizes,  and  structured  through  "rule-
ordered relationships" that are "constitutive of the institutional facts" that affected not only 
the "ru  les ofthe game" but the very "play of  the game" itself (V. Ostrom, 1997, pp. 26 &  58). 
As Joly's  (1878) analysis seems to suggest, whether and how institutions were changed to 
address problematical situations depended not on the cost-benefit calcul us of lumbermen but 
on the perceived trade-offs that political decision-makers faced.  Because Pareto better rule 
arrangements are never "self-formulating, self-applying, or self-enforcing" (V. Ostrom, 1997, 
p. 138) efforts to understand and explain the nature of recurrent problems in Québec's forest 
343  To this effect, the Montreal  Board of Trade and Corn Association  noted that "Government wou id deserve  the praise of  the 
future inlwbitants of  the country if  they wou  id originale a scheme for planting with young timber trees the immense wast  es of 
the  Province of Quebec. Such an investment would certain/y not paya dividend to this generation, but if would uti/ize wlzat 
will on/y be a wilderness when the present trees are ali eut, and would be a mine ofwealth ta those who possessif when the 
timber becomes large enough ta be merchantab/e. By maintaining a judiciously matured system of  planting, the supp!y might 
be prolonged indefini/ely; as if is, the forests are denuded of  ali the  ir va/uable timber and comparative/y nothing grows up ta 
supply ifs place. A very large proportion of  the country north of  the Ottawa is not fit for farming, and never can be properly 
made fit for grain-growing or pasturage, but if is admirably suitedfor the growth of  timber; and even a limited experùnent 
would soon convince ali as ta the good results likely ta accrue" (cited in Hough, 1880, p. 454). 261 
sector must necessarily take  into account the incompatible interests of government itself.  In 
this  sense,  the  ultimate  source  of failure  is  unlikely  to  have  emerged  from  the  pressure 
exerted  by  markets  or  the  much-touted  short-term  interests  of the  lumberers  themselves. 
Rather,  probable  answers  are  to  be  found  in  the  system  of social  order  that  allowed 
governments and  lumberers alike to pursue self-regarding strategies at the expense of long 
term social, ecological and  economie outcomes - whether these be derived from  their own 
motives or the influence of  other more powerful interests. 
The fundamental recognition that decisions on the use of public lands and forests had 
long term consequences for the province led  a  group of elected representatives (under the 
leadership of Joly) to  pass  a  motion  in  1873  in favour of adding a  standing committee on 
woods  and  forests  to  the  permanent  standing  committees  already  named  by  the  house.
344 
Unfortunately,  the  motion  was  withdrawn  with  no  further  explanation  and  such  issues 
remained  the  exclusive franchise of the executive until  forests  and  natural  resources  more 
broadly were added to the ros ter of standing committees in the 1970s. 
6.3.1  Responding to the Criticism: Productivity Through Conservation 
As the province began to recover from the economie crisis of  the late 1870s,
345  the idea 
of forest  conservation  had  gained  widespread  appeal  amongst lumbermen and  politicians. 
The works  of Benjamin F.  Hough were widely  read and  cited,
346  and  the  contributions of 
Henri G.  Joly
347 exercised a strong influence over E.J. Flynn and W. W.  Lynch who served as 
Commissioners of Crown Lands between 1880-82 and 1882-87 respectively.
348  Admittedly, 
conservation, like sustainable development in the late twentieth century, was a broadly used 
and abused ideal. lt had become the operative word to describe sound resource management 
policies after Confederation but most of the changes introduced under the guise of ''forest 
conservation"  had  little or no  effect on  (or relationship to)  the  actual  conservation of the 
province's  forests.  Though  forest  conservation  was  generally  understood  to  mean  both 
344 JLAQ, 1873-74, Vol. 7, p. 35 
J.IS  ln August 1880, the Crown Lands Department recorded its larges! and most profitable sale ever, when 3,243 square miles of 
timber limits were auctioned off for $261,182 in bonuses (equal to $80.54 per square mile). See RCCL, 1880, p. v 
3-16  For example, see RCCL, 1881. 
347 Joly was Quebec's fourth Premier between  1878-1879, and leader of the official Opposition un til  1883. 
348  Flynn  and  Lynch  were  both  former  members  of  the  Liberal  party  who  defected  to  the  Conservative  party  in  1879, in 
opposition to Joly's effort to  rid the province of the Legislative Council. On Joly's influence over the conservation movement 
and  Commissioners of Crown  Lands, see W. Little (1 890); on the issue of shifting political allegiances, see Hamelin and Roby 
(1971). 262 
reductions in  the leve! of appropriation and investments in related maintenance activities, the 
politically espoused (and economically valued) definition that evolved in Québec invariably 
centred  on  fire  prevention,  restrained  settlement,  and  the  creation  of forest  reserves.  No 
comparable commitment was  ever made to reduce the forest sector's aggregate demand on 
public  resources,  change  wasteful  practices  (  e.g.,  timber  squaring),  or  impose  user 
contributions towards the maintenance of resource system productivity. In  a context where 
the vast majority of the province's expendable revenue came from  its natural  resources, the 
incentive to restrain demand on public forests (and returns to the public coffer) was decidedly 
limited.  Anything  that  would  have  negatively  affected  resource  appropriation  trends  or 
interfered with the expansion of the forest sector was expressly avoided. 
Nevertheless, the reprise of economie activity and the speed with  which government 
sold sorne of the largest timber concessions
349 ever ultimately forced Commissioner Flynn to 
recognize that sin ce "the value" of the province's "woods and forests must increase year by 
year,  ... the'  greatest care  and prudence  should  be  exercised  in  the  sale  of our  timber 
lands."
35°  Flynn passed an order in council in November 1880 (No. 39- see table below) that 
raised timber dues on pine and spruce logs slightly before changing the system altogether on 
April i\  1881  (  order in council no. 15) to lineal board measures in  order to make "the tarif! 
more  proportionate  and  equitable"  (see  Table  6.1  below).
351  The  changes  had  a  near 
immediate crown timber revenue, which rose from $303,950 in 1880 to $567,815 in  1882. 
However, in  spite of the seemingly robust economie resurgence, a general "feeling of 
insecurity"  had  "sprung  up  amongst  banking  corporations  and holders  of licenses  with 
regard to  the .... char  acter of  the tenure by which they [held] the ir licenses to eut timber." 
352 
At issue was the fact that no  provision had yet been made to explain what would happen after 
April1889, when annually renewable timber limits were scheduled to expire. To defend their 
case  before  the  Chapleau government  in  1880,  the  Timber Limit Holders  Association  of 
Québec  turned  to  long  time judge and  conservative  member of the  provincial  Assembly, 
349  Nearly 4,000 square  miles of timber limits were sold  between  1880 (3 ,243 square miles) and  1881 (715 square  miles).  See 
RCCL for 1881 and 1882. 
350 RCCL, 1882, pp. v-vi 
351 RCCL, 1880, p. v 
352  Church, Ruggles  L. (1 880)  "Report  of  argument submined  to  the  honorable  the  Executive  Council  for  the  province  of 
Quebec on  presentation of a  memorial  respecting the  vested  rights of  limit  holders in  their limits"  [microform], CIHM no. 
03048. 263 
Ruggles  Church.  Addressing his  concerns direct! y to the  members of the Executive Council, 
because  it  alone  had  authority  to  make  an  "an  explicit  declaration"
353  of the  rights  of 
lumbermen that would have the force of law, Church reminded members of the executive of 
the  important  common  law  principle  of  precedents,  which  ultimately  provides  sorne 
assurance  against the usurpation of power, the pursuit of illegal doings,  or the adoption of 
rules  and  policies  that would be contrary to judicially  acknowledged principles such  as the 
rights of citizens: 
"No  statute  atone  can  provide for  the  administration  of the  Crown  Domain:  the 
exercise of the sovereign power which is given to  the executive under our system must 
be coordinated to that dominant idea of progressive development which the subject has 
a right to expect will be observed in matt  ers of great public po  licy.  "
354 
Table 6.1 Variation in Timber Dues From 1866 to  1888 
0RDERS-IN-COUNCI  L  13 JUN. I866  21 JUL. 1868&  12Nov.1880  7 AP.  188 1  6 OCT. 18871 
27 FEB.  1874  (No. 39)  (No. 15)  3 FEB.  1888
1 
Ground rent 1  square mile  50~  $2.00  $2.00  $2.00  $3.00
2 
Pine  logs  (13 '.5'')  >  17''  10  ~  15  ~  22  ~  $1.30/mille  Idem 
!east diameter (each)  ft.B.M. 
Pine  logs  ( l3,  .5'')  <  17''  10  ~  Il  ~ 
!east diameter (each) 
Spruce logs 13'.5'' (cach)  4~  5 ~  5.5  ~  65  ~ /mill e  Idem 
ft.B.M 
Oak & walnut (ft
3
)  25 ~  3 ~  3 ~  3  ~  4~ 
Elm, ash and  tamarack (ft
3
)  l '!.~  2~  2~  2~  2 ~ 
Pi  ne,  birch,  basswood,  '!.~  ! Y..~  ! Y..~  ! Y..~  2~ 
cedar, spruce (re) 
Co  rd (hard) wood
3 
( 128 ft
3
)  13  y. ~  16  ~  16  ~  16  ~  20  ~ 
Cord (soft) wood' (128ft')  6 % ~  8 ~  8 ~  8 ~  10  ~ 
!.  Dues to be  mamtamed  unttl  1900, govemment reservmg nght to alter table gtvmg the contents  m board measure of 
sawlogs whenever expedient (24 April 1888, order no. 249). 
2.  Ground  rent increased to  $5.00 per square mile (7 April 1887, no.  160), before being reduced to $3.00 on 6 October 
1887 (arder no.  505) due to strong opposition from lumberers. Rents were payable in cash on or before lst September of 
each year. 
3. Strong demand  for white birch for cabinet work and spools incited govemment to increase duties from  1 6~/co rd to 30~ 
on 25 November, 1882 (arder no. 43), before lowering it to 20 ~o n 3 March, 1884 (order no. ! 00), due to strong protes!. 
4.  Pulp wood, as weil  as smalllogs (Jess than 10 feet in  length and 10 incites in diameter at small  end) set at 25  ~/co rd. A 
cord of 128 re is equal to 600 feet B.M. 
353  Ibid, p.30. 
3_,.  Ibid, p.29. 264 
While  Church  failed  to  sway  a  favourable  response  from  premier Chapleau  on  the 
tenure issue, he did manage to obtain an ordinance that reduced the bonus on limit transfers 
from $8.00 to $1.00 (1 0 J  uly, 1880) to, as he put it, "ease the burden of  favourable exchanges 
amongst lumberers." But according to  the Monetary Times, what kept government in  check, 
was  not  the  supposedly  close  connection  between  cabinet  and  the  forest  sector,  but  the 
"assistance" of the Legislative Council.
355  As Gow (1979) and Orban (1969) point out, the 
Legislative  Council  played  a  key  rote  in  supporting  the  business  interests  of Quebec's 
commercial class un til the end of the 19
111  century, using its veto privilege to strike down any 
legislative decision that did not concur with private sector interests. From 1900 onwards, the 
Legislative Council assumed a much more subdued if not effaced rote. 
Hence,  Church's  testimony  and  the  government's  subdued  reaction  nevertheless 
provide another compelling example of the awkward relationship that existed between public 
officiais  and the  forest  sector up  until  the  end of the nineteenth  century.  As  discussed  in 
Chapter V, relationships between the two sub-groups were, in  ali  likelihood, not as  close as 
what previous scholars have tended to emphasize (e.g., Gaudreau,  1999; Gillis and Roach, 
1986; J.  Hamelin and  Roby,  1971;  M.  Hamelin,  1974;  Howlett and  Rayner,  2001;  Lower, 
1938,  1973;  Malenfant,  1987).  Compared  to  other  provinces,  relationships  between  the 
political  and  commercial classes in Québec were principally divided along linguistic !ines. 
Whereas  economie  interests  in  Québec  was  under  the  control  of the  English-speaking 
minority,  politics  had  became the domain of the upper-middle class  French-speaking elite, 
after  the  Constitution  Act of 1791  allowed  for  the  creation  of an  elective  lower  house. 
Consequently, if provincial forest institutions appeared to favour lumbermen over settlers, at 
any given point in time, it was either because such positions were favoured by the dominant 
political interests of the day, or because the commercial class had actually succeeded in  its 
efforts to convince elected (i.e.,  members of the Assembly and the executive in  particular) 
and/or appointed (i.e., the Legislative Council) members of parliament. The failed attempt of 
the  Lim it  Holders  Association  to  obtain  more  favourable  conditions  from  the  provincial 
government provides a convincing case in  point. The Limit Holders Association was by far 
the  most powerful  lobby  group to  have ever been organized to  secure the  interests of the 
355 The Monetary Times, June 16, 1882, Vol.  15, No. 51, p.l544. 265 
forest sector. 
356  Y  et, the fact that not even the full  weight of ali the leading lumbermen and 
financial  institutions  of the  province  could  deliver  a  more  favourable  response  from  the 
executive  shows  just  how  much  the  ties  between  Government  and  Industry  had  yet to 
con  geai. 
6.3.2  The First Forest Reserves 
The fortunes  of lumberers  became more  promising  in  August  1882  when Montreal 
played host to the an nuai  meeting of the American Forestry Congress, at the request of father 
and son lumberers and conservation activists James and William Little. The newly appointed 
Commissioner  of  Crown  Lands,  William  W.  Lynch,  was  deeply  impressed  by  the 
proceedings of the  Congress and  vowed to  pursue sorne of the key  recommendations that 
were  then  made  for  conserving  forest  resources
357 
- ideas  that  were  already  weil 
acknowledged  by  his  predecessors  ( e.g.,  Vankoughnet,  1858-1862;  Campbell,  1864-1866; 
Beaubien,  1867  -1872).  To  support  conservation  efforts,  Lynch  proposed  to  map  out  the 
nature of the soi ls  ac  ross the province in  a bid to categorize land rights for either agricultural 
or forestal  (i.e.,  permanent forest  reserves)  purposes;  and to  limit the  occurrence of forest 
fires due to "negligence,  accident or malice."
358  In doing so, Lynch laid the ground work for 
what was to  become Québec's  policy on forest conservation for the next four decades - a 
policy  that  essentially  centred  on  thee  basic  strategies:  create  large  forest  reserves  (i.e., 
supply  guarantees),  limit the  risk  of fire,  and  control  the  reach  of settlement.  ln order to 
protect the province's forests, it was therefore decided: 
"that no township [should] be laid out in farm lots before it be proved to  contain soit 
fit for cultivation; and that no wooded region be subdivided in which the land cannat 
profitably be devoted ta agriculture; and ta  neutralise those sa so-called colonization 
movements who'  s real abject is the pillaging of  our forests." 
In other words, instead of taking a cl oser look at how government was selling off the 
province's  resource  assets  as  quickly  as  markets  allowed  and  the  wasteful  tendencies  of 
356 The Li  mit Holders Association was created to "secure the united action of  ail who were interested in the tenure of limits,f or 
the protection of the  ir rights ...  and for mu tuai assistance  in  promoting [the  ir joint] inferes/s."  ln addition  to ali  the  major 
lumbering interests of the day, it included  the directors of such prominent financial institutions as the Bank of Montreal, the 
Moisons' Bank, the Bank of British North  America, the Merchants'  bank, the Quebec Bank, and La Banque Nationale. See 
The Monetary Times, June 16, 1882, Vol.  15, No. 51, p.l544. 
357 DLQ, 1883, p. 3 18-321 
358  RCCL 1882, p. vi 266 
lumber  merchants  themselves,
359  the  Commissioner  tossed  the  biarne  of dwindling  forest 
stocks onto settlers, failing himself to recognize that the "so-called colonization movement" 
was in fact created by, and maintained through the legislative action of the province.
360  While 
Lynch acknowledged the need to maintain the productivity of forest resource systems, and to 
reforest the "immense wastes" of the province, these preoccupations were principally left to 
voluntary  measures applicable to  settlers only,
361 as if to  suggest that the inhabitants of the 
province were somehow culpable of the overexploitation of public forests.  Whether and how 
lumbermen could be induced to  adopt more sustainable patterns of forest resource use were 
again  obviated  from  the  Commissioner's  reflections.  The  "iron  rule...  [that}  converts 
everything into cash," as Joly (1880, p.  3) put it, effectively limited the government's ability 
to see beyond its own self-interest. While Joly (1882, p. 10) rightly understood that the "lives 
of governments" are too short to sustain the long tenn perspective that forest restoration and 
maintenance  require,  what  he  and  most  of his  contemporaries  and  successors  failed  to 
comprehend was that choice need not be limited to the vagaries of succeeding governments, 
and  what ever policy temporary politicians may  be  persuaded to follow  (Buchanan,  [1981] 
2001,  p. 46).  In  other words,  what made  it  di ffi cult for  governments to  pursue  long-term 
investment strategies with any  degree of consistency  was  not the differing  incentives  and 
prerogatives  that  succeeding  governments  faced,  but  the  utter  absence  of  adequate 
constitutional  safeguards or mechanisms to  direct the actions  and  decisions of government 
toward clear normative ends. 
Talks with key lumbermen of the day were nevertheless initiated to set-up a "system of 
superintendence sufficiently ejjicacious to justifj; expenses" and within a few  months,  Lynch 
359  On this note, Quebec's fi rst Commissioner of Crown  Lands, the Hon. Beau bien reminded his colleague in the debates of the 
legislature thal the wastefullumbering practices of the day were as harmful to the long-term maintenance of forest resources as 
were fire and land  clearing by settlers. See Débats de la Législature de Québec, 1883, p. 320. 
360  RCCL 1882, p. vi. The righi to establish colonization societies  in each electoral division was granted in  1869 (32 Vict.  Cap 
14) to promo te the establishment of se tt! ers and emigrants on crown lands by opening roads, assist in clearing and sowing land, 
and  provide  information  relevant  to  agriculture.  While  such  societies  provided  a  cost-effective  mechanism  to  ensure  an 
organized  approach  to  the  settlement  of province's  ungranted  lands,  their  creation  also  provided  the  Church  and  French 
nationalists with a new forum for their emancipation and even  tuai contestation of the province's forest governance institutions, 
along with the quasi monopoly that lumbennen exercised over the public domain. Despite being a creation of government, the 
colonization movement was often blamed for the ailments of the industry. 
361  1nfluenced by  the  contributions of Joly (1878,  1880,  1882), the  Government of Quebec, in  partnership with  the  Forestry 
Association  of the  province,  established  by  special  proclamation  a  holiday  to  improve  the  value  of trees  among  rural 
inhabitants  (as  per  an  Act  to  encourage  the  planting  of  trees - 1882  Vict. 45, Cap.  13). "Celebrations"  were  exclusively 
directed  at  "municipal,  religious  and  school  corporarions."  No  comparable  effort  was  made  to  bring  awareness  to  the 
lumberers. See Chapais, J.C., 1885. "Arbor day programme for ils celebration in the year 1885 and advice on the planting and 
sowing offoresttrees." [Microform], CIHM no.  12007, Published in Québec. 267 
was able to  obtain legislative enactments for the creation of fire districts (1883  Vict. 46, c. 
1  0)  and  forests  reserves  (1883  Vi ct.  46,  c.  9)  throughout the  province. Because  Québec's 
forests represented su ch an "important a source of  revenue" for the province, every available 
means had to be adopted "to pralong its existence ta an indefinite period." In essence, Lynch 
believed that forests in Québec "have not to be created,  they only have to be preserved'' from 
disastrous fires, and the carelessness of settlers.
362  To support the government's new policy 
and  provide  more  effectuai  meaning  to  its  legislation,  a  string  of orders-in-council  were 
adopted to establish forest reserves and fire districts across much of the Ottawa, St.  Maurice, 
Saguenay, and Lower St. Lawrence regions. Nearly ali  the unsold  territories of the province 
were  thus  defined  as  fire  districts,
363  which  essentially  prevented  anyone  from  setting  or 
causing to be set any fire in or near designated areas between April and October inclusively 
(  except for  cooking,  heating,  and  industrial  purposes,  or for  clearing  land,  in  which  case 
limitations  applied  to  July  and  August only).  Forest reserves,
364  on the  other hand,  where 
created to exclude well-timbered areas from the possibility of  seUlement for at !east ten years, 
and  not before the "Lieutenant-Governor  in  council" determined  that such territories "may 
with  advantage  be  opened for  seulement"  (1883,  46  V.,  c.  9,  s.  1). In  essence,  the  forest 
reserve clause of 1883 more or Jess  reiterated what had existed in the books since 1868 (i.e., 
the Public Lands Act, 32 V.,  c.  11, s.  10, art.  3)/
65  but never applied because "the  idea that 
vast tracts of land  should be withheld from  the people"  was a sure path to electoral defeat 
(Lower, 1936, p. 63). 
Renee, even though  proposed  changes were broadly  appreciated  by  the  forest sector 
and conservationists in particular (see Little, 1890),
366 they were denounced by the province's 
colonization movement, which saw in these measures the confirmation of the government's 
362 RCCL, 1883, p.vii 
363  Fi re districts were created in ali  unsold terri tory of the province (14 May 1883, order no. 14). 
364  Forest reserves were established in the Upper and Lower Ottawa agencies (10 September 1883, order no. 30); in the counties 
of Compton, Beauce, Dorchester, Wolfe, Arthabaska and Megantic (9 January 1884, order no.6); and in  the Sr. Maurice region 
(JO January 1884, order no.7). 
365  The right  of the  Lieutenant-Governor in council  to  set  aside  portions of  vacant  public  lands  as  forests, to  serve  for  the 
production and culture of timber was reinstated under 39 Vier., c. Il (1875). 
366  In  his  illustrated guide  to silvicuture, J.C. Chapais stressed  the  need for forest reserves as  the  line of defence against the 
wasteful  deforestation by settlers and imprudent overexploitation by  lumbermen: "Depuis longtemps déjà, les économistes et 
les  agronomes pratiques  de  notre province  se  sont émus  à la vue  des  dilapidations dont  nos  belles forêts  sont  l'objet ... les 
marchands de  bois qui achètent des limites des gouvernements s'appliquent  à retirer le  plus de  bois possible de  ces  limites, 
sans s'inquiéter de  l'avenir." To correct the situation, "La première chose  que nous avons  à jaire est donc de  prendre les 
moyens de  conserver intact, là où il l'est encore possible, et de  rétablir autant que possible, dans son intégrité primitive, le 
domaine boisé qui  nous  reste."  See Chapais, J.C.  1883. Guide  Illustré  du  Sylviculteur  Canadien. Eusèbe  Sénécal  et Fils: 
Montréal. CIHM no. 00560, pp. 7 & 27. 268 
bias  towards  lumbering  interests  (Buies,  1889,  pp.  23-24).  For in  their view,  the ten-year 
freeze on newly assigned forest  reserves effectively meant that the progress of colonization 
would be arrested for a decade or more in designated areas. In the political struggle to control 
the levers of power, the forest reserve act, as refurbished in  1883, was unlikely to past the test 
oftime. 
After a  few  years of strong economie growth,  lumberers  faced  yet another spell  of 
sharp  declines.  As  in  the  past,  overconfidence  in  prevailing  market  conditions  led  to 
overproduction,  which  in  turn  brought  about  a  general  decline  in  productivity  and 
diminishing  returns  for  the  state.  But  during  these  final  years  of  the  conservative 
government's  hold  on  power,  what  preoccupied  Commissioner  Lynch,  more  than  the 
"depressed  condition  of the  timber  trade,"  was  the  realization  that  the  information  his 
Department relied  upon to make land  use decisions was  in  fact "very uncertain and almost 
useless. "
367  If go vern ment was to make better use of available resources, it needed to have a 
better idea ofwhat resources it disposed of. 
368 
6.3.3  The Struggle for Resource Rights 
For the colonization movement, the idea that government did not have a clear grasp of 
the  nature of the  lands  held  under  public  ownership  was  not a  rhetorical  question  but an 
empirical reality. In the opinion of most colonization advocates, the Forest Reserve Act only 
helped  to  confirm their belief that government was  controlled  by  the  forest  lobby  (Buies, 
1889, p. 23).
369  While the forest sector provided crucial employment opportunities during the 
long winter months,  labour conditions in  the backwoods of the province were anything but 
enviable. Legislation, such as  the Master and  Servants Act (1870, Vict. 33, c.  20), gave the 
'timber barons'  and  'lumber lords' of the day Leviathan-like powers over the men operating 
in  their camps, thus granting them the authority to discharge anyone in their employ without 
compensation or due process.  As  stipulated by  the said Act, anyone neglecting to enter the 
367  RCCL, 1885, p.vii 
368  Since the ti me of Cauchon (1852-1856), the idea of developing detailcd surveys of the public domain to assign land use rights 
according to  the  arable  qualities of the soi!  has  been a constant  goal of succeeding commissioners. The  recurrent theme of 
flawed or inadequate surveys suggests that the Department's ability to deal with issues such as trespass was at best weak. 
369  Buies  (1889, p.  23):  <<la  législation n'a  cessé de  favoriser le marchand de  bois  au  détriment  du  défricheur ;  elle  s'est 
accentuée dans ce sens à chaque période, jusqu'en 1883, époque où l'on combla la mesure par la création de  ces " réserves " 
qui étouffaient graduellement la colonisation, mettaient la corde au cou du colon et en présentaient le bout au commerçant de 
bois, qui n'avait aucun scrupule de tirer dessus, quand ses intérêts, le temps, les lieux, les circonstances le permettaient.>> 269 
service of "his master," at the ti me agreed upon, or who was found guilty of "ill-behaviour, 
ref ractory conduct or idleness, of  deserting from his service or dulies, or of  absenting himself 
by day  or  by night without  ...  leave  or  ... refuses  to  perform his  dulies  or  ohey the  lawful 
commands [of  his master] [was]liable upon conviction of  a penalty not exceeding twenty 
dollars  or  two  calendar  months  of imprisonment for  each  offense  committed."  When 
combined with  the  limited  availability  of arable  lands,  forest  policies  that  favoured  large 
capital  holders  over  small  operators,  uncertainty  over  land  rights,  and  the  absence  of 
affordable and equitable arbitration, the situation created by the government's land  policies 
encouraged thousands of poor households to migrate to the more prosperous factory towns of 
New England in search ofwork and better living arrangements (Buies, 1889, p.  24). 
Change however,  was  on  the  horizon. The controversial  execution  of French  Métis 
leader  Louis  Riel  in  November  1885  by  the  federal  conservative  government  helped 
galvanize  public  opinion  in  Québec  against  its  own  conservative  government.  Taking 
advantage of  the growing nationalist sentiment, Honoré Mercier, along with fellow dissidents 
from the Liberal and  Conservative created the "Parti  National." After a successful  campaign 
against the  provincial conservatives in  1886, Mercier was appointed premier of Québec in 
January  1887, thus becoming the first truly nationalist politicalleader in  the province. As the 
new head of  cabinet, Mercier took advantage of  his position to alter existing forest legislation 
to suit the interests of his political base, which largely  consisted of the Catholic Church, and 
the  rural  inhabitants  of the  province.
370  Although  the  extent  to  which  Mercier  actually 
succeeded in  recalibrating provincial  legislation  in  favour of the  colonization movement is 
debatable, his style was unique and his influence over federal-provincial relations continues 
to affect public policy to this very day.
371  His government was not merely the government of 
the  Parti  National,  it  was  the  Mercier  Government,  and  whatever  policies  the  different 
branches of his administration adopted, such policies or legislation ultimately bore his name. 
370  Mercier created  the  Department of Agriculture  and  Colonization, thus  severing  ties  with  the  Crown  Lands  Department, 
naming  himself as  the head  of the  new department, and the  popular cleric  Father Antoine Labelle as  his Deputy Minister. 
However, the relationship quickly soured once it  became evident that Mercier had no real intention of changing crown timber 
poli ci es  in favour of the colonization movement (Dussault, 1983). 
371 As the first true champion of provincial sovereignty, Honoré Mercier (1887-1891) is credited with introducing the concept of 
interprovincial  conferences.  He  led  provincial  demands  for  greater  political  autonomy  and  authority  as  weil  as  increased 
federal  transfers  to  the  provinces; protested  the federal  government's right  to  disallow  provincial laws; and  called for  the 
removal of Quebec's legislative council, among many other things. See Rumilly (1975) and Hamelin et Roby (1971 ). 270 
To redress  the  province's finances  and  exact greater control  over the  forest  sector, 
Mercier appointed  George  Duhamel as  Commissioner of Crown Lands  in  1888.  Duhamel 
wasted no time in  investigating the operational and  legislative workings of his Department, 
and less than a few months after taking office, he boldly announced that the province lost "at 
!east one hundred thousand dollars due to the inaccuracy  of,  and lack of  control over the 
returns of  certain lumber-merchants. "
372  The problem, as explained by  Duhamel, was that in 
spite of an  obligation  to  declare  upon  oath  the  quantity  and  quality  of timber taken  from 
public lands, the cullers hired by  lumbermen simply followed the time honoured practice of 
underestimating  the  size  of harvested  logs  and/or  the  number  of pieces  produced.
373  To 
prevent such abuses, Duhamel reinforced the Department's authority to access and examine 
ali  relevant records from  lumbering operations and further imposed the obligation to  count 
and  measure ali  appropriated timber in  the field  rather than at the moment of sale.
374  The 
regulatory  changes  had  a  near  immediate  effect  on  crown  revenues,  which  rose  from 
$598,663  in  1888 to  $958,038  in  1889. This was followed  in  1890 by  the Québec Cullers' 
Act (54 Vict., c.  14), which reinstated the obligatory evaluation of culler competencies before 
an independent board of examiners. The revisions required alllogging camps, mi lis or related 
processing facilities to  hire only licensed cullers to  keep track of production.
375  The policy 
would undoubtedly have proven beneficiai, had the cullers been made independent of their 
employers but as the law stood, they were placed under the payroll of limit holders and the 
incentives to retain the interests oftheir employers in the conduct oftheir office is  as obvious 
today as it undoubtedly was then. 
To reinforce the Crown Lands Department's capacity to monitor lumbering activities, 
enforce  the  payment  of crown  dues,  prevent  fraud,  and  generally  increase  the  revenues 
exacted from  the forest sector,
376  the Mercier Government undertook the revision of timber 
372 RCCL, 1888, p. vi 
373  See "Forest Rangers," Sessional Papers, No.  114, Part 3, Vol. 22, 1889, pp. 4-5 
37•  Ibid. 
375 The licensing of cullers could on! y be performed by a dully appointed board of examiners under the  tatutes of the Province 
of Canada. See Section 8 of Consolidated Statures of Canada ( 1859, 22 Vi  ct., c.46). 
376  In  a speech delivered  10 April  1888, Mercier states thal the object of the Crown Land reforms were principally directed at 
increasing revenues generared by the forest sector:  "nous nous sommes principa.lemenl occupies de l'augmenrarion du revenue 
- augmenler les renies foncières el droils de coupes 1 organisé un  sysrème d'inspecrion qui nous perme/Ira d'enpêcher les 
frauds" (Pelland, 1890, p. 542). 271 
regulations through severa! different instruments.
377  By order-in-council (no. 50, February 3rd, 
1888),  Duhamel  mostly  reaffirmed  existing regulations  such  as  the  rights  of licentiates  to 
pledge  their  limits  as  a  security  to  obtain  advances  for  carrying  out operations  with  no 
obligation  to  remit  a  transfer  bonus  (Section  1  0).  Consequently,  if the  debtor  failed  to 
perform his obligations, the only recourse given to the creditor was that it would  have priority 
over subsequent renewals, as long as the transfer bonus of $1.00 per square mile was paid in 
full.  To exact greater control over crown timber dues, foremen  in  the  Jogging camps were 
again reminded of the  ir obligation to furnish sworn statements of the number and description 
of ali  manufactured  wood  products,  along with  a  corroborating affidavit from  the  license 
holder or his  representative (Section  12).  Each shanty  was  required to  keep  a  logbook or 
record of articles produced (Sections  13  and  15) and forest rangers held the right to  inspect, 
count,  and  measure ali  manufactured timber (Section  17).  The commissioner reserved  the 
right  to  revise  the  schedule  used  to  calculate  the  board-feet contents  of logs,  as  weil  as 
appoint qualified officers to sawmills to ascertain actual production (Section 18). The revised 
rules placed an additional diameter restriction of  ni ne inches at the stump on ali  merchantable 
trees other than pine, which remained at twelve inches (Section 33). Finally, to ease tensions 
regarding the fate of timber limits after the expiry of existing li censes on April 30, 1889, and 
facilitate  the  procurement of advances  from  banks  and  financial  institutions,  an  order-in-
council  (no. 230) issued on  17  April,  1888, gave limit holders the right to  annually  renew 
their  licenses  under the  revised  rules  until  September  1
5
\  1900.  Government reserved  the 
right to modify or increase timber dues as necessary. 
More  significantly  however,  it  was  the  repeal  of the  1883  Act establishing  forest 
reserves, and  ali  related orders-in-council that received most of the attention at the time.
378 
Through  section  4  of Act  52-53  Vict.,  c.  15  (1888),
379  Mercier  overturned  pre-existing 
legislation,  replacing  it  with  a  twenty  per  cent  reserve  on  ali  lots  sold  for  settlement 
m  See The Revised Statutes of the Province of Quebec, promulgated and published in virtue of the Acts 50 Yict., c. 5 (1887) 
and 51-52 Vi ct., c. 2 (1888). 
378  For  a  detailed, albeit  partisan, account  of  the  repeal  of the  Forest  Reserve  Act, see  "Politique  provinciale  :  Discours 
prononcés par l'hon. M. Lamer Gouin, Ministre  de  la  Colonisation  et des  Travaux  Publics, a  l'Assemblée  Legislative  de 
Quebec, Session de 1904." Available at [http://archive.org/details/politiqueprovincOOgouiuoft] 
379 See articles 1339 to 1343 of the Revised Statutcs (1888) 51-52 Victoria, Chapter 15. 272 
purposes.
380  To prevent  the  problematic situation encountered  in  the  treeless  landscape of 
older settlements,  a  mandatory  twenty  per cent forest  reserve  on  ali  newly  sold  lots  was 
established in favour of the settler who retained the "perpetuai usufructuary [rights] of  such 
land,"  including the right to eut and use timber for private consumption in  accordance with 
any  regulation  the  Lieutenant-Governor  in  council  may  deem  fit  to  apply.  As  for  trees 
removed in  the process of clearing land, and sold for a  profit, settlers were required to pay 
crown dues on ali  merchantable trees (i.e.,  white and red  pine, spruce, tamarack, black and 
white birch, and ash) and  apply  the  ir earnings towards any  remaining balance (capital and 
interest)  of the  lot  so  acquired  (Section  8).  More  controversially  however,  government 
maintained rights over any revenue collected in  excess of the purchase priee and lots issued 
in  areas  under  licensed  occupation  gave  the  licentiate  thirty  months  to  remove  ali 
merchantable timber, except for that part on which the settler was engaged in clearing land to 
fulfil his settlement duties, and to the fmther extent of ten acres (Article 1343 of the Revised 
Statutes). In other words, settlers were given limited withdrawal rights in  favour of the land 
purchase and to  meet settlement or household requirements. On the other hand, government 
retained residual rights on ali  crown timber and the authority to determine where the twenty 
per cent should be located and how it ought to be managed. 
Repeal of the forest reserve act helped reaffirm the rights of settlers to the ungranted 
territories of the province, but it did so at the cost of a slightly Jess  beneficiai title than what 
previous legislation provided for.  Prior arrangements limited the rights of lumbermen to pine 
only (1882, 45 Vict., c. 10), but the new rules entitled license holders to take ali merchantable 
stocks (see above). Lumbermen also gained an extended grace period to remove timber from 
lots under location tickets (from the previous twelve months to thirty months), and ali  profits 
incurred  through  the  sale  of timber from  a  lot  appropriated  for  settlement purposes  now 
belonged  to  the  Crown,  including  any  surplus  over  and  above  the  purchase  priee. 
Consequently,  even  though  the  revised  regulations  were  greeted  with  much  fanfare  and 
optimism by the defenders ofthe colonization movement (Buies, 1889, p. 91), settlers merely 
acquired the right to  push settlement further onto the  marginal lands and  backwoods  of the 
380 Fi  re districts were also reorganized to main tain  coherence with amended statu tes. By virtue of Act 52 V., c. 44, fi re  districts 
designated by Order no.  174 (16 April  1889) for the territories watered  by the Ottawa and  Rouge Rivers, by order no. 254 (22 
May  1889) for the St-Maurice and  Lower Ottawa portions, and  additional designations made on 28 June 1889 for Saguenay, 
Gaspé, Bonenvature, Kamouraska, and St-Francis. 273 
province. As for lumbermen, their situation was similar to the conditions that prevailed prior 
to the enactment of forest reserves, except that now, their rights over ali timber under licence 
was  nearly  exclusive  and  made  secure  by  the  thirty  month  clause.  More  fundamentally 
however, the revisions endorsed by Mercier's government ultimately helped set the stage for 
renewed confrontations between lumberers and settlers. 
A  year after implementing  the  new  regulatory  scheme (i.e.,  1889), revenues  rose by 
38%,  thanks  to  a  substantial  increase  in  the  production  of pine  (from  329,518,600  to 
467,751,800 feet board measure) and spruce saw logs (from 76,361,000 to  129,586,400 feet 
board  measure),  as  weil  as  an  increase  in  squared timber from  521,112  to  604,768  cubic 
feet.
381  Wh ether or not the increase in declared quanti  ti es of manufactured timber and lumber 
can be attributed to the renewed vigilance of the Crown Lands Department is impossible to 
te11,
382 but after the unprecedented returns of $958,938 in  1889, revenues steadily decrease to 
$806,051  in  1890  and  $646,237  in  1891,  des pite  near  record  production  in  squared  pi ne 
(increase from 604,768 ft
3 in  1889 to 3,145,687 fe in  1891), hard wood timber (increase from 
55,431  fe in  1889 to 2,955,799 ft
3  in  1891) and spruce logs (increase from  129,586,400 to 
188,517,400  feet  board  measure  ).
383  The  reas ons  for  this,  as  Treasurer  Joseph  Shehyn 
explained
384 stemmed from  renewed "stagnation and depression in  the timber trade" arising 
from  "the sudden fall in priee of  square timber, the overstocking of  the market  .. .[in Europe], 
import duties  imposed by the  United States  on sawn lumber, and the failure  of important 
houses which threw back  ... immense quantifies of  woods of  all kinds sold and unpaidfor." In 
short, unfavourable market conditions combined with overproduction to depreciate the value 
and "sale of  stocks on hand and the ...  collection of  timber dues and other large sums owing 
ta the Department." 
381  See Comparative  statement  of  timber manufactured  since  1867, Appendix  No.  14, Sessional  Paper  No. 8, Report of the 
Depatment of Lands, Forests and Fisheries ending June 1901 , Sessional Pa pers 1901 , Part  1. 
382  Revisions to the Cullers Act were only carried forth in  1890 (see text above). 
383  Report of the Depatment  of  Lands, Forests  and  Fisheries ending June  1901, Sessional  Papers  1901 , Part  1.  Pine saw  log 
production decreased slightly during this period from 467,751 ,800 to 310,508,200 feet board measure. 
3~>< See "Budget Speech delivered by Hon. Joseph Shehyn, Treasurer of the Province to the Legislative Assembly, December 9'h, 
1890,"  CIHM no.l3417, p.l0. 274 
Regardless  of their own  past policies,  the  Conservative  members  of the  opposition 
wasted no time in challenging the credibility of Mercier's colonization agenda.
385  As it was 
then  argued,  the  Conservatives  charged  that Mercier  created  a  twenty  percent reserve  10 
favour of the  Crown on  land  sold  for .settlement purposes,  and  a  thirty  month  reserve  10 
favour of timber merchants in  the case of previously licensed areas.
386  For Mercier however, 
the benefits of the new system  were clear.  When  opposition charged that the thirty-month 
reserve  was  nothing  short  of an  unrestricted  grant  to  lumbermen  ("un  pur  don  que  le 
governement fait aux marchands  de bois au  grand détriment de la  colonisation"), Mercier 
countered  that  lumbermen  had  acquired  certain  rights  through  the  Conservative's  forest 
reserve scheme,  which  his government had to  honour.
387  Moreover, removal  of the thirty-
month  clause,  he  added,  would  inevitably  mean  the  Joss  of sorne  $200,000  in  additional 
revenues, which the province needed in  order to  redress the woeful state of public finances 
that was brought about by twenty years of Conservative rule. Wh ile Lomer Gouin would later 
argue  that  the  thirty-month  clause  was  forced  upon  Mercier  by  the  Conservative-led 
Legislative Council, members of the opposition contradicted this version of events
388  and in 
fact, the said Council had even  called for the removal of the 30 month clause altogether.
389 
Following Rumilly (1940, pp.  258-266) however, the idea that the 1888 regulatory revisions 
were likely hammered out through ongoing negotiations between Mercier's cabinet and the 
Limit Holders Association of Québec is  probably closer to  reality.
390  When combined with 
the fact that Mercier's initial  term  in  office was  the first ever coalition government in  the 
province's short history (after Confederation), the incentive to compromise was undoubtedly 
high. Moreover, the revised regulations were not in  anyway discordant with the views of the 
Mercier Government, as  expressed by  the Treasurer of the Province, Joseph Shehyn in  his 
budget  speeches  for  the  years  1887  and  1888.
391  Similarly,  Gouin's  argument  that  the 
385  For example, see Picard, MJ. 1890. Discours pronounce à l'Assemblé Législative de Québec le 27 Février 1890 sur le Bill 
Relatif  à la coupe du bois marchand. [microfonn], CIHM no. 04795; Débats de la legislature de Québec, Vol. 1, pp. 127-141 
386 Picard, 1890, pp. 26-27. 
387  Ibid.,  p. 27 
388  See  pages  49-50  in  Lomer  Gouin,  "Politique  Provinciale"  (see  footnote  above).  Available  evidence  makes  it  nearly 
impossible to fi nd out who was right, but political  interference by the Legislative Council  remained problematical until the end 
of the 19'h century, bef  ore lapsing into near complete silence un til  1968, when the upper house was finally terminated (Orban, 
1969). 
389 JLCQ, Vol. XXII , 1888, p. 265. 
390  R. Rummily, 1940. Histoire de la Province de Québec. Vo1.5, pp. 258-266. 
391  See Budget Speech Delivered by Hon. Joseph Shehyn, Treasurer of the  Province, in  the Legislative  Assembly of Quebec, 
dated  12 April  1887, pp. 38-39 and  14th June, 1888, pp. 44-45. Shehyn noted the  need to exercise greater control  over, and 
exact more revenue from the forest sector. 
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Legislative  Council  was  to  biarne  for  amending  crown  timber  regulations  in  faveur  of 
lumbermen further fails to account for the subsequent repeal of nearly every constraint on the 
actions  of  settlers  in  1892  (un der  a  Conservative  administration),  and  the  eventual 
reinstatement  of  forest  reserves  by  his  own  government  in  1904.  A  more  reliable 
interpretation of events during the last two decades of the nineteenth century would suggest 
that whoever held the reigns of government tended to  pursue institutional amendments that 
supported their political  beliefs, but changes were acted upon with reference to the broader 
electorate and the existing distribution of rights and benefits. In brief, the vote motive loomed 
high in  late nineteenth century Québec politics. 
Regardless  of the  debates  that were  triggered  by  Mercier's decisions,  the  practical 
implications  of  his  natural  resource  policies  never  materialised,  for  the  Premier  was 
dismissed from his functions by the Lieutenant-Governor in  December 1891 over allegations 
of corruption. 
392  Earl y elections were called to deal with the cri sis and  by March  1892, the 
Conservatives swept the majority of the seats in  the legislature. Less than three months after 
resuming power, the province's forest institutions were again changed to suit the interests and 
motives of the new government. The twenty per cent reserve, the thirty-month privilege on 
merchantable  timber,  and  the  very  definition  of merchantable timber were ali  repealed.
393 
With regards to  land sold for settlement purposes, timber dues were now exacted only if lots 
acquired by  location tickets were not paid in full, and for no  more than the value of the land 
itself. In other terms, the proceeds from timber sales were imputed on the balance owed to the 
Province and any surplus was to be returned to the settler, "should the Lieutenant-Governor 
in  council so  determine." Moreover,  if settlers took-up land "in good faith"  and  performed 
"the seulement duties required" without first obtaining a location ticket (i.e., squatters), the 
Lieutenant-Governor in  council could, at "his discretion, impute the timber dues chargeable 
on  timber eut by such [an}  occupant" and return any remaining balance to  the settler if his 
labour was found to exceed the value of  the land itself.
394  In short, instead ofpunishing illegal 
entry,  the  'lawful'  practice  of  an  otherwise  condoned  behaviour  could  actually  be 
392  Following alleged diversion of public funds for the  construction of a railway  li ne  to the Baie des Chaleurs, and before the 
pursuit of a more thorough investigation, the Lieutenant-Governor Auguste-Réal Angers dismissed Honoré Mercier as Premier 
in December 1891. 
393  See 1892, 55-56 Vict., c.  18, 
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compensated. Finally, any  lot purchased within a  territory  held  under license to  eut timber 
ceased to be the subject of such authority by  the thirtieth of April  following  reception of a 
request made to the Crown Lands Department. Consequently, other than the government's 
ability  to  coordinate where  land  grants  and  colonization roads  should  be  Iocated,  the new 
rules more or Jess created open access conditions in  the ungranted territory of the province, 
thus  opening  the  door  to  renewed  confrontations,  competing  land  use  claims,  and  bitter 
disputes over resource rights. 
6.4  Industrialization: Renewing the Conservation Imperative 
The development of a  coherent theory  of institutional  change  that  can  explain  the 
evolution of public forest resource governance in  Québec must necessarily consider how the 
administration of the province's public domain evolved. As discussed in  this and  preceding 
chapters  (see  Chapters  IV  and  V),  the  need  to  discriminate  between  competing  land  use 
claims  on the  bases of the  arable  qualities  of the  soi!  constantly  preoccupied  succeeding 
Crown Lands  Commissioners. Y et,  the  rational  acknowledgement of such  a  necessity  was 
never  acted  upon,  either  in  terms  of public  policy  or  in  the  enforcement  of applicable 
institutional constraints. While there can be no  denying that weak enforcement capacity ancL 
inconsistencies in government priorities helped to create a professional class of land grabbers 
and  roving  bandits  that  brought about a  general  sense of insecurity  amongst  lumbermen, 
including gross social inefficiencies in  the exploitation of available timber, the more crucial 
question  is  why  such  behaviour  was  allowed  and  even  supported  in  sorne  cases  by  the 
succeeding public officiais who repeatedly vowed to take care of  such problems. Neo-marxist 
approaches  rooted  in  dependency  theory  or  the  staples  thesis  (e.g.,  Lower,  1938,  1973; 
Malenfant,  1987) cannot provide answers to  such  a  question,  nor can  the posited  revenue-
enhancing paradigm and government-business  nexus  advanced by  policy scientists (Howlett 
and  Rayner, 1995, 2001). A more reliable line of reasoning would be to suggest that public 
policy  makers  faced  different  if not  contradictory  sets  of incentives  that  lessened  the 
likelihood of unilateral action in one direction or another. Until the needs of the forest sector 
and  those  of the  colonists  became  more  unified  or  at  )east  (forced  to  become  more) 
complementary to one another in the first decades of the twentieth century- as a formula for 
establishing  resource  dependent  communities  in  the  outlying  regions  of the  province  -277 
political  leaders  continued  to  play  the  middle  ground  by  publicly  chastising  insensible 
colonization efforts while refusing to change the rules that lent credence to such behaviours. 
Consequently, even though the need for revenue encouraged legislators to provide favourable 
conditions to  lumbermen, they  could not politically  commit themselves to  one group over 
another.  As  Bates  (1995,  p.  46)  put  it,  "numbers count"  in  electoral  systems: "[p]olitical 
incentives spur efforts by  politicians to secure majorities, and politicians will champion laws 
that favour the numerous small, even sometimes at the expense of the big interests." 
In these final  days of the nineteenth century, the pace of change suddenly quickened. 
Technological  progress  created  new  realms  of  possibilities,  communication  drastically 
improved,  and  previously  isolated  communities were increasingly  linked  by  an expanding 
system of roads, railways, and telegraph or telephone !ines. New user groups with different 
needs and interests began to change the way forests had so far been considered, and with the 
diversification of demand came new opportunities to diversify the revenue potential  of the 
public domain. For instance, the Fisheries division, which was established in 1883, brought in 
$2,167 th at year. By 1898, returns from this bran  ch al one yielded no Jess th an $40,943. The 
branch relating to Game was inaugurated on October 5th  1896 and within less than two years, 
there were already 79  leases covering an area of 3,700 square miles that had been handed to 
clubs and private individuals.
395 The growing popularity of hunting and fishing also helped to 
foster the creation of the first public preserves, notably the Laurentides National Park (Act 58 
V., c. 22) and the "Trembling Mountain Park" (58 V., c. 23) in January, 1895.
396 
With  respect  to  public  forests,  the  very  character  and  nature  of Québec's  forest 
resource  systems  were  themselves  feeling  the  aftershock  of a  century  of improvident 
exploitation. The pine  reserves were  nearly  depleted,
397  the  large trees  that gave the sawn 
395 Report of the Commissioner of Lands, Forests and  Fisheries, 1899. 
396 As specified in their respective preambles, the "Parc des Laurentides" was established to specifically preserve its forests, fish, 
and  game, main tain  an even  water supply, and  to  encourage  the  study  and  culture of forest  trees.  As for the  "Parc de  la 
montagne tremblante,"  which was eventually renamed "Parc du  Mont-Tremblant,"  it was created to develop a sanatorium for 
the treatment of pulmonary diseases. Both  parks were established by arder in council  (1 9 july  1894) before being turned into 
law by the provincial legislature. 
397  The quality  of  pine, as  weil  as is the average cubic content of remaining trees consistently depreciated  between  1865 and 
1895. The contents of waney white pi ne timber dropped from an average of 80 ff  in  1865 to 58 ff  in  1893, squared white pine 
went from an average of 66 to 44 ff , and squared red pine was reduced from 59 to 39 ff. Similarly, total Canadian exports for 
white pine in  1865 was 606,300 tons for a mean value of $2,963,534 (or $4.90 per ton), and in  1893, exports diminished to 
105,789 tons for $1,481  ,155 (or $14 per ton). See Report of the Forest Wealth of Canada, p. 16-17, in Appendix to the Report 
of the Minister of Agriculture for 1894. Session  al Pa pers of Canada 1895. No. SA 278 
lumber industry its profitability were becoming harder to find, and in the old cut-over regions 
of the Laurentian highlands, Appalachian foothills and Ottawa watershed, the province soon 
found  itself with  an abundant regrowth of what was  once regarded  as  mere forest weeds: 
balsam fir (abies balsamea), red and white spruce (picea glauca),  poplar and aspen (populus 
balsamifera, tremuloides, and gradidentata), and birch (betula populifolia and papyrifera). 
But the  bane of Québec's square timber trade  and  sawn  lumber industry  was  the treasure 
trove of the far Jess  discriminating pulp and paper industry.  When considered in  light of the 
seemingly endless boreal north of late nineteenth century Québec, one can readily appreciate 
why the pulp and paper industry came to dominate the province's forest economy during the 
twentieth century. 
Up until the 1890s, there was scarcely ever any mention of the nascent pulp and paper 
industry in the reports of the Crown Lands Department. Pulp mills using various technologies 
and resources were established relatively early on in the 19th century but production remained 
marginal up until the  1880s. According to Charland (1990, pp. 49-54), the first paper mill in 
Québec was established in  1805 at Saint-André-d'  Argenteuil (using non-wood fibres), but the 
very  first mechanical  pulp mill  using wood fibre  in Canada was established in  Valleyfield 
(Québec)  by  the  Alexander  Buntin  Company  in  1866.
398  Chemical  pulp  was  introduced 
around 1889 in Hull (Québec), and many of the larger mills that were established afterwards 
integrated  bath technologies  in  their production process.  By  1870,  there were seven  mills 
using wood fibres,  and the numbers grew steadily thereafter to  18  in  1880 and 28  in  1901, 
with 12 others in the process ofbeing built.
399 
Mechanical, or ground wood pulp, which is  produced by grinding wood, was relatively 
cheap to manufacture, but resulted in fibres that were too short to provide the strength needed 
for the production of newsprint or finer grades of paper. Chemical, or sulphite pulp, on the 
other hand, required the use of more complex technologies and was thus more expensive to 
manufacture, but its  reliance on a chemical separation process produced the long fibres that 
398  Biggar (1908) indicates that the first paper mill  in Canada, according to  Pulp and  Paper Magazine, was started at Jacques 
Cartier, Québec by aMr. Jackson, in  August  1800, and  successfully operated  until  1857. The second  mill  was started at St-
Andrée  in  1803, the  same year as  the  Fourdrinier machine, which  was  to  revolutionize  paper  making, was  introduced  in 
En gland . 
399  The development of pulp and paper mills is documented in Chari and ( 1990, pp. 49-54). Figures for 1901  are provided in  the 
Report of the Commissioner of Lands, Forest and Fisheries, 1901 , p. xi. 279 
were necessary to support the production of more resistant papers. Hence, most varieties of 
paper could be produced  by  mixing various concentrations of mechanical  (70% to  75% of 
contents) and chemical (25% to 30%) pulp.
400  However, regardless of the preference given to 
either or  both  of the  two  processes,  the  establishment of any  pulp  and  paper  mill  was  a 
capital-intensive endeavour, and those who invested in  it ultimately gained an unprecedented 
degree of leverage and influence in the management of public resources. 
The decision to  pursue pulp and  paper-making was thus  predicated on  the  long-term 
stability of at !east two fundamental  factors:  1)  an  abundant and  relatively  cheap  resource 
stocks, and 2) an unlimited source of power. Québec was weil  suited to fulfil  both of these 
requirements and ali  levels of government endeavoured to provide as ideal a set of conditions 
as  they could. At the municipal  leve!, towns and cities located near sufficiently large rivers 
and  ample  resource  stocks  competed  amongst  each  other  to  attract  investors  intent  on 
building milling facilities by  offering various benefits, such as long term (20 to 30 years) tax 
exemptions,  loan  guaranties  and  other  questionable  offers  (Charland,  1990,  pp.  70-71; 
Naylor,  1975,  pp.  140-141; Niosi,  1975,  p.  378).  At the  provincial  leve!,  the  government 
made sure investors obtained the necessary supplies on favourable conditions, sold the rights 
to  "water powers"  on  its  rivers,
401  and  enacted  far-reaching  incorporation  acts  that  gave 
prospective  pulp and paper mi lis  exclusive rights to nearly every aspect of their operations 
and more.
402  Interesting examples of  this practice include the acts to incorporate the Labrador 
Electric and Pulp Company (1900, 63 V., c.  72) and The Jonquière Pulp Company ( 1900, 63 
V.,  c.  73). In both cases, the companies gained the power to  erect, construct, and  maintain 
dams along specified  rivers;  build  any  facility  required  for  the  purpose of their  business; 
acquire, hold and enjoy ali  lands necessary for their operations, including the right to possess, 
purchase,  lease,  operate  and  sel!  timber  limits  and  timber;  manufacture  mechanical  and 
chemical pulp, paper, lumber and any other product incidental to their business; manufacture, 
sell or lease surplus water and electricity for local purposes; construct tramways or railways; 
400  See "The Pulp  lndustry in  Canada,"  by  Lorne  D.  McGibbon, Manager of the  Laurentide Pulp Company, in Third Annual 
Report of the CFA, 1902, p. 9 1. 
401  For example, Shawinigan Falls were sold for $60,000 in  return for a $100,000 investment; Chats Rapids on the Ottawa were 
sold  for $10,000; Saguenay  Falls  and  Metabetchouan  Rapids  were sold  for  $3,000 each; and  La  Grande  Décharge on  the 
Saguenay was sold for $6,000. See Budget Speech Delivered by  the Hon. H.T. Duffy, Provincial Treasurer, in the Legislative 
Assembly of Que bec, March Il  th, 1902. CIHM no. 78330 
402  The practice  of incorporating and  therefore  securing  the  rights  of pulp  and  paper manufacturers  was  initiated  under  the 
administration of F.G. Marchand (1897-1900). 280 
grant licenses (for a fee) to others for the use oftheir patents; construct and maintain facilities 
and  other infrastructure needed to convey electricity and water sold to  municipalities; issue 
capital stock to creditors in  lieu of pa  y ment for ali or any part of their business; the power to 
receive from any government, town, city or municipal corporation exemptions from taxation, 
loans,  gifts  of money,  guarantees  and  other securities;  a  perpetuai  indemnity  against any 
damage  caused  by  flooding  that  may  be  caused  by  its  operations;  and  the  power  to 
expropriate  land  and  buildings  as  required  (except  railways).  In  short,  the  provincial 
government was interested in generating private investments in  its  natural resources, and no 
concession was too great to achieve such ends. As Simon-Napoleon Parent, Commissioner of 
Lands, Forests and Fisheries
403  and soon to be Premier put it in his 1899 report: 
"[The demandfor] paper pulp or wood intendedfor-that purpose ...  attract[s] more and 
more .. foreign capital .. .[and] manufacturers desirous of  making use  ...  of our forest 
riches within the  immediate vicinity of  the ir place of  exploitation. We  should therefore 
aid as much as possible this movement which is destined, unless we place obstacles in 
its way, to provide remunerative labour for our population in  ne arly every part of  the 
country by the direct and indirect development of  our forest, mineral and agricultural 
resources. "
404 
In  a  context  where  the  production  needs  of pulp  and  paper  manufactures  were 
generously provided for, the main cost factor was th us "determined large/y by the cast of  the 
raw material. " Naturally, the  "pulp manufacturer endeavor[ed] to  obtain his supply ofraw 
material at the  very  lowest possible  cost"
405  and thanks to  their investments,  the  industry 
gained unparalleled leve! of influence on how the political-econom ic  affairs of the province 
ought to be managed. Obviously, rent seeking by  lumbering interests was as  old as the trade 
itself,  but  until  the  1890s, such  fervour  had  always  been tempered  by  the  imperatives of 
settlement and colonization. The situation changed however, when legislators understood that 
the  pulp  and  paper  industry  could  be  used  to  advance  the  interests  of the  colonization 
movement and thus further settlement without impinging on the allocated resource rights of 
limit  holders.  As  Treasurer,  H.T.  Duffy,  succinctly  put  it  in  his  1902  address  on  the 
provincial  budget,  "Our  timber  limits  and our  water  powers  are  the  true  handmaids  of 
-lû3  Department of Crown Lands was reconfigured on January 9th, 1897 by Act 60 V., c.22 to create  the Department of  Lands, 
Forests and Fisheries, and  the Department of Colonization and Mines. 
404 Report of the Commissioner of Lands, Forests and Fisheries, 1899, p.v. 
-WS See The Pulp lndustry, in Third Annual Report of the CFA, 1902, p. 93. 281 
colonization." With this change of emphasis came a subtle but definitive shi ft in the attitudes 
of public officiais them selves. Gradually, the succeeding premiers and their cabinets took on 
an increasingly expanded view of their rote in  the provincial economy. No longer were they 
restricted to  the management of public affairs. They were now becoming important partners 
in  the  success  of private  enterprise,  a  conception  that  would  largely  culminate  with  the 
premierships  of Gouin  (1905-1920)  and  Taschereau (1920-1935),  before  being carried  to 
ex  cess by Duplessis ( 1944-1959). Obviously, state involvement in  public enterprise has never 
faded.  In  fact,  the  role  of the  provincial  government in  the  exploitation of public  natural 
resources  only  increased  over time.  While  nowadays,  governments  can affect  investment 
decisions through a  diverse and complex set of financial and  legal  instruments that give a 
certain  degree of opaqueness to  their undertakings, provincial  administrations at the end of 
the  nineteenth  century  provided  a  more  open  view  of their  cards,  and  the  decisions  or 
strategies they pursued. 
6.4.1  The Power of Private Capital 
The discernable influence of  the forest sector over the use of  the public domain became 
progressively clearer in the 1880s and 90s. From the first attempt to create forest reserves, to 
Mercier's thirty month reserve clause in  favour of lumberers (see discussions above), and the 
favourable  responses  of governments to  the  demands  of operators  around  the  turn  of the 
century (see below), the  power of the forest sector in  Québec's increasingly  industrialized 
eco  no  my  reached · unprecedented  heights  during  this  period,  and  its  influence  over  public 
policy would only grow over time. The reasons for this change offate in the struggle between 
lumberers  and  settlers  are  attributable to  a  number of factors.  First,  lumbermen  provided 
substantial returns to the public's coffers, whereas settlers did  not.  Second, the forest sector 
formed a relatively  homogeneous community of interest that could concentrate its  demands 
on specifie issues. Since legislative action tends to favour "well-organized and concentrated 
groups at the ex pense of diffuse interests" (Tollison, 1988, p.  343; see also Oison, 1965), and 
the needs of colonization societies, settlers, and rural households differed from one region to 
another, the outcome of competing interests had  predictable consequences. Third,  industry, 
and pulp and paper manufacturing in  particular, entai! high start-up and maintenance costs, 
and in order for investors to feel confident about the value oftheir undertakings, they require 282 
assurances and inducements, such as  favourable regulatory environments, strict enforcement 
of property  rights,  and  easy  access  to  material  and  labour needs  (Lindblom,  1977; North, 
1981, 1990). 
Hence,  in  addition  to  the  government's  willingness  to  hand  over  nearly  unlimited 
rights  to  pulp  and  power  investors  at the  turn  of the  century  (see  discussion  above),  the 
change  in  government attitudes vis-à-vis private entrepreneurs  is  further exemplified by  the 
problems that different administrations  faced  in  trying to  leverage a  surtax to  prevent the 
export  of  unprocessed  pulpwood.  During  the  ir  last  term  in  office  ( 1892-97),  the 
Conservatives passed an order-in-counci1 (no. 419), which cal1ed for an increase in pulpwood 
dues from  25  to 40 cents per cord on August 1  i
11
,  1894.
406  Moreover, in  order to ensure the 
long-term  maintenance of this  increasingly valuable  resource asset,  it  was also considered 
prudent to  impose  a diameter restriction of eleven inches at the stump on ali  merchantable 
spruce a year la  ter (  order no. 104, dated 30 march, 1895). However, within a matter of weeks, 
the Commissioner of Crown Lands received a petition from the manager of the Québec-Lac-
St-Jean Rai1way  line  complaining of a  Jack  of traffic and comparatively  high  maintenance 
costs on a one hundred mile stretch of rail between Rivière-à-Pierre and Lac-Édouard (in the 
Mauricie region), due to the Jack of industries in the area.
407  As a solution, railway operators 
advised  the  Commissioner  that  the  American-owned  St.  Maurice  Lumber  Company  (a 
subsidiary oflnternational Paper) would be willing to put up a mill along the said track if the 
diameter restriction on spruce was lowered to ten  inches instead of eleven. No sooner asked 
than  done,  the  limit was  lowered as  requested  (no.  396,  dated  October 25
1
h  1895)  on the 
expressed  condition  that  ali  appropriated  timber  be  processed  (eut  and  debarked)  at  the 
proposed mill.
408  Similarly, in  1892,  1894, and  1895, the company was granted the right to 
406 The original order allowed for a reduction of 15<t  if pulpwood was  used to manufacture pulp or other products in Quebec. But 
merchants selling timber to  the US argued  thal the government's policy was discriminatory, so Que bec  sim ply replaced the 
contested clause with a single flat rate of 40çt  per cord for ali  timber li mit holders (order no. 506, dated 6 October  1894).  See 
"Copies  of  ali  orders-in-council  adopted  since  1892 inclusively  respecting  the  regulation of the  manufacture of  pulp  wood 
dated January 30th, 1900," in Sessional Papers, 1900, Part 3, No. 19. 
""'7  See "Copies  of  ali  orders-in-council  adopted  since  1892  inclusively  respecting  the  regulation of  the  manufacture of  pulp 
wood dated January 30
1
", 1900," in Sessional Pa pers, 1900, Part 3, No. 19 . 
..œ  The  St.Maurice  Lumber  Co.,  which  exported  ali  appropriatcd  timber  to  Glen  Falls,  NY,  continued  to  push  for  more 
concessions, including a reduction in  the diameter restriction for pi  ne to  ten inches thal was prompt!  y denied. Then in October 
1896, the company (with a supporting letter from  the railway  director) demanded  a  15çt  reduction on the cord  of pulpwood 
(equal to 25<t  per cord) on the promise thal it would build two mi lis on the Quebec-Lac-St-Jean railway line, to provide even 
more  employment  and  revenues  to  the  state,  white  helping  to  promote  settlement  and  improve  railway  maintenance. 
Unfortunately, the Comrnissioncr's rcsponse could not be traced. 283 
pa  y a reduced rate on spruce logs (  40~, instead of  65~, per thousand board feet) th at were Jess 
than ten  inches in  diameter and therefore unfit for anything other than pulpwood.
409  By this 
skilful expedient, the St-Maurice could effectively eut "defective" spruce trees in exchange of 
a  25~ reduction,  based  on  a  criterion that was  knowingly  unenforceable.  Exactly  how the 
only  commercial  firm  in  Québec that exported ali  of its  timber unprocessed to  the  United 
States- a practice that was heavily criticized at the time- could be allowed to operate under 
pa  y  off ru les that were less restrictive than what others faced could not be ascertained. 
Like the broad powers that were later given to those who purchased the right to hamess 
the energy from  the province's rivers, the provincial government was becoming increasingly 
sensitive  to  the  advantages  that  industry  procured  in  terms  of  furthering  regional 
development. If by ceding sorne advantages to private operators it could induce employment-
generating investments, help stem the flow of French Canadian migrants to the factory towns 
ofNew England, and contribute to the expansion of the colonization agenda, then the costs of 
less restrictive institutional arrangements appeared a reasonable priee to  pay for the benefits 
that were expected. 
As  suggested elsewhere, the industry's ability to flex its  newfound muscles and exert 
influence  over  policy-makers  reached  an  unparalleled  significance  under  the 
commissionership  (1897-1904)  of  Simon-Napoléon  Parent.  Fearing  the  political  and 
economie  consequences  of the  massive  pulpwood  exports  from  the  province  to  milling 
facilities  in  the  United  States,  Parent  tried  to  impose  a  surcharge  of $1.60  per  cord  of 
unprocessed pulpwood exported outside of the province in  January  1900.
410  Wh ile in  favour 
of a  system  that  increased  opportunities  for  the  manufacture  of pulp  in  the  Canadian 
Dominion,  the  Paper  Manufacturers  Association  of Canada  felt  that  Québec's  approach 
unnecessarily breached the rights of operators with processing facilities  in  Ontario and New 
Brunswick. On May 29
1
'\ 1901 the Paper Manufacturers and Timber Limit Owners of  Québec 
sent a petition to Parent requesting an immediate change to what they regarded as  an export 
tax: 
409  See Parent, S-N  (1903) Discours de  1'/wn. SN. Parent, premier ministre, sur la question des droits de coupe sur le  bois à 
pulpe, prononcé à l'Assemblée législative de Québec, le 25 avri/1903. Québec : [s.n.], pp.l 0-13. 
410  By order-in-council  no. 39 (18 January 1900), the Commissioner raised dues on  pulpwood to $1.90 per cord with a reduction 
of $1.50 when pulpwood manufactured in the province. 284 
"petitioners,  have  been extensive/y engaged in  the  manufacture of spruce  and have 
been large contributors to the revenue ofyour department, and have vested rights long 
be  fore the present act governing the cutting of  spruce was passed. "
411 
The memorialists asked that the tariff on pulpwood be  retroactively fixed  at  40~ per 
co  rd  until 1910 and that no diameter size restrictions be placed on black spruce. The request 
was  promptly  dealt  with.  While  Parent  considered  that  foreign  investment  in  Québec's 
natural resources would be best achieved by  imposing "an exceptional duty on the production 
of  raw material destined to  supply foreign manufactories," he  reasoned th at too high a tariff 
would  inevitably  incite  manufacturers  to  find  the  "articles"  of "prime  necessity  in  the 
neighbouring provinces on easier conditions. "
412  Further, si nee the application of a surcharge 
was considered "practically inapplicable," due to the plethora of ways that opera  tors. could 
use  to  evade  the  Department's  control,
413  the  priee  on  pulpwood  manufactured  in  the 
Dominion (i.e., not just the province) was adjusted by  order-in-council (no.  558, dated June 
1  s\  1901) to 40~ per co  rd, allowing for a 25~ surcharge to be imposed on ex  ports south of the 
border.
414  The diameter li mit on "black spruce, balsam jir, poplar, hemlock, and other small 
timber logs intendedfor the manufacture ofpaper pulp" was set at seven inches at the stump 
"to favour  industry and colonization. "
415  Rates pertaining to ground rents (set at $3.00  per 
square mile) and ali other stumpage dues (as established in  1888- see Table 6.1  above) were 
prolonged until September 1s\  1910. An unspecified annual fire-tax (to be "fixedfrom time to 
time  by the  Commissioner") was added, and the bonus on the transfer of timber limits was 
raised from $1.00 to $4.00 per square mile. 
411  See Appendix 40 (p.6), Sessional  Papers Vol. 36, Part 3, 1903. Lest it should  be  misunderstood, the  Paper Manufacturers 
Association was very  much in  favour of a surcharge  on  exports  to  the United  States. Their main concern was  that Quebec 
discriminated  against  ali  manufacturers  outside  of the  province.  lt was  "imperative,"  members  argued  that  an  annually 
increasing surcharge be imposed on exports of spruce logs and pulpwood. Legislative action on this finally came in  1910 under 
Gouin. 
m  Report of the Commissioner of Lands, Forests and  Fisheries, 1899, pp.v-vi. Parent goes on to state that "before coming ta any 
decision ... 1 have  deemed il my dufy  ta communicale  willz  most of the  leading  capilalisls and merchanls engaged in  thal 
business in arder ta ascerlain the  ir views and ablain from them ail data tlzat miglzt affect this subjecl of  discussion.." 
413  ln reaction to the demands of timbcr limit owners, Paul Blouin, Superintendent of Woods and Forests commented that: "par 
expérience .. .le  droit  [appliqué]  au  bois  de  pulpe  jrabriqué  en  pâte  à  papiers  hors  de  la  province  est  pratiquement 
inapplicable. On trouve pour s'y soustraitre et frauder la Couronne une foule de moyens qui échappent inévitablement à notre 
contrôle." See Discours de l'Hon. Parent (1903), pp. 6-7. The comment brings into question the government's very capacity to 
monitor and en force any of its rules. 
414  Report of the Commissioner of Lands, Forests and Fisheries, 1901 
415  Ibid.  Reduction in diameter size restrictions on spruce were based on assurances from the "leading surveyors of  the country" 
that "the black spruce lree besl suitedfor pulp-making seldom allains a diameler of el  even inches at the stump- and since in 
certain  regions .. .  1/zree-fourths of  tlze forest consisl of  lrees of thal kind, il was becoming impossible ta dispose the same by 
continuing ta prohibitlhe cutting oftrees under Il inches" (p. viii). 285 
Whilst  legislators  were  evidently  willing to  amend  rules  in  favour of large  capital 
holders, as businessmen and industrialists were then referred to, the extent to which they held 
on to  their seats  in  parliament was still determined by  the broader electorate, not the deals 
they  brokered  with  private  interests. The task therefore was  to  turn the benefits of private 
sector investments to ad vanta  ge by demonstrating the benefits of trickledown economies. As 
explained by the Provincial Treasurer in  1902, in  his attempt to defend the heavily criticized 
and  unprecedented  sale  of energy  rights  to  foreign  investors,  along  with  the  granting of 
14,486 square miles oftimber limits since 1898: 
"the best possible way to  help colonization and emigration is  to  make it possible for 
the colonist and emigrant to  live in the country .....  [0  ]ur pulp and paper industry, and 
the development of our water powers gives employment  ...  , and furnishes our farmers 
and new settlers with a market  .. for their .. .produce." 
The government's policy was so "marvellously successful," Treasurer Duffy went on 
to explain, that a town like Shawinigan, which did not have "a single inhabitant" five years 
before,  could  grow  four  thousand  strong  because  of his  government's  policies.
416  The 
conclusion  was  straightforward,  provide  incentives  and  favourable  conditions  to  foreign 
investors willing to develop the province's natural resources, and everyone else will  benefit. 
To achieve this goal however, Québec first needed to put an end to "the pillaging of  the forest 
under  the  specious  and alluring pretext of colonization," and  limit  the  devastating  tires, 
which were supposedly caused by the carelessness offalse settlers.m 
6.4.2  Dealing with Farmers, Settlers, and Speculators 
By 1903, Parent estimated that at !east fifty percent of Québec's pulpwood production 
was exported to  the United States.
418  Of the estimated 300,000 cords (i.e., 38,400,000 ft
3
)  of 
pulp wood exported on an  annual  basis, only 50,000 cords were known to be produced by 
timber  license  holders,
419  the  rest  came from  farmer-held  woodlots  and  land  acquired  for 
416  See Budget Speech Delivered by  the Hon. H.T. Duffy, Provincial Treasurer, in  the Legislative Assembly of Quebec, March 
IJ'h,  1902. CIHM no. 78330 
417  J.C.  Langelier,  1901. "The  Pulp lndustry in  Relation to Our Forests,"  in  Second Report of the CFA.  Ottawa:  Govemment 
Printing Bureau, p. 43 
418 See Discours de l'Hon. Parent, 1903, p. 22. 
419  Of the 300,000 cords of pulp wood exported  to the  United  States in  1903, the Superintendent of Woods and  Forests, Paul 
Blouin, estirnated that 44,958 cords were produced by the St. Maurice Lurnber Company and the Union Bag Company, 5,790 
cords were produced in  the remaining fïrms, and  250,000 stemmed from private wood lots. See- Discours de  l'Hon. Parent, 
1903, pp. 24-26. 286 
seUlement purposes. For those who invested heavily in developing Québec's forest resources, 
there  could  be  no  greater  evil  than  the  pillaging,  waste  and  destruction  perpetrated  by 
speculators and  lumbermen  disguised  as  settlers.
420  To understand  the  dynamics that were 
theo  at  play,  clear  distinctions  need  to  be  drawn  between  the  incentives  that  farmers  in 
established  communities were  confronted with  and  the  depredation  that was  said  to  occur 
under the guise of settlement. In a paper delivered before the Canadian Forestry Association 
in  1908,  the  Dean  of the  Faculty  of Arts  at  the  University  of Laval,  Mgr Latlamme,
421 
explained that everywhere, farmers were increasingly compelled to sacrifice their long-term 
interests  for  short  term  pecuniary  gains.  "[T]he  very  rapid  development  of railroads, 
telegraph  and telephone !ines,  and above al!,  the devouring industry of  the  manufacture of 
pulp," Latlamme observed, had resulted in the doubling of the priee of a co  rd wood si nee the 
turn of the century (from $1.50 to  $3.00 for a  cord of spruce and $2.50 to  $5  or $6.00 for 
maple). As a result, "farmers have gone to work to exploit their forest reserves and sel! their 
products  either direct/y  to the  manufacturers  or  to  agents  who  establish  a  very  lucrative 
business. "  While  improving  their  situation  "by  meeting  their  most pressing  debts  or  by 
procuring comforts of  which  they had never even dreamed," the rate at which forests were 
being  eut  could  not  be  productively  sustained,  "because ...  proprietors,  by  this  intensive 
exploitation, demand[ed] from  their forested areas  more  than  they annually produce[d}." 
Instead of the "hundred cubic feet of  wood"  or so  that a  forest might yield,  farmers  were 
"harvest[ing]  a  thousand," due  to  the  necessity  of "temporary  difficulties"  or the  more 
"regrettable indiff erence" to  the future. Latlamme advocated the need to follow the lead of 
the  United  States,  which had  initiated  a  vast program  designed  to educate farmers  on  the 
benefits  of forests,  and  encourage  the  re-stocking  of deforested  areas  with  diverse  and 
valuable trees  under the guidance of dedicated foresters - a strategy that was  based on the 
time-honoured  principle  of  diversizying  one's  investments  in  order  to  leverage  more 
economie opportunities over the  long term.
422  But the challenge of convincing farmers  that 
they "should only demand of  their forests  each year the equivalent of  the wood that grows 
~
20  Exports  of  unprocessed  wood  wcre  broadly  decried  as  a  loss  for  the  public  treasury  and  an  encouragement  to 
overexploitation, since it left most of the gains from transformation uncapturcd. On this subjcct, sec the Annual Reports of the 
Canadian Forestry Association, from  1900 to  1911. 
~
21  Laflamme, Mgr J .U .K., 1908. 'The Manner In Which Somc Farrners Use The  ir Wood," in  Nin th Annual Report of  the CFA, 
pp. 29-34. 
~
22 The success of this cxpcrimcnt is ''isible today, throughout  north-eastern United_States, particularly in  New York State and 
New England. Little did they know at the tirne that the pursuit of such strate  gy also helped bols ter biodiversity and create more 
resilient forests. 287 
there, "  lay  in  the  more  difficult  problem  of convincing  "them  that  their  interest,  weil 
understood, demands  that they renounce their profits of  to-day," as  high  as  these may  be, 
"and content themselves with more modest gains, but such as shall always persist." 
The  notion  that  sustainability  is  somehow  constitutive  of  a  self-interest,  "weil 
understood"  as  Laflamme  put  it  - a  conception  that  largely  parallel's  de  Tocqueville's 
(([1835-1840]  1990,  II,  p.  121)[1835-1840]  1990,  II,  p.121)  idea of "self-interest  rightly 
understood"- harkens back to the ideas of Henri Joly and Benjamin Hough discussed earlier. 
ln this sense, the dilemma that succeeding governments faced was not unlike the challenges 
farmers  were  confronted  with  in  Laflamme's  study.  Both  faced  imperatives  that  helped 
justify  their actions.  Neither were  willing  to  recognize that their  long  te1m  interest, weil 
understood,  lay  in  reducing  their  consumption  of resource  units  and  in  maintaining  the 
reproductive capacities of the system they depended upon, and th us equalize returns over the 
long term, instead of maximizing short term benefits.
423 
With respect to land acquired for settlement purposes, one may safely posit that their 
proprietors were just as keenly motivated to take advantage of the demand for pulp wood as 
were their counterparts in  the older settlements. But unlike established farmers, the rights of 
settlers to use and dispose of such timber was determined by  law.  Until titles were perfected 
(i.e., settlement duties complied with and  money owed to the government paid  in  full),  the 
state  remained  the  residual  claimant of ali  crown lands and the  timber thereon,  and  could 
revoke,  change or modify  the  conditions applicable to  the  sale of the said  land  or use  of 
related  timber at any  given  moment, should the "Lieutenant-Governor in  council" think  it 
expedient to do so. Government therefore, affected land use decisions by the regulations it set 
and by the extent to which it applied and enforced its own rules. Land use decisions were in 
turn  guided  by  two  fundamental  principles that were as  old as  the  first  European colonial 
establishments  in  the  province. The first being that settlement should be encouraged by  ali 
necessary means and the second, that land use should be determined by the arable qualities of 
the soi!, with  the  Crown  reserving  as  always  the  right to  set aside  for  its  own benefit or 
423  Unfortunately, Mgr Laflamme's ad vice was never followed. The poor quality of Quebec's deciduous forests, along the  St. 
Lawrence Valley and  Eastern Townships, and  the consequent absence of wood  suitable for the  manufacture  of higher end 
products  such  as  furniture  and  cabinetry  was  denounced  in  the  "Second Annual  Report  of the  Quebec  Forest  Products 
Commission"  (1933, pp. 7-8) and  the  report  of the  "Commission  d'étude sur  la  gestion  de la  forêt  publique québécoise." 
Bibliothèque nationale du Québec, 2004 pp.l63-l69. 288 
purpose, ali land fit for growing timber only. From the earliest days of the French regime to 
the British Conquest and the development of responsible go  vern ment a century later, the need 
to classify land according to its cultivable potential served as the core management principle 
of succeeding governments until the twentieth century.
424  Y et, in  spite of articulating such a 
principle in nearly every legislative or regulatory requirement ever adopted on this issue, with 
periodic  acknowledgments  from  succeeding  Crown  Lands  Commissioners,  the  extent  to 
which  land  conceded  for  settlement  was  appropriate  for  agriculture  was  seldom  if ever 
validated. In fact, the practice of acquiring land via location tickets, for the sole purpose of 
extracting timber at a  fraction  of the cost of a  license to  do  the  same,  was  pursued  with 
unremitting consistency  from  the  earliest days  of the trade  onwards. Of course,  efforts  to 
apply and enforce Crown land regulations have been impaired by  a number of factors  over 
the years, including the sheer size of the province, unreliable land surveys, limited means of 
communication,  weak  monitoring  and  enforcement  capacities,  and  the  difficult  if not 
impossible task of maintaining control over the transactions of isolated land agents. However, 
the fact that the rules governing land use were so often inconsistent with the overall objective 
of preserving timber for the benefit of  the Crown and the lucrative trade it supported, begs the 
question of why  sucb_inefftcient rules  were knowingly maintained or reinstated  time after 
time. The answer, as  discussed on severa! occasions already, lies in  the fact that settlement 
and  colonization  were  to  be  favoured  by  ali  possible  means,  and  that  the  sale  of well-
timbered land was easier to complete than the sale of land denuded of useful timber.
425  But 
once land  in  the alluvial flood  plains, lowlands, and hardwood forests  of the  province was 
spoken  for,  government  began  promoting  colonization  on  the  rocky  shoals  of  the 
Appalachian and  Laurentian foothills.  And  so,  from  the  1860s  onwards, "most of the  lots 
given up to colonization," the Superintendent of Forest Rangers, J.C Langelier, admitted in  a 
paper delivered before the  1901  meeting of the  Canadian Forestry  Association, were  "not 
~
2~ The need to survey land, establish timber reserves and  identify those areas that can be effectively senled formed part of the 
basic set of instructions handed to colonial governors from Murray ( 1764-1768) to Sydenham ( 1839-1 841  ). lt was reiterated in 
the  instructions  given  to  the  Province's first Commissioner of Woods  and  Forests  (John  Davidson)  in  1826 and  the  first 
Commissioner of Crown Lands (W.B. Fe1ton) in 1827, and was subsequent1y reaffirmed by ail  of their successors (see Chapter 
IV). 
425  This  point  was  again  reinforced  in  the  findings  of the  Co1onization  Commission  (1 904)  which  endevoured  to  reassure 
migrants  and  potential  settlers  that "they may he sure of  finding ...  ali the  timber needed for building and  even for sale  to 
maintain the  ir families du  ring the first years."  See "Report of the Quebec Co1onization"  in  The Canada  lwnberman, 1904, 
25(5):20-21. 289 
suitable for profitable farming."m Between  1867  and  1913,  an  average of 157,391  acres 
were sold annually  in  Québec for settlement purposes. Of this  amount, sorne  53,935  acres 
(nearly a third) were reverted back to the Crown on a yearly basis due to sale cancellations.
427 
Since lots  obtained  under false  pretences were just as  soon cleared of merchantable timber 
before being abandoned, and that many a poor settler reportedly toiled laboriously to remove 
forest growth only to discover that the soi! could not support much more than a season or two 
of sowing,  one  can  safely  assume  that  a  considerable  portion  of the  land  that  was  thus 
returned  to  the  Crown  was  likely  cleared  of its  valuable  timber  - a  fact  that  is  later 
corroborated by the creation of the first tree nursery in Québec and the efforts of  the Ministry 
of Lands  and  Forests  to  reforest  the  3,000,000  acres  of waste  lands  created  by  the 
improvident sale of uncultivable areas (see below). A telling example of this  problem  was 
again presented by Lange  lier. He observed that in one area of the lower Laurentians,
428  a total 
of 73,258  acres  were taken  up  for settlement during the  1880s  and  early  90s.  Out of this 
amount, only  12,091  acres (less than  17%) were still  under crop at the turn of the century. 
The  rest  of the  area,  Langelier  claimed,  had  been  eut  over  by  "speculators"  and  "false-
settlers." 
429  Ultimately,  the  high  priee  of timber  led  "a  host of merchants"  to  approach 
"individuals with patented lands or lots," since these were "not subject to the regulations of 
the provincial government," and ''forests [could be] razed [with] not even the young trees  ... 
le  ft  for producing seed [or ensuring] the reproduction of  the forest.  "
430 
Over time,  the  villain  with  a  thousand  names - "lumbermen disguised  as  settlers," 
"false-settlers,"  "timber  thieves,"  "ruthless  merchants,"  "speculators,"  "timber  agents"-
became  the  scapegoat  for  ali  the  evils  that  affected  honest  limit  holders,  robbed  the 
government of its revenue, started the fires that squandered the province's forest wealth, and 
gave a  bad  name  to  settlers.  Reports  of roving  bandits  taking  advantage  of Crown  land 
regulations  to access timber on false  pretences can  be traced as far back as the  1820s.  Y  et, 
such  "false-settlers"  seldom  operated  outside  of  existing  rules.  Rather,  accounts  of 
426 See Langelier ( 1901 ) "The Pulp Jndustry in Relation to Our  Fo r~s t s ,' ~  p.44. 
427  See Appendix No.6, "Statement  Showing Number of Acres of Crown Lands Alienated", in  Report of the Minister of  Lands 
and Forests of the Province of Quebec ending June 1913. 
428 The area in question was developed by Father Labelle, one of Quebec's foremost leaders of the colonization movement, and 
former Assistant Commissioner of the Colonization Department that was created by  Honoré Mercier. He died in January  1891 
after a failed operation. 
429 See Langelier (1 901 ) "The Pulp Jndustry in Relation to Our Forests," p.44. 
430 Ibid., p.46. 290 
improvised  lumberers tend  to  support the  idea that such  operators simply  learned  how the 
system could be turned to their advantage. After ali, the laws that made it possible for anyone 
to  request  and  obtain  nearly  any  parce!  of  land  under  the  settlement  clause  was  not 
formulated,  applied, or enforced  by  the so-called false-settlers,  but by  government and the 
functionaries or agents in  its employ. Wh ile the pernicious effects of Crown land  regulations 
were variously underscored by succeeding commissioners, few  governments ever attempted 
to  make the system more coherent.  And when changes were adopted,  as  in  1883  with the 
Forest  Reserve  Act  and  in  1888  with  the  thirty-month  reserve  clause,  seldom  did  these 
changes  last  longer  than  the  administration  that  implemented  them.  Otherwise,  as  when 
Simon-Napoléon Parent occupied the Premier's office between 1900 and  1904, crown  land 
regulations were wilfully ignored as if to create the impression that the legal appropriation of 
lots under license was pursued by criminals in  breach of existing regulations and could thus 
be vilified for acting in accord with existing institutional arrangements. 
Bence, the  situation  was  undoubtedly  more complex than what authorities and  limit 
holders willingly depicted to their advantage.  When compared with the area that was placed 
under  licence  to  eut timber,  the  amount of land  sold  for  settlement  purposes  after  1867 
remained somewhat marginal. Between June 1868 and June 1903, the land conceded to limit 
holders rose from  17,997 square miles (or 46,612  km
2
)  to  62,952 square miles (or 163,045 
km\ which meant that for  every acre sold for settlement purposes, five  were placed under 
license to  eut timber. Given that the wood needed to  support household requirements (fuel 
and building supplies) was already in short supply by the early 1860s, as noted in severa) bills 
that were intended  to "preserve standing timber" in  established communities,
431 it stands to 
reas  on that local demand for wood did not dissipate after 1867. Instead, farmers and various 
entrepreneurs  used  the  accommodating  tenns  of Crown  land  regulations  to  access  the 
supplies needed to  fulfil  domestic demand. As  the Colonization Commission
432  would later 
reveal (see below), Crown forests were sought by an assortment of user groups that included 
431  See  Bill  97, "An Act to  provide for the  preservation of standing timber,"  1863, CIHM no.  9_03033; Bill  20, "An  Act to 
empower county counci/s in  Lower Canada to suspend within the limits of the ir jurisdiction  the operation of  the provisions 
respecting découverts" (i.e., the obligation to eut strips of woodland between adjoining parcels of land for the shading that may 
cause prejudice on  the productive potential of neighbouring croplands),  1863, CIHM no.  9_03 114; Bill  57, "An act for  the 
protection of standing timber in the province of Lower Canada, 1863, CIHM no. 9_02692. 
432  Sec Report of the Colonization Commission , 1904. Québec:  Dept. of Colonization and Public Works. A transcription of key 
findings and  recommendations is also available in The Cqnada lumberman, 1904, 25(5):20-21. 291 
legitimate  settlers  with  limited  choice  over  the  quality  of available  sites;  established 
inhabitants who purchased Crown land to  meet household needs, possibly taking advantage 
of the  demand  for  pulpwood  to  eut  and  sell  timber  for  their  own  benefit;  and  various 
entrepreneurs who followed the time-honoured tradition of acquiring land  rights  in  order to 
evade Crown dues.
433  In the absence of any effort to coordinate land use amongst the various 
user groups, confrontations were inevitable. 
Other than settlers, no one was encouraged to  become the actual owner of a parce! of 
land, or to  maintain the  productivity of the forests  acquired through the settlement clause. 
Settlers were asked to fulfil  their "duties" and "improve" their holding by clearing standing 
timber, constructing a house and other buildings as required, and to place under crop so many 
acres of land  per year. Lumbermen on the other hand were expected to pay a minimal ground 
rent and  to  remit dues  on  timber appropriated  in  right of applicable  diameter restrictions. 
Apart  from  these  two  legalized  forms  of occupation,  no  other  tenure  arrangement  was 
permitted.  Since those who  acquired  land  under  false  pretences  (however  legitimate  their 
needs  may  have been) knowingly  obtained a title that could be  revoked  at  any  time,  such 
operators faced  strong  incentives to  remove merchantable timber as  quickly as  they  could. 
Efforts to  provide long term forest rights to local operators and communities, as  Bouchette 
(1906)
434  and Joll
35  recommended were finally adopted at the end of the  1930s as  a way to 
stimulate  regional  employment,  increase  joint  retums  and  reduce  pressure  on  resources 
through common property and cooperative arrangements (see Chapter VII). 
433  As referenced further below, the  law  affecting the management of Crown lands and forests was amended in  1904 to allow 
farmers  and communities to  take  wood  from  Crown lands (under permission) to  meet household  needs  related  to  fuel  and 
building materials. Eventually, this clause was replaced with the creation of"Cantonal" Forest Reserves in  1911  to address the 
plight  of communities  that  had  no  more  wood  to  support  their  needs.  Interestingly,  the  Cantonal  Forest  Reserve  system 
consecrated an  idea that was first proposed by Henri Joly nearly half a century earlier in  1863 to  the legislature of the United 
Province of Canada (but without the local governance institutions thal called for the estblishment of community-based forest 
management systems. 
434  ln "L'Indépendance économique du Canada Français" (1906, pp. 294-300), Errol Souchette advocated the creation of a non-
governmental Society of Forest Industries  ("Société des industries forestière") to  improve the capacity of settlers to  manage 
forests directly, monitor compliance, identify market opportunities, and  help finance the development of cooperative  milling 
operations and  pulp and  paper manufacturing using supplies from private and public sources (managed by local  inhabitants). 
Further, operators would be bounded by  mutual commitment to  maintain the permanence of collective!  y used forest resource 
systems. "[C]haque colon .. .  recevrait un titre, disons à deux cents acres de terre au lieu de cent acres  ... dont il s'engagerait à 
tenir une portion déterminée en coupe réglée ...  Les colons s'engageraient à ne pas les vendre directement [les bois provenant 
d'une  coupe  annuelle],  mais  à  les  porter  à  la  fabrique  qui  serail  établie  dans  leur  voisinage  et  dont  ils  seraient  les 
actionnaires ...  une scierie,  dont  les colons ainsi groupés  seraient conjointement les propriétaires ou les patrons,  pour une 
époque  déterminée"  (p. 295).  References  to  common-property  management of forest  resources  in  Jate  nineteenth  century 
literature are also made in Phipps, 1883, Report on the necessity of  preserving and replanting forests, and Hough, 1880, Report 
on Forestry, Volume Il. 
435  Bill97, "An Act to provide for the preservation of standing timber,"  1863, C!HM no. 9_03033 292 
6.4.3  Legitimizing Change: The Colonization Commission 
With the sudden increase in  the prominence of pulp and paper manufacturing at the 
end of the nineteenth century,  industrialists began pressuring government into safeguarding 
their timber limits. To  this  end,  the  forest  industry  could  not  have  found  a  more  fervent 
defender  of their  interest  than  the  persan  of  Simon-Napoléon  Parent,  who  was  both 
commissioner of crown lands  (1897-1904) and Premier of the Province (1900-1904) during 
this  crucial  transition  period.  However,  given  the  Liberal  party's  historical  stance  as  the 
defender of the  colonization  movement,  it  was  inadmissible  for  Parent  to  alter  the  pro-
seUlement regulations adopted in  1892 by  the opposing Conservative, without appearing to 
renege the commitments of his own party. The solution therefore was to secure the expansion 
of the  colonization  effort  by  meeting  the  needs  and  interests  of the  forest  sector,  or  as 
Treasurer Duffy  had  put it,  to  turn the forests  and  water powers of the province into "the 
handmaids of  colonization" (see above). Hence, if "seUlement and opening up of  our vacant 
lands  and  the  consequent  increase  of our  population  constitute  our  chief aim, "  Parent 
reflected, then the way  to achieve such an end was to capture the benefits of development 
through "the exploitation of  our vast forests." 
436  Parent conjectured that since public forests 
"constitute our greatest source of  revenue," then it follows to  reason that the province will 
only find what it  "needs  to become a great manufacturing country and thereby retain  .. .{ils} 
population" by  placing its resource wealth in the bands of those who are best able to finance 
the indus  trial expansion of  the province.
437  To pro  vide the allure of  political correctness in  his 
decision to  support the interests of pulp and paper manufacturers over smallholders, Parent 
called for the creation of a commission in  1902 "to assist in the advancement of  colonization 
and the development of  forest industries. "
438 
After severa! false starts,
439  the Commission was finally placed in the trusted hands of 
the  pro-conservation  senator  Joseph  H01·rnidas  Legris  and  long-time  civil  servant  of the 
Woods and Forest branch, Jean Chrysostome Langelier. From a political perspective, the task 
of the Commission was relatively clear: absolve the industry and government of ali  possible 
436  Report of the Minister of Lands, Mines and Fisheries, 1902, p. vii. Through Act 1 Ed.  VIl, c. 8 (1902), the Department of 
Lands, Forests and  Fisheries was renamed the Ministry of Lands, Mines and Fisheries 
437 Ibid. 
4' 8 The Colonization Commission was initiated through Act 2, Ed. VII, c. 3, 1902. 
439 The head of the Commission was changed three times and the Commission itself was relaunched twice. Legris and Langelier 
essentially headed the Commission, supported by Judge John L. Brodie and Pastor N. Thivièrge. 293 
wrongdoing  and  failure  in  the  management of Crown  resources;  uphold  the  idea of the 
virtuous settler; and place ali the ills of irresponsible forest use in  the bands of"speculators" 
and "false-settlers." The main conclusions of the Commission were thus straightforward and 
unequivocal.
440  The Commission found  that there could scm·cely be a  more productive and 
respectful  relationship than  that which existed between bona fide settlers and limit-holders. 
The severa! "isolated cases" where licentiates may have been proven to be somewhat "guilty 
of injustices"  towards  settlers  were the "exceptions"  that "prove[d]  the  rule."  Complaints 
such as  the cutting of timber below allowable diameter restrictions and clear cutting of lots 
before surrendering them for settlement purposes were described as "unfounded rumours," 
spread by "specula tors disappointed  in  the  ir  schemes by the vigilance  of  the Crown  Lands 
Department."  In essence, the "scourge of  colonization," the cause of "serious  !osses to  the 
license-holders," and the principal "menace  to  the legitimately conducted lumber industry" 
were ali  attributed to the ruthless "speculators" and "interlopers" who disguised themselves 
as settlers to extract ever larger benefits from the public domain. Among the more important 
recommendations, the Commission reiterated the need to make distinctions between the land 
suitable for cultivation and that which should be strictly kept as forests;  holders of location 
tickets should be bound to sell their wood to the licensed limit bolder who previously held the 
rights  to  the said  lot; crown  land  agents  should  have the legal  authority to  cancel  any  lot 
wherein purchasers are suspected of illicit conduct; lots sold through location tickets should 
be duly registered with signed affidavits to prevent the accumulation of land by  speculators; 
and fire season should be extended to include April, May and June. 
6.4.4  Supply Guarantees: Forest Reserves Revisited 
Until  Parent held  in  his  bands  the definitive proof he  needed to  pursue the changes 
sought by  industry,  and thus alter his party's long time opposition to legislation that might 
appear to favour the forest sector over the colonization movement, he continued to grant the 
wishes  of  limit  holders  by  the  time  honoured  expedient  of orders-in-council.  As  the 
Commission proceeded with its inquiry, complaints from  limit holders kept pouring into the 
Premier's office. By 1903, the demands of the Li mit Holders'  Association became more or 
Jess consistent, incorporating the familiar refrain of depredation by settlers (legitimate or not) 
+m Sec transcription of key fi ndings and recommendations in The Canada lumberman, 1904, 25(5):20-2 1 294 
who "robb[ed}  limit holders  of their property  and the  province of its  dues  by  obtaining 
location tickets for land notoriously and manifestly unfit for cultivation and seUlement. ,m 
The problem, according to limit holders, lay  in the May 1  st deadline for requesting lots that 
were held under license to eut timber. Since most would-be settlers waited as near the closure 
date as possible before submitting a claim for the land in question, limit holders felt that such 
claims constituted nothing Jess  than a seizure of their property and a confiscation of public 
revenues.  Parent responded with his characteristic zeal and passed a succession of orders-in-
council disallowing the sale or free  grant of land in  various districts across the province.
442 
Moreover, Crown land agents were now obligated to  submit rigorous inspection reports of 
lots  requested  for  settlement  purposes  in  their  agency,  and  should  such  reports  prove 
inaccurate or incomplete, the offending agent was liable to be  dismissed from his duties. As 
always,  the Minister reserved the right to  make the  final  decision  regarding the  extent to 
which certificates ought to be issued (or not). 
Reprieve from  having to  deal with each individual case came in  the spring of 1904, 
after  the  conclusive  report  of the  Colonization  Commission  was  finally  submitted  to  the 
provincial  legislature.  With  Chrysostome  Langelier  as  the  principal  author of the  Report, 
Parent was  assured  of a  near  perfect justificatory piece  to  defend  the  pressing  legislative 
reforms that the forest industry demanded.
443  On June 2"d,  1904, the law  respecting the sale 
and  management of public lands,  woods and forests (Act 4 Ed.  VII, c.  13) was amended to 
include  many  of the  assurances  sought by  industry.  Among other things,  the  Lieutenant-
Governor  in  council  was  given  the  authority  to  classify  public  lands  according  to  their 
suitability for "cultivation" or "forest industries" (Article 1268a), and in the future, land sold 
for  colonization  purposes  could  only  be  obtained  in  areas  that  were  classified  for  such 
""1  See "Memorial of the  Quebec Limit Holders' Association  to  Hon.  SN  Parent"  (pp.9-IO), in  Copies of orders-in-council, 
documents and /el/ers on the subject ofdif.ficulties between selliers and limil holders, Return No. 135, Sessional Papers, 1903. 
442  See Sessional Paper no. 38, Sessional Papers, 1907 Vol. 40, ptJ 
-"
3  Langelier's report was large! y consistent with  his  prior beliefs. As presented bef  ore Canadian  Forestry Association in  190 1 
Langelier considered that "the pulp  industry [did] not constitute a threat or a danger in connec/ion with the preserva/ion of 
our spruce forests;  on  the contrary, il  adds  considerably  to  the productive  capacity  of  tlwse fores/s. The great, the  real 
dangers, in this respect are, inlhefirst place,fire, thenthe abuses commilled under pretext ofco lon i~a tion and wasteju./ness in 
lumbering operations,"  which  he equated to  the overexploitation of forests on land  held under location tickets.  If the boreal 
forest was affected by "the fi res started each summer by Ille lndians," the mixed forests of southern Québec were afnicted  by 
the  "Many interloping traders who lwld no tùnber licenses and use [the pre/ex/ of colonization] for securing the eut of timber 
wl!icl! they cou  id not othenvise  obtain . .. Notwitl!standing aUthe efforts of the governmentto stop these jraudulent practices, 
they are carried on an extensive scale, and this explains how so muel! land un.fit for profitablefanning is every year given over 
to colonization." See Langelier, 1901. 'The Pulp lndustry in Relation to Our Forests," Second Annual Report of the CFA, pp. 
39-47. 295 
put·poses (A1ticle 1268b). Crown Land agents were obligated to sellland (up to three hundred 
acres)  applied  for  by  bona jide settlers  (Artcle  1269),  provided  that such  settlers  make  a 
declaration un der oath that such  land shall  be used prin ci  pail y for cultivation (Article 1269a). 
The  Minister reserved  the  right to  cancel  any  sale,  grant,  lease  or  license  should  he  have 
reason to  suspect that a violation  of the  conditions  applicable  to  the  said  transactions  had 
been committed (Article 1283 -the owner or occupant was given twenty days to contest any 
such  cancellations,  Article  1288).  Saw-mill  owners  or  persons  carrying  on  the  lumber 
business may be required to declare upon oath the origin of the timber owned by them and to 
prove, if required, that such timber is  exempt from  Crown dues  (Article  1321a).  No  timber 
dues  were  to  be  exacted  from  trees  eut for  settlement purposes  (Article  1342). Owners  of 
timber limits were required to  give the owner of a location ticket a "preference" in  terms of 
cutting ''for him the merchantable timber on  such lot" (Ibid.), orto sel!  in  preference to  the 
holder of the timber license ali the timber eut by him  (Article 1343d) until the latter's license 
expired  on  the following April  30th (Article 1342,  Section 20).
444  The Lieutenant-Governor 
in council reserved the right to sel!  public lands not under license for industrial purposes upon 
conditions  which  it  alone  could  define  (Article  1343c  - thus  confirming the  right  of the 
executive to  sel!  any  section  of the  public territory without legislative approval). Finally, to 
address  the critical  shortage of wood  in  older settlements  relative  to  fuel  and  construction 
needs,  the Minister reserved the right to grant licenses to eut, on Crown lands, fire-wood and 
timber for the construction ofhouses, buildings and fences (Article 1343b'- provided there is 
no appreciable quantity of merchantable timber on the lots assigned, as amended under 5 Ed. 
VII, c.  16, 1905), along with the right to operate "sugaries" on Crown lands (Article 1343a). 
Premier Parent's  abil ity  to  savour the  successful  reinstatement of the  forest  reserve 
principle was  however eut short in the run-up to provincial elections in November 1904 when 
Joseph H.  Legris, the  Chair of the Colonization  Commission, accused  Parent of corruption 
and ofbeing overly generous to the forest industry.
445  In  spite ofwinning a landslide majority 
on November 25, dissention amongst the Liberal ranks kept growing. On February 3'ct,  1905, 
three  of Parent's  most  prominent  cabinet  ministers  (Lomer Gouin,  Adélard  Turgeon,  and 
......  In  effect, the revised regulations did  not amend the clause that was strongly  contested by lumbermen and which essentially 
enabled settlers to wait until the very end of April  to claim a parce! of land held under li cense. 
""5 See "Rapports de comités: Administration du  Département des Terres de la Couronne," in  Débats de l'Assemblée legislative, 
14mars, 1905, pp.75-113. 296 
William Alexander Weir) resigned and five  days later, sorne 44 members of the Legislative 
Assembly asked for his resignation. Lamer Gouin was appointed Premier on  March 21  stand 
with  his  no-nonsense  leadership  approach  and  strong  beliefs  in  education  and  the 
professionalization of public administration, Gouin's fifteen-year tenure in  office ultimately 
turned  Québec  into  the  leading  pulp  and  paper manufacturer of the  world,  ali  the  while 
instituting sorne of the most progressive forest legislation of the day. 
It was Gouin therefore, and his government, that ultimately gave meaning to Québec's 
forest reserves. Between 1904 and  1908, sorne  19 reserves were established in  the province, 
covering a total area of 174,064 square miles (or 450,823 km\
446 The forest reserves served 
a number of different objectives such as  watersheds maintenance (e.g., Chaudière),
447  or the 
protection  of other  valued  goods  and  services  such  as  fishing,  game-hunting  and  even 
recreation  (e.g.,  Gaspésie).  But as  specified  in  a  1906  amendment of the  law  respecting 
public  lands,
448  forest  reserves  were  to  be  established  above  ali  for  "the  production, 
conservation,  and  cultivation  of trees,"  to  ensure  "a  constant supply of timber,"  and  to 
regulate the perpetuai flow of waters originating upon su ch lands. In short, if Québec wished 
its "wood commerce ta prosper" then it was necessary "ta guarantee ta [the] forest industry 
the integrity ofits domains" and ensure [its] "continued supplies."
449 
While Gouin was as committed to economie development and industrial expansion as 
his  predecessor,  his  approach  was  more  prudent  and  mindful  of  the  administrative 
responsibilities that forestry experts and  industry leaders were by then expecting ofCanadian 
governments.  In  keeping  with  the  dominant  views  of the  period  concerning  the  need  to 
centralize resource governance and Gouin's firm intention to develop what he qualified as the 
province's "vast" and "inexhaustible" resources, the administration of the public domain was 
reorganized in  1905 to establish the Department of Lands and Forests and the Department of 
+l6 RMTF, 1908, p.xi 
...,, By order-in-council  no.235, 18 May  1906, the forest reserve on the Chaudière River was created to protect against inundation 
and  to  provide  a near constant  water supply.  See Sessional  Paper no.  103  on Forest Reserves, in  Session Papers for  19 12 
Vol.45, Part 4. 
4-18  Act 6, Ed. VII , c.  15, Section 4, Article 1340 
...,9 G. Piché, 1908. "The Forest Situation in  the Province of Que bec," Nin th An  nuai Report of CFA, p.75. 297 
Colonization, Mines, and Fisheries (Act 5 Ed. VII, c. 12).
450  Two young graduates were sent 
to  Yale University  to  complete  the  new  forestry  programme (A vila Bédard  and  Gustave 
Piché) and  to  strengthen  the  administrative capacity of the Lands and Forests Department. 
The forest (tire) protection service was created. To distance himself from  the policies of his 
predecessor and secure higher returns for the state, Gouin abandoned the system of  selling the 
rights  to  waterfalls and  rivers for the production of power and other industrial  purposes (a 
suggestion  forwarded  by  the  Colonization  Commission),  and  replaced  it  with  long  term 
leasing agreements.
45 1 In order to consolidate the remaining extent of public assets and more 
prudently di vide ungranted  lands· in  terms of cultivation or forest reserves, Gouin ordered a 
temporary  ban  on  the sale of timber  limits  in  1906.
452  And finally,  a  state-sponsored  tree 
nursery was established in  1908, in  Berthierville, to support farmers and the reforestation of 
reclaimed public lands. 
6.5  Managing Towards Conservation: Some Concluding Thoughts 
Taking advantage of the  broad set of institutional changes that were  initiated  by  his 
predecessors but completed under his watch, Gouin set out to achieve what everyone else had 
failed to do. Namely, to bring about social arder through improved settler-lumberer relations, 
a  more  equitable  sharing of benefits,  and  sustained  growth  in  this  primary  sector of the 
provincial economy. Following in  the footsteps of Simon-Napoléon Parent, Gouin believed 
that the solution to  Québec's  century-old struggle for  resource  rights  between commercial 
entrepreneurs and  proponents of an  agrarian  land  use  economy laid  in  the development of 
resource-centred  communities,  organized  around  the  mass-production  of  exportable 
commodities.  By  focusing  their attention  on the basic requirements of the  pulp and  paper 
~
50 In an  address delivered to the Legislative Assembly in  1905 on his government's programme, Gouin  underscored the value of 
the province's natural resources and  reasons for dividing administrative responsibilities as follows:  "Vraiment. il y a tant de 
richesses d'enfouies dans nos forêts, dans nos terrains miniers, dans nos pêcheries, dans nos territoires de chasse el dans nos 
elut/es  d'eau.  la  tâche  de  développer ces ressources  inépuisables  est tellement  vaste qu'il serail à propos  de  partager les 
attributions actuelles du ministre des terres; el c'est, je crois, ce qui sera fait avant longtemps. w question forestière mérite à 
elle seule  l'attention de  tout  un département. Nos  bois nous on/ rapporté,  l'an dernier, la so11une de  $1  ,167,447.63.  Il fau/ 
qu'avant dix ans nous en relirions $2,000,000." See "Le Gouvernement Gouin et son ouvre: onze années de progrès et de saine 
administration,"  1916, p. 159. Que bec. Available at [http://www .archive.org/details/legouvernementgoOOqu] 
~
5 1  See Report of the Department of Lands and  Forests for the year ending June I 906, pp.xvi-xvii. The first of sale of  16 selected 
sites  was  held  on  June 22,  1906,  but  unspecified  interference  by  the  Federal  Government  and  the  reluctance  of foreign 
investors  to  agree  to  anything  short of  a  perfect  title  resulted  in  the  sale  of  only  three sites:  Manicouagan  ($2,500/year), 
Manounan ($505/year) &  Sault au  Cochon ($805/year). In  1909, the sale of water powers called  the  Kai-Kai-Ke and Island 
Rapids on the Rivière des Quinze was authorized, subject to  investments of $250,000 and $300,000 respectively to develop 
hydro-powers, along  with  the  payment  of fixed  annual  rents of  $3,00I  and  $3,505. Leases were  written for 75 years.  See 
Return  No. 94 in Sessional Pa pers for  191  O. 
m  The ban on the sale of timber limits was maintained un  til  I 914, except for sales du ring the years 1907-08 and  I 9I 1- I 2. 298 
industry, Parent and Gouin considered that they could solve two fundamental problems with 
one able solution, i.e., employment. Hence, in order to provide pulp and paper manufacturers 
with a stable workforce, an abundant and cheep supply of resources, and an unlimited source 
of power, the competing land  use claims of the colonization movement needed to be brought 
under control and the consequent migration of French Canadians from  the outlying regions 
and  rural districts of the province to  the mill towns of North-Eastern United-States likewise 
needed to be curbed. In either case, the promise of stable employment provided the operative 
condition  to  limit the expanse of seUlement onto well-timbered lands, while stemming the 
outward flow of migrants in search of  alternative livelihoods. 
In terms of natural resource management, the piecemeal approach to timber li mit sales 
that had  so far been used to  allocate resource  rights  was  no  longer viable.  To sustain the 
supply needs of the pulp and  paper sector, government had to exercise greater control over 
land  use,  and  improve its capacity to coordinate the allocation of both resource and water 
(i.e., power) rights.  Given the upfront costs of pulp and  paper making, long term planning 
was  now essential and the development of a dedicated body of professional public servants, 
capable of carrying out such an important task was rendered crucial by  necessity.  However, 
in  a context where the knowledge and skills of department officiais was arguably limited and 
experience with such vast undertakings altogether absent, the prudent course of action was to 
create  massive  forest  reserves  that  essentially  provided  the  assurance  needed  by  an 
increasingly  voracious  industry, to  both  maintain existing operations and  stimulate further 
investments. 
Analysis of institutional change and the factors that contributed to the development of 
Québec's  forest  resource  institutions  following  Confederation  reveals  severa!  striking 
features that can be clustered around two broadly defined variables. The first deals with the 
degree or depth of awareness of human-environment interactions, and  the resulting dynamics 
of  social  and  ecological  system  components.  The  second  relates  to  the  central  role  of 
government in defining the course of political-economic affairs,  the distribution of costs and 
benefits, and the adoption or  maintenance of politically motivated institutional arrangements 
that were  not always  consistent with  the  public's interests  or the  sustainable use of forest 
resources.  Awareness  of the  role  and  importance  of forests  for  their  direct  (i.e.,  raw 299 
commodity  value of wood) and  indirect (i.e.,  environmental  services  related  to  watershed 
maintenance,  drought  control,  climate  regulation,  and  crop  protection)  utilities  grew 
considerably  between the  1870s  and  the early  1900s. Although concern for more complex 
issues such as biological diversity would take another century to develop, the recognition that 
forests  provide services that  are  fundamental  to  the  wellbeing of human societies  became 
more broadly  accepted and  discussed  during the  blte  19
111 century.  Of related  importance to 
the  rising  tied  of early  environmental  awareness,  and  of greater  significance  for  the 
development of sustainable forest resource governance, is the crucial distinction and detailed 
analytical understanding of appropriation and provisioning problems that emerged during the 
late  1870s and early  1880s.  As detailed in  the writings of Henri Joly, Benjamin Hough, and 
many  other subsequent analysts,  the  struggle to  find  durable  solutions  to  the  widespread 
problem  of deforestation  in  the  Eastern  half of continental  United  States  and  related 
decimation of Eastern  Canadian pineries stimulated the search to understand  the underlying 
dynamics of forest resource use and develop more sustainable patterns of forest exploitation. 
However, attempts by  public officiais to  deal with such emerging problems feil  short of the 
changes that were then being discussed. In  the hands of government, the joint problems of 
overexploitation and absent provisioning efforts was addressed at first through Commissioner 
Lynch's forest reserve initiative which did little more than fuel  the frustration of settlers and 
provide  unlimited  supply  guarantees  to  the forest sector.  And  after the  Conservatives  !ost 
power in  1888, the Mercier government simply struck down the forest reserves but increased 
the privileges of forest operators to the detriment of settlers by increasing the  ir rights over ali 
licensed timber limits. In short, the rights of claimants on ali  sides of the debate were shifted 
around to satisfy political expediency but the fundamental problems of overexploitation and 
utter absence of  forest res ource management or maintenance activities were left unaddressed. 
Nevertheless, evidence points to emerging distinctions in the structure of the situations 
that  different  user  groups  (i.e.,  lumbermen,  settlers,  and  farmers)  and  political  decision-
makers  faced,  and  the  development of a  more  nuanced  appreciation  of the  motives  and 
incentives that affected the choice sets of differing actors. Gradually, the picture that begins 
to emerge is of an evolving polity that was full y aware of the dynamics of the situation that 
they  confronted, and the factors  that affected public choice,  including  the concentration of 300 
rulership prerogatives, the vote motive, and  ultimately, the power and influence of economie 
imperatives. 301 
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GROWTH IMPERATIVE 
7.1  Introduction 
The  idea  of  conservation  emerged  in  a  context  of  rapid  industrial  growth, 
unprecedented  levels of resource exploitation, and  accelerating rates  of land  cover change 
that  affected  nearly  ali  of eastern  United-States  and  Canada.  Then  as  now,  conservation 
meant taking only  as  much timber as the forest could produce on  a  sustained basis,  white 
taking  care  to  maintain  the  reproductive  potential  of the  resource  systems  through:  (i) 
restoration, (ii) the protection of undergrowth, (iii) fire prevention, (iv) the improvident and 
wasteful  conversion  to  unsuitable  land  uses  (e.g.,  agriculture  in  areas  unsuited  for  such 
purposes), (v) the maintenance of naturally occurring variability, both in  terms of structure 
and  composition,  (vi)  better  alignment of human  manufacturing  and  natural  reprod~ctive 
capacities, and the  (vi) the development of higher end-uses that could maxim ize social and 
economie  returns  (e.g.,  employment and  profit)  white  reducing  aggregate demand  on  the 
forests  themselves  (see  Chapters  IV to  VI,  as  weil  as  this  one).  Consequently,  if forest 
resource use was to  become a sustainable proposition, then user-groups and managers had to 
maintain  demand  within  bounds  and  minimize  observed  appropriation  externalities  (  e.g., 
overexploitation,  soil  erosion,  flooding,  changes  in  resource  system  composition,  rent 
dissipation,  increased operational and transactions costs, reductions in  the size and  value of 
timber,  increased  fire  hazards,  etc).  And  second,  to  correct  past  mistakes  and  increase 
productivity in  managed areas, appropriators and resource owners (whether public or private) 
had  to  contribute  to  costs  of  maintaining  such  systems,  both  to  stimulate  near-term 
productivity  and  enhance  the  long-terrn  viability  of forests  to  support  human  social-
ecological  welfare
453 (e.g., improve understanding of forest dynamics, planned and rnanaged 
"53  As discussed in the previous and current chapters, evidence clearly shows thal people were weil  aware  of the provisioning 
and  regulation services  thal forests  provided, as weil  as  their own socio-economic dependence on  such  services. The  term 
"social-ecological  welfare"  is  used  berc  to  translate  the  literai and  visceral  understanding  of  human  dependence  on  such 
ecosystcm services - as discusscd during the late  19'h  and carly 20'h  centuries - while recognizing that the use of such terms 
stems from 21" ccntury scientific contributions. 306 
· interventions,  fire  control,  reforestation  where appropriate,  monitoring and  enforcement of 
regulatory measures, etc.). Then (e.g., Hough,  1880) as  now (e.g., Ostrom et al. , 1994), the 
struggle to solve these two fundamental dilemmas remain crucial to any meaningful  effort to 
manage forests on a sustainable basis. 
White these and other related issues helped infonn discussions on the art and  science 
of forest  resource  management at  the  turn  of the  20
111  century,
454  the  application  of such 
principles in the context of legislative reforms was decidedly more limited. In  its  legal form 
(e.g.,  1883 Vict. 46, c.  9 &  1904, Act 4 Ed. VII, c.  13), conservation merely implied: (i) the 
creation  of forest  reserves  to  secure  the  supply  needs  of the  forest  sector  and  reduce 
encroachment by  settlers,  (ii)  fire  prevention  through  education  and  the  creation of "fire 
districts"  in  areas  adjacent to  forest  reserves,  and  (iii)  the  use  of diameter restrictions  to 
sustain the growth of smaller-sized trees. As the resource needs of the pulp and paper sector 
increased, efficiency became a corollary of  sound conservation management. 
However,  in  a  context  of  increasing  industrialization  where  the  standard  for 
performance was (and  remains) economie growth, it was but a question of time before the 
Jimited  constraints of legislated  conservation  efforts  would  begin  to  hinder the  expansive 
tendencies and growth of the forest sector. To secure the  interests of industrialists, a  more 
flexible conception was needed to  increase harvestable yields while seemingly  maintaining 
the long-term reproductive potential of forest resource systems. Science, it was believed, and 
the  emerging  field  of forest  science  in  particular,  provided  the  necessary  assurance  for 
moving beyond the limited precautionary measures ofthe day (e.g., diameter restrictions) to 
predict resource flows over increasingly large areas and longer time horizons.  In the process, 
experience was  replaced  by  expertise,  and  the  idea that  a  resource system  could  only  be 
managed within comprehensible and comprehensive  limits  was summarily neglected. Even 
though forest operators had historically proven themselves  of being  incapable of exercising 
restraint or judgement in  the use of available resources- and at scales that were considerably 
closer  to  what human's  could  reliably  imagine  and  experience - the  power of scientific 
management lay  in  the  promise  that  it  would correct past  mistakes  and  optimize  resource 
extraction  at  scales  that  were  heretofore  unimagined.  But whether  or not  operators  were 
.,. For example, see proceedings/discussions in  the Reports of the an nuai meetings of the Canadian Forestry Association. 307 
correct  in  their  assumptions  and  models  mattered  little,  since  government  had  a  vested 
interest  in  maintaining the  forest  industry  afloat (especially the  pulp  and  paper sector)  and 
excessive  appropriation  could  always  be  compensated  with  fresh  supplies  in  what  seemed 
like  an  endless  storehouse  of pulp-wood,  having  already  written-off  any  likelihood  of 
sustaining the once majestic pineries and valuable hard wood forests of southern Que bec. 
This  chapter considers  how  forest  governance  institutions  in  Québec evolved  from  a 
conservation-centered approach to  a forest management paradigm, predicated upon the belief 
of a  knowable  and  objectively  identifiable  maximum  annual  allowable  eut  that  could  be 
sustained  indefinitely.  The  failure  of either  systems  to  achieve  sustainable  and  equitable 
outcomes,  along  with  the  critical  role  of government  in  selecting  and  encouraging  such 
developments constitute the underlying narrative that ties the chapter together. 
7.2  Conservation and its Limitations 
In spite of the many changes introduced by Gouin during his first years as Premier, ali 
was  not  going weil  with  the  revised  system  of public forest administration.  Amongst other 
things, the conservation measures adopted by  Gouin  and his government did  little to address 
the  provisioning  (i.e.,  maintenance)  and  appropriation  problems,  which  Henri  Joly  and 
Benjamin  Hough  had  underscored  a  few  decades  earlier, nor  did  it  limit entry  for  either 
lumbering or  settlement purposes. As  the Minister of Lands  and  Forests, Adélard Turgeon, 
recognized  in  1908, forest reserves were decidedly not a panacea against overexploitation by 
lum berers, or the steady thrust of the colonization movement: 
"[I]f one may judge by the many retrenchments and the changes they are constant/y 
undergoing, the samefate awaits them, a little slower perhaps, but just as surely."
455 
In  the Chaudière-Appalaches region  for  instance, one officer of the Lands and Forests 
division  reported  in  1908  that speculation  sparked  by  rising  demand  for  pulp  wood, easy 
access  (railway  and  river),  and  proximity  to  the  American market ali  combined  to  create 
conditions that could only be described as unsustainable: 
455 RMLF, 1908, p. vii. 308 
"[T]he quantity of trees felled every year is enormous, so much so that they will soon 
have ruined who le townships. The  volume of  the rivers has .. .perceptibly decreased, the 
regularity of the ir flow is  a thing of the past  ... The pulp wood trade has not brought 
about the rapid development of  the new parishes or made many settlers rich. The older 
settlers  say  there  is  more  poverty  now  that  the  fields  are  deserted  and farming 
languishes .. .For the  satisfaction and well-being of a small number, the forests  have 
been  impoverished and the  baleful  consequences  of such  deforestation  will  be felt 
before long, iffictitious settlers and speculators cannat be discovered and stopped" .
456 
Moreover, in  spite of added efforts to better control the demands that were then being 
placed on  cultivable lands, "careful examination clearly  show[ed} that many letters patent 
[were]  issued on  information and certificates  that [were} part/y erroneous and sometimes 
complete/y inaccurate. "
457 
In theory, lots held under location tickets were liable for the payment of dues on timber 
eut  in  excess  of the  ten  per  cent  acreage  that  settlers  were  obliged  to  bring  under 
cultivation.
458  However, few (if any) settlers ever bothered to report the actual amount of land 
that was eut over or the quantity of wood that was harvested. Complicating matters further 
still  was  the  fact  that  sorne  400  to  500  square  miles  of licensed  territory  were  annually 
withdrawn from  limit holders and placed in  the hands of settlers for colonization purposes. 
While  sorne  considered  this  system  to  be  an  injustice  (see  below),  others  found  distinct 
advantages  since  it  gave  firms  operating  near  colonization  townships  the  opportunity  to 
purchase  timber  that  was  free  (though  seldom  legally  free)  of additional  duties  and 
unhindered by diameter restrictions
459  (see Table 7.1  below). 
456 Ibid., pp. vii-viii 
457 Ibid., p. viii 
458  Ibid. , p. 203 (Appendix no. 53). As amended under Act 6 Ed. VII, c. 15, s. 5 (1905), settlers were obligated to clear ten per 
cent of their property in the performance of their settlement duties. This was raised to fïfteen percent under Article 1632 of Act 
8, Ed. VII, c. 7,s. 5 ( 1908). 
459 Ibid., p. 204 309 
Table 7.1 The Source ofPulp Wood in  1908 
FIRM  FROM CROWN LANDS (Ft.B.M.)  FROM  PRIVA TE LAND (Ft.B.M) 
Chitoutimi Pulp Co. 
Priee Bros. 
Atkinson (Chaudière) 
Métis Lumber Co. 
Belgo-Canadmn Pulp and Paper Co. 
Laurentide Pulp and  Paper Co. 
J.R. Booth 
4,452,000 
12,000,000 
1,000,000 
8,000,000 
15,000,000 
35,000,000 
25,000,000 
4,854,000 
6,000,000 
10,000,000 
8,000,000 
8,500,000 
4,000,000 
25,000,000 
Source:  Report of the Minister of Lands and Forests for the year ending June 1908, p. ix, Sessional Papers No. 3, 1908-09. 
So considerable was the quantity of timber taken from  private land (whether patented 
or in the process thereof) that the Superintendent of Woods and Forests, Paul Blouin, thought 
it  impossible  to  tell  just how  much  wood  was  being  produced  by  settlers.  For  instance, 
exports of unprocessed pulp wood to the United States (which was essentially eut on private 
land)  went from  30,360  cords  in  1901  to  720,639  cords  in  1908  (equal  to  432,383,400 
ft.B.M.), ofwhich, only 147,159 cords was believed to have been taken from public lands.
460 
In  addition  to  the  export of sorne  344,088,000 feet  of pulp wood
461  from  private sources, 
another  100,000,000  feet  was  sold  directly  to  local  pulp  and  paper  manufacturers  to 
supplement their operations in  1908, and a no-less sizeab1e quantity of wood was likely sold 
to the many sawmills that pocketed the country-side and over which, the government lacked 
any form of control.
462  Regardless of how high these numbers might seem, it remains that no 
one actually knew how  much wood was being eut each year (whether on  public or private 
lands), how much of it was consumed locally, and how much was exported (see Section 7.2.1 
below). 
As the interest of large capital holders shifted from the square timber and sawn lumber 
industries to  pulp  and  paper manufacturing, the  door was  left open for smaller sawmilling 
-l60  Figures for pulp wood ex ports and production during this period are blatantly inconsistent. For instance, the numbers used for 
1908 (i.e., 720,639 cords) are drawn from the RMLF, pages xi-xii. However, in  the annual tabulated index  of pulp and paper 
production that was introduced to the Minister's reports during the  1910s (e.g., Appendix no. 15 for the  1932-33 report) total 
production for  1908  was  registered  at 939,646  cords  (of  unspecifïed sources)  of  which, 683,803  or 72,7  % was  exported. 
Moreover, official  numbers  upon  which  timber  dues  were  charged  (Appendix  no.  16  of  RMLF,  1908)  shows  that  total 
production  for  the  said  year was equal  to 359,858  cords.  Along similar !ines, results  for  1901  were  taken from  a  report 
provided by  the Superintendent of Woods and Forests, Paul Blouin, printed in "Discours de l'Hon. Parent,"  1903, p.25. Given 
that over fïfty percent of pulp wood produced in  Quebcc was exported until  at !east 1914, and that, according to J.C. Langelier 
(Sixth  Annual Report of the CFA, 1905, p.8 1) total pulpwood production in  1901  was 526,865 cords, it is simply impossible 
that only 30,360 cords were exported for that year. 
461  A sum equal to 573,480 cords, or 720,639 cords (total) minus the  147,159 cords taken from public lands. 
462  RMLF, 1908, p. 204. 310 
operations to  set-up shop throughout rural  Québec, and since the establishment of industry 
was seen as  a  positive statement of the province's growing economie health,  no  effort was 
ever made to control the potential for over-entry that high commodity priees commanded.
463 
Consequently,  when  the  Minister  of Lands  and  Forests  boasted  of the  31  new  wood 
processing  plants  (including  both  sawn  lumber  and  pulp  and  paper  mills)  that  were 
establ ished between 1897 and  1907, attention was directed solely on the $14,252,800 in  new 
investments  that were  made  possible  by  the  policies  of the  Liberal  government,  and  the 
estimated  8,585  new  jobs that  would  be  created  in  Québec's  growing regional  economy. 
Whether or not such industries could be sustained was beside the point.
464 
Underlying this frenzy of development was the system that essentially allowed private 
entrepreneurs to use public forests as  collateral for private loans. Proudly, Minister Turgeon 
claimed in  1907, the right to  use concessions to sec  ure credit "helped to powerfully transform 
immense are as  that had, until then, be en ignored and left a/most entirely unproductive.  "
465 
To support the ongoing capital  needs of industry, limit holders gained the right to mortgage 
public lands  in  1912, thus setting the stage for a problem that no  one likely foresaw  at the 
time.  As the Québec Association of Forest Engineers explained in their extensive review of 
Québec's forestry  problems in  1949, up  until the advent of the pulp and paper industry, the 
capital costs of forestry operations were minimal, but the situation drastically changed with 
industrialization: 
"L'installation d'une usine à pate et papier exige en soi de fort déboursés et, chez nous 
du  moins,  elle  doit toujours  s'appuyer sur une  réserve  de  matière premières qui en 
garantit le fonctionnement pour plusieurs années. On aurait peut-être pu réaliser les 
capitaux nécessaires en émettant seulement des actions ordinaire sou privilégiées, et 
en ne grevant pas de garanties hypothécaires à Long terme la forêt dont la tenure, dans 
l'esprit de  la  Loi, est essentiellement précaire puisque La  licence d'exploitation est, de 
part cette  loi  et les  règlements  est renouvelable  annuellement.  Malheureusement,  il 
n'en a pas été ainsi, de sorte que  tout notre domaine forestier concédé en limites et 
situé  dans  la  section  la  plus  avantageuse  de  la  province,  tant  au  point  de  vue 
accroiisement  qu'accessibilité,  est depuis  plusieurs  années  surchargé  de  dettes  de 
plusieurs  centaines  de millions  dont  le public  est devenu  L e  créancier . .. .[Et]  cette 
formidable hypothèque n'a pas tendance à s'amortir  .. .puisque l'actif qui pourrait être 
-l63  Strong belief in self-regulating capacity of markets was another source of over entry, which Joly ( 1878) and Bouchette ( 1906) 
both criticized. 
464 RMTF, 1907, p. viii. 
465 Ibid.,  p.ix 311 
représenté par la valeur foncière des forêts concédées dans les livres de la province se 
trouve réduit d'autant. "
466 
Hence, over time, the pulp and  paper industry  not only decimated the most productive 
and accessible forests in the province, it also crippled the public with debt and left in  its wake 
a valueless asset that would take years to re-establish.
467 
Returning  to  the  industrialisation  strategy  pursued  by  Gouin  and  his  government 
during  the  first  years  of office,  the  thrust  of development  could  not  endlessly  stimulate 
demand  without  incurring  a  similar  reaction  on  the  supply  side.  As  manufacturing 
infrastructures  increased, so  did  demand  for  private  land  hold  on  account  of the  timber it 
offered.
468  An example of the  ineffectual boundary  rules  used  to  allocate land  for  settlement 
purposes was  given by  one Crown Lands Agent in  a letter to the then Minister of Lands and 
Forests,  Jules  Allard,  in  January  1910.
469  The  problem  was  again  tied  to  the  practice  of 
submitting demands for lots held  under license in the months or weeks leading up to the May 
1  st  deadline  to  leave  as  little  time  as  possible  for  the  limit  holder  to  react  and  remove 
merchantable timber.
470  In  one area,  the Agent commented, some  50 sawmills were counted 
in  a radius of 45  miles, "and each of  these mills needs timber" - causing  "a host of  timber 
buyers ... seek[ing} to get the wood at any cost." So  lucrative were the potential earnings  that 
even  priests  and  other  community  leaders  were  cited  as  being  involved  in  racketeering 
schemes designed to  buy timber from  unwary settlers for half its market value, only  to sell  it 
back to local mi lis for twice the amount paid for.
471 And like their predecessors half a century 
466  Association des  Ingénieurs  Forestiers  du Québec,  1949. Le  problème forestier du  Québec.  Montréal, Fides, bibliothèque 
économique et sociale, pp.  19-20. 
-l6
7 These issues are discussed further in subsequent sections of this chapter. 
468  RMTF,  1908,  p.  204.  Blouin  states:  "nos  terres  vendues  et  patentees  pour  la  culture  servent  surtout  à  l'exploitation 
forestière, pour la ruine de nos forêts el sans donner de revenue au trésor." 
-l6
9 See Sessional Paper no. 26, Sessional Papers, 1912, Vol. 45, pt.4, p.6-7 
470  ln spite of repeated demands by limit holders, the law  respecting the rights of settlers (legitimate or not) to claim land  held 
under licence and obtain  the same on the fïrst day of May following (Article 1633 of the Revised Statutes of 1909) was left 
unchanged until  1924. ln  the mean time, petitions by  limit-holders continued to flow into the Minister's office and positively 
responded to without ever validating the suitability of the land for agricultural purposes, as the law  required. For example, see 
Return No. 50 in Session al Papers for 1908: "Copies of  ail orders-in-council ...  relating to the assurance givento certain timber 
license-lwlders thal no .. farming or sel/lementlols wou id be grantedfor agricu/tural or colonization purposes." 
471  Ibid, pp.l-6 312 
earlier, modern  "pretending settlers" actually "care[d}  nothing for the oath required by the 
form of  application. "
472 
7.2.1  Appropriation and Provisioning Patterns and Problems 
As shown in Table 7.2 below, the gross earnings of the Lands and Forest Department 
increased from  $543,518  in  1881  to $1 ,234,072 in  1901, and  reached $3,035,360 by  1921. 
While  revenue  would  keep  on  increasing (save  the six year period  that marked  the  Great 
Depression),  its  overall  contribution  to  the total  revenue of the  province steadily  declined 
from  an  average ofnearly 27% prior to  1901  to  12% in  1931  and only 6% in  1951. Square 
timber production (pine) steadily declined from  3,145,687 cubic feet in  1891  to just 67,154 
cubic feet in  1901, and by  1922, the last recorded year for such timber, the volume produced 
was 7,533 cubic feet.  ln contrast~  pulp wood production doubled from  1901  (526,865 cords) 
to  1911  (1,026,562 cords). It increased to  3,350,231  cords in  1929,  and  kept going strong 
after the great depression. By  1951, overall  production had more than doubled the average 
an nuai production of the 1920s (i.e., 7,412,677 cords) which, according to the most respected 
experts of the day  (  circa 1920), was considered utterly unsustainable sin  ce not a single firm 
was able to meet its manufacturing targets using the limits it disposed of (unless fundamental 
changes  were  introduced  to  allow  more  intensive  practices,  which  obviously  does  not 
contribute to  more sustainable production - see discussion below). As for the sawn lumber, 
declared  production  volumes  (since  most  of the  production  arose  from  private  land  and 
therefore  not  monitored)  hovered  below  600  million  board  feet  until  the  1940s,  but  rose 
sharply to 1.2 billion board feet in  1951 . However, if one adds estimates of ali other types of 
sawn  wood  production  (e.g.,  shingles,  lathwood,  poles,  posts,  etc)  and  that  which  was 
believed  to  be  taken  private  land,  the  Ministry  of Lands  and  Forests  considered  that 
production for  1921, for instance, was at !east 2,449,751 ,572 (ft.b.m.), nearly four times the 
amount reported in the annual tables produced for such purposes. 
472  Ibid, p.7. Declarations upon oath  to deter illegal  appropriation were initiated in  the  1840s and  re-introduced thereafter with 
the same limited success. 313 
Table 7.2Production Estimates 
Y EAR  PULPWOOD  PULPWOOD  SQUARE TIMBER  SAWN LUMBER  REVENUES ($)  % OF TOTAL 
(CORDS)  EX PORTS (CORDS)  (FT')  (FT.B.M)  REVENUE 
187 1  ...  ...  3,983,458  19,857,667  460,480  32 
188 1  ...  ...  1,596,243  28,557,933  543,518  22 
189 1  109,333  ...  3,145,687  493,025,600  646,237  21 
190 1  526,865  30,360  67,154  594,892,400  1,234,072  32 
1911  1,026,562  636,136  71,601  756,508,000  1,126,907  17 
192 1  1,713,123  601,846  48,624  640,334,000  3,035,360  22 
1929  3,350,23 1  512,872  ...  625,808,000  5,178,511  ... 
193 1  2,940,376  323,507  ...  399,581,000  2,393,639  12 
1941  5,103,95 1  323,301  ...  927,287,000  6,313,841  Il 
195 1  7,412,677  557,274  ...  1,239,090,000  15,714,128  6 
Source:  Production  estimates  taken  from  Annual  Reports  of Minister  of Lands  and  Forests.  Total  revenue 
percentage  taken  from  Gow  (1986,  p.  394).  Pulpwood  production  figures  for  1891  and  190 1  taken  from 
presentation by J.C.  Langelier during the 1901 and  1905 Annual Meetings of the Canadian Forestry Association. 
Figures  related  to  the  quantity  of wood  taken  from  public  and  private  lands,  total 
production  value,  estimated  returns  for  the  State,  annual  yield  estimates,  manufacturing 
investments, and so forth, were  of crucial importance to  the  province, both from a  political 
standpoint and  an economie  perspective.  However, because numbers bore such significance 
for  defending  one's  political  record,  policies,  management  strategy,  or the  failure  of  the 
system altogether, the actual amount of wood that was annually eut, processed and sold  can 
be excruciatingly  difficult  to  ascertain. Operators  were  motivated to  declare  Jess than what 
they took,  politicians and  senior bureaucrats  were  motivated  to  show  positive  results,  and 
skeptics  or members  of the  official  Opposition  faced  strong  incentives  to  skew  numbers 
either way, depending on their interest. 
Using pulpwood production data (of unknown sources) for 1891  to calculate Québec's 
baseline  consumption  (i.e.,  65,595,500  ft.b.m)  multiplied  by  ten,  to  obtain  an  "extreme 
figure," Québec's  Superintendent of Forest Rangers, J.C. Langelier, estimated that  it would 314 
take  1,103 years (in  1901) before forests were exhausted.
473  However, given th at "a spruce 
forest re news itself  in fifteen or twenty years" wh  en  "operations are carried on in a wise and 
provident  manner,  Langelier  concluded  that  "spruce  forests  are  practically 
inexhaustible. ,.m  Four  years  later,  before  the  same  audience,  Langelier  revised  his 
predictions based on pulp wood consumption in  1901  (i.e., 316,095,000 ft.b.m) and estimated 
that it  would in  fact take 334 years to consume the remainder of Québec's forests.
475  While 
optimistic  that  such  levels  of  appropriation  could  be  sustained  indetinitely,  Langelier 
cautioned that when lumbermen "apprehend that they are to !ose the fruit oftheir labour and 
wise husbandry,  through the  invasion of  colonization, they quite naturally  try  to make the 
most out of  the situation.  "
476  But as  a representative of the provincial government, Langelier 
again failed  to âcknowledge the fact that the  rules  that allowed  settler encroachment onto 
licensed timber berths were  in  fact set by  government, and that failure  to  enforce existing 
regulations was not the fault of settlers, lumberers or speculators but of government itself. As 
the chiefforester of  the Laurentide Pulp and Paper Company, Ellwood Wilson, put it, 
"Government has the right at any time to  open up lands under license for seulement, 
without in any way compensating the holder for the loss of  his timber. ft grants him the 
right to  remove the timber before the date on which he must renew his license, but as 
the settler usually waits until within a few weeks or da ys of  this date be  fore making his 
application, the  limit ho/der has no opportunity to  remove the timber. This method of 
.  1  l  dfi  l  'l''  .  " 477  opemng t œ  an  or se tt ement amounts to conJ tscatwn. 
In  effect,  Wilson  furthered,  limit  holders  held  "no  guarantee ... that  a  change  in 
Government"  would  "not result in  an  increase  in  ground rent and stumpage  dues,"  thus 
rendering  his  operations  entirely  unprotitable.
478  Given  the  perception  that "government" 
merely "gives with one hand and takes back with  the other,"  Wilson later underscored that 
473  Langelier, J.C.,  1901 . 'T he  Pulp  Industry  in  Relation  to  Our Forests,"  in  Report  of the  Second Annual Meeting of CFA , 
Government Printing Bureau:  Ottawa, pp. 40-41 . 
474 Ibid., p. 42. 
475  Langelier, J.C.,  1905. "Forest Wealth  of the Province of Quebec,"  in  Report of  the Sixth Annua/ Meeting of  the CFA.  p.82. 
Again Langelier maintained that if Quebec's forests were "protected against fi  re and prudent/y husbanded,"  then they would 
be "practically exhaustless." 
476  Ibid.,  p.83.  With  this  admission,  Langelier  contradicted  one  of  the  major  findings  of  the  report  he  authored  for  the 
Colonization Commission, wherein  he  refuted  claims  that Iumbermen tend  to clear ail  merchantable  timber from land  held 
under licence bef  ore the same could be transferred to senlers. 
4n  Report of the Tenth Annual Meeting of the CFA, 1909, p. 138. 
478 Ibid. , p. !40. 315 
operators were understandably hesitant "ta spend money on forestry work and then have the 
land taken away, and the benefit oftheir investment and work given ta sorne body else."
479 
But the challenge of sustainable forest resource use  in  Québec, and the perennial issue 
of inadequate efforts to  maintain forest productivity went further than the problem of tenure 
insecurity. As a stark reminder of the challenges that continue to plague the province's forest 
sector to this very day, Langelier attributed the near impossible task of investing in  resource 
maintenance to  two factors. First, government did  not have "the means ta  carry on a system 
of silviculture" that could produce appreciable results over as large a terri tory as Québec. And 
second,  most  of its  "public  lands  are  in  the  hands  of  capitalists  who  have  invested  their 
money in forest as a business matter and who cannat reasonably be expected ta  adopt any 
new system of forest management,  unless the ultimate returns are shawn ta  be greater than 
those  accruing from  the  ordinary  methods  of lumbering."  Citing  observations  made  by 
Professor  Bernard  Fernow  at  the  1902  meeting  of the  Canadian  Forestry  Association,
480 
Langelier furthered  that "the only reason for lumbermen and most private owners  ta adopt 
forestry  is  the jinancial one."
481  Unless  it  pays  to  invest  in  more  effective and  sustainable 
resource management efforts, few will be tempted to spend the additional resources needed to 
achieve such  ends. While severa!  firms  such as  the Belgo-Canadian and the Laurentide Pulp 
& Paper Companies actively sought to restock harvested areas as early as  1905,
482  Langelier 
believed that the  practice of forestry  in Québec was  invariably "limited ta protection against 
jire and the  inroads  of  timber pirates  raiding  the forest under  the pretence of  promoting 
colonization." Anything  resembling  a "sustained yield,"  as  "considered ... in  Europe"  must 
"be given up as impracticable, for the present. "
483 
If "[t]he average lumberman can not be expected ta go far in  conservative methods, 
unless  he  contemplates  a  long  future  for  his  business,  or  is  compensated  by  the 
community,"
484 and  govemment, acting in  lieu of the community, did  not have the  means or 
479 Report of the  Ninth An nuai Meeting of the CFA, 1908, p.49. 
480  Sec Fernow's discussion on the financial imperative  in  the Report of  the Third Annual Meeting of  the CFA, 1902, pp. 110-
114: "tliere are many things which we know to be the rightthings to do, and yet we are unable to do them, because offinancial 
limitations" (p. 11 3). 
481 See "Forest Wealth of the Province of Quebec," p.84 
482  RMTF, 1906, p. xiii 
483  Sec "Forest Wealth of the Province of Quebec,"  p.84 
484 Sec "The Forest Necessities Of Canada," in Report of the Ninth An nuai Meeting of  the CFA, 1908, pp. 102-103 316 
resources to induce more sustainable behaviours, then the widely held assumption that only 
public resource governance could possibly secure the long term interests of the country was 
indeed quite thin.
485  As C.A.  Schenck
486  emphasized as early as  1901, since private investors 
are  unlikely  to  capture the  full  benefits of improved sustainability,  including the  positive 
externalities of environmental services, appropriators will  naturally face strong incentives to 
overexploit the system for their own benefit, especially if they do not bear the costs of their 
decisions.  In other words, without proper constraints or inducements,  limit holders can be 
expected to act upon their self-interest and  limit any  action that does  not bear the fruit of 
direct economie returns: 
"[T]he gross returns from forestry practised  by the  commonwealth are  not tangible 
goods only; the yield of  the forest consists, to a large extent, of  safety, of  assistance, of 
insurance furnished to  the  people and to  their  industrial  vocations (i.e., navigation, 
water supply, irrigation, agriculture, public health, and the protection of  property from 
floods). Within the forest itseif, these  "indirect" blessings are scarcely ever felt. Hence 
the private individual owning forests does not care to produce them: the pennies saved 
are  not saved for  him. ln addition,  "indirect"  revenue  cannat be  derived from  the 
forest  in  many  a  case  without  curtailing  the  "direct"  monetary  revenue.  Private 
forestry, left to itselj, cannat be expected to meet the combined tasks. Where the private 
forests form a small percentage only of the total forest-area of a country, no harm is 
do ne by disregarding them. ln the opposite case, the liberties of  the private owner must 
be restricted  with  reference to  the free  disposition over woodlands (as  was do ne  in 
Europe since centuries), or else the owner must be continually driven, at the expense of 
the people by financial  inducements, towards that forestal practice, which makes the 
forest  a  source of direct and indirect revenue.  Whether  it  is  not preferable for the 
government to practice forestry on its own account, rather than to  enter the slippery 
raad of inducements and bounties,  is  a question open since Adam Smith's time. Only 
thorough  appreciation  of the  economie  and politic  sphere  of a  country  [can  one] 
solv[e] the problem in a given case."
487 
While a  number of firms  did their best to  maintain the long  term  perspective that is 
central to the application of "conservation methods"  (see ongoing discussion in subsequent 
485  The inherent superiority of public ownership, as a  means to  safeguard forests  resources from  the  inevitable greed of self-
interested actors is a dominant theme in la te  19'h century - earl y 20'h century literature. 
486 'The Commercial Side of Governmental  and  Private Forestry: Factors Underlying Conservative Utilization," in Report of  the 
Second Annual Meeting of the  CFA,  1901 , pp. 53-59.  ln  his analysis, Schenck goes on to state that: Forestry investments, like 
t!wse of  railroads and insu rance companies, are as a rule long ti me investments. The forest  er is campe/led to look far a  head 
into the .future.  ln many a case the teachings of  his tory throw !ight into the darkness of  coming events. 1 have no lime to dilate 
on the indirect utility of  the forest, of the forest as a h.ealer, of  the forest as the regula/or ofwater and navigation, of  the forest 
as  an  employer to the wage-earner. The indirect utility of the forest is  apparent/y most highly appreciated where no forest 
exists. ln  the United States  millions of dollars are 5pent for raising forests  in  the treeless regions, and scarce!y a cent for 
preventing forests from /osing ground on soi! fit for timber production only . 
..,, Ibid., pp.57-58. 317 
sections), the inconsistency of institutional interplay, created by the dominant imperatives of 
industrialization and  economie  growth and  the  corresponding  challenge of competing  land 
use  claims  by  different  user  groups,  ultimately  rendered  the  possibility  of sustainable 
resource use impracticable.
488 
The  other  notable  challenge  to  sustainability  was  the  permanent  problem  of  rule 
enforcement.  In  terms  of  colonization  and  tire  protection,  legislative  measures  were 
essentially  considered  adequate  to  achieve  their  intended  objectives  if  "thoroughly 
observed, " as  Langelier put it. 
489  The problem however, was that  "when it cames to  ... strict 
enforcement, political influence interposes and the best interest of  the province is removed to 
the  back  ground."
490  More  often  than  not,  forest  rangers  were  selected  because of their 
political  connections,  as  opposed  to  their  knowledge  and  willingness  to  work  in  adverse 
conditions.  Consequently,  en  forcement left much to be desired. Diameter restrictions on eut 
timber were difficult to enforce due to the inability of most forest rangers to distinguish tree 
species,  and  the  most  basic  duties  of monitoring  and  enforcement  werè  left  unattended 
because the said rangers seldom if ever visited lumbering operations.
49 1 In fact, forest ran ge r~ 
had so  little credibility  amongst jobbers,
492  lumbermen, and settlers that the population as a 
whole openly mocked them: 
"There has been no attempt to  enforce laws in the back districts. The settlers and the 
rural population are absolutely defiant of  the laws." Consequent/y, "it is impossible to 
get re  fiable and honest men who will go  out there and do  the ir duty [. . .]. Most .. .men 
get very small salaries, ... [have] an enormous territory ta  caver, ...  lack train[ing]," 
and "lack .. .sympathy among the people."
493 
488  For  a  detailed  discussion  on  the  problems  of fit,  interplay  and  scale  applicable  to  the  institutional  dimensions  of 
environmental change, see Oran Young (2002). 
489  Langelier, J.C., 1905. "Forest Wealth of the Province of Quebec,"  in Report of  the Si.xth An nuai Meeting of  the CFA, p. 85. 
From  the  report of  the  Colonization Commission, Langelier cites: "The  staff cha.rged with  this service  are  loo  subject lo 
politica.l  influences  ta perjorm  rh.eir dulies  wilh  rhe  energy and independence  which atone  can secure ils effecriveness.  ln 
severa/ cases polirical influence !tas causee!  1/ze post of  forest ranger ra be en/rusted ro men who have neil/ter rhe activiry nor 
the a  bi  lily  required ta properly Jill  a.  posilion upon which depends /he preservation of  rhe grea/es/ source of  weallh of  the 
province." 
490 Ibid. 
491 RMTF, 1906, p.xiv. 
492  "Jobber" was a colloquial term  used in  reference to the contracter or foreman hired by  limit holders to carry out harvesting 
operations.  The  term  gained  widespread  acceptance  in  both  English  and  French  in  the  later  half  of the  19'h century  (see 
MacKay,2007, pp. 153-157). 
493  See Wilson, Ellwood ( 1909) "Forestry and Lumbering in Northern Que bec," in  Report of  /he Tenth Annual Meeling  of  the 
CFA. p.l41. 318 
Moreover, decried Ellwood  Wilson, "government officers [i.e., cullers} charged with 
the  duty of seeing to  the following of these  rules,"  had  such "insufficient knowledge  and 
training"  and  were  "so  over  burdened with  work that  they  [could}  not  look out for  the 
government interest."
494  Obligations such as  the duty to eut timber no  more than a foot from 
the base ofthe tree orto account for ali trees used in  Jogging operations (i.e., timber used for 
skids, corduroy roads, bridges, lodged in trees, or left on the ground) were left unattended.
495 
Renee,  the  underlying  threat  to  forest  conservation  was  not  so  much  the  fact  that 
anyone could obtain seUlement rights to areas that were utterly unfit for cultivation but that 
they were explicitly allowed to do so  by the very absence of any effective system of public 
administration and the  Jack  of investment to  support existing measures.
496  For instance,  to 
cover an area equal to 63,000 square miles in 1903, the government employed 99 fire rangers 
at the cost of $17,000  in  salaries and  expenses (half of which were paid by  limit-holders), 
while the receipts from  woods and forests  brought to the provincial treasury $1,241,814 for 
the same year.
497  However,  Wilson contended that the  problems went far deeper since the 
Department did  not appear to have any definitive form of administration that could provide 
even the semblance of a coordinated effort on the part of government. There was "no definite 
plan .. .for selecting lands for settlement" and "no effort to skilfully or even carefully examine 
soil  conditions."  Instead,  "lands  are  allotted practically  wherever  the  intending colonist 
wishes, and this  ...  enabled many speculators" to take up  land for the timber itself. In  sum, 
the  "[l]aws  regarding seUlement conditions and duties  [were  left}  unenforced,  certificates 
[were} falsely sworn and ...  the lack of  trained and reliable rangers nullifie[d}" the efficacy 
of  "rules and regulations."
498 
4
"-' Ibid., see p.l40. 
495  Ibid., Wilson states: "The Governmenl have a regulation thal the stump can be eut no higher than one foot from the swell of 
the roofs, and you can go anywhere between the Lake St. John region and the head of  the Ma.llawa River, which is almost to 
the head of  the Rideau River, and you won'l Ji nd a stump in the cuttings IWo years ajler thal is under three fee/ high, and in the 
Lake St. John region you will fi  nd stumpsfive or six fee/ high. 
496  See  Report  of the  Sixth  Annual  Meeting  of the  CFA ,  1905,  pp.88-89.  William  Little  argued  that  "the  plea  made  by 
[succeeding] Crown Lands Commissioners" for grea ter control over the activities of settlers was nothing more than "an excuse 
for their  imprudent düposal of timber  limits at  the merest trifle of tl1eir value"  and  that  of the  "careless lumbermen thal 
conducttheir operations in a wasteji.il and reckless manner." 
497  See "Forest Wealth of the Province of Que  bec," Report of  the Sixth An nua! Meeting of  the CFA , 1905, p. 86. 
498 See Wilson, 1909. Report of  the Tenth Annual Meeting of  the CFA, p.l39. 319 
7.2.2  Emerging Threats to Sustained Productivity 
There is  little doubt that rising demand for  lumber of various size and quality, along 
with  the development of the  pulp  and  paper  sector ultimately  gave renewed  vigour to  the 
decades-old  struggle for resource  rights  between  limit holders  and  smallholders. In  effect, 
institutional dynamics during this period were largely conditioned by the competing interests 
of these  two  broadly  defined  user  groups,  along  with  the  interposition  of government 
prerogatives. However, as  pressure on public forests  mounted, early assumptions regarding 
the expected  behaviour of forest  resource  systems  began  to  unravel,  casting doubt on  the 
assumed inexhaustibility of Québec's pulp forests and the efficacy of existing regulations to 
meet long term supply needs. 
7.2.2.1  The Dynamics ofNorthern Forests 
Regardless ofwhether timber-harvesting activities were performed by settlers or by the 
jobbers hired for such purposes, the  pressure exerted on Québec's forest brought about the 
progressive  retreat of the valuable softwoods and  the expansion of the  relatively  valueless 
and fast growing hardwoods.
499  As the provincial forester and soon to be Chief of Québec's 
Forest  Service,  Gustave  Piché,  summed  up  the  situation  before  the  1908  meeting  of the 
Canadian Forestry Association, lumberers: 
"are obliged to  work always farther and farther from  the  basis of operation,  [and] 
regions former/y neglected on account of  the dif.ficulty of  access are now exploited.  ln 
spite  of the  introduction  of substitutes,  such  as  spruce  for  pine,  etc.,  or  the 
ùnprovements  of transportation  methods,  the  priee  of wood  rises  steadily.  ft  is 
un.deniable that wood is becoming scarce. "
500 
In  the  absence of any  deliberate  planning,  management,  or foresight  regarding  the 
actions of lumberers and  their effect on  the reproductive dynamics of economically  valued 
resource  units,  the  systematic  overexploitation  of Québec's  primeval  forests  invariably 
changed the structure and composition of the forest ecosystems colonists and 1  umberers first 
499  Hardwood  regeneration  in  cut-over areas  is  naturally dominated  by fast growing shade intolerant species such  as  poplar, 
aspen and birch , trees which have limited  value for construction purposes (due to their brittleness &  proneness to decay) and 
pulp  and  paper manufacturing  (due  to  weak  links  between fibers).  The other point of interest is  that hardwoods had  only 
limited floatability, and si  nee ri vers remained the predominant mode of transportation up  un til  the mid 20'h century, the !osses 
incured during river drives was considerably more important for hardwoods than for softwoods. 
500 Piché, C.G., 1908. The Forest Situation in the Province of Quebec, in Report of the Nin th Annual Meeting of the CFA , p.75. 320 
encountered.  Although concern over the rapid disappearance of Québec's majestic pineries 
helped fuel discussion on forest conservation during the 1870s and 1880s, no effectuai means 
were  ever  instituted  to  curb  wasteful  practices,  such  as  timber  squaring,  or  to  limit 
appropriation  rates  more  extensively  than  the  somewhat  useless  and  seldom  enforced 
diameter restrictions (see below). By the early twentieth century, the feeble fight to save the 
province's  pineries  ended,  and  the  valuable (shade tolerant)  hardwoods  (e.g.,  elm,  beech, 
walnut,  ash,  hickories,  etc)  were  essentially  cut-over  and  sold  to  the  British  Market,  or 
rapidly  consumed by  settlers for construction,  cooking and  heating. 
501  As  such,  other than 
collecting applicable  dues,  authorities  essentially  turned  a  blind eye  to  the  few  remaining 
square  timber  producers  and  rapacious  sawn  lumber  industry  that  proceeded  to  deplete 
whatever pine and valuable hardwoods they could find. 
Hence, the focus of conservation during the earl  y decades of the twentieth century had 
little  to  do  with  pine. Instead,  what commanded the attention  of political,  economie,  and 
scientific arenas was the so-called pulp forest, and black and white spruce in  particular (i.e., 
picea mariana & glauca).
502 In a context where the territory under public administration was 
simply too  extensive for authorities to  manage in  any  meaningful  way, and  industry - too 
insecure as  it  was  relative  to  its  annual  titles,  indebtedness,  and susceptibility  to  political 
change to  expend additional resources for the maintenance of public forests,  the only cost-
effective approach was  to  safeguard  unlicensed  portions  of the  public domain  (hence the 
forest reserves) and require the strictest economy in the use of allocated berths. Nevertheless, 
the  proposed  strategy  failed  to  address  many  important  issues  that  were  then  emerging. 
Among the issues th at were then gaining widespread attention were: the cause of forest fi res; 
the response of forest systems to selective high grading; the need for adaptable and  variable 
management strategies; the dominant patterns of forest regeneration; and the limited value of 
diameter-based restrictions as a means ofensuring long-term sustainability. 
501 Overtime, the  loss of valuable hardwoods and  inadequate  efforts to regenerate such  trees became a central preocupation of 
succeeding governments, yet, as reported in  the 2004 commission for study of the public forests, no sustainaed effort to correct 
the situation was ever implemented. 
502  Red spruce,picea rubens, was likewise used but not differentiated by users or government until the 1920s. 321 
7.2.2.2  Forest Fires 
Forest fires  were  attributed  to  numerous  causes,  including settlers,  hunters, fishers, 
river drivers, sparks from  railways and firebrand from  the smoke stacks of train engines, and 
occasionally, lumbermen themselves.  But for the longest time, forest fires were more or Jess 
blamed on  the  ill-advised actions of settlers or the deliberate acts of fraudulent speculators. 
However, as  lumbennen ventured futiher and  further away  from  settlement,  it soon became 
apparent th at ''f orest ji  res [tended} to follow the lumberman and [were} a direct result of  the 
condition he [brought} about in the woods. "
503  In the absence of any  market for the branches 
and  debris  produced  through conventional  Jogging operations/
04  lumberers  simply  left the 
refuse  of their  industry  scattered  on  the  newly  exposed  forest  fioor  or  placed  them  in 
generous  heaps  along  the  pathways  created  to  remove  harvested  timber.  By  leaving  the 
resinous  crown,  branches, and  remnants  of squaring activity  to  dry  in  the  sun, lumbermen 
created a tinderbox of fuel  ladders ready to ignite and cause the massive crown fi res th at were 
being reported by  the  1860s (see Chapter Y). In comparison, the canopy in virgin pine forests 
was  so  thick,  lumberman and  conservationist William  Little explained  before the  Canadian 
Forestry  Association, that there was  barely "enough  loose wood lying about ta make a fire 
hot enough to cook your dinner, so that even if  a fire were started ... [it} could do but little 
damage to the timber. ,sos  By opening roads and  paths to access timber, by  preparing beds of 
small  trees to  protect the fall  of giant pine, and  by  leaving the unwanted parts to  bake in the 
sun, lumbermen created ample supplies of fuel  along with channels for the wind to  blow and 
breath life into any spark that may  inadvertently fall  onto the site.s
06  Whereas the old pineries 
"had withstood the risk of fire and tempest for severa! centuries, and under like conditions 
would do  sa  till  it  died of old age, "
507  the  passing of lumbermen  likely  accelerated  the 
frequency  and  severity  of forest tires  in  the  pineries  and  mixed forest  regions of southern 
Québec. 
503 Clarck, J.F., 1905. 'The Forest as a National Resource," in Report of  the Sixt  ft An nuai Meeting of  the CFA, p.l05 
5()l lbid., p. 104 
505  Report ojtlle Sixth An  nuai Meeting of  the CFA, 1905, p.89. 
506  Ibid., p. 90. 
507  Ibid. 322 
In  the  spruce  and  fir  forests  of the  boreal  north,  forest  fires  were  blamed  on  the 
"Indians."
508  However, as Robert Bell of the  Geological  Survey of Canada reported at the 
first  annual  meeting  of the  Canadian  Forestry  Association (1900),  sedimentary  evidence 
collected  north  of the 50th  parallel  pointed to  a  regularity of forest fires  that predated any 
known human presence or influence on the system.
509  Further, the nearly ubiquitous presence 
of jack pine (Pinus  banksiana), a  tire-dependent tree with  serotinous cones that only open 
when exposed to fire,  suggested to Bell that such adaptations necessarily evolved over time 
and in  response to  naturally occurring phenomena, which he posited could only be attributed 
to  natural  causes  such  as  lightning.
510  In  his  travels  through  the  northern  boreal  forest of 
Ontario, Clark reported that there was not a square mile of forest that did not show evidence 
of past fire  activity.  Sam pies of Banksian pine (now known as  Jack Pi ne, Pinus banksiana) 
taken near Mattagami showed that at least four severe fires had occurred in  the area prior to 
1905  (  over a  66  year  period). 
511  Y  et  in  spi te  of su  ch  evidence,  forest  fi re  regulations  m 
Québec  continued  to  focus  legislative  action  on  everything  but  the  consequences  of 
lumbering activities, which arguably made remaining stands more vulnerable to fire hazards. 
The forest  reserves,  like  the  fire  districts  that  were  initially  introduced  by  Commissioner 
Lynch  in  1883, were thus largely  viewed as  "firewalls" which,  if properly  applied, would 
help protect Québec's forest domain from  the imprudent activities of ill-informed settlers or 
the illegal doings of speculators.
512 
7.2.2.3  Age Structure and Forest Regeneration 
Another widely  held  assumption  in  the  early  decades  of the  20t
11  century  was  that 
spruce trees were relative( y young (i.e.,  Jess  than 100 years old) and regeneration took place 
in  predictable  cycles  of fifteen  to  twenty  five  years
51 3 
- assertions  that  were  altogether 
508  For example, see previous citations of Clark ( 1905) and  Langelier ( 1901 , 1905) 
sœ  ls should be  noted that efforts to understand the dynamics of mixed and boreal forest systems was just emerging at the tu rn of 
the twentieth century. ln  this conte)(t, the work of Dr. Bell  on forest fires;  the idea that lightening might have a role to play; 
that forest fi res were a  naturally occuring phenomena; and  that sorne  species were fi re-dependent - ali  were new  ideas that 
challenged the way forests had so far been considered. 
510  Bell , R., 1900. ·•canada's Northern Forcsts," in  Report of  tlze Firsl AmiUal Meeting of  the CFA, Ottawa Government Printing 
Bureau, pp. 12-14. 
511  See Clark ( 1905, p. 1  08). The au thor however, considered that most of these fi res were likely caused by the 'indians'. 
512  Fire-districts (Act 58 V., c.  19, s. 2)  were never repealed and  were reiterated in  Article 1647 of the  revised statutes of 1909 
(Act 8 Ed. VII, c. 7, s. 5). 
513  For example, see Langclier, J .C., 1905. "Forest Wealth of the Province of Que  bec,"  in  Report of  the Sixth Annua/ Meeting of 
tlzeCFA. 323 
different from the experience of pulp and paper manufacturers.
514  Taking stock of how forest 
resources were used  over time and the way in  which appropriators traditionally operated in 
Québec, Gustave Piché summarized  the underlying  pattern of resource use  in  the province 
and its effect on forest system change in  rather stark terms: 
"Forest exploitation has thus far neglected the future of the forest; one  section  has 
been completely cleared, then another has been taken. There was never any care as to 
future cuttings. Thus, when the best of  our pines were removed, not a single seed tree 
was left standing to  ensure the reproduction of the species. As a result, the forest has 
transfonned itself, in many places, into a spruce forest. Since the spruce has come into 
demand the same methods have been pursued, and now we  see this valuable species 
being replaced by fir and hard woods.
515 
The effects of such selective high grading on the capacity of Québec's forest resource 
systems to regenerate themselves was the object of a compelling study in 1918 by C.D. Howe 
of the  University  of Toronto. 
516  Compiled  with  the  assistance of Ellwood  Wilson of the 
Lauren  ti de Pulp and Paper Company using a strip-method survey of various sections of forest 
in the southern portion ofthe St. Maurice valley, results of the study revealed that the original 
forest cover in the region had two distinct layers: 
"The lower storey was a mixed forest of  yellow birch, maple, spruce, and bals  am, in 
abundance in the order named. Towering 50 or 75 feet above this were scattered giant 
pine trees from 3 to 6 feet in diameter,from 100 to 150 feet high, and probably 200 to 
300  years  old.  Had  there  been  only  six  such  trees  to  the  acre,  they  would  have 
dominated  it,  but there  were  probably more,  but not sufficient, however,  to form a 
complete  crown  cover  in  this  upper  storey,  except on  rocky  ridges.  ln  the  latter 
situations  we  often  found from  20  to  30  big  pine  stumps  to  the  acre,  evidently 
indicating a pure stand. To  one flying  over the region at that time in an airplane, it 
would have appeared as a  'black' forest, that is, one in which the pines predominated 
over the hardwoods. Passing to-day the conditions are reversed;  it is a  'green' forest, 
that is, one in which the hardwoods predominate. "
517 
5 14  ln the St. Maurice watershed where the Laurentide Pulp and Paper Company operated, Ellwood Wilson alarmingly pointed to 
how lumbermen were "rapidly tuming this whole ferri/ory inlo a ba/sam forest." See Report of the Ninth Annual Meeting of 
the Canadian Forestry Association, 1908, p. 48. 
515  Piché, C.G., 1908. 'The Forest Situation in  the Province of Quebec,"  in Report of  the Ninth An  nuai Meeting of  the CFA, p.75. 
51 6  Howe, C.D. 1918. Forest Regeneration on Certain  Cut-over Pulpwood Lands in  Quebec, in  Silviculture:  Forestry Pamphlets, 
Vol.  Xl,  Reprinted  from  the  Ninth  Annual  Report  of  the  Commission  of  Conservation, Ottawa,  1918, CIHM  no.  82804; 
Available at [hllp://www .archive.org/details/pamphletsonsilvi Il silvrich] . 
51 7 Ibid., pp. 6-7 324 
Howe  posited  that the  original  pine  cover was  probably  removed  around  the  mid-
nineteenth century,
518  giving an opportunity to the spruce dominated mixed undergrowth to 
tlourish: 
Our  growth  studies  show  that  al/  the  spruce  trees  since  removed  by  lumbering 
operations  were  present in  the  orig ina! forest beneath the  pine  trees.  They  were  at 
!east 6 inches in dia me  ter and about 100 years old when the pine was eut [circ  a 1855 -
see Chapter  V].  Many  lumbermen think  that the  second cutting  on an  area  is from 
young  trees,  which  have  grown  since  the  last  cutting.  The  area  which  we  are 
describing has been eut two or three times in the last 30 years and the youngest spruce 
eut was over 100 years old, most of  the trees being more than 150 years old. This is the 
length of time that it takes to  make a spruce forest from seed to pulpwood size, when 
the spruce grows up in company with hardwoods. 
Howe's investigation confirmed earlier observations showing that the average  age of 
spruce eut in the first decade of the twentieth century was no  Jess  than  150 years in  eastern 
Canada. As Professor Fernow bluntly put it: 
"1t needs to be driven home to every Canadian that in spite of  foolish assertions to the 
contrary and exceptional cases,  ... it takes  in  the average not less than  100 years to 
make a  12  inch tree, and the  majority of the [pulp] trees which the  lumberman cuts 
have required 150 years and more to make." 
519 
Consequently, if a tree with a 9 inch diameter stump could be over 200 years old in one 
place and a  14  inch tree in  another could be half as  old, then it  followed that the diameter-
based  appropriation  rules  were  more  or  Jess  arbitrary  and  could  not  be  used  as  reliable 
indicators for maintaining the  reproductive capacity of valued resource stocks.  As  Fernow 
explained  ti me and time again: "The idea of 'renewal' in  15  to  20 years, where the eut is 
down to  7 inches, is ridiculous.  What is meant is, that after 15 or 20 years some and enough 
of  the left over trees will have attained a diameter which it pays to eut." Further, it "stands to 
reason  where spruce  is  culled and hard wood left,  it is  hard wood  that renews  and  not 
spruce.  Y  our government [i.e., Québec}, having control of  the forest,  should certain/y  limit 
518  Howe's assessment of when pine in  the area was  first removed is consistent with historical records. As shawn in Chapter V, 
the area  was first put  up  for sale  in  1852  by  Commissioner Joseph  Cauchon. See  Annual Report  of  the  Commissioner of 
Crown Lands for the Year 1856, JLAC., 1857, Appendix 25, section on Woods and  Forests Branch, as weil  as the Notice from 
the Crown Lands Department, dated October !5th, 1852, Canada Gazette no.: 593. 
519  Fernow, B. E., 1909. "What We Want,"  in Report of the Tenth An  nuai Meeting of the CFA , pp. 76-77. Fernow reported that 
observations taken in  New Brunswick, showed that spruce trees with an average diameter of 9 inchcs were  between  150 and 
200 years old. 325 
the  diameter to  which  trees  may be eut,  but the  size must be variable according to  local 
conditions, for even 9 inch trees would not stand up  under the winds,  if  left standing singly 
without the support of neighbours. ,j
20  Diameter restrictions  simply  did  not and  could  not 
"assure any reproduction of young seedlings" and as  such, could not be treated as anything 
that  would  resemble  sustainable  forest  resource  use.
521  But  more  fundamentally,  his 
insistence was on  the fact that forests  are complex entities,
522  and that the rate of growth of 
any particular species varies according to the ti me and place exigencies of the grove or stand 
wherein  it  is  found, soit and climate conditions, exposure or aspect, age structure, root and 
crown competition, and  the  naturally  occurring disturbance dynamics of a  given  local.  "It 
must be realized" Fernow insisted, 
"that no general rule as for instance a universal diameter limit, or even of  the burning 
of  debris,  will  work  satisfactorily  in  ali  cases.  Each  case  requires  specifie 
consideration and description," such that "proper working plans should be made and 
followed, i.e .,for  estry practiced from the start. "
523 
In short, lumbermen and foresters had to learn to "eut down to what nature intended we 
should eut to," and not what governments or business leaders arbitrarily required or wished at 
.  .  .  24 
any g1 ven moment m t1me.  . 
However, what alarmed early forest scientists even more was the realisation that the 
harvest of merchantable spruce and  balsam (i.e., 7 inch diameter) did not favour the release · 
of the abondant seedlings of the same species but instead favoured the transition of the forest 
towards a less desirable equilibrium dominated by either fir,  mixed deciduous composition or 
a  nearly  pure hardwood stand - depending on the composition of the undergrowth and the 
severity of the prescribed eut. In summarizing the effects of diameter-based selective logging 
practices and  low stumpage priees, before the Second British Empire Forestry Conference of 
1923, Howe pointed to four main consequences. Such practices caused: 1) the removal of the 
best  available  subjects  and  survival  of the  !east fit; 2) the  filling-in  and  overcrowding by 
520 See Report of the Third Annual Meeting of the CFA, 1902, p. 103 
521 Ibid., p.  Ill 
522  On  this  point,  Bouchelle (1906, p. 249) put forth  the  idea  that forests  need to-be  considered  as  living organisms and  not 
simply an aggregate assortment of timber: "La forêt n'es/ plus seulement un élément économique el social, c'est un organisme 
doué d'une vie collective distincte de chaque arbre qui la compose." 
523  Fernow, B. E., 1909. "Wh at We Want," in Tenth An nuai Report of the CFA. 
524 See Report of the Third Annual Meeting of the CFA, 1902, p. 112. 326 
hardwoods;  3) the  crowding out of more  valuable species  in  the  regeneration;  and 4)  the 
predominance of balsam fir in  the regeneration.
525  As lumbering operations were renewed in 
favour of spruce towards the end of the  !9th  century, harvesting  in  the St.  Maurice valley 
drastically reduced the overall basal area occupied by  the dominant red  spruce from  25  to  5 
square  feet  per  acre,  with  similar  declines  in  balsam.  The  result,  from  an  economie 
perspective, was  that "the capital stock and, therefore,  the  earning capacity of  those areas 
[was] only one-fifth of  what they were originally, " th us reducing the marginal benefit of any 
future operation. The prospect of a  long term  recovery  did  not appear much better, for Jess 
than one percent of spruce seedlings observed per acre (i.e., 635 seedlings) and only a third 
of a  percentage (i.e.,  0.3%) of the balsam seedlings  (i.e., 3972) appeared to  reach  maturity 
after merchantable stock were taken out.
526  In sum, without any serious effort to open-up the 
hardwood  undergrowth  by  thinning  or  better  yet,  through  the  use  of  hardwoods  in 
economically  rewarding  activities,  the  idea that another viable "crop of  spruce"  might  be 
produced on such  lands  within a  relatively  short time period was, as  Howe  put it,  simply 
"hopeless'' For "[n}o private concern could afford to wail 50 years, paying annual renta! for 
th at length of  time for the sake of  a few cards of  pulpwood." 
The problem of  deciduous regeneration in dominant softwood stands was not unique to 
the  southern portions  of the  province.  In  colder and  harsher  conditions,  lumbermen  were 
experience  similar  regenerative  trends  (i.e.,  balsam  fir,  birch  and  poplar  as  opposed  to 
spruce),  which  prompted  sorne  to  argue,  as  early  as  1902,  that  the  best  strategy  for 
stimulating  the  growth  of spruce  might  be  to  simply  eut everything clean  and  scour  the 
surface with fi re. 
527  This was a  Iso the conclusion that Howe and Wilson reached: "If  nature is 
real/y against us, it might be the  best thing to  eut every acre off  clean,  if  a market could be 
foundfor the hardwoods, and start the spruce anew by planting." But planting was a costly 
endeavor, and in  a system where the principle motive of operators was the financial one, as 
Langelier and Fernow surmised, and resource rights were granted through annual licensing 
agreements, few were those who were willing to invest in  the maintenance of public forests. 
525  See  Second British Empire  Forestry Conference, 1923. Proceedings and  Resolutions. F.A. Acland, p.  147. 
526 Howe, 1918. 
527 As Prof  essor John Macoun of the Geological Survey of Canada put it during the third annual meeting of the CFA: "Why not 
cul il al/ dawn ...  and clean off  the grou  nd will! a Ji re or Iwo Jires,  and then let il a/one,  and you will gel a new forest and a 
va/uab/e one. / am quite sure thal we will come to il, and we will agree thal complete denudation is the only hope." See Report 
of the Third Annual Meeting of the CFA (1902), page  113. 327 
The  notion  that  regeneration  could  be  improved  trough  variable  cutting  patterns  that 
maintained undisturbed (or slightly thinned) stands in  and around cutover areas was an  idea 
that  had  yet  to  germinate.  And  pre-commercial  thinning  was  simply  too  expensive  to 
consider. 
7.2.2.4  The Search for Efficiency and Sustainability 
Until the  1920s, the favourable economie circumstances created by  the steadily  rising 
value of pulp led severa! influential manufacturers in  Québec to seek ongoing improvements 
in the productivity of forest sections held under li cense, and the development of technologies 
to improve the efficiency oftheir operations. Unfortunately, as the Manager of  the Laurentide 
Pulp and Paper Company Lorne McGibbon decried, few manufacturers could be motivated to 
adopt such  strategies because Canada as  whole "was not pursuing a proper policy for the 
preservation of  her forests," a  policy that  would  incite operators to get "the  best possible 
results."
528  By allowing exports of unprocessed pulp wood or the production of pulp without 
the manufacture of paper and other higher valued goods, governments at the provincial and 
federal levels were not encouraging the development of more sustainable patterns of resource 
use or inciting investments in  processing technologies to capture a greater share of available 
rents. 
The relevance ofMcGibbon's criticism is best understood by considering the returns of 
pulp and  paper products at the onset of the early 1900s. In  1903, the average value of a cord 
of wood shipped from the Eastern Townships to the United States was $3.50 per cord, and in 
1907,  $6  to  $7.00  in  the  rough,  or  $8  to  $10.00  when peeled.  But if  the  same cord  was 
converted into pulp, it could fetch $20.00, $45 if turned into newsprint, and $50 to $100 for 
paper  of the  highest  qualities.
529  Given,  as  discussed  earlier,  that  the  most  important 
production factor was the cost of raw  materials,  sorne firms  considered that the  long  term 
stability  of their  enterprise  ultimately  depended  on  their  ability  to  extract  the  maximum 
amount  of benefit  from  each  unit  of resource,  and  to  further  maintain  or  enhance  the 
productive capacity of the forests held under license. Already in  1901, Langelier reported that 
528 McGibbon, D.L., 1902. "The Pulp lndustry in Canada,"  in  Report of  the Third Annual Meeting of the CFA , p. 91. 
529  Biggar, E.B., 1908. Canada's approaching peril: The forest a necessity in  regulating 1 vater powers and sustaining agriculture; 
warnings from the history of dcad and dying nations; the unrestricted export of pulpwood a menace [sic] to the country. CIHM 
no. 76263, p. Il 328 
manufacturers in the Mauricie region had  begun building integrated systems using the waste 
from  sawmills in the production of pulp, th us  increasing the productive value of their forests 
by  "without  in  any way  hastening their  exhaustion."
530  While  Langelier believed  that  the 
adoption  of such  systems  would  help  ensure  that  forest  supplies  were  maintained  "ad 
infinitum," what he and most of his contemporaries consistently failed to  realize or admit was 
how quickly demand for wood-based products increased and how this affected the capacity of 
manufacturers to maintain the productive output of forest resource supplies.
531 As Fernow put 
it: 
"Governments ...  have acted in the beliefthat this wealth was inexhaustible and that ... 
no  concern  need be  had  as  to  a  conservative  management  ... [What]  they  did  not 
realize  is  how  rapid  the  growth  of the  world  and of the  requirements  of modem 
indus  trial development would be, and how slow the growth of  trees. "
532 
Concern  for  the  future  did  however exist,  and  among those  who  worried  about the 
continued  supply  of raw  forest  timber  were  those  who  depended  most  heavily  on  such 
resources. The  attitude  of progressive  pulp  and  paper manufacturers  in  Québec  during the 
early  1900s was  clearly laid  out by one of its  leading advocates, Carl  (Charles Christopher) 
Riordan, during the  1909  meeting of the  Canadian  Forestry  Association.
533  As  "industrial 
institutions"  that  depended  on  the  use  of natural  resources,  pulp  and  paper  manufacturers 
always  needed  to  "consider  immediate  profits  in  appropriating  and  exploiting  these 
resources. " However, once short-term needs were  "provided for, " they  had to  operate the ir 
resource holding "to perpetuate the supply. " ln this sense, 
"[t]he paper and pulp  industry has more need of conservative forestry methods than 
any  other  industry  that  uses ...  forests  commercially,  because  it  has  the  largest 
investment per quantity of  timber used," an investment "that is less movable than any 
other wood-using indu.stry. "
534 
530  See  Langelier, J.C.,  1901 , "The Pulp  lndustry in  Relation  to  our Forests,"  in  Report of  the Second An  nuai Meeting of  the 
CFA, p. 46. Langelier estimated the gain  in efficiency to be somewhere a round 20%. 
531  For instance, exports of Canadian pulp wood for use in  American mills  increased by 47%  between  1900 and  1905, while 
consumption of pulp  wood by  Canadian  manufacturcrs incrcased by  102 % in quantity and  150% in  value. Sec Biggar, 1908, 
p.8 
532  Fernow, B. E.,  1909. "What We Want," in Report of  the Tenth Annual Meeting of  the CFA, p.76. 
533  See Riordon, C.  1909, 'The Artitude of the Paper Manufacturers towards Conservative Forestry Methods," in  Report of the 
Tenth Annual Meeting of the CFA,p. 132. 
53-l /bid. 329 
The Union Bag and Paper Co., the Riordan Paper Mills, and the Laurentide Paper Co., 
ali  employed trained  f01·esters  and  spent "considerable  money  in  thoroughly  investigating 
their  timber  resources  and everything  to  do  with  their  development. "  These  firms  began 
inventorying their timber reserves long before the practice became a legal requirement during 
the  1920s.
535  Trees to  be eut were marked in  advance and  rules were adopted to  eliminate 
waste and  maximize the  use  of every  "product of  the forest. "
536 However,  in  spi te of their 
best  intentions,  industry  efforts  to  improve  the  efficiency  and  sustainability  of  their 
operations were soon confronted with the incompatible nature of "government regulations" 
that interfered  "to sorne extent with the carrying out of  systems of  timber management based 
on [their] forestry investigation." For instance, Riordan reported, regulations did "not permit 
the leaving of  mature trees  in  an  area eut over, although some of  them are  necessary for 
seeding. " They did not allow "the cutting oftrees below a certain size on the stump although 
in many places trees reach maturity below this size and sometimes even reach their maximum 
growth."  And  they  did  "not  permit  the  slashing  of timber  that  [was}  of  no  value 
commercially," even though this  would have limited the 'greening'  of cutover forests  (i.e., 
the transition from softwood to hardwood-dominated forest systems).
537 
7.2.3  Finalizing the Conservation Agenda 
To  address  the  wide  range  of concerns  that  were  then  emerging,  Gouin  and  his 
government instituted the provincial Forest Service in  1909 to monitor and control forestry 
operations throughout Québec,  both  on  lots  acquired  by  location tickets  and  in  areas  held 
un der li cense to eut timber. Placed in  the hands of Gustave C. Piché, the new service was also 
tasked  with  exploring  unsurveyed  land,  classifying  soi!  for  colonization  purposes,  and 
carrying  out  silvicultural  studies,  including  experiments  with  reforestation  work.
538  The 
territory was divided into 14 forest districts and each placed under the care of a trained forest 
ranger.  To  strengthen  the  government's  long  term  effort  to  improve  forest  resource 
management, a special fu nd  was created to finance the creation of a forestry  school, l'École 
d'arpentage et de  genie forestier à l'Université Laval, and  a  library  was created to  support 
535  See "2e Rapport annuel du service forestier,"  RMTF, 2010, pp. 52-53. 
536  See Riordon, 1909, The Attitude of the Paper Manufacturers. p. 133. 
537  Ibid., p. 134 
538  See "2e Rapport annuel du service forestier,"  RMTF, 2010, pp. 42-57. 330 
the  work of the Ministry of Lands and Forests.  As  Piché proudly concluded in  his  second 
an nuai report as Chief of  the Forest Service: "Une nouvelle ère commence." 
In tenns of legislative changes, Québec finally passed an order-in-council on April 26, 
1910  (exactly  ten  years after Ontario had  done the same)  decreeing that from  the First of 
May,  1910, "al!  timber eut on  Crown Lands ...  must be  manufactured in  Canada, that is  to 
say,  converted into pulp, or paper,  deals  or  boards,  or  into  any other  article of trade  or 
merchandise ofwhich such timber is only the raw material." 
539 The revised statutes of 1909 
corrected  sorne  incongruities  relative  to  the  allocation  of lots  acquired  through  location 
tickets  by  granting the Minister the authority to decide where future  settlements would  be 
authorized.
540  Together with the creation of sorne twenty township reserves in  1911  (varying 
in  size from 2,700 to 27,000 acres for a total of267,709 acres) to support household needs in 
settlements  or communities  that  no  longer  had  access  to  private  supplies,  improved  tire 
surveillance and control, and increased vigilance by  the newly appointed forest rangers, the 
government  managed  to  subdue  settler  encroachment  on  existing  timber  limits,  but  not 
remove it. 
While Piche's  initial  intent was to  improve  existing methods of exploitation to make 
the  utilization  of the trees  as  complete  as  possible,  and  the  development of site-specifie 
management plans to ens  ure "the renewal of  our forests, "
541 the inability of the newly created 
Forest Service to direct such planning, at this early stage in  its development, compelled the 
Ministry of Lands and Forests to adopta more prudent course of action based on the idea of 
"conserv[ing}  what was  left of the forests, and  ... induc[ing}  limit holders  and settlers  to 
employ  more  conservative  methods  of lumbering. "
542  Like  the  tree  nursery  that  was 
established in  1908 "as an  abject lesson to farmers,"  it was felt that the more important task 
of the Service was "to protect the  immediate crop" rather than "to plant trees [thal would] 
539  As  introduced, fully  squared  timber and  railway  ties  were  considered as  being  manufactured, whereas waney  and  board 
timber were not. Waney timber was adopted as the method of choice during the  I870s for squaring, and consists in following 
the  natural  circumference of the  bole of a trec during the squaring process, thus leaving more wood on each trec, helping to 
reduce unnecessary waste. 
,., The previous statutes (1904) allowed land agents to  sell  any parce! of land categorized as "lands suitable  for cultivation" 
(Article 1268a) regardless of whether it was held  under license to eut timber or not. The revised statu tes of 1909 were amended 
(Act 9 Ed.  VII, C.24) to allow the Minister to determine those portions of the territory that should be opened for settlement, 
provided "there is no contestation" of such allocations by li mit holders . 
.>Il  Piché, C.G., 1908. The Forest Situation in the Province of Que  bec, in  Nin th An  nuai Report of the CFA, p.75 
.>12 Piché, C.G .,  191 O.  Conditions in Quebec, in  Eleventh Annual Report of the CFA, p. 72. 331 
mature in  a century."
543  In  essence, the conservation of forest resources was viewed as  an 
intermediary step towards  the actual  management of crown  forests. Until  trained  foresters 
from  Laval University could  be hired by  the Forest Service and the industry, to  strengthen 
the  ir  respective  capacity,  the  strate  gy  pursued  by  the  government essentially  centred  on 
monitoring  and  enforcing applicable  appropriation  rules  (i.e.,  diameter restrictions,  timber 
dues, ground rents, and in-country manufacturing requirements).
544 
7.3  From Conservation to Management: The Political Economy ofOverexploitation 
While there  is  little  doubt that the  Forest Service brought much needed  rigour to  a 
system  that  more  or Jess  provided  carte  blanche to  anyone  holding a  location  ticket or a 
license  to  eut timber,  the  conservation  idea began  to  unravel  within  a  few  years  only.
545 
Between  1910 and  1920,  pulp  wood  production  rose  from  1,085,628  to  2,161 ,797 cards. 
Exports of unprocessed pulp wood remained stable at 742,933  cords in  1910 and  827,982 
cords in  1920. Sawn lumber production
546  increased from 736,790,594 feet (board measure), 
to  1,391,603,879  feet,  and  the  volume of square timber produced  feil  from  109,406 ft
3  in 
1910 to 7,533 fe  in  1922, the last registered year for such production.
547  During this time, the 
number of pulp and  paper mills  in  operation in  the  province rose from  25  to 46,  and  the 
number of sawmills  continued  to  oscillate  between  1,500  and  2,000,  as  mills  continual1y 
opened and closed along the receding edge of the forest line. Given that very little pulp wood 
(i.e., unprocessed timber) was exported from public lands to the United-States prior to the in-
country  manufacturing  requirement of 1910,  the  growth of the  pulp and  paper sector had 
more  to  do  with  the  availability  of cheap  supplies  and  abundant  hydro-power  than  the 
purported effects of the  1910 legislation (prohibiting the export of raw timber) that changed 
next to nothing in terms of real exports (see Roby, 1976, ch. V; Vigod, 1986, p. 54). 
543  Ibid., pp.  72-73. Only once the system of fire  protection was completed, would  they "consider the advisability of  planting 
along t/œ river fronts, .. . but wou  id leave to Nature the work ofrejoresting the interior." 
5+1  By order-in-council  (April 26, 19 10), timber dues were nominally raised by a few cents; ground rents were raised from $3.00 
to $5.00 per square miles; diameter restrictions on red and white pi ne were raised to 13 inches, restrictions on spruce, hemlock, 
cedar, maple, yellow birch and  other woods were set at  12  inches, and  balsam fïr and  black spruce could  be legally eut at 8 
inches- ali  measures  taken two feet above grou nd; rates on timber dues  and  ground rents were to be maintained until  1920, 
however, ground rent could be increased if  timber limits were not made productive, with the crown reserving the right to set 
the  quantity of timber  that  had  to  be  eut in  order  to  constitute  a  rate  of  exploitation  that  was  considered  suffïcient. See 
Appendix no. 27, in  RMTF, 191 O. 
545 Howlett and Rayner (1995 and 2001) pointed to  1909 as the year thal Quebec adopted its "conservation regime." 
546 Given that sawmills were most! y small  operations that depended al  most en  ti rely on wood from priva te sources, and  therefore 
were  not  liable  (theoretically)  for  the  payment of crown dues, most of the  sawn  lumber  production  was  not registered  or 
tabulated, such thal overall  production must have been considerably higher. 
547 Figures taken from the respective reports of the Minister of Lands and  Forests for the years 1910, 1920 and  1922. 332 
Moreover, evidence shows that land held under license continued to be handed over to 
settlers, in  spite of the fact that the decision to open-up areas for colonization purposes was 
now a purely executive function, and thus could not be blamed on the misjudgement of land 
agents  in  the  field.
548  Evidence of the ongoing threat of speculation from  individuals  who 
acquired  land  under  false  pretences  remained  problematic  in  various  regions  of  the 
province.
549  Correspondence between leading  industrialists (lumbermen and  pulp and  paper 
manufacturers)  and  succeeding  ministers  of Lands  and  Forests  to  solicit such  favours  as 
changes  to  land-use  decisions,  especially  with  regards  to the  rights  of settlers,  continued 
unabated. 
550  And whenever the government was accused of  si ding with lumbering interests, it 
invariably raised the false argument of the li mit holder's "vested rights."
551 Y  et,  in  spite of 
the competing interests of settlers and lumberers, it remained that natural  resources were as 
central to the political economie imperatives of development as they were to settlement and 
efforts to bring an end to emigration. As Taschereau himself put it: 
"We want to bring in new industries, and we are ready to do aLI that is possible in that 
direction...  We  invite  foreign  capital  to  jo  in  with  us  in  developing  our  natural 
resources and creating industries here. Let the capital of England and of the  United 
States come lure as much as it wishes and multiply our industries, so  that our people 
.>18  See Act 9  Ed.VII , C.  24. This point was emphasized by  Gouin himself: "Des abus se glissèrent à la faveur de  [la] loi de 
1904. Nombre  de  personnes achetèrent des  lots, non pour les  mellre en culture,  mais pour y couper  le  bois ou pour les 
revendre  à  des propriétaires  de scieries.  De plus, comme  le  ministre  n'avait  pas de  contrôle  sur les  ventes,  les  lots  se 
concédaient sans méthode, et,  les colons, au lieu de se grouper, s'éparpillaient par la forêt. C'est pour remédier à ces abus que 
fut proposée el votée la loi de  /909 ... Aujourd'hui la  vente ne duit  se faire que dans les cantons désignés par le ministre des 
terres."  See  "Le  Gouvernement  Gouin  el  son  euvre,"  1916,  pp.  172-173.  Available  at 
[http://www .archive.org/details/legouvernementgoOOqu] 
549  For example, see Sessional  Paper no. 26, 1912, Vol. 45, pt.4; See also introduction to section 4. 
550  See  Letter  by  John  Gilmour  to  Jules  Allard, dated  December 7'h,  1910, as  weil  as  nu merous  other examples  of direct 
government interference to change land ordinances in favour of lumbering interests, in "Copies of ali  correspondence, circulars 
and  other  documents  between  the  lands  Departmcnt  and  any  persans  in  connection  with  the  minister's  instructions  to 
exchange, delay or put off the sale by land agents," in Sessional  Paper No.33, 1912, Vol. 45, pt.4. 
551 ln discussing the limited availability  of land in  older settlements, Gouin explained: "dans la vieille partie de la province de 
Québec, nous avom à faire face à d'autres conditions. Presque toutes les ferres actuellement accessibles à la colonisation sont 
sous licences de coupe de bois. C'est une situation dont le gouvernement Gouin est moins responsable que ses prédécesseurs. 
Les porteurs de  licences ont des droits  acquis,  el pour  les faire  renoncer à  ces droits, il faudrait  les dédonamager. Or, 
l'indemnité à payer serail énorme." See "Le  Gouvernement Gouin et son oeuvre,"  1916, p.  178. The claim that governments 
could not alter the  conditions  handed  to  limit holders was  used  by  nearly  ali  succeeding  administrations, even  though  the 
revocable nature of licensing rights was stipulated by law (e.g., see Article  1633 of Act 8 Ed. VIl, c.7 and Act 9 Ed.VII , c. 24) 
and  supported by judicial decisions from the Ontario Court of Appeal that were le gall y binding to Que  bec (e.g., sec Smylie v. 
The Queen, 27 A.R. (Ont.) 172 & Muskoka Mill and Lumber Co. v. McDermott et al., 21  A.R. (Ont.)  129). 333 
will have work ....  [A]s 1 have said many times, 1 prejer importing American Dollars to 
exporting Canadian workmen.. "
552 
Hence, regardless of the conservation rhetoric, the end. purpose of forest resource use 
had  little to  do  with  achieving sorne  semblance of sustainability.  Industrial  expansion was 
needed to  stop the outward flow  of French-Canadian migrants to  New England mill-towns 
and well-timbered  lots  were needed to  attract settlers in  the  rural  districts of the  province. 
Neither of these  imperatives  was consistent with the  "conservation"  idea of capturing the 
interests generated by moderate resource use, not the capital itself. 
Although the right to sell-off concessionary rights to Québec's natural  resources, and 
encourage the  influx of foreign  capital  to develop the province's forests,  mines and  hydra-
power was  vested  in  the Lieutenenant-Governor in  council, and thus  feil  into the realm of 
political  decision-making,  the  creation  of a  dedicated  department  under  the  care  of a 
respected civil servant meant that decisions could now be framed in  administrative terms, as 
opposed  to  political  ones. ln fact,  the  traditional  statement of yearly  activities,  events  and 
decisions  by  the  Minister of Lands  of Forests  disappeared  during  the  1910s.  While  the 
reasons  for  this  transition  likely  reside  in  the  increasing  responsibilities  of  public 
administrators (i.e., public servants), the change of reporting relationships ultimately helped 
to  defend  public  choices  by  couching  political  decisions  as  the  rational  outcome  of 
responsible public administrators. 
At  the  onset of his  25-year tenure  as  Chief of the  Forest  Service,  Gustave  Piché 
obviously concurred with the principles of his executive orders, but his exasperation over the 
management of public affairs ultimately began to filter through his yearly reports. Over time, 
emphasis in  the Department's year-end reviews steadily shifted from what the Forest Service 
did (although cl earl y enunciated in every report) to what it could do if the rules and decisions 
were  changed  in  favour  of more  sustainable  outcomes,  or  if the  espoused  virtues  of 
responsible and  long term resource use were actually applied.  So when confronted with the 
552  Cited in Roby (1976, p.  169). Throughout  his tenure  as  Minister of  Lands and  Forests, Honoré  Mercier (fils)  periodically 
produced promotional pamphlets detailing the natural resource wealth of the province and the stable conditions it offered to 
potential investors (resource supplies, trained workforce, and  modest regulatory environment). For example, see Mercier, H., 
1923. Les forêts et les forces hydrauliques de  la province de Québec, Québec:  Ministère des Terres et Forêts; and  Mercier, H. 
and  F.X.,  Lemicux,  1930. Ressources Naturelles du Québec: Les forêts, l'industrie forestière,  les  ressources hydrauliques, 
Québec: Ministère des Terres ct Forêts. 334 
incongruities of political  imperatives, as  when Piché explained  in  1924 that forest  reserves 
near  factories  were rapidly being  depleted  without the  slightest  regard  to  future  needs,  he 
seldom missed an opportunity to suggest a more preferable course of action: "it seems ta me 
that,  by  limiting  the amount of cutting  ta  the  annual growth  of  the forest,  that we  would 
establish more stable exploitation."
553  With his casual  yet respectful tone, Piché consistently 
slipped  persona!  remarks  and  anecdotal  evidence,  showing  that things  were  not  going  as 
planned.  Forests were not reproducing and growing as quickly as posited.
554  Efficiency in  the 
use of available resources remained wanting,  both at the leve!  of the  individual  unit - with 
only  35%  of the  available wood  used  per tree,
555  and  in  terms  of market  opportunities  or 
effort  to  diversify  production  to  favour  sm  ali  industries  and  higher-end  products  (  e.g., 
furniture,  toys,  cabinetry,  flouring  and  textiles  derived  from  wood  cellulose).
556  The 
maintenance of forest system productivity was continually tbreatened by abusive patterns of 
overexploitation  on  both  public  and  private  lands.
557  And  the  continuous  growth  of the 
resource intensive  pulp and  paper sector could  not be sustained  by  limiting  the  geographie 
scope of its expanding needs nor the size and quantity of timber appropriated from any given 
area.
558 
Fortunately, Québec had no shortage of wood beyond the boundaries of existing timber 
limits. Together with the shared  belief that old-growth  forests were  necessarily  decrepit or 
declining  resource  systems  that  needed  to  be  removed  in  order  to  better  regulate  the 
reproductive  potential  of spruce  timber,  there  was  never  any  shortage  of territory  for 
extending operations.  However,  the  problem  with  the  liquidation tbeory  of "over-mature" 
553  See Appendix no. 9, RMLF 1923-24, pp.22-23 
554  For example, sec  RCSF, 1919-20, p.33:  "Jusqu'ici le rendement de  nos forêt n'a guère augmenté.  Dans plus·ieurs cas, par 
suite de  l'exploitation  mal dirigée, de  même que par suite des  incendies,  la.  composition de nos ténéments forestiers a.  même 
subi une  dégradation marquée. Il y a donc lieu de Jaire des  réformes. Ces réformes  s'imposent, el  on doit  les  commencer 
immédiatement."  In  his  report  for  1916-17  (Appendix  no.  13, p. 34), Piché  writes:  "noils savons que,  depuis  une dizaine 
d'année, on s'occupe un  peu  partout  de  trouver  des  substituts à  l'épine/le  el au  sapin, pour  les  remplacer par  d'autres 
essences, croissant plus rapidement, annuellement si possible." 
555  See Appendix no. 13, RCSF, 1919·20, p. 31. Piché observes thal on  average, no  more than  35% of wood available in any 
given piece of timber is used. 
556  Ibid., sec pages 30 to 33: After explaining the Jack of outlets for wood in Que  bec, Piché adds, "Je pourrais ainsi multiplier les 
citations et les exemples pour conjinner ce que j'avance au sujet de  la grande nécessité de trouver des débouchés pour nos 
bois, de l'urgence de savoir employer judicieusement/es bois indigènes." 
557  For example, see RCSF, 1916-17, p. 38: "il nous faut aviser, le plus tôt possible, à la restauration de  la richesse forestière 
des ténémen/s ruinés par le feu ou appauvris par une exploitation abusive." On priva te  lands, Piché insisted that: "il wou  id be 
very desirable thal  we  prevenl abusive  cu/ling  wlziclz  of/en  lzappens tlzereon, in  arder la prevenl properlies and lots being 
dejorested tao often witlzoul muchprofitlo tlzeir owner." ln RCFS, 1922-23, p. 17. 
558  For examp1e, see RCSF, 1916- 17, p.  33: "Par suite de l'expansion considérable de nos usines  à.  pulpe el à.  papier, il était 
devenu urgent pour ces sociétés d'augmenter leurs résen,es de bois." 335 
forests (i.e., "forêts surannées"), as Howe and others recognized (see section 7.2.2.3 above), 
was  that  removal  of the  over-mature  layer  did  not  stimulate  the  growth  of only  those 
seedlings that had economie value.  In fact, not only did  it accelerate the production of Jess 
desirable species, it tended to alter the system altogether by changing the composition of the 
dominant strata,  thus  diminishing  the  returns  generated  by  mixed-temperate  forests  found 
along the main tributaries of the St. Lawrence watershed from the initial pi ne stock to spruce, 
then balsam fir and eventually the Jess desirable hardwoods (i.e., poplar, birch, and maple). 
Regardless of the effects of selective high grading and the fact th at the valuable spruce 
forest took much longer to  grow than anyone cared to  admit, the  notion that virgin  forests 
were declining or deteriorating  resource  systems  provided  a  powerful justification for  the 
continuous expansion of resource intensive industries. So instead of adjusting the productive 
output  of  pulp  and  paper  manufacturers,  and  the  number  of  sawmills  to  the  actual 
reproductive capacity of the forest under concession, as  A.T. Drummond, James Little, and 
Gustave Piché (among others) had  suggested at various  points  in  time, operators were not 
only allowed to expand and intensify their resource needs, they were in fact encouraged (and 
sometimes  forced)  to  do  so  by  the  pro-development stance of the  Gouin  and  Taschereau 
governments  (Roby,  1976).  The  absence  of any  incentive  to  maintain  the  reproductive 
potential of forests held under short term licensing agreements only helped to aggravate the 
situation even further.
559  Thus, the sale oftimber limits could always be justified by the need 
to  avoid  the  waste of over-matured  forests, the  commendable objective of stimulating the 
growth  of  new  timber  stocks,
560  and  the  ali-important  tasks  9f  promoting  economie 
development and rural  employment.
561 Moreover, forest held under license were believed to 
559  The  usual  exceptions  to  this  rule  (i.e., the  Laurentide  Co.,  Riordon  Paper Mills,  Belgo-Canadian  P&P  Co.)  had  begun 
experimenting with reforestation methods during the early  l900s and  were actively pursuing such strategies by  1916, but on 
private-held  lands only (RCSF,  1916-17, p. 38).  Piché called  attention  to  the  need  \O  reforest lands held  by  municipalities, 
create "parks and urban forests," plant trees on the streets of towns and cities, and along the byways and  roads in  rural areas 
for ali  the  benefits that trees  provide  in  terms of  diminishing heat island effects, dust, soi!  desiccation, etc.  ln  short, Piché 
indicated, legislation was needed to give effectto such imperatives: "Une legislation s'impose à ce sujet, comme pour le reste 
des autres questions se rallachant au reboisement." Sec pages 37 to 40. 
560  RCSF,  1921-22,  p.  26:  "[O]n  sail  que, dans  les  forêts  vierges, parvenues  à  leur maturité,  l'accroissement  annuel  est 
totalement annulé par les  insects el les champignons, sans compter les ravages du  vent [el du feu] qui sont beaucoup plus 
importants qu'an ie soupçonne; il est donc nécessaire de  reviver la croissance, par une exploitation judicieuse et opportune." 
Sec also Appendix no.l3, Report of the Minister, 1916-17, pp. 33-34. 
561 RCSF, 1917-18. p. 33: "Notre province ne peut compter que sur celle industrie pour la mise en valeur d'une grande partie de 
son territoire. là ou le sol y est incultivable el le  climat rigoureux. Nous devons donc concentrer nos efforts pour y amener le 
plus 1 61  possible l'installation de ces usines, afin que voyions en meme lemps surgir de beaux villages ...  " For a detailed treatise 
on the  motives  that supported  Quebec's industrial development during the first three decades of the  twentieth  century, see 
Roby (1 976). 336 
be better protected from  illegal appropriation and tire, and every concession brought with  it 
considerable returns for the provincial economy. As Piché explained in  1917: 
"each new pulp or paper mill means a new town of  three to five thousand inhabitants, 
which consequent/y means the expansion of the railroad system, and the development 
of  a new section of  the province. "
562 
With the expansion of the pulp and  paper industry, the intensification of its  resource 
needs, and the demand for new territories to serve the interests of settlers, the conservation 
principles of extended forest reserves, diameter size restrictions, and  efficient resource use 
quietly  withered  away.  But  more  imp01iantly,  the  familiar  struggle  for  resource  rights 
between  settlers  and  lumberers  could  once  again  be  used  to  leverage  exceptions  in  the 
application ofrules. Each year, sorne 300 to 500 square miles of forest, productive of revenue 
to  the  Province,  were  detached  from  the  so-ca\led  forest  reserves
563  and  handed  over  to 
settlers.
564  As a result, Piché explained, concession holders were forced to find the wood they 
needed further and further up-country, where "the trees are not so big. .,  not so high and not 
so productive of  timber as  in  the sections handed to  agriculture. Trees  have to  be eut [at} 
smaller  diameter  than  elsewhere,  which  explains  ... the  numerous  permits  which  the 
government  has  to  grant  each  year  to  lumbermen  to  use  the  wood of these  stands."
565 
However, as detailed in the following section, the actual cause of the timber limit exhaustion 
and forced  migration of lumbering further away from  processing facilities - where the trees 
are not so big and the forests not so productive - had less to do with the demands of a few 
settlers than the significant overcapitalization spree that followed  the First World  War and 
which was pursued unremittingly until the end of  the 1920s. 
562  RCSF, 1916-17, Appendix no.l3, p. 34: "Chaque nouvelle usine à pulpe ou à papier veut dire une nouvelle petite ville de 
trois à cinq mille habitants; cela signifies par conséquent: agrandissement de notre système de voies ferrées, et développement 
de nouvelles sections du pays."  See also Report 1917-18, Appendix no. ) 2, p. 33. 
563  Piché's use of the term "forest reserves" was figurative only, for the idea of Forest Reserves, as defined in Article 1628 of the 
Revised Statutes of  1909, was rep!aced in  1924 (Act 14 Geo. V, c.27, s.3) to  mean only those permanent forest reserves that 
were constitutive of the  parks  and games reserves that included the Laurentide  Park, Mont-Tremblant, and Gaspé for a total 
area  of  7,288  square  miles.  Such areas could  be  logged, as  per  the  existing  auctioning  process  and  could  be  clear eut  in 
conformity with Article  l597a ( 1922, Act 12 Geo V, c. 36, s. 2). 
564 See RCSF, 1923-24, p. 21. 
565 Ibid. , p.22. Unfortunately, with the arrivai of Taschereau, correspondances between Ministers and· the forest industry ceased 
to  be printed and  th us made available for public scrutin  y. Decisions were  now  made  be hi nd  closed  doors, ma king it  more 
difficult to assess how and why institutional changes were adopted. ,-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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7.3.1  Finalizing the Transition to Forest Management 
Between 1919 and  1928, Nelles (1974, p.  444) indicates that investments in  pulp and 
paper manufacturing in  Canada increased  by  375% and  output rose  by  220%.  In  Québec, 
investments  in  processing  technologies  were  motivated  as  elsewhere  by  US  and  British 
demand for newsprint, and especially the arrivai of the American owned International Paper 
Company ( 1919-20).  With  its  considerable  resources  and  purchasing  power,  International 
Paper acquired rights to hydro-power facilities on the St.  Maurice and Gatineau Rivers, and 
developed state of the art processing facilities for newsprint production, capable of producing 
pulp  and  newsprint  at  priees  that  undercut  competition  by  a  wide  margin.  To  remain 
competitive, Jess  efficient operators had little choice but to  invest and modernize their own 
facilities.
566  The scenario was  nearly  identical  in  Ontario, and together, the major pulp and 
paper manufacturers engaged in an ongoing process of overcapitalization, overproduction and 
under-pricing that drove the market value of  newsprint from $137 per ton in  1921 to only $57 
in  1931  (Nelles,  1974, p. 444). The priee of newsprint feil  below the cost of production to 
$40  per  ton  in  1932,  causing  the  collapse  of the  overall  pulp  and  paper  trade,  and  the 
bankruptcy of severa! large firms (including Abitibi and  Priee Brothers). Attempts to bring 
order  to  the  situation  by  forging  an  alliance  between  Canadian  and  British  owned  firms 
against the  priee-fixing  practices of International  Paper invariably  faltered  as  each  player, 
believing  that  others  would  renege  on  their  promises,  defected  from  whatever  pricing 
agreement  was  reached.  The spiralling  effect of the  high  stakes  dilemma was  eventually 
resolved  in  1935  when  new  legislative  enactments  made  it  possible  for  government  to 
retaliate  against  any  firm  that  did  not  respect  its  commitment  to  other  operators  (see 
discussion below).
567 
Unfortunately for those who  had contracted heavy debts in  the initial race to increase 
production capacity  in  1920, the rising U.S. demand for newsprint took a turn for the worse 
in  1921 -22 as the American economy entered into a deep, though short-lived, recession. The 
effects of the economie downturn were felt immediately in Québec and operators wasted no. 
time in  demanding more accommodating conditions from the Lands and Forest Department. 
566 See Agriculture and  Industrial Progress in Canada, Vol. 3, No. 5, May, 1921, p.93 
567  For more detailed analyses of the struggle for dominance in the newsprint sector, see Nell es (1974, pp. 443-461), Feil (1934), 
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The government responded by  suspending an  increase in  dues and ground rent
568  that was 
scheduled  to  take  place  in  1920-21,  if operators  agreed  to  harvest at  !east 25%  of the ir 
previous annual eut, even temporarily suspending such dues if companies agreed to  harvest 
burnt or damaged timber.
569  However, industry  demands  extended far  beyond the  issue of 
timber dues  and  rents.  To remain  competitive, and  increase their production capacity, pulp 
and paper manufacturers cou  Id  no longer rely on that portion of the ir timber stock that met or 
surpassed  allowable  diameter  restrictions.  More  fundamental  changes  were  needed  in  the 
existing regulatory  framework  because,  it  was  argued,  operators  were  continuously  being 
forced  onto  marginal  and  Jess  productive  areas  due  to  the  incessant  demands  of settlers. 
Consequently, limit holders needed to solicit larger areas and exceptions to harvesting rules 
in order to sustain the ir activities. 
570 
The question was  how to  introduce such amendments without appearing to endanger 
the long-tenn viability of public forests or risk attracting the ire of opposition and cri tics. The 
solution  lay  in  widening the  set of allowable  actions  that  limit  holders  could  pursue  (in 
contradiction to applicable Crown tim ber regulations) if su ch actions could be justified on the 
basis  of a  timber  management  plan.  Revisions  to  the  Lands  and  Forest  Act  were  thus 
introduced in March 1922 to offer such flexibility. Through Article 1597a (1922, Act 12 Geo. 
V,  c.  36,  s.  2),  the  government  prohibited  "clean  cutting"  (i.e.,  clear-cutting)  on  forests 
belonging  to  the  Crown,  unless  a  licentiate  obtained  a  "special  authorization"  from  the 
"Executive Council." Operators could no  longer request "special permits"  that contravened 
regulations by appealing to the Minister direct! y, as practiced be fore 1922.
571  Instead, 1  icense-
holders  who  wished to  obtain  the  right to  carry  out "extraordinary  cutting"  now  bad two 
options: 1) either they produced a workplan "based on a proper inventory" oftheir limits that 
could demonstrate anticipated growth gains over time or, 2) in the case oftimber damaged by 
568  Since  1910, Timber dues and grou  nd  rents were increased twice by order-in-council no. 765 on June !3th, 1918 and a gain  by 
arder no.  1956 on October 6th, 1920. 
569 RCSF, 1920-21 , pp. 23-24. 
570  RCSF,  1921-22, p.  18.:  "les  concessionnaires forestiers doivent aujourd'lnti  solliciter, pour de  très grandes étendues,  la 
permission de couper par exception aux règlements, afin de pouvoir exploiter une quantité de matériel ligneux suffisante pour 
alimenter leurs usines." 
571 Since  the government no  longer published relevant correspondence in  the Sessional  Papers, as practiced up  until  the  First 
World War, it is difficult to  tell  how  old and  how  widespread was the  practice  of requesting  special  permits to  eut below 
regulated diameter restrictions  prior to  1922. But in  his report for the year 1922-23, Piché indicated  that 42 special  permits 
were  handed  by  the  government  during  the  cutting  season  for  1920-21  (see  p.  20).  Experimentation  with  clear-cuts  were 
initiated by Ellwood Wilson of the Lauren ti de Company on privately-held land bctwcen 1916-1917. Sec RCSF 1916-17, p. 47. 339 
"windfall,  tire,  epidemies  of insects  or cryptogamic  diseases,"  they  could  produce a  plan 
showing the  extent of the  damage  and  the  volume of timber that  would  thus  need  to  be 
salvaged.
572  Such management plans had to  present a table, backed by  studies, showing the 
annual rate of growth on limits held  under license.  Such growth estimates, Piché explained, 
would be recognized as  the ''possibility" of a forest, or "that which we  can allow being eut 
each year without decreasing the volume of  the forest- reducing ... overall estimates ta  take 
into consideration !oses from natural causes (fire, insect,  wind)."
573 Therewith was born the 
concept of "la possibilité forestière," which would come to  guide al!  forestry  operations in 
the province to this very day. Ultimately, Piché hoped, the legislative change of 1922 would 
place the forest industry on a more sustainable path, by  progressively instituting a sustained 
yield approach that would help  regularize the  regeneration of timber stands and harvesting 
operations,  increase system  productivity,  and  force  concessionary  holders to  eut only  that 
which the forest could produce, not what their facilities could process: 
"De  cette  façon,  nous  nous  acheminons  d'une  part  vers  une  coupe  soutenue  et 
régulière  et  d'autre  part,  vers  un  enrichissement  progressif  de  nos  ressources 
forestières.  Ceci  ne  constitue  qu'un  premier  pas  dans  la  bonne  direction"  qui 
"aura ...  pour  effet  de  régulariser  la  marche  des  coupes,  et  de  forcer  les 
concessionnaires à limiter le chiffre de leurs explo'itation non plus aux besoins de leurs 
usines, mais de la capacité productrice des forêts qu'ils détiennent. "
574 
However, the idea that forest management plans, as  practiced at the time, would help 
create a better fit  between the demand for forest resources and the reproductive capacity of 
forest resource systems was fraught with challenges. For even if the stated objective of the 
new  management paradigm was to  improve such a fit,  the unwritten purpose of the revised 
forest  institutions  was  clearly  focused  on  deregulating  public  forest  resource  use  for  the 
benefit  of the  industry.  In  other words,  Article  1597a gave  limit  holders  the  freedom  to 
justify, with more or Jess credibility, their ability to withdraw increasing volumes of wood on 
the basis of anticipated  hypothetical gains,  which  no  one at the time could  reasonably  or 
reliably  predict.  There is  no  clearer proof of this  assertion than  the continuous  northward 
572 Article 1597a, Act 12 Geo. V, c. 36, s. 2 (March 21, 1922). 
573  RCSF,  1921-22, p.l9:  "Cette quantité que nous désignons sous le nom de  "possibilité" est par conséquent, celle que l'on 
pourrait perme/Ire de couper clzaque année sans diminuer le volume de la forêt. " Timber damaged by wind, fire or insect was 
not subject to the "possibility" clause and cou  id  th us be en  ti  rely removed without hindering future cutting operations. 
574  ibid. 340 
migration  of the  forest  sector,  as  reserves,  limits  or  concessions  were  repeatedly  and 
continuously depleted oftheir valuable time (see discussion below and in Chapter VIII).
575 
The need to  undertake forest inventories was advocated by  the progressive branch of 
the pulp and paper manufacturers as early as  1906 (see above), reiterated time and time again 
by  Piché, and consistently demanded  by  members of the Opposition.
576  The origins of the 
1922 regulatory  amendment therefore,  cannot be attributed to Premier Taschereau and  his 
Minister of Lands and Forests, Honoré Mercier (son of  the late Premier). Gustave Piché, who 
had long sought to place forest resource management in  Québec on a more reliable, rational, 
and "scientific" footing, certainly played a key role in defining the inventory concept and the 
more  important  principle  of the  forest's  potential  yield  (i.e.,  "la possibilité  forestière"). 
However, by  handing over of the final  decision on  whether to approve clear cutting to  the 
Lieutenant-Governor in  council, not only did the new  law protect the residual prerogative of 
the Crown - vested as always  in  the executive, but it  also helped to ensure that government 
would retain  control  over the  course of political-economic affairs  in  the province and thus 
continue  its  policy  of  unhindered  free-market  enterprise  and  resource-based  industrial 
development (Roby, 1976). 
The recognition that government had no  intention of limiting the growth of the forest 
sector, either in  terms of the annual  volume of wood appropriated from  public and  private 
sources,  or the  number of sawmills  and  pulp  and  paper manufacturing facilities  that were 
being  built  each  year,  did  not  deter Piché  from  advocating  the  need  for  greater  control. 
"There can be no question" he  wrote in  his Report for 1923-24, that Québec cannot 1imit the 
production of its mi ils without "the same policy beingfollowed in ... other Provinces." But, he 
insisted, "we  can  and ought ta  limit the cutting of timber  on  Crown  lands  within  what is 
possible ... The  legal means at our disposa! is  the  inventory and we should use it judiciously 
and without  weakness."  In  1920,  the  president of the  Laurentide  Co.,  Piché  reminds  his 
575 As thoroughly examined  in  the 2004 Report of the Commission for the study of public forests (see Chapters 5 and  6), the 
failure  of the  government  to  develop  reliable  estimates  of the  reproductive  potential  of public  forests  (i.e.,  "le  calcul de 
possibilité forestière") was one of the leading causes of overexploitation and deficient forest resource management at the tu rn 
of the 21st century. The reliability of early forest estimates was by  no means any better.  See Ls.Z. Rouseau,  1937. Les bases 
scientifiques de notre économie forestière. Contribution no. 16, Publication de sylviculture de Québec : Québec; RCSF, 1940, 
pp. 44-45, 87-88;  P.E Lachance, 1949, Sustained Yield Management in Quebec, The Forestry Chronicle; Lussier (1953:  172-
173) 
576 On the demands of the legislative opposition, see Débats de 1  'Assemblée législative, 20 janvier 1927, p. 776. ----- -~- ---· ----------------
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readers, urged the need "ta reduce the cutting on timber limits sa as avoid a dearth of  wood." 
But "since then,  new [pulp and paper} mills have been built, [and] others have doubled and 
tripled the ir output ...  We  cannat go on this way for there is  imminent danger that we shall be 
short of wood in  certain  places."
577  Sawmills  were  continuously  being erected with  little 
regards to actual conditions, such that before long, Piché worried, ali "the serviceable wood" 
would be eut, leading to an even more "rapfd exhaustion of  our forest resources."
578 
Piché was  not the  only  one to  be  alarmed by  the pace of overexploitation. The near 
exhaustion  of existing  timber  limits  was  denounced  by  the  most  respected  foresters  and 
industrialists  of the  day,  including  C.D.  Howe,  Ellwood  Wilson,  William  Priee,  Hubert 
Biermans  (President  of the  Belgo-Canadian  Pulp  ),  and  F.  J.  Campbell  (President  of the 
Canadian  Pulp  &  Paper  Association).
579  The  endless  march  of forest  operations  and  the 
limitless needs of industry brought about the progressive depletion of valued ti rn ber stocks in 
and  around established processing facilities, "ta the point where"  sorne of the largest limit 
holders in Canada, such as the Priee Brothers, could "see the end a/the forest resources." As 
William Priee underscored during the Second British Empire Forestry Conference in  1923: 
"/ remember the  day  when we  would eut nothing but the  biggest spruce logs, ... but 
gradually  we  be gan  ta  eut the  smaller sizes ...  When  1 got into  the  business  no  one 
would make a  log  out of balsam;  it  was  regarded as a  weed  ...  but balsam today  is 
almost as highly regarded as spruce. Then the paper business came in, and now we eut 
our  logs  dawn  ta  three  inches.  Not  only  are  we  doing  that,  but  we  are 
cutting .. .  anything we can get to make paper. "
580 
For Clifton D. Howe, of  the University of  Toronto, the situation was critical not only in 
Québec,  but across Eastern Canada as  a  whole.  The utter absence of any  effort to achieve 
what would  today  be  referred  to  as  sustainable outcomes  could  only  be  explained  by  the 
comparable absence of any  effort by  the State to  maintain the ambitions of industry within 
bounds and further ensure the productive capacity ofthe forests themselves: 
571  RCSF, 1923-24, pp. 36-37. 
518 /bid., pp. 37-38. With Article  1610a of Act 12 Geo. V, c.36, s.S (1922), sawmills on Crown Lands could only be established 
with the consent of the Department of Lands and  Forests, which, according to Piché, was relative! y easy to obtain. 
S79  See Débats de l'Assemblée législative, Cahier n°46, 17 mars 1926, pp. 608-621 , 
580  See Second British Empire Forestry Conference, 1923. Proceedings and Resolutions. Ottawa: F.A. Acland, p. 44. 342 
"As  you  know,  industrial development on this  continent is  based upon  the  reckless 
exploitation, not upon the  intelligent conservation, of the  natural re sources.  We  are 
rich because Nature's gifts are rich .. .In a land ofplenty we have helped ourselves with 
marvelous prodigality;  we  have  not only  wasted materials  but  we  have  dissipated 
Nature 's productive capacity in field and in forest. Notwithstanding this, the appeal is 
still emphatic for more reapers and more paper-machines,  whereas the plea for an 
intelligent basis for future production upon which alone prosperity can be maintained 
is scarcely lzeard above the roar of  machinery. The abject of  all indus  trial effort se ems 
to  be  mass production. He  is  successful  who  can produce  the  greatest quantity of 
things in the shortest time - and sell them. We  have indeed made a fetish of  speed and 
riches. "
581 
7.3 .2  Consequences of Concentrated Authority 
As  explained elsewhere in  this chapter, no one at the time was actually worried that 
Québec was  going to  run  out of wood in  any  predictable future,  for  the province still  had 
severa)  hundred thousand square kilometres of untapped supplies in the boreal north.  What 
concerned  lumbermen,  foresters,  and  leading  industrialists  was  the  speed  with  which 
allocated resource supplies were being depleted, and the consequences that might be expected 
to  follow  from  the  exhaustion of nearby stocks. For instance,  it was  reported that in  sorne 
cases, wood had to be ferried 500 miles by railway car or down winding rivers, and it could 
take up to two years for wood to travel from a eut block to its final  destiny.
582  Mill owners 
were understandably anxious about the future and how they might secure affordable supplies 
over  the  long  term.  While  abondance  and  relatively  cheap  timber  dues  had  previously 
conspired against the foreseeable gains of forest maintenance activities, the diminishing stock 
of nearby supplies and the rising costs of appropriating timber further and further away from 
processing  facilities  made  the  idea  of investing  in  local  resource  supplies  a  worthwhile 
proposition at the onset of the  1920s.
583 Reforestation experiments were conducted by a few 
pulp and  paper manufacturers (e.g.,  Laurentide, Riordon, Belgo-Canadian, and Abitibi) but 
the overall effort was simply too modest to even be considered a viable alternative to the use 
of natural  forests.
584  On  its  end,  government invested  considerable  sums  of money  in  its 
initial  Berthierville nursery,
585  but most of its  production was  destined  for  use  on  private 
581 Ibid., p.l43 
582 Ibid., p.  146. 
583  Ibid. 
ss. Ibid., p. 145. 
585 The nu rn ber of government sponsored nurseries was increased to eight in  1935. -----------------------------:----------------
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lands  and  the  estimated  3,000,000  acres  of wastelands  created  by  past efforts  to  convert 
uncultivable areas into farmland. Moreover, given the fact that forest appropriation activities 
essentially covered tens of thousands of square kilometres, the very notion that such a vast 
expanse of territory could ever be  replanted was regarded as  being both  impracticable and 
wasteful  of scarce  resources.  The solution, which Fernow and  Piché defended  in  the  early 
1900s  and  Howe  and  others  later  corroborated  in  the  1920s,  was  to  foster  the  natural 
regenerative  capacity  of forests  them selves. 
586  Intense  silvicultural  techniques  involving 
artificial propagation may  be warranted near existing processing facilities, where returns on 
investments  could  be  maximized,  but  given  the  extensive  nature  of forest  operations  in 
Québec  and  the  fact  that  operators  more  or  Jess  lacked  any  "continuity of outlook [or] 
purpose"
581  relative to  payoffs that may take 30 or 50 years to mature on land that did  not 
belong to  them, operators were understandably reluctant to invest anything more than what 
they expected to recoup. 
However,  the  more fundamental  provisioning problem that Québec had  to  confront, 
according to Piché and Howe was not the regeneration of forests per se, but the management 
of regenerating systems. As Fernow put it, ''forestry is not tree-planting, but begins best when 
the first tree is  eut. "
588  What the province needed to encourage more than anything el se was 
the  use  of  thinning  and  improvement  cuttings,  so  as  to  favour  the  regeneration  of 
economically valued timber, and prevent the transition of cutover areas to either pure stands 
of balsam fir or hardwood dominated ecosystems.
589  Again however, such practical measures 
had  little  purchase  in  a  system  dominated  by  short-term  interests.  In  the absence of any 
constraints, obligations, or incentives that might have compelled users to act differently, the 
ultimate objective of most concession holders  inevitably centred on maximizing returns as 
quickly  as  they  could,  which  in  turn  meant  investing as  little  as  possible  in  maintaining 
resource systems that did not belong to them.
590  While some argued that tenure insecurity was 
the  fundamental  reason  for  the  reluctance  of  concessionary  holders  to  maintain  the 
586 See Proceedings of the Second British Empire Forestry Conference, 1923, pp. 144-145, 151. 
"" Ibid., p. 150 
588 Fernow, B. 1909. "Wh  at We Want", in Report of  the Tenth An  nuai Meeting of  the CFA, p.77 
589  Proceedings of the  Second  British Empire  Forestry  Conference,  1923, pp.  146  and  151. See also RCFS, Appendix no. 9, 
1923-24, pp. 36-37. 
590  The absence of any obligation on the part  of concession holders to invest in  the maintenance of forest resource systems was 
a gain underscord during the Bélanger Commission (1965, p. 204). 344 
productivity of public forests (  e.g., Lussier,  1953, p.  171 ),  it  is  interesting to  note that such 
insecurity,  if  it  indeed  ever  existed,  never  prevented  anyone  from  building  costly 
manufacturing facilities or investing further resources to improve the efficiency of processing 
technologies - a point that is  further enforced by the fact that the liability for miscalculated 
investments largely rested with the public (see Section 7.2 above). 
As  Henri  Joly,  Benjamin  Hough  and  Bernard  Fernow  had  long  ago  recognized, 
sustainable forestry necessarily  implies ''financially foregoing present revenue[s] or making 
present expenditure[s} or investments for the sake of  future revenues." For "only in  the long 
run," Fernow insisted, can ''forestry ... be made profitable."
591  However, the calculus of self-
interest in  large industrial  investments tends towards even larger ftnancial  returns and few 
were willing to compromise the immediacy of short-term payoffs for the sake of an  uncertain 
future  return.  While  the  cost-sharing  system  of ftre  surveillance  was  a  broadly  accepted 
expenditure, forest restoration was not.  So when the Ministry of Lands and Forests  widened 
its  reforestation  efforts  during the  1920s and  30s,  costs were borne by  the public  and  the 
practice remained unchanged thereafter (see further discussion below). Recurrent references 
to government operated tree nurseries in public debates certainly suggests that such measures 
provided  a  politically  convenient  response  to  those  who  accused  the  government  of 
complacency  in  the  overexploitation  of  public  forests,  but  the  effectiveness  of  such 
restoration  work  was  never  actually  evaluated  and  the  need  to  engage  in  sustained 
maintenance  activities  such  as  pre-commercial  clearing,  thinning  or  release  cutting  was 
conveniently neglected by private operators and public managers alike.
592 
In the run-up to  the stock market crash of 1929, the severa!  ftrms  that did engage in 
forest maintenance activities invariably abandoned such ideals,  as  competition between pulp 
and paper manufacturers grew and the market value of their products began to fall  back. To 
sustain the  pace of growth, government intervened by  reducing stumpage dues and  ground 
rents whenever market conditions rendered operations less profitable (  e.g., between 1921-24 
and 1930-36). As large-diameter supplies neared exhaustion, the rules governing withdrawal 
591 Fernow, B. 1908. 'The Forest Necessities Of Canada", in Report oftlze Nintlz Annual Meeting oftlze CFA, p.  103. 
592  Deforestation was  the subject of ongoing discussion in  the Debates of the Legislative Assembly as weil  as in  the press. The 
limits of reforestation efforts are discussed in  Howe (1923) Proceedings of the Second British Empire Forestry Conference, pp. 
144-145; and Reports from the Chief of Forest Service, 1910 to 1930. 345 
rights  were  continuously  amended  to  legalize  cutting  below  previous  restrictions,  thus 
increasing  the  volume  of wood  that  could  be  withdrawn  in  any  given  area  of forest. 
Additional cost-savings measures were provided in the form of reduced stumpage on wood 
damaged by tire, insects or wind,
593  even though such damage made little difference for pulp 
and paper manufacturers. And for those that had already exhausted their limits - especially in 
the St. Maurice valley -the concept of  "domanial forests" was introduced in  1924 (i.e., forêts 
domaniales- 14  Geo. V,  c.27) to support the ongoing resource needs of industry in  heavily 
logged  areas.  Specifically  created  to  serve  industrial  purposes,  domanial  forests  were 
essentially crown-owned timber limits that could be used by mill owners to supplement their 
operations by purchasing specifie quantities of wood, but with the added benefit of being free 
from any additional charges, such as ground rents, bonuses on the purchase priee, or the need 
to develop management plans. Over time, the principle motive for domanial reserves shifted 
towards the need to  support small industries, but even then,  most operators tended to send 
their wood to  pulp mills,  instead of favouring alternative uses.
594  During the  1960s and 70s, 
the  concept of domanial  reserves  was  expanded  to  become  the  principle  mechanism  for 
allocating resource rights (see Chapter VIII). 
White a  more appropriate  response to overcapitalization and  the  increasing resource 
needs of pulp and  paper manufacturers would have been  to  proportionally  increase crown 
dues to restrain the intemperate actions of concession holders, the fact is that most operators 
had become simply too big and too important to fai t.  Moreover, the overzealous behaviour of 
operators was in large part attributable to  succeeding governments.  Since  1873, the sale of 
forest  resource  rights  had  to  proceed  through  an  auctioning  process  but  in  truth,  such 
competition - especially with regards to the pulp and paper industry - never really  existed. 
Thanks to  the executive's exclusive rights over Crown resources, the sale or leasing of such 
assets could be negotiated behind closed doors, thus limiting thitd party interference and the 
uncertainty of an auctioning process. In turn, the Minister of Lands and Forests could easily 
reciprocate private advances by manipulating the terms and conditions of advertised auctions 
593  Rates on  saw  logs (per  1000 fee!  board measure)  were set at $5.00 for white pi  ne, oak, hickory and  walnut; $3.50 for Red 
pi ne, elm, ash, birch, maple, etc.; and  $2.70 for Spruce, balsam, cedar, and gray pine. To promote salvage cutting, these rates 
were reduced to $2.00; $1.75 ; and $1.50 respectively. Between 1919-24, ground rent was maintained at $6.50, raised to $8.00 
for 1925-30, and lowered to $3.00 in  1930. 
594  See Report of the Chief of Forest Service for 1939-40, p. 38. 346 
with such specificities and requirements that only those firms that held prior knowledge could 
bid on a proposed sale. Overtime, such proximity inevitably rendered government even more 
susceptible to  the rent seeking efforts of private operators. Interesting cases that generated 
lengthy  debates  in  the Legislature  include  the  sale of 2,500  square miles of forest on  the 
Manicouagan  River
595  in  November  1923,  and  the  advertised  sale  of various  blocs
596  of 
forests totalling 4,200 square  miles  between February and March 1926. In both  instances, 
purchasers were obligated to  build manufacturing plants capable of producing over 200 tons 
of pulp  and  100  tons of paper  per day  in  the  case of the Manicouagan sale;  450  tons  of 
newsprint per day for an  1800 square mile acquisition on the Gatineau River; and 200 tons of 
pulp a day  along with a power generating facility  on a  1000 square mile concession on the 
Mistassini River.
597  To place  a successful  bid,  tenders had Jess  then a  month to  draw-up a 
plan for the construction of  the proposed pulp and paper mill and/or power generating facility 
(given  the  delay  between the  relevant order-in-council  and  the  publication of the  cali  for 
proposais). They were required to deposit a security of $200,000 to  $500,000 days prior to 
the scheduled sale. They had  to  inventory conceded limits before a single tree was eut; and 
pay  a  ground  rent bonus of $400 to  $600 per square mile.  The sales were adjudged to the 
firms that bid the highest surplus, over and above the normal timber dues (per co  rd or 1000 
feet board measure), which was seldom more than five or ten cents above the base priee since 
no  more  than  two  bidders ever submitted  a  proposa1.
598  While  such  priees  might appear 
reasonably high, compared to the average bonus on a timber limit in 1903 (i.e., $111.60),
599  it 
was  nothing  compared  to  the  actual  market value of a  well-stocked  berth,  which  William 
Priee  estimated  to  be  worth  between  $5,000  and  $10,000  per  square  mile  in  1923.
600 
However,  no  matter  how  significant  or  credible  the  evidence  of  corruption  and 
mismanagement or how prejudicial to  the public's  interests such sales may have been, the 
ruling  Liberal  party  only  had  to  use  its  majority  to  defeat  any  motion,  amendment  or 
proposition that members of the Opposition dared to bring forth in the Assembly. In truth, the 
595  DAL, Cahier n°54, 14 mars 1924, pp. 842-850 
596  DAL, Cahier n°23, Il février  1926. pp. 328-333; Cahier n°24, 12 février 1926, pp. 335-341; Cahier n°46, 17 mars 1926, pp. 
608-621. 
597  DAL, Cahier 11°46, 17 mars 1926, pp. 608-621. 
598  Based on the evidence brought bef  ore  the  Legislative Assembly, it appears as though second  bidders were used to give the 
appearance of a competition between  at !east two con tenders, only one of which was cl  earl y credible. See the debate over the 
sale of the Manicouagan concession in  DAL, Cahier n°54, 14 mars 1924, pp. 842-850. 
599  See Report of the Minister of Lands, Mines and  Fisheries, 1901-02, p. xv. 
600  See Proceedings of the Second Empire Forestry Conference, 1923, p. 44. 347 
government's only real  worry was to fend off attacks by the Conservative opposition, which 
Honoré Mercier did  with the ali  art and cunning of a  well-seasoned  politician.  As  for the 
likelihood  of unfavourable statements  in  the press, the leading papers of the  day  were so 
evenly  divided  along clear partisanship !ines  (Roby,  1976) that any  negative  media report 
could easily be refuted as just another lie or fabrication in favour of  the opposition. 
Between 1920 and  1926, sorne  1  0,528 square miles of forestland - an  are a  equal  to 
five  times  the  size of Prince-Edward-Island - were thus  "auctioned"  off to  a  handful  of 
industrialists. For those who were most intimately acquainted with the consequences of over-
entry  on  Québec's  forest  resource  systems,  the  situation  had  become  untenable  and  a 
moratorium had to  be placed on the construction of new mills or the  propensity of existing 
establishment  to  continuously  increase  their  production  capacity.  Ellwood  Wilson,  for 
instance, argued that there were indeed limits to  growth and that, out of common interest, 
firms  had  a  duty  to  adjust  their  manufacturing  requirements  to  the  actual  reproductive 
capacity or sustainable yield of  the forest upon which they depended: 
"Il  semble  que  le  temps  est venu  de  crier halte  dans  la  construction  de  moulins  à 
papier ou  dans l'érection de  nouvelles machines à papier dans les usines existantes. 
Peut-être que tout cela crée la prospérité présente, bien que j'en doute,  car le  temps 
viendra vite où les fabricants se prendront à la gorge pour s'emparer du marché, et ce 
serait faire  preuve  de  sens  commun  de  ne  construire  des  moulins  que  selon  la 
possibilité de production forestière.  "
601 
In considering the potential effects of the situation, Taschereau appeared to recognize 
the need  to  conserve forest  resources  and  place sorne  limits  on  the  establishment of new 
mi lis, as discussed in  his 1927 Speech from the Throne: 
"[Il est] temps de  se demander si cette expansion extraordinaire ne doit pas avoir ses 
limites  et  si,  dans  l'intérêt  de  la  forêt  et de  sa  conservation,  et  pour  assurer  la 
prospérité des industries établies,  il n'est pas mieux de  ralentir quelque peu et de  ne 
pas encourager trop d'usines nouvelles?" 
Although  Taschereau  was  not  above  the  idea  of expanding  industry  further  still, 
especially on  rivers that could be harnessed for their energy, or where communities might 
601 Cited in Débats de l'Assemblée législative (DAL), Cahier n°7, 20 janvier 1927, pp. 76-77 348 
foreseeably profit from such developments, the primary task of his government was to en sure 
that  existing  operators  would  find  the  long-term  supplies  they  needed  to  maintain  their 
operations: 
"Il  est vrai que,  dans certains endroits de la province, là où il y a des pouvoirs d'eau 
inexploités et qui ne peuvent l'être que comme accessoires de la forêt, là encore où une 
population peut  en  bénéficier  largement,  la  restriction  n'a peut-être pas  encore  sa 
raison  d'être .. .[Mais]  il  est  également  de  notre  devoir  d'assurer  aux  grandes 
compagnies  actuelles  des ressources forestières pour leur permettre de  vivre  et des 
réserves  qui  enlèveront  aux  compagnies  propriétaires  de  ces  usines  toute 
inquiétude.  "
602 
In the last half of the  1920s,  competition between pulp and paper manufacturers had 
become so tierce that when the  speculative bubble finally  burst  in  1929, the industry  was 
mired  in  debt generated  by  overcapitalization  and  a  sub-optimal  pricing  structure that was 
barely  sufficient  to  cover  operating costs.  Caught  in  a  complex  web  of funding  schemes 
supported by  financial institutions and  insurance brokers  who were  themselves organized in 
trust-like  structures,  most operators  had  no  cash  reserves  on  hand  to  absorb  tosses,  many 
went under, production came to a near standstiiJ, and thousands of labourers were put out of 
work throughout the province.  Although the forest sector represented  less than  10% of the 
province's total revenues by  1929 (compared with 32% of revenues in  1901),
603  the economie 
wellbeing of the province remained inextricably tied to  its forest wealth and a slowdown in 
the productivity of the forest sector meant economie hardship across the province. As the full 
effects  of the  economie crisis  began  to  take  their toll, no  sector of the provincial economy 
preoccupied Taschereau  more than the pulp and paper industry (Vigod,  1986, pp. 180-187). 
For in  contrast to most other sectors of the provincial economy,  the pulp and  paper industry 
was not so much a victim of ongoing circumstances but a net contributor to the speculative 
bubble that led to the collapse of North American markets in  1929. In short, the demise ofthe 
pulp and paper sector was largely self-inflicted. In trying to come to gri ps with the relentless 
efforts of manufacturers to undercut their competitors, Tascherau believed that: 
"there  [was] on/y one an.swer  [to  the  general failure  of the forest sector  ], and  that 
[was]. ..  the promoters' passion.  to  "get." .. .Future profits  have be  en capitalized, and 
602 Sec Débats de l'Assemblée législative. Cahier n°3, 13 janvier 1927, pages 20-32. 
603 See Débats de 1  'Assemblée législative. Cahier no 12, 29 janvier 1929, pages 186-21 4. 349 
the  overcapitalization converted ... to  the  benefit of the enterprising promoters [i.e., 
financiers],  and as  a  result,  this  basic  industry  [wasj hopelessly overloaded to  the 
crack of  doom. "
604 
However,  the situation  was  more complex and  indeed  far  more persona!  than what 
Taschereau  willingly  admitted.  Essentially,  the  problems of over-entry,  overcapitalization, 
and  cutthroat  competition  were  not  the  fruit  of unfettered  capitalism  and  self-interested 
behaviour alone. In effect, such risk-taking behaviours were largely created or stimulated by 
the government's pro-development policies, including:  1) the maintenance of low priees for 
resources and energy  in  the midst of rising demand; 2)  contractual obligations to build and 
maintain resource intensive pulp and  paper processing facilities,  along with minimum daily 
production quotas; and 3) the constant manipulation of rules to support the growing resource 
needs of an unsustainable industry. Further, from the mid 1920s onwards, Taschereau also sat 
on the board of many of the major financial institutions that underwrote the expansion of the 
pulp and paper industry and  hydroelectric sector.  As  a prominent member of the Barclay's 
Bank, the Royal Trust Company, North American Life, the Sun Life Insurance Company, the 
Title  Guarantee  and  Trust  Corporation,  the  Royal  Liverpool  Insurance  group,  and  the 
Canadian Investment Funds, which he joined in  1932 (see Vigod,  1986, p.  191), Taschereau 
not only determined the course of public and economie affairs in the province, he also stood 
to benefit directly from such decisions and/or assist others in doing so. As one contemporary 
observer noted, it was possible to "transact business with the Québec government as quickly 
as you can with any private company" (Ibid., p.  192). 
Whether Taschereau felt personally responsible for the demise of the pulp and  paper 
industry is  unclear, but from  1930 to 1935, most of his attention was focused on trying to get 
the  leading  manufacturers  to  stop  their  suicidai  priee  wars  and  adopt  minimum  pricing 
agreements that would provide more stable conditions for investors and resource-dependent 
communities  alike.  Confronted  with  the  impossibility  of  getting  pulp  and  paper 
manufacturers to voluntarily agree to a common pricing structure and bring an end to the cut-
throat  tactics  of the  American-owned  International  Paper,  Taschereau  passed  legislation 
designed to ensure the protection of  forest resources in the province (1935 Act 25-26 Geo. V, 
604  Financial Post, 23  April, 1930, cited in Vigod (1986, p. 181). 350 
c.  22), which threatened to substantially increase crown dues for any license holder that did 
not follow the  pricing directives  set by  Ontario  and  Québec,  maintain  pre-set  production 
targets  and  pay  workers a  minimum  wage.  While  successful  in  mediating a  "gentlemen's 
agreement"  in  early  1936  that  essentially  avoided  the  use  of authorized  sanctions,
605 
Taschereau's government had  become so  deeply  enmeshed  in  what Black (1977,  p.  153) 
neatly  described as  "bribery, embezzlement, nepotism, [and] extortion"  that its  future  was 
essentially  over.  As  revealed  in  the  more credible  portions  of the  inquiry  carried  out by 
Maurice  Duplessis  through  the  Public  Accounts  Committee  (1936-39),
606  the  stench  of 
corruption was rampant throughout the Taschereau government, both at the leve!  of Cabinet 
(though no one was ever formerly charged) and within the various public depa1tments (see 
Gow,  1986, pp.  155-159). After nearly four decades of one party rule, the government had 
lost  ali  trace  of public  accountability;  the  misappropriation  of public  funds  had  become 
rampant; and patronage, cronyism or nepotism became accepted norms for allocating public 
contracts,  purchasing  supplies  or  hiring  staff.  As  evidence  of questionable  decisions  and 
duplicitous behaviour began to fil ter through the press, along with the unrelenting criticism of 
prominent former Liberais such as  Paul Gouin (son of the late  premier), the odds  of ever 
regaining control over the situation were set against Taschereau, forcing him to  resign from 
office on June 11 t\  1936 
7.3.3  Crisis and Experimentation 
As is often the case, crises can generate new ideas but they can also serve as an excuse 
to  relax  institutional  safeguards  in  order  to  stimulate  private  investments  and  renewed 
economie  activity.  Between  1930  and  1936,  the  government  began  to  experiment  with 
variable leasing agreements (lasting anywhere from  six months to twenty years, and one to 
fifty square miles in size) that were awarded to local manufacturers and sawmill owners (with 
reduced  ground  rent  obligations  from  $8.00  to  $3.00  per  square  miles)  to  stimulate 
employment.  To support  the  needs of  factories that  had  depleted  their  reserves, rules were 
amended in  193 1 to allow  the  Ministry  of  Lands and  Forests to  issue "special permits" to 
operators to eut up to  150,000 cu bic feet (per year) of timber from vacant lands in  ex  change 
605 See Rapport du Chef du Service Forestier, 1938-39, p. 34-36 
606 Enquête du Comité des comptes publics. (Procès-verbal) Québec, dactylographié, 8 vol.  Maurice Duplessis took advantage of 
his position as the head of the Committee to push his own agenda (see Gow, 1986, pp. 155-156). 351 
for a slightly hire stumpage (to compensate the fact that permit holders did not have to  pay 
bonus fees, ground rents, culling fees, or fire protection fees)
607
- a practice that was initiated 
un der Taschereau but pursued unremittingly thereafter. In  1932-33,  10  permits were issued; 
58  where  handed  out  in  1935-36,  and  177  in  1941-42,  after  the  law  was  changed  (i.e., 
1941 )
608  to  allow  permit holders to  take up  to  300,000 cu bic feet  of timber to  support the 
mi !ling needs of factories that were of "economie necessity" to  the  region where they  were 
located (see Boutin,  1944, p. 130).  And to  suppot1 growing household needs, the system of 
township reserves (i.e., "reserve cantonales") was increased from  1,070 square miles in  1931 
to  1,455 square miles in  1936 (and eventually raised to 2,142 square miles in  1941), and free 
permits for firewood and other necessities were handed out until the end of  the 1930s. 
In terms of developing more efficient patterns of forest resource use, one of the most 
interesting  initiatives  to  have  been  created  during  this  period  was  the  Forest  Products 
Commission of 1931  (Act 21  Geo. V., c. 33). As often considered in  the annual reports ofthe 
chief of the forest service, Québec's forest sector bad become overly dependent on the pulp 
and paper industry in  the first decades of the 20
1
h  century. And as  C.D.  Howe and G.  Piché 
underscored in their various writings, the absence of a diversified industry affected not only 
the economie resilience of the  overall  forest  sector (i.e.,  mono-industrial  complex  with  no 
alternative  outlets  to  face  fluctuating  market conditions),  it  also  limited  the possibility  of 
establishing more sustainable pathways. ln effect, the extensive development of the pulp and 
paper sector created strong incentives to  overharvest sorne trees (  e.g., spruce and fir)  to the 
detriment  of  others  (  e.g.,  shade  tolerant  and  intolerant  hard woods),  th  us  creating  an 
imbalance in  the natural regenerative capacity of accessible mixed and boreal forest systems, 
which  in  turn  allowed  faster  growing  poplar,  birch,  and  maple  to  overcome  the  slower 
growing evergreens. 
The Forest Products Commission was created at the insistence of the timber trade and 
sawn lumber industry, and sought to  understand how Québec's forests were being used, and 
identify  unexplored  niches  or outlets that would  be  productive  of wages  and  labour (e.g., 
tools, toys, furniture, cabinetry, construction, veneers, interior finishing,  flooring,  mouldings, 
007  RCSF, 1930-3 1, p.  28; See also Act 21 Geo V., c34 authorizing the Minister of Lands and Forests to  issue, without public 
auction and without previous notice, special pern1its to eut up to 150,000 cu  bic feet on vacant lands. 
608 5Geo. Vl,c.25, s. 2,art. l7a. 352 
and other special applications such as synthetic silks). The logic pursued by the Commission 
was  straightforward.  Not only  would  the  pursuit  of value-added  production  maximise 
efficiency gains by supporting a more complete use of available resources, it would also help 
manage forests better by  balancing demands across the range of available supplies (instead of 
only spruce,  pine,  and  fir). Until  its  dissolution  in  1936,
609  the Commission produced four 
an nua! reports, reminiscent of more recent campaigns to promote the use of forest products as 
an environmentally and socially responsible choice. In a nut-shell, the Commission cal  led for 
the  reinstatement of wood as  a  viable alternative to  steel  and concrete  in  commercial and 
residential  building projects;  improve the quality  of products being produced;  promote the 
use of wood for heating and energy production; and disseminate information on best practices 
and  !essons  learned for the  production and  marketing of value added goods.  Sorne of the 
more notable recommendations included the need to: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Standardize  the  size,  quality  and  dimensions  of  sawn  lumber  production  (a 
suggestion repeated since the 1850s); 
Restock and improve the quality of degraded hardwood forests in southern Québec 
with  valuable  trees  (e.g.,  oak,  butternut,  walnut,  ash,  cherry,  etc.)  for  use  in 
cabinetry, furniture building, and other fine wooden articles; 
Support the production of engineered wood
610  such as  the development of beams 
and trusses, using the overlay of compressed and bolted strips of wood to produce 
laminated structures, lighter than  western  timber, but more  resistant to  stress, in 
lengths of up to two hundred feet; 
Adjust  production  to  demand  in  order  to  maintain  priee  ratios  favourable  to 
producers; 
Promote the use of firewood and charcoal for heating; 
Reduce unemployment by using ali available bands to reforest public waste lands, 
community-held wood lots and build forest roads to improve access; 
Create syndicates  or cooperative associations  of sawmill  owners  to  facilitate  the 
development of common standards, advise members on market trends, regulate the 
production  to  match  market  demand,  adopt  common  pricing  agreements  to 
improve  wages  and  cost  recovery,  share  information,  and  reduce  aggregate 
demands on overexploited private forests; and 
li09' The Commission was replaced with  the "Bureau des produits forestiers," and reduced in  scope  to a statistical book kceping 
function of wh at was being produced, instead of bringing attention to what ought to be produced. 
610  Piché suggested the need to develop engineered wood products for building use as carly as 1928. See RCFS, 1928. 353 
•  Limit the  number  and capacity of sawmills, and favour a  more efficient use of 
available resources by  integrating sawmills to pulp and paper facilities to prevent 
the needless waste of larger sized  timber; diversify output; maximize returns on 
every  tree  eut;  and  promote  a  more  complete  use  of available  wood  fibre  by 
recycling waste in pulp and  paper manufacturing.
611 
Unfortunately, unless good ideas are backed by  positive changes in  the incentives and 
constraints  resource  users  face,  the  likelihood  of change  in  the  habits  and  behaviours  of 
targeted user groups is indeed very slim. Renee, when economie activity picked-up again in 
1936, the  pulp and  paper industry  quickly  returned  to  its  former habits of overproduction, 
leading to yet another spell  of economie slowdown, job tosses, and reduced wages from  1937 
to  1939.
612 Nevertheless, optimism remained strong. Duplessis was elected premier in  August 
1936, the influential position of deputy premier was handed over to A vila Bédard, who held 
on to his position until  1960 and also served as Chief of Forest Service from  1936 to  1939. 
Although  Bédard  had  trained  alongside Piché at Yale in  1905-07,  his  style  was  altogether 
different and his support for the pulp and paper industry was unyielding. 
7.3.4  Return to Business as Usual 
Referring to the familiar but unfounded idea that colonization was forcing operators to 
work ever further in the interior- where the climate was harsher, soit conditions were poorer, 
and  trees  were  necessarily  smaller - Bédard  argued  the  need  to  do  away  with  diameter 
restrictions altogether.  Since the sawn  lumber had  become a  mere  shadow of what it once 
was,  Bédard  claimed,  and  tree  size  mattered  little  for  pulp  and  paper  production,  the 
"arbitrariness"  of past  diameter  restrictions  had  to  be  supplanted  by  shorter  and  more 
productive rotations that would do more to maintain the profitability of forestry operations in 
a context of growing industrialization: 
"Il  reste que la  culture du  petit bois diamètre permet à l'exploitant de  revenir, à de 
moins longs intervalles, aux mêmes endroits. C'est là un  avantage; les capitaux que 
représentent,  à  l'état  donnant,  les  arbres  en  croissance  étant  moins  longtemps 
immobilisés,  plus vite productifs. Reppelons-le,  l'exploitation forestière  consiste dans 
la récolte d'un produit spontané de  la  nature. V ne telle récolte, pour être profitable, 
611  See the Second, Third and Fourth Annual Reports of the Quebec Forest Products Commission in  the Reports of the Minister 
of Lands  and  Forests  (1933,  1934 and  1935).  Between  1934 and  1936, "La  Commission  des  opérations  forestières"  was 
instituted to improve the livelihoods of forest workers. 
612 RCSF, 1937-38, p. l7 &  1938-39, p.33. 354 
doit  être  substantielle  à  l'unité  de  surface,  c'est  à-dire  plutôt  intensive 
qu'extensive. "
613 
To conform to this  new  ideal and ensure the successful development of the pulp and 
paper industry, operators were now required to "subordinate cutting to  the potential growth 
of  a forest" (i.e.,  "la possibilité de  la forêt")  by  completing inventories of their eut-blacks 
using  a  standardized  form  developed  by  Piché  in  October  1929  (i.e.,  permit  "B-44,"  in 
reference  to  chapter 44  of the  Revised  Statutes  of 1925).  In  conformity  with  article  69 
(inventory  and  management  plan)  of the  revised  statutes,  overmature  forests  and  large-
diameter trees  left standing in  previously eut areas had to be harvested; scattered seed trees 
were to be left standing in  mixed or broad-leaf dominated systems only; timber damaged by 
wind, fire or insects had to be harvested; unless prescribed for, trees less than 60 years of age 
were to be left uncut; and in  order to take advantage of small diameter trees, clear cuts (i.e., 
"coupes claires ou blanc-étoc") were to be privileged in areas where softwoods were likely to 
regenerate  fully  and  easily.
614  By  1939,  operators  were  required  to  complete  long  term 
decadal forest management plans,
615  as  weil as  annual plans that had to be submitted to the 
Ministry  of Lands  and  Forests  for  approval  three  months  ahead  of planned  operation. 
According to this new management scheme, the total amount of wood taken could not exceed 
the  annual  or periodic allowable eut (if measured  against the decadal  planning estimates), 
except in  situations where it  would be desirable to "normalize" forest growth (i.e., produce 
even-aged forests).
616  Since the favoured optimum was to normalize forests everywhere, the 
meaning of a "sustainable yield" became a highly subjective notion that could be manipulated 
to  achieve nearly any political-economic end. Finally, in  spite of Duplessis' criticism of the 
way forest concessions were sold  under the Liberal government, the Premier wasted no time 
in  using  his  own  majority  government  in  1937  to  repeal  the  1910  expo11  ban  on 
unmanufactured  wood  arising  from  public  lands  (replaced  with  the  need  to  acquire  a 
transportation permit- 1 Geo VI, c.29), and bypass the requirement of 1872, pertaining to the 
public sale of timber limits. Together with the adoption of a permanency clause (instituted 
un der Taschereau in  1934, 24 Geo. V. c. 21  ), which granted automatic renewals to th  ose who 
613 RCSF, 1937-38, p. 23 
6 14 Ibid., pp. 24-25. 
615 RCSF, 1938-39, pp ..  62-63. 
616  Ibid. The periodic sustained yield principle allowed opera  tors to exceed the an  nuai  allowable eut, as Jong as overall  rates of 
appropriation respected the estimated 10 year growth forecast. 
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respected  departmental  regulations  (leading to  long term  guarantees of 10  to  50  years),
617 
Duplessis clearly showed that he was  indeed "the boss,"
618  as  most of his  predecessors had 
done before him. 
With  these final  specifications, the  management of public forests  remained virtually 
unchanged un ti 1 the  1970s. The close relationship th at was forged  between government and 
industry during 38 years of consecutive Liberal majorities was there to stay. And in spite of 
repeated  warnings  that  appropriation  rates  were  exceeding  the  reproductive  capacity  of 
forests  in  various  regions  of the  province  (  especially  in  the  continued  absence  of forest 
maintenance activities), production levels continued to  increase as if the system was indeed 
boundless (see Table 7.2 above). Following in the footsteps  of his  predecessors, Duplessis 
fervently  pursued  the  expansion  of resource-based  industrial  development  like  no  other 
premier before him.  Using his  majority  government to  advantage,  he  unashamedly  passed 
private bills in favour of the forest industry and mining operations
61 9 that left little doubt over 
his intentions. In  1946 for instance, Duplessis passed an Act ''for the purpose of  securing the 
continuity and progress of  the  [forest} industry"
620  that handed over 1,755  square miles of 
"renewable cutting licenses" to 9 different operators that had depleted their reserves. Among 
the entitlements that were so granted by the Act in  question, the Gaspesia Sulphite Company 
was  given  unlimited  rights  "to  build,  maintain  and  use  roads  telephone  or  electric 
transmission fines and camps upon upon vacant crown lands. " But should it need "to occupy 
other lands and is  unable to agree with owners or possessors of  such lands," the Lieutenant-
Governor  in  council  maintained  "the  right  to  decree  real  servitudes"  (Article  1  0)  to  be 
determined  by  the  Provincial  Transportation  and  Communication  Board  whose  decisions 
were  final  (i.e.,  no  right  of appeal).  Similarly,  Duplessis  past  a  massive  land  swapping 
agreement  in  1945  as  part  of an  Act respecting the  Industrial  Stability  and Progress  of 
Québec (Act 9 Geo. VI, c. 29). Pursuant to the interests ofsome ofthe largest limit holders in 
617  See Rapport du Chef du  Service Forestier, !939-40, p. 38. Sorne Jeases were reported to be 75 and even !50 years. However, 
No evidence of such extensive arrangements were fou  nd  in subsequent reports. 
618 Duplessis was widely refered to as "Je boss" by fri ends and foes alike (see Black, !977). 
619  One of the more famous examples of Duplessis' resource  po!icies  is Act !0 Geo. VI, c. 42  (1946), which gave Hollinger 
North  Shore Exploration Company unlimited prospecting rights over a 3,900 miles2 area bordering Labrador. According to the 
terms of the enactment, Hollinger had  until  !958 to begin mining operations on a terri tory that was not to exceed 300 miles2 in 
exchange of an annual rent of $100,000 dollars and  a 7% taxon profits. li  was spared  the obligation of paying crown dues on 
the extracted minerais (like ali  other finns at the time), which led to  the famous accusation that Duplessis sold  the rights to 
Quebec's north shore iron ore for as little as  1  Y:  per ton. See also Black (1977). 
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the province such as the Canada Paper Company, the Canadian International Paper Company, 
the  Anglo-Canadian  Pulp and  Paper Mills,  and  the  Québec North  Shore Paper Company, 
among others, and the need to "considerably increase their industrial operations and ta bring 
new industry ta  Québec, " the government considered it "advisable ta place at their disposai 
the forest reserves  necessary ta  stabilize  such  undertakings and ta  enable them  ta  develop 
normally. " By doing so, government posited that the legislative enactment would ''favour the 
utilization of  .. timber that has  matured and is  exposed ta  loss through decay"  and  further 
"help  bring stability and contribute ta  the  settlement of  post-war problems, [including}  the 
stabilization ofCanadian money on foreign markets." While the latter Bill was introduced to 
correct  the  problem  of speculative  land  hold  and  concentrate  reserves  nearer  to  existing · 
facilities, the redistribution effort did  nothing to improve access for Jess  intensive forms of 
resource use or stimulate investments in resource maintenance activities. 
7.3.5  Sustaining the Unsustainable 
Over time,  the  palpable  search  for  an  independent  and  objective  voice  within  the 
government apparatus, which Gustave Piché sought to bring during the first 25 years with the 
Forest Service,  eventually  dissipated  (save  the  exceptional  but short tenure of Henri  Roy 
between 1939-41 - see below), as the Lands and Forest Department more or Jess became the 
public relations arm  of the forest industry.  Wh ile its primary role during the first forty years 
of its  existence  was  essentially  administrative,  its  ability  to  affect  the  progress  of forest 
resource  use  was  progressively  restrained  by  the  growing  burden  of  bureaucratie 
responsibilities  and  chronic  underinvestment.
621  Since  operators  followed  departmental 
regulations and forest engineers from either government or industry used the same methods, 
theories,  and  frameworks  to  select  the  most  favourable  course  of action,  technical  and 
operational  staff were essentially  bounded  by  the  conventions of their  profession  and  the 
respective interests of their employers. Dissension within the  ranks was rare and both faced 
strong incentives to maintain the status quo.  In  effect, foresters exercised little or no control 
over the  decisions  they  were  asked  to  implement  and  their ability  to  affect  resource  use 
outcomes was  at best  limited.  Individuals  like  Ellwood  Wilson  and  the finn  for which  he 
worked (Laurentide Pulp and  Paper) were the exceptions rather than the  rule.  Equally  rare 
621 See Rousseau, L.Z., 1937. Les bases scientifiques de notre  économie forestière. Publication de la  Société de silviculture de 
Québec: Québec, p.3; and Gow (1986, pp. 96-98 & 207). - --------------------
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were outspoken critics of government policies who could speak from  first hand experience, 
such as Thomas Maher who left the Forest Service at the start of a promising career in  the 
l920s  because of the  way  in  which  he  felt  public resources were  wilfully  and knowingly 
being overexploited to support the growth of the pulp and paper sector and the interests of  the 
pine lumber industry at the expense of the public.
622 
But oppo1iunities to  speak truth to  power did occur. As the post-war economie boom 
of the  1940s  and  50s  intensified,  foresters,  economists  and  social  scientists  increasingly 
called attention to the many problems associated with administration of public forests in  the 
Province. Unfortunately, little if anything was ever done to reduce overexploitation, invest in 
resource maintenance activities, change existing tenure arrangements, expand community-led 
agroforestry  initiatives,  and  develop  small  industries  (as  more  sustainable  and  equitable 
alternatives to  large pulp and paper manufacturers). Government and industry decidedly had 
other interests in mind. 
The first (and probably the only) official to openly question the collective choices that 
commanded forest resource use in the province, and the medium to Iong-term implications of 
such decisions, was the Chief of Forest Service from  1939 to 1941, Henri  Roy.  During his 
brief tenure  as  the  senior-most public  servant in  the  Lands  and  Forests  Department, Roy 
stated in  clear and  unequivocal terms what everyone knew.  Forests in  the  most accessible 
districts  of the  province,  near  agricultural  and  industrial  centres  were  knowingly  being 
overexploited, and none of the systems used for allocating resource rights
623  were productive 
of sustainable results. Overall,  forests  were poorly  managed,  and  not enough was  done to 
change the situation: 
"L'acuité  du  problème  forestier  provient  d'un  manque  d'équilibre  dans  notre 
exploitation forestière, d'un aménagement général défectueux, et en définitive, aussi de 
la  négligence  à  appliquer  les  règles  de  la  sylviculture.  Il  devient  de  plus  en  plus 
évident qu'il est plus important pour nous de  bien prendre soin des terrains forestiers 
622  See Rumilly ( 1953, pp. 32-34). For a more open critique of public forest management, see Maher ( 1952). 
623  These included township reserves, domanial reserves, timber concessions, special permits to vacant lands, colonisation lands, 
and land  grants for municipalities, industrial development or infrastructure development. 358 
situés dans  notre  rayon  économique d'activité que de  nous préoccuper des  réserves 
éloignées qui ne peuvent éviter des embarras actuels. "
624 
Like most of his  peers,  Roy  insisted that Québec had more than enough wood in  the 
northern latitudes to support the foreseeable long-term needs of the province, but ali  in  ali, 
such stocks were "a poor substitute" for the greater productivity of southern forests. Further, 
systems nearest to existing "circles of  economie activity" were wantonly depleted with little 
regards to the interests of local communities.
625  In  regions adjoining agricultural or industrial 
developments,  the  rising  demand  for  pulp  wood  was  leading  to  a  growing "scarcity  of 
timber" in the domanial reserve, which was "highly prejudicial ta economie development and 
ta  small industries. "
626  Moreover, such reserves, Roy decried, were increasingly being taken 
over by large-capital holders who stopped at nothing to get the wood they needed to maintain 
the productive output of their pulp and paper facilities, thus limiting the diversification of the 
local economy: 
"The installation of  plants and mills must  ...  be regulated in view of  the reserves of  raw 
mate  rial of which they  dispose, for if we  suffer from forest concessions held inactive 
[by] speculation, we also suffer from having small units which, attached to big mills, 
are necessarily exploited on a liquidation basis. "
627 
The issuance of "special permits" to eut timber on vacant crown lands also suffered 
from overexploitation and the  absence of any provisioning requirement. These permits, Roy 
indicated, were initially created to aid the lumber industry "handicapped by the gathering up 
of  forest concessions in  the hands of  ...  pulp and paper [manufacturers}." However, instead 
of diversifying the rural  economy, the practice of selling specified volumes of timber was 
"quickly  wip[ing]  out  the  wooded  vacant  lands  close  [ta}  agricultural  establishments." 
Combined with the continuous onslaught of lumberers on private land hold or lots sold for 
colonization purposes, entire districts were thus  being depleted of their valuable timber.  In 
Roy's opinion, the solution to Québec's anticipated wood shortage was relatively clear: 
624  RCSF, 193940, p. 45, The official English translation is: "the acuteness of  our forest problem arises from a J ack of  balance 
in our forest exploitation, and from a general/y inadequate forest management, as a  iso from neglect in  the application of the 
laws of  si/vieu/ture.  Il  becomes more and more evidenttilat it  is more  important for us lo lake care of  forest lands situated 
within our circ!e of economie activity,thanto worry about distant reserves thal cannat save us from our present troubles." 
625 Ibid.,  p. 44-45 
626 Ibid.,  p. 38 
627 Ibid., p. 39 359 
"As an  immediate palliative, the commercial eut ... must be reduced to the minimum, 
and in  more prospero us  times  the  people must be  urged to  ...  work  in  more  distant 
forests. "
628 
However, "the only positive solution" to the recurrent problem of overexploitation was 
not to endlessly push operators northwards, but to better manage and increase the productive 
potential of forests by applying basic "rules of  silviculture. "
629 Ultimately, this proved a hard 
lesson  to  integrate.  Instead of adjusting withdrawal  rates  to  the productive capacity of the 
systems in  use (or a designated safe threshold), as Roy recommended, government raised the 
maximum  volume  of wood  that  could  be  taken  from  vacant  lands  (by  means  of special 
permits) from  150,000 ft
3 to 300,000 fe in  1941, in order to support economie development 
(  see above). 
Township forest reserves on the other band, were designed to support the household 
needs of communities, but evidence suggests that they did not fare better than other portions 
of the public domain. For not only did the system place few if any constraints on  users, which 
in turn negatively affected the quality and integrity of  such forests, township reserves also: 
"cost  more  in  administration  than  they  bring  in,  because  the  cuts  are  too  widely 
scattered in  small  lots  and they  require  constant vigilance  and effective  protection 
against abuses and marauders. "
630 
While  admitting  that  township  reserves  were  nothing  other  than  an  assembly  of 
degraded  forest  ecosystems  - "the  result  of consolidations  made  by  the  whim  of 
circumstances"  - their  purpose  remained  vital  to  the  communities  who  depended  upon 
them.
631  Yet,  experience  showed that reserves  that were "too small  in  area",  were "soon 
exhausted'', and those that were "too big," provided "an incitement to  illegal or commercial 
cutting."  To  protect  against  abuses  perpetrated  by  "the  very  people  for  whose  benefit 
[reserves]  were  created,"  Roy  recommended  fundamental  changes  to  the  system  of 
administration  and  the  adoption  of a  common  property  or  co-management  arrangement 
between community and government: 
628  Ibid. 
629 Ibid., p. 42. 
630 Ibid., p. 46. 
631 Ibid., p. 47 There were 149 township reserves in  1941 , covering an area equal to  1,280,853 acres. 360 
"We  [will] despair of  enforcing the law which governs them, so long as those who use 
them fail to  realize that such reserves constitute goods that are theirs to  care for and 
conserve, and we are in consequence, brought to the belief  that only some co-operative 
formula will bring about this result."
632 
Although community-led forestry  was  strongly supported by  the likes of the Québec 
Association of Forest Engineers,
633  and results of experimentation from  1937 onwards, which 
showed  that  local  cooperatives  and  common-property  arrangements  tend  to  outweigh  the 
returns  produced by  the dominant industrial  model,
634  such experiments remained marginal 
and in  fact, have more or less  been systematically undermined by  government and  industry 
alike in the 50 years that followed the first agroforestry initiatives (Otis, 2001). Outside of  the 
public domain, the dynamics of smallholder behaviour was not much different than what Roy 
expressed for township reserves. In fact, forests held by private land owners (i.e., settlers and 
farmers) were in even more deplorable conditions than those held under concessionary rights 
(Lussier,  1953, p. 171 ).  The reasons for such a poor state of affairs had changed little since 
Mgr Laflamme began his efforts to  raise awareness at the turn of the century (see Chapter 
VI). In short, the "generalised dilapidation " of  priva  te forests, as  George Maheux ( 1944, p. 
285) put it,  was "born from  the greed of  profit, "
635  and  was  maintained  by  the  insatiable 
needs of an industry that had an interest in purchasing timber exempt of Crown dues, and free 
of the additional labour costs of extracting timber ever further up-country. Consequently, as 
much wood was apparently being eut on  12,500  miles
2 of privately held forests  in  1940, as 
what was  produced  from  the  75,000  miles
2  that was  then  under  concessionary  land  hold 
(Maheux, 1944, pp. 285-286). 
632  Ibid.,  pp. 47-48. Agroforestry  cooperatives  were  initiated  by  Edras  Mainville  (Professor at  HEC),  with  the  help  of the 
Ministries of Colonization and Lands and  Forests. The fïrst "agroforestry  colonies"  was  established in  Grande Vallée  (150 
miles
2
)  in  1937, before  being  implemented in  10  other sites  in  Gaspé, Bonaventure, Mattapedia, Chicoutimi  and  Beauce-
Frontenac (covering a total area of933 miles2)  by  1942. (See RCSF, 1943, p. 27). 
633  The idea of establishing community-based agroforestry cooperatives  was strongly defended  by  the  Quebec  Association of 
Forest  Engineers  in  1938:  << Des  expériences  diverses  [suivant  l'introduction  des  méthodes  coopératives  d'exploitation, 
d'usinage et de mise en vente des produits forestiers], tant à l'étranger que dans notre propre pays, démontrent que, dans tous 
les  cas,  l'exploitation  complémentaire  des  richesses  du  sol  et  de  la forêt  maintient  sur  un  plan  convenable  le  niveau 
d'existence  de la  population, assure  la  stabilité de  l'industrie et, connne  corollaire,  la prospérité générale>>  (Programme 
d'Action  et  de  Politique  Forestière  pour  le  Québec,  1938,  L'Association  professionnelle  des  Ingénieurs  forestiers  de  la 
Province de Québec). 
634 Sec discussion on benefïts of forest colonies in  LaBrie (1950) La Forêt et le problème social dans le comté de Saguenay. For 
an overview of the history, challenges, and benefïts of community-based forestry initiatives in Quebec, see Baets et al., (2007) 
Portrait of  Agrof orestry in  Québec;  Laplante (1995) L'expérience  de  Guyenne;  and Teitelbaum (2010) L'arbre est dans ses 
feuilles et la forêt, dans sa communauté: guide sur la foresterie communautaire. 
635 Original text: "un sympt6me inquiétant de dilapidation généralisée née de l'appât du gain" 361 
Predictably, Roy's strongest criticism regarding the ways in  which forests  in  Québec 
were  wastefully  treated  and  poorly  managed  came  in  his  remarks  on the  pulp  and  paper 
sector.  First,  Québec  was  no  longer  the  undisputed  world  leader  in  terms  of pulp  and 
newsprint production. Rivais from  north European countries that were "less favoured as  to 
raw materials, but better served by better technique in  the forest and in  the mills" helped to 
reinforce  the  fact  that Québec  was  doing  next to  nothing  in  terms  of forest  maintenance 
activities.
636  And second, Roy observed that "the pulp industry, in certain territories,  acts like 
a suction pump on wood supplies which could be used to supply small industries, with much 
greater profit to  the local populations."  Consequently,  many  mi lis  had  exhausted supplies 
nearer to  their operations  and each  year,  they  had  to  send  further  and further  away  from 
established economie ceritres to fi nd the supplies they needed, thus increasing the operational 
and  social  costs  of maintaining  production.  As  for  territories  that  remained  abundantly 
stocked, the virtual  monopoly of concessionary rights held by  pulp industrialists meant that 
such areas were essentially "closed to  al! other exploitation," further limiting opportunities 
for the development of more productive and efficient uses. 
Taken  together,  Roy  believed  that  there  was  only  one  viable  course  of action  "to 
correct the  defects  of an  economy"  that  was  bound  to  "creat[e}  serious  trouble for  the 
future." 
637  Major legislative  reforms  were  needed  to  better allocate  resources  and  reduce 
pressure on forest systems by limiting withdrawal rates and by stimulating forest productivity 
nearer to  existing centres of economie activity (see also  Asselin,  1944, pp.  110-111). Roy 
was obviously not alone  in  his  assessment of the situation.  For L-Z Rousseau, director of 
l'École  d'Arpentage et de Génie Forestier at Laval  University,  and  former president of the 
) 
Association  of Québec  Forest  Engineers,  the  problem  Québec  faced  was  not  unlike  the 
swidden  or  shifting  agricultural  techniques  used  in  tropical  landscapes  where  soils  are 
stripped of the their fertility  in  but a  few  years before the process was repeated anew in  a 
further and more remo te corner of  the forest: 
"Jusqu 'ici  notre  industrie  n'a  pas  fait  davantage,  perfectionnant  peut-être  les 
méthodes extractives, mais restant oublieuse des lois économiques élémentaires. C'est 
636  RCSF, 1940, p.88. According to Orner Lussier (1953, p.  169), the productivity of forests in Sweden and  Finland was  more 
th an twice (i.e., 29 to 30 ft2 per acre) the estirnated growth of forests in Que  bec ( 12 to  16 ft2 per acre). 
637  Ibid.,  p. 88 362 
ce qui nous a valu la disposition de nos massifs de pin blanc et la ruine de nos sciages. 
Et qui nous voudra la détérioration de  nos forêts d'épinette si nous n'y mettons ordre 
dés aujourd'hui" (Rousseau, 1944, p. 76) .
638 
As alluded to on many occasions already, the government never purposefully sought to 
limit entry nor the size and capacity of sawmills and pulp and paper processing facilities. If 
anything,  it  actually  encouraged  overcapitalization  and  overproduction  by  imposing 
minimum production targets and selling off  ever larger limits that could only be purchased by 
large companies (Asselin,  1944, p.108). This resulted in  a concentrated production capacity 
that  vastly  exceeded  the annual  yield  (i.e.,  "la possibilité") of the  forests  systems  in  the 
regions where they were situated: 
"C'est ce qui donne lieu ... à cette situation paradoxale d'usines géantes qui doivent, 
pour continuer de  produire, recourir à l'importation de  leur matière première par ce 
qu'elles ont négligé les  règles de  la  sylviculture,  quant elles  sont pourtant bâties à 
deux pas de la forêt" (Rousseau, 1944, p. 76). 
The  corollary  to  such  large  capital  expenditures  is  that  few  pulp  and  paper 
manufacturers were motivated to conserve forests, invest in maintenance activities, or spend 
additional  ti me and  energy to  use resources  more efficient(  y  (Asse] in,  1944,  pp.  108-1 09). 
What  mattered  most  were  cost  recovery  and  the  need  to  generate  returns  as  quickly  as 
possible: 
"Dans la crainte de perdre ses droits et sa mise de fonds,  il  est tout naturel et  bien 
explicable  que  le  concessionnaire  cherche  à  rentrer  dans  son  capital  le  plus  tôt 
possible  et  ne  soit  nullement  intéressé  à jaire  des  coupes  d'amélioration  dont  les 
résultats ne pourraient être profitables qu'après plusieurs années." (  Lussier, 1953, p. 
171) 
Appropriators  were thus faced  with strong incentives to  reduce their costs to  a  bear 
minimum, which  in  turn produced massive social and environmental externalities (Minville, 
1944, pp.  308-309).  The promise of trickle down economies,  predicated on the assumption 
that  industry  profitability  would  lead  to  individual prosperity  and  social welfare  gains was 
proving  disastrously  wrong  for  forest-dependent  households  and  communities  across  the 
638  See also Rousseau, L.Z., 1937. Les bases scientifiques de  notre économie forestière.  Québec: Publication de  la  Société de 
silviculture de Québec, p.2: "Jusqu'ici on a exploité tout le territoire d'accès facile, oublieux d'assurer sur ce meme territoire 
la reconstitution des massifs autrement qu'en laissant à la nature le soin d'y pourvoir." 363 
province.
639  The  unambiguous  fai lure  of industrialisation,  initiated  half a  century  earlier 
under Premier F-G Marchand in  1897 and defended ever since by his successors was perhaps 
best summarised by Minville (1944, p.  333): 
"On a créé littéralement le  vide, ruiné l'une des principales sources de  revenus de  la 
population. Qui d'entre nous ne connaît une ou plusieurs localités  où  la forêt a  été 
ainsi rasé et dont la  population désormais doit chaque année aller chercher au  loin 
tout  ou  partie  de  sa  subsistance.  Il  faut  avoir  vécu  dans  l'un  de  ces  villages  où 
brusquement, par l'épuisement du  bois ou toute autre raison, l'exploitation forestière 
cesse, pour se faire une idée exacte des conséquences sociales et humaines de pareil 
événement.  Or,  de  ces  anciens  centres  forestiers  tombés  dans  la  médiocrité 
économique et le désarroi social par suite de  la cessation de  l'exploitation forestière, 
on en croise dans notre province autant dire à tous les tournants de  routes ...  .Et nous 
connaissons tous des localités, voire des régions entières, qui sont menacées à plus ou 
moins brève échéance, d'un pareil sort." 
The conditions  within which  forest jobbers and  labourers  operated  were so  unstable 
and  poorly  renumerated  that  a  general  strike  broke  out  in  the  lumbering  camps  of 
Témiscamingue  during the  winter of 1933-34,  that threatened  to  spread  across  the  entire 
province if nothing was done to  bring order to the situation. The crisis led to the creation of 
the "Commission des  opérations forestières"  (1934-36) and eventual  legislative action  (24 
Geo.  V,  c.  22),  which  imposed a  minimum salary of $26  per  month (equal  to  26 days of 
work, or $1/day) (see Minville 1944, pp.  315-316). Even though a series of amendments and 
orders-in-council raised the average salary to $57.20 by the onset. of the 1940s (Ibid.,  pp. 320-
322), many issues were left unresolved, including the migratory nature of forestry operations 
and the socio-economic consequences for  forest  dependent communities.  With  the  graduai 
mechanisation  of lumbering  activities,  shortened  work  season,  and  the  need  to  carry  out 
operations  in  ever  more  remote  locals,  manpower  in  the  lumbering  camps  became 
increasingly  unstable  (Lussier,  1953,  p.  172).  Fewer workers  were  willing to  offer  their 
labour, and ofthose who reluctantly did so were, like their employers, primarily motivated to 
capture the benefit of their labour as quickly as  possible, caring nothing of the damage their 
639  Minville ( 1944, p. 3 10) writes: "Malheureusement, il ne semble pas que jusqu'ici notre politique forestière se soit beaucoup 
embarrassée de  considérations sociales, qu'elle se soit même posée le problème du  grand bénéfice social de  l'exploitation de 
la première de  nos  richesses naturelles. Elle paraît avoir  procédé d'une  pensée unique  : oblenir de la forêl le plus  Izaut 
rendement économique- et ce qui est plus grave, le plus haut rendement économique immédiat. L'exploitation forestière dans 
notre province est, en très grande partie, pour ne pas dire  en totalité,  indus/rie/le et capitaliste . ... La forêt  es/ considérée 
autan/ dire exclusivement comme source  de matières premières, donc comme richesse à exploiter sur la  base du  plus haul 
rendement financier, le reste, c'est-à-dire le bien-êlre social, devant en découler automatiquement." 364 
haste  might cause,  the  prescriptions  foresters  provided,  or the  idea of forest  conservation 
altogether (Ibid.). 
The incentive to reduce operational (as weil as forests maintenance) costs affected not 
only  the  behaviour of forest  users,  but  government  itself.  The  concurrent  and  somewhat 
complicit interests  of the State,  as  possessor of Crown  lands,  and  the  forest  operator,  as 
concessionaire with usufructuary  rights to  the timber thereon, resulted  in  a situation where 
neither  party,  according  to  Lussier  (1953,  pp.  170-71),  was  motivated  to  assume 
responsibility for the management and conservation of public forests: 
"Ces  deux  associés ont  tendance  à  rejeter  l'un  sur  l'autre  la  responsabilité de  la 
conservation  et  à  ne  considérer  que  l'intérêt  immédiate  qui  consiste  à  retirer  le 
maximum de  revenus avec le  minimum de  déboursés. Sans doute que le premier a en 
mains tous les pouvoirs, mais sans la bonne volonté, la coopération et la conviction du 
second, il lui est impossible d'obtenir des résultats satisfaisants à cause de l'immensité 
de  la  tâche  à accomplir,  du  caractère des fonctionnaires  trop peu nombreux et trop 
mal rétribués, de l'instabilité des administrations et de  l'ignorance et des préjugés de 
la  population  qui  peut  tout  aussi  bien  croire  que  tout  va  pour  le  mieux  dans  ce 
domaine,  ou  bien  que  nous  sommes  tellement proches  du  désastre  qu'il n'y a  pas 
moyen de s'en sauver ... " 
Hence,  the  inability (or unwillingness) of government to either assume provisioning 
costs  or  force  industry  to  shoulder  forest  maintenance  activities  meant  that  overall 
investments were sparse, and  what little was done, was usually carried out at the expense of 
the  public  treasury.  Each  year,  the  go  vern ment  invested  sorne  $70,000  dollars  on 
reforestation activities and another $50,000 to  maintain tree nurseries.  Between the start of 
the public nursery initiative in 1908 and 1944, sorne 17,000 acres of forests were replanted by 
concession  holders  (mostly  between  1910  and  1925),  38,400 acres  were restocked  by  the 
Forest Service, and another 3,000 acres were improved by  farmers (Boutin,  1944,  p.  135). 
Given that reforestation by concession holders  was essentially  performed on  privately  held 
wood lots; the leve! of effort on public lands (i.e.,  38,400 acres by  1944) had barely begun to 
scratch the surface of the 3,000,000 or so acres of waste lands th at Piché so often referred to. 
However, with  an  average cost of $10 to  $12  per acre, the government's motivation to  do 
more in  this sense was qui te limited (Asse! in, 1944, p.  1  02). Further, sin ce depleted reserves 
could  always be redeemed by  fresh  grants of vacant forestlands,  the  need  to  invest in  any 365 
kind  of forest  maintenance  activity  obviously  appeared  as  unnecessary  and  expens1ve 
(Maheux, 1944, pp. 286-287; Minville, 1944, pp. 332-333). In fact, the ease with which large 
forest operators could bypass the administrative hurtle of the Forest Service and petition the 
executive directly for their resource needs provided a strong deterrent against any long term 
investment (Lower,  1936, p.  82; Lussier, 1953, pp. 170-171). Consequently, the system that 
evolved during this  period (and  maintained thereafter) was based on a graduai and more or 
less  systematic  depletion  of the  virgin  forest  cover,  causing  socio-economic  upheaval  in 
forest-dependent communities, and the graduai Joss of  forest productivity through overcutting 
and the negligence of basic management activities.
640 In the words of  Bernard Fernow: 
"Hitherto,  governments  have  looked  upon  the  forest  either  as  an  inexhaustible 
resource like air and water, or else as an exhaustible, but non-restorable resource, like 
the mines. They have pulled the ho use ta pieces and sold the brick instead of  keeping it 
in repair and securing the rents by proper management."
641 
7.4  Discussion and Conclusion 
Over time, disregard for the threats posed by  overexploitation and the  near complete 
absence of forest maintenance activities led to the demise of Québec's pineries, shifts in  the 
composition and structure of forest eco  systems, and the graduai loss of valued stocks through 
the continuous and systematic onslaught of selective high-grading. In the process, the "dark" 
forest canopy of mixed coniferous growth that dominated the Laurentian and Appalachian 
uplands eventually turned "green," ·as the faster growing broadleaf understory outcompeted 
the slower growing softwoods. Within a  matter of decades, the forest industry changed not 
only the character, dynamics, and composition of the forests  in  the southern portion of the 
province, they  also  changed their economie value - changes  that would take  decades  for 
natural regenerative processes to correct. Following the decimation of white oak at the onset 
of the  19th  century,  the  pineries  and  shade-tolerant hardwoods sustained the  sawn  lumber 
industry  and  the  much 'denounced  squared timber trade until  the early  decades of the 20th 
century. Eastern hemlocks were largely squandered for the  ir bark, and with the arrivai of the 
pulp and paper industry, spruce and fir were gradually depleted from the Ottawa Valley and 
6-lO "L'exploitation forestière sur les terres publiques se pratique exclusivement dans des forêts vierges ou parvenue à maturité. 
Ceci contribue jusqu'à aujourd'hui à faire oublier le fait principal qui est la capacité de production." (Lussier, 1953, p. 172) 
6-l l  Fernow, B. E.  1909. What We Want, in Report of the Tenth An  nuai Meeting of the CFA , p. 76. 366 
along the major tributaries of the St-Lawrence (St.  Maurice, Ottawa, Saguenay, St-Francis, 
Chaudière, etc.) where mills were mostly concentrated. 
The causes and  consequences  of unsustainable  patterns  of forest resource  use  were 
certainly  well  understood.  Historical  evidence amply  supports  the  notion  that actors  were 
aware of the structure of the situation that fostered such behaviours, and were cognizant of 
remedies  th at  could  help  absorb  maintenance  costs  and  redu  ce  appropriation  rates  (  e.g., 
stimulate  Jess  resource  intensive  value-added  production,  favour  cooperative  small-holder 
arrangements,  exact higher crown dues,  put a  tax on timber to  support maintenance costs, 
change  tenure  arrangements  to  fos ter  a  longer  term  perspective,  li  mit  entry,  improve 
monitoring  and  enforcement,  classify  soils  to  better  determine  land  use  rights,  diversify 
sources of public revenue, ... ).  Y  et, few of these measures were ev  er implemented and wh  en 
they  were, seldom did they  affect the existing distribution of benefits  or limit pressure on 
forest resources.  The question that must be asked therefore is  why? Given that there was no 
shortage of knowledgeable,  skilled,  and experienced foresters  and  administrators,  nor was 
there a Jack of viable solutions to increase the robustness of resource institutions or improve 
forest conservation (i.e., sustainable resource use), then what prevented change from  being 
pursued? Within-case analytical insights drawn from  the  19
111  century sawn-lumber industry 
and  the 20
111  century  shift to  pulp  and  paper production  both  point to  the  central  role  of 
government in defining institutional arrangements that supported the interests of the few over 
the wellbeing of  the many. 
Until the advent of industrialisation, towards the end of the  l9
1
h century, governments 
were principally motivated to secure revenues for the public coffers. In turn, dependency on 
resource rents limited the range of allowable actions that succeeding governments could take 
against the interest of lumbermen, and since every foot of lumber eut was a penny earned, no 
holder of public office was ever motivated to curtail the amount of wood that lumberers were 
prepared  to  take  out.  While  the  conservation  ideal  loomed  large  in  shaping  political 
discourse, its application was consistently limited to the control of forest tires and the spread 
of settlement.  With the  development of the pulp  and  paper industry  however,  the  role  of 
government changed dramatically. Given the sector's substantial start-up costs, the promise 
of bountiful  forests  was  no  longer  sufficient  to  attract  foreign  investors.  Other  tangible 367 
benefits had to  be offered, including large infrastructure developments (  e.g., roads, rail ways, 
dams  and  reservoirs),  permanent  sources  of  energy  (i.e.,  waterpower  and  eventually 
electricity),  cheap  and  abundant supplies,  and  a  dependable  workforce.  Thus,  the  role  of 
government changed from  landlord and rent collector to business partner and rent developer. 
As Lindblom (1979, p.  175) put it, "business needs inducements" in market-oriented systems 
"if it  is  to  do  its job" and  by  holding the  keys to ali  Crown resource assets, the executive 
government was ideally  suited to  respond to the  needs  and  interests of industry. Operators 
were  alleviated of the  burden of having to  maintain the  productivity  of their concessions. 
Those  who  exhausted  their  reserves  could  count  on  the  government  to  obtain  new 
concessions or access timber on special reserves created for such situations.  As the pace of 
exploitation quickened and the exhaustion of available reserves  neared, appropriation rules 
were  amended  to  give  operators  greater  discretionary  authority  in  the  application  of 
management decisions. As  long as  overexploitation could be rationalized on paper, operators 
were  more  or less  given  the  freedom  to  pursue the course of action  that supported  their 
interest. 
Whether the unsustainable forest use was maintained because it was in  the interest of 
government or because limit holders were able to exert sufficient pressure on the executive 
matters little for discerning the influence of constitutional choice rules. For both phenomena 
are  tide  to  the  limited  constitutional  constraints  of  the  Canadian  (and  provincial) 
parliamentary system, the right of the executive to use Crown resources as  if the latter were 
its private property, the absence of inclusive and authoritative decision-making arrangements 
- such as  those proposed  by  Gerring and  Thacker (2008, see Chapter III), and  the limited 
capacity of any  parliamentary opposition to  affect change. Further, systems marked by  the 
concentration of decision-making authority arguably makes  it easier (if not more efficient) 
for  third  party  interests  to  concentrate their own lobbying or rent-seeking efforts.  In  such 
settings, Fernow warned, "the exigencies of  the present are  often an  overwhelming superior 
argument against the needs of  the future."  Since governments depend  "on direct support by 
the present day masses, the politician, be he ever so farseeing is bound to let the present day 
considerations weigh the most"
6
•
2 Given that investments in resource maintenance activities 
&<2 Fernow, B.E.  1909. What We Want, in Report of  the Tentil Annual Meeting of the CFA, p.74 368 
constitute an investment in  the future, and the  benefits of such investments are likely to  be 
reaped  by  others,  public choices  in  such settings  will  naturally  tend to favour present-day 
interests over other considerations: 
"ft takes ...  a strong government to disturb long established usages, especially when the 
change means curtailment of revenue, increase of expenditure,  and possibly a strong 
opposition actuated by fear of materialloss. Political exigencies make it desirable to 
defer action and to  Leave another administration to wrestle with problems that can be 
postponed" (Ibid.). 369 
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8.1  Introduction 
The death of Premier Maurice Duplessis in  1959 brought an abrupt end to  nearly two 
decades of conservative, parochial, and  paternalistic policies that shrouded the province  in 
what is  commonly referred to as  the great darkness ("la grande noirceur"). Y  et, Duplessis' 
economie policies, and his stance on natural resource development in particular, differed very 
little if any from the path established by his predecessors, such as  Premier Louis-Alexandre 
Taschereau.  His  anti-union  stance,  heavy-handed  use  of patronage and  strong support for 
foreign-owned and increasingly  large and powerful resource industries were a continuation of 
the past, not a break from it (Black, 1977; Roby, 1976; Rocher, 2004). Ifanything, his belief 
in  the virtues of traditional livelihoods, rural communities and religious servitude made him 
the first Premier in  the province to  champion the idea of community-based forest  resource 
management, though experimentation with such approaches remained marginal relative to the 
overall  industrial  thrust  of the  sector (see  Chapter  VII).  Consequently,  by  the  time  Jean 
Lesage took over as Premier in 1960, over 90% of the public domain attributed to the forest 
sector  lay  in  hands  of only  nine  pulp  and  paper companies.
643  In fact,  the  entire  natural 
resource  sector  in  Québec  was  essentially  governed  by  foreign-owned  oligopolies,  which 
meant  that  industry  was  primarily  extractive,  with  little  or  no  investments  in  the 
transformation  of raw  materials  to  capture  the  spread  effects  found  in  more  advanced 
industrial economies (Gaudet, 1980, p. 255). 
Stepping out from und er the tu  te lage of the Cathol ic Church and Duplessis' stronghold 
over the political-economic affairs of the province, the state of the situation became readily 
obvious:  "Economie progress has  occurred without us," decried  Premier Lesage,  and the 
ti me had come for the French speaking majority to full y participate in the development of the 
<HJ  MTFQ, 1971 , Exposé sur la politique forestière, Tome 1, Prospective et problématique, p 185. 372 
province.
644  To  correct  the  situation,  1mprove  québécois  involvement,  and  further  the 
province's economie progress, Lesage initiated sweeping changes that affected nearly aspect 
of the province's  cultural  and  socioeconomic conditions.  In  less  than  a  decade, the "quiet 
revolution"  ushered  in  a  vast  modernisation  agenda of the  Québec  "state"  that  arguably 
changed the course of history in the province. 
As detailed in  this chapter, the reforms undertaken by  Lesage and  his successors also 
had dramatic effects on the forest sector. Between 1960 and  1990, the industry became fully 
mechanized;  two  important  institutional  reforms  were  passed;  the  entire  sector  was 
restructured to  encourage a  more complete use of available timber; and forestry  operations 
had  spread to the furthest  reaches of the  Boreal  forest.  However,  in  spite of these various 
transformations,  other, arguably  more  important considerations  remained  unchanged.  First, 
not only did the basic expansionist mode! of public forest resource use remain unchallenged, 
the pace and  intensity  of forest operations actually  accelerated during the  period, aided  in 
large part by federal  and provincial subsidies.  Second, the mounting threat of appropriation 
and  provisioning  problems  associated  with  the  historical  failure  to  curb  the  industry's 
appetite and/or increase investments in  maintenance costs gained increased attention during 
the period, but efforts to deal with these problems remained woefully insufficient. Third, in 
spite of investments and related restructuring efforts, little or no  attention was given to need 
to  diversify  the  industry  and  further  product  transformation  to  reduce  pressure  from 
commodity-driven  resource  exploitation  and  further  regional  employment.  Fourth,  the 
fundamental  yet  historically  tlawed  assumption  that  "la  possibilité  forestière"  could  be 
positively and objectively identified for complex systems and at scales that arguably exceed 
basic human imagination was left unquestioned. And finally, the pivotai role of government 
in defining public choices remained strong, though increasingly (and predictably) conditioned 
by  the  interests  of powerful  industry  leaders.  Arguing  that  the  direction  of institutional 
change followed the path established since the turn of  the 20
111  century, this chapter provides a 
briefoverview ofthe evolution offorest institutions from  1960 to 1986. 
6+1  DAL,  April  3, 1963, p.  780:  "le progrès économique s'est fait sans nous, les  Québecois". To amend the situation, Lesage 
argued  that  economie  progress  ultimately  depended  upon  four  key  areas:  education, agricultural  development,  industrial 
growth and  public finances (p. 783); see also DAL, 12/4/62, pp. 6-12 & 36-42. 373 
8.2  Assessing the State of  the Forest Sector 
The  quiet  revolution  was  instituted  through  two  through  interdependent  strategies 
(Gow,  1986,  pp.  297-298).  First,  to  fully  understand the  overall  structure of the  state  of 
affairs  in  Québec,  detailed  investigations  of every  working part of the province's political 
economy  were  unde1iaken.  Commissions,  inquiries,  and  parliamentary  committees  were 
appointed  to  assess  the  administration  of public  affairs  in  ali  of its  facets  and  make 
recommendations as required.
645  In keeping with the socio-cultural and economie aspirations 
of the  quiet  revolution,  appointed  commissioners  invariably  observed  that Québec  lacked 
coherent policies in  nearly every aspect of its  administration, and the conclusion was  nearly 
always  the  same:  changes  were  needed  and  only  government  could  solve the  province's 
woes.  And  second,  in  order to  counterbalance the  large  share of foreign-ownership  in  the 
province and better direct its economie development, the state's ability to leverage funds was 
used  to  direct public  investments  in  key  sectors of the  economy and  strategically  suppo1i 
infrastructure developments. To this  end, hydro-electric developments were nationalized  in 
1962-63  to  better  control  priees  and  financial  returns.  State-sponsored  financing 
instruments
646  were  created  to  stimulate  private  investments  by  means  of  financial 
inducements (e.g.,  low-interest loans, investment guarantees, and subsidies), while enabling 
government to capture a greater share of retums from its natural resource assets. And in order 
to  offset  private  risks  and  reduce  entry  costs,  Québec  also  created  a  number  of state-
corporations  to  supplement  the  work  of its  line  departments  by  carrying  out  strategie 
investments in targeted areas.
647 
Within  this  broad context,  the  forest sector was a  primary concern. Even though the 
sector's contributions to  public revenues had become, by  the mid  1960s, a mere shadow of 
645  Effectively, Lesage renewed a tradition of inquiry thar more  or less disappeared after Confederation Between the lare  1830s 
and  1860s,  the  administration  of public  affairs  was  regularly  investigated  by  various  committees  and  commissions.  See 
Chapter V. 
646 For example, the "Société générale de financement du Québec (SGF) and the "Caisse de dépot et de placement." 
647  These public corporations include contributions rowards mining exploration (SOQUEM- Société québécoise d'exploration 
minière);  iron-ore  production  (SIDBEC  - Sidérurgie  du  Québec);  gas  and  petroleum  exploration  (SOQUIP  - Société 
québécoise d'initiatives pétrolières); pulp and pape.r manufacturing (SOGEFOR - Société de gestion forestière); hydro-electric 
developrnent (SDBJ - Société de développement de la Baie James); and  forest exploitation, and salvage cutting (REXFOR -
Société de récupération et d'exploitation forestière). 374 
what they once were
648 
- with administrative overruns that were nearly as high as the returns 
that were generated
649 -the industry still employed more people than any other sector of the 
provincial economy and  its  health was a vital  indicator of the overall state of affairs  in the 
province.  Consequently,  the  wellbeing  of  the  forest  industry  was  central  to  the 
preoccupations of government during this dynamic and politically charged period. And what 
concerned public officiais more than anything else was the ongoing decline of the industry as 
who  le. 
Relative  to  the  rest  of  Canada,  Québec's  contribution  to  the  country's  overall 
production (including pulp,  paper and  sawn  lumber from  both  public and  private sources) 
diminished from a high of41% in 1946 to 25.1% in  1962.
650  While the net value ofsawmill 
production rose slightly between 1950 and  1962 (from  12.1% of the total Canadian output to 
13.7%),  output in  the  pulp and  paper sector diminished from  43.4%  in  1949 to  37.2%  in 
1962.
651  And  in  terms  of  global  market  shares,  Québec's  newsprint  production  (the 
province's chief export) went from  28.7% in  1950 to  Jess  than  19% in  1965.
652  Awareness 
that the industry was slowly but surely losing ground prompted officiais to take a number of 
short term precautionary measures, coupled with the first ever modern-day public inquiry into 
the state of  the forest sec  tor. 
As part of the government's overall effort to regain control over the use of public lands 
and the allocation of available timber, the system of concessionary grants  was  replaced  in 
1963  by  limited  timber  sales  within  the  domanial  reserves.
653  In  1964,  it  introduced 
legislative  changes,  which,  for  the  first  time,  provided  incentives  in  the  way  of reduced 
608 • The share of public revenues, derived from the forest sector feil  from  10.7% in  1940-41  to 3.3% in  1950-51, 2.7% in  1960-
61, and  only 0.8% in  1970-71 (Gow, 1981 , p.  61). As  reported  by  Bélanger Commission (Québec, 1965, p.  204), this trend 
affected ali  of  the natural resource sectors. For the year  1964-65, returns from ali  of Québec's natural resources (including 
Hydro, mines and  forests) amounted to only 4.4% of total revenues, 70% of which was dedicated to  administrative expenses, 
services to industry and/or capital investments. 
"'9  Ex penses for the management of crown forests rose shârply towards the end of the 1960s. As detailed in Malenfant ( 1987, pp. 
1  08-111), ex penses relative to revenues steadily increased during the 20'h  century from an average of 17% between  1900-09, to 
21% between  1910-19, 25.5% between  1920-29, 45% from  1930-39, 39% from  1940-49, 53% from  1950-59, and 90% from 
1960-69. 
650  Bélanger Commission  (Québec, 1965, p.  181, Table VIII-2). Overall  production in  Québec feil  from  1,073,000,000  f~ or 
30,383,976.5 m3 in  1946  to 876,000,000 f~  or 24,805,557.7 m3 in  1962. 
651  Ibid., p. 185 (Table VIII-8) and p.  182 (Table VIII-4) respectively. 
652 The Council  of Pulp and Paper Producers of Québec. 1972. The Competitive Position of  the Québec Pulp and Paper lndustry: 
A submission to the Parliamentary Committee on Lands and Forests, p. 29, Table 9. 
653  MTFQ 1965. Exposé sur l'administration ella gestion des terres et forêts du Québec, Québec, pp. 32-33. Timber sales were 
conducted through supply con  tracts that limited purchaser entitlements to specifie volumes and kinds of wood. 375 
stumpage fees to operators who willingly performed forest maintenance activities within their 
concessions  (e.g.,  reforestation  and  release  cutting).
654  Finally,  in  a  bid  to  stimulate 
productivity  and  improve  access  to  previously  un-exploited  reserves,  the  federal  and 
provincial  government  built  sorne  900  miles  of forest  roads  between  1960  and  1965.
655 
However,  be.fore  any  further  changes could  be  implemented with effect,  a  more thorough 
investigation of the factors affecting the different strands of the industry would be required. 
The first  modern  public inquiry  on the management of public forests
656  was  held  in 
December 1965, and  its conclusions confirmed what Henry Roy and others anticipated more 
than  two  decades  before  (see  Chapter  VII).  In  essence,  the  graduai  depletion  of forest 
reserves (i.e.,  overexploitation and  insufficient maintenance activities) nearer to processing 
facilities was forcing large concession holders to purchase limits ever further away from their 
operations. Over time, this contributed to an irrational and uncoordinated system of land use 
that increased  the  collective costs of transportation,  and  prevented other user groups  from 
accessing wood Jess suited for pulp and paper manufacturing, thus contributing to the demise 
of the sawn lumber industry.
657  The problem again, as the Bélanger Commission recognized, 
was  intrinsically  tied  to  the  absence of any  effectuai  measure,  constraint,  or incentive  to 
maintain the  productivity of public forests and to extract only that which the system  could 
actually  produce on a sustained basis.
658  Even though limit holders systematically regarded 
their  renewable  (and  therefore  revocable)  licensing  arrangement as  an  entitlement to  use 
public forests as if their own private property,
659  they never hesitated to use the real tenuous 
nature of such  concessionary land hold to divest themselves from the obligation to invest in 
forest  maintenance  activities.
660  As  presented  in  the  proceedings  of  the  Bélanger 
Commission,  concessionary  land  rights  never  provided  a  sufficiently  strong  incentive  for 
654  R.S.Q.  194, c. 93 , s.4 & 51  c.92. 
655  Forest-access road construction program,jointly financed by the provincial ad federal governments. See RMTF 1964-65. 
656 Exposé sur l'administration ( 1965). Sorne 44 memoranda were handed to the commissioners. 
657 Bélanger Commission, (Québec, 1965, p. 188); See also Exposé sur l'administration (1965, p. 44). 
658  Ibid. 
659 Ibid., p.  189. The Bélanger Commission seriously questioncd the legal foundation underlying the concession holders' ability 
to  transfer  (i.e., sell)  appropriation  rights  to  unused  portions  or stocks  of their  concessions  to  third  parties  (i.e., "permit 
holders"). Since most of the accessible public domain lay  in the hands of concession holders, operators were allowed to turn 
their (revocable) concessionary tilles into a de facto monopoly over the public domain. Consequently, "wlzenever concession 
lwlders agree[dj to lease timber licences on certain unused varieties [oftrees], they charge[d] two or three times the regula.r 
dues" or a premium. a.vera.ging $5,000 per square mile. plus  govemment tra.nsfer fees of  $65 for the sale of  limits thal were 
original/y acquired for $1,000 or $1,200 per square mile." 
660  Exposé sur l'administration ( 1965, p. 44): "Le concessionnaire invoque souvent la.  précarité de  ce mode de tenure pour ne 
pas investir en vue d'augmenter la productivité du territoire qui lui est concédé." 376 
operators "to concern" themselves "with reforestation and silviculture", nor was it ever used 
to  oblige  operators  "to  cultivate  [or]  replace  the forests"  they  used.
661  However,  since 
operating costs in Québec were reportedly higher than in  other Canadian jurisdictions,
662  the 
industry claimed that its ability to assume further liabilities, for the care and  maintenance of 
the  forest systems was decidedly  limited. For any  additional  burden would  likely  interfere 
with  "the  economie  activity,  which  their  development  must foster  and stimulate  in  the 
community." Hence, if the overall performance of the forest sector was to be improve, then 
state intervention would be required, as reported in the 1965 exposé on the administration of 
the public domain: 
"La forêt étant l'une des richesses les plus importantes de nôtre territoire, il appartient 
donc à l'État de prendre  les mesures nécessaires pour en assurer la  conservation et 
l'exploitation  rationnelle.  La  première  période  dans  l'organisation  de  notre 
exploitation forestière  est  révolue;  il  n'est plus  possible  de  laisser  l'initiative  des 
individus  et  des  groupes  s'exercer  librement  sans  plan  d'ensemble  et  sans 
coordination.  Du  point  de  vue  social  et économique,  il est  important  aujourd'hui 
d'assurer la permanence de cette richesse en vue ."
663 
In  short,  management  of the  public  domain  had  to  be  placed  in  the  hands  of 
government if public interest was to be met, and resource rights had to be re-allocated if the 
use of available wood was to be optimized.
664 
8.2.1  The End of  Forest Concessions 
The  changes  envisioned  by  Lesage  and  his  government  never  had  a  chance  to 
materialize. A change of government in  1966 put a stop to the initiative and  it was not until 
the Liberais were returned to  power in  1970 that the findings of the 1965 inquiry were again 
reconsidered. The intent to give legislative meaning to the idea of publicly managed forests 
661 Bélanger Commission, (Québec, 1965, p. 189). 
662 /bid., p.  184. 
663  Exposé sur l'administration (1965, p.  21):  "il n'est plus possible de  laisser l'initiative des individus et des groups s'exercer 
librement sans plan d'ensemble et sans coordination." Further, in a planned market-economy, it was considered more practical 
to  allocate  resources  through  private bi lls, rather  than  general  public  policies:  " .. .  dans  une  ère d'économie dirigée  et de 
planification, il  est  beaucoup  plus  efficace  de ...  procéder  par  des  lois  particulières  aux  conditions  déterminées  par  la 
législature" (p. 31). 
664 The Bélanger Commission went a step further in  its recommendations. To deter operators from withholding large portions of 
public forests from economically valued  ends, the commission (unknowingly)  recommended a return  to the  1851 regulatory 
amendment of increasing  ground  rents  on  unused  portions  of  their concessions, to  "mak[e] il  costly to keep  timber lands 
undeveloped' and encourage concession holders "to re-timber Crown forest lands" by providing a rebate to those who "show 
equal concem for the fit ture replacement of  public forests [as they do for] current production." See page 190. 377 
was  reintroduced  in  1971  with  the  first  of two  white  papers  on  the  state  of the  forest 
industry.
665  The  second  volume,  published  in  1972,  provided  the  basic  framework  for 
operationalizing the set of proposed changes.
666  ln essence, the problem remained the same: 
compared with forest operators elsewhere in  Canada and the U.S, Québec's forest industry 
supposedly  faced  higher  than  average  costs,  which  were  themselves  attributable  to  the 
inefficiencies of the concessionary system.
667 Using the abundantly stocked forests of British 
Columbia  and  the  productive  pineries  of  Southern  United-States  as  the  barometer  for 
measuring the performance of forest operations in Québec, the report concluded that in terms 
of  harvesting,  preparation,  and  transportation  costs,  Québec's  forest  industry  was 
disadvantaged on every front.  Y  et, given that the yardstick for measuring the performance of 
Québec's industry was so utterly different from  the exigencies of operating in  the sparsely 
timbered boreal forest, results of  the inquiry were anything but surprising. 
But what makes the government's report even more interesting is the fact that it sim ply 
reiterated  the  industry's  own  analysis  of the  situation  with  no  explicit  effort  to  test  the 
industry's assertions on a more leve!  playing field. 
668  Among the many other grievances of 
the pulp and  paper sector, concerns were also raised regarding:  1)  the uncompetitive labour 
and social welfare costs of operating in Québec (i.e., workmen's compensation, medicare, the 
Québec Pension Plan, minimum wage requirements, etc.); 2) above average taxes, levies, and 
stumpage dues; 3) the Jess  productive and more extensive nature of the boreal forest and the 
need  to  travel  ever further  to  extract ever smaller trees;  and  4)  the  industry's  inability  to 
invest in more efficient technologies due to higher operating costs. 
The sawn  lumber industry  on the  other hand,  faced  a  structural  imbalance  that  was 
attributed to the excessive number of small mills and the resulting loss of efficiency, which 
665 MTFQ (197 1  ). Exposé sur la politique forestière, Tome /: prospthat ective et problématique, Québec. 
666 MTFQ (1972). Exposé sur la politiqueforesrière. Tome Il: réforme et programme d'action, Québec. 
6Q?  Exposé, Tome 1, pp. 254-256. 
668  The Competitive  Position of the Québec Pulp and Paper /ndustry (1972, pp. 5-1 9). The industry's li ne  of argument focused 
on the fact that it  had to expend  a higher leve!  of effort per unit of extracted wood than competitors on the West Coast or in 
Southern  United States. ln other words, no explicit effort was made to investi gate the industry's cl ai ms. 378 
could only be amended by fewer and larger operators.
669  But more important! y, the wellbeing 
of this important contributor to  regional employment was hampered by  its  limited access to 
available. resources- a problem that was direct! y attributable to the pulp and paper industry's 
virtual  monopoly  over concessionary  land  hold  in  the  province.  In  short,  Québec's forest 
sector was ill-organized to take advantage of the projected world demand for forest products 
and changes had to  be  introduced to  amend structural  inefficiencies, correct the  incomplete 
use of  available timber, and reduce the high costs of resource extraction. 
The forest sector - as  government understood it - was not hampered by  the threat of 
overcapacity, overproduction, and overexploitation, for the aggregate consumption of wood 
was believed to  be weil  below the annual allowable eut.  The problem lay  in  the  underlying 
set  of  conditions  that  rendered  available  timber  stocks  unproductive  of  revenue  and 
employment.  In  order to  improve the  industry's competitive advantage and  strengthen  its 
capacity to further socio-economic wellbeing (i.e., generate employment), costs needed to be 
reduced to a bare'minimum,
670  and forest management decisions had be placed in  the hands 
of a' central  governing authority  to  increase  allocative  efficiency  and  optimise the  use  of 
available resources.
671  To achieve such ends, the concessionary system had to be abandoned 
and  replaced  with  resource-specific supply contracts (i.e.,  guarantees of 20 to 40 years),
672 
tailored to the needs of each user group. Efficiency gains would be achieved by handing over 
forest operations (i.e., Jogging) to the sawn lumber industry, which would in  turn supply the 
resource needs of pulp and paper manufacturers through waste recycling (i.e., the transfer of 
669  The number of sawmills in  operation feil  consistently from over 2000 in  1940 to 1125 in  1961, and less than 600 by  1968. 
However, productive output kept increasing, such  that the number of mi ils  producing O. 1 to  5  million ft.b.m  per year went 
from  1125 in  1961  to  507 in  1968; those  producing 5  to  JO  million ft.b.m. per year went from 32 to 40;  10  to  25 million 
ft.b.m., from 26 to 48; and those producing over 25 million ft.b.m., rose from  1 to  17. Based on these and other observations, 
the Ministry advised that the viability threshold for sawmilling operations was 7 to  10 million ft.b.m. See Exposé, Tome 1, p. 
258. 
670  Exposé,  Tome/, p.  21 6:  "la meilleure contribution que le  Ministère des  Terres et Forêts peut apporter pour participer au 
redressement  de  l'industrie forestière est d'aider à réduire le coût de  la matière ligneuse." The Bélanger Commission had 
made similar recommendations. lnstead of placing additional tax burdens on industry, government ought to get the "maximum 
use from our natural resources and ensuring thal more of Québec's raw materials are processed local/y .. .[tlws] creat[ing] 
new employment by favouring economie activity wlziclz is a source of tox revenue" (pp. 204-205). 
671 Exposé, Tome 1, p. 27:  "Optimiser l'utilisation de  la  resource forestière en vue du  développement économique et social du 
Québec." See also Exposé, Tome 1, p. 280; Exposé, Tome Il, p. 191 . 
672  Exposé, Tome Il, p. 135. Between  1963 and 1971 , domanial forest reserves were increased from less than 2,000 miles
2 to over 
88,000 miles2; concessionary land hold remained stable at around 87,000 miles2; 3,400 miles2 were dedicated to conservation 
purposes or remained locked in municipal or township reserves; and 90,000 miles2 were listed as vacant lands. 379 
wood chips and sawdust residue).
673  As long as operators remained in business, their supplies 
would be guaranteed. 
In the public domain, forest productivity would be assured through the government's 
handling  of  ali  maintenance-related  activities,  including  management,  silvicultural 
treatments, and  reforestation. Similarly,  long-term  productivity  in  private forests  was  to  be 
harnessed via tax incentives, subsidies, and professional assistance.
674  In other words, since 
ali  citizens benefited either directly or indirectly from the exploitation of public forests (i.e., 
jobs, economie growth,  and  a  positive  trade  balance),  then  the cost of maintaining viable 
resource  systems  needed  to  be  assumed by  the  public  at large,  rather than  by  those  who 
profited directly from  forest exploitation (i.e.,  the lumber and pulp and paper producers).
675 
With this  change of emphasis,  government would  no  longer assume a  passive  role  in  the 
administration of the public domain. Tax dollars  were  to  be used to  bolster private sector 
development, pay for past failures by improving the productivity of systems that were overly 
exploited,  and  provide  assurances  that minimized  private  risks. To support this  expanded 
role,  efficiency  would  be  assured  through  administrative  decentralization
676  that would  at 
once  help  rationalize  public  interventions,  and  improve  coordination  across  demand  and 
supply.
677  Lastly, given the "arbitrariness" of previously used payoff rules (i.e., ground rents 
and  stumpage  dues),  the  cost  of extracting  resources  from  public  lands  would  now  be 
determined  by  a  broader  range  of factors,  including  the  quality  and  quantity  of wood 
extracted, the distance between cut-blocks and factories, variations in commodity priees, and 
changes in the underlying socio-economic context.
678 
With these changes in  place, the Ministry gained complete discretionary authority over 
the cost of operating  on  public  lands.  Since  priees were subject to  such  a  broad range of 
variables, it became nearly impossible to determine if the public's interest was indeed being 
considered.  As  for  the  costs  generated  by  the  spatial  heterogeneity  of northern  resource 
673  Exposé, Tome Il, p. 190. 
674  Exposée, Tome Il, pp. 11 0-l l l. 
675 Ibid., pp. 66-67 : "la charge qu'elle occasionne devrait être répartie à toute la population el non aux seuls utilisateurs". 
676 Regionalisation of management activities through ni ne different administrative regions covering 44 management units. 
6-n  Exposée, Tome Il, pp. 7 and  189-190. 
678  Ibid., pp. 68 and  158-159. While the old system may have been arbitrary in terms of establishing the fixed rates used in  the 
fee schedule, the new  system was open to even more abuse. lt essentially gave participants the freedom to negotiate terms and 
conditions on a case by case, th us opening the door to arbitrariness & discretion in the application of payoff ru les. 380 
systems (i.e.,  rent dissipation), these would  largely  be  offset by  an ongoing rationalization 
process (i.e., consolidation and vertical integration of forest operators) that would help bring 
about  economies  of scale  and  the  concentration  of resource  rents  (in  the  hands  of a 
diminishing number of  ever Iarger operators).
679 
8.2.2  Industrial Opposition 
The plan to cancel timber concessions and manage public forests through a system of 
supply  guarantees  was  finally  given  legal  weight  nearly  two  years  later  through  Bill  28 
(adopted in December 1974). However, in spite compensatory measures that were design to 
serve as an incentive to concessionaires who willingly forfeited their resource rights in favour 
of the state (sections 98), in exchange for supply guarantees (section 1  08), only a third of the 
concessions were retroceded by 1984. 
Originally, the first and second volume of the 1971-72 white book were scheduled to 
be  published  simultaneously,  but  release  of the  proposed  policy  directives  was  delayed 
pending clarification  of the  interests  of pulp  and  paper  manufacturers.  The fear  was  that 
Québec's intended course of action would disrupt the precarious situation in  which operators 
found  themselves,
680  even though wood-pulp production (a limited value commodity)  rose 
45% between  1960  and  1970,  and  newsprint increased  by  28%. The Council  of Pulp and 
Paper Maimfacturers of Québec argued that key competitors during this same period (in the 
United States and  Scandinavia) had increased their production levels by  margins of 62% to 
82% during the same period. Such "slow growth," the Council contended, and "the industry 's 
competitive difjiculties"  were further compounded by  the fact that net profits  in  1970  were 
actually 67% lower than in  1960. Two key factors were invoked to explain such results. First, 
"overcapacity in  the major producing regions of  the world [hadj depressing e.flects on priee 
structure and the profitability of pulp and paper companies everywhere."  And  second, the 
ability of manufacturers  in  Québec to  remain  competitive in  a changing global market was 
severely hampered by the province's unfavourable "cast/priee relationships", which imposed 
higher than average costs in a market of continuously diminishing returns. ln addition to the 
issues  already  listed  above  (see  section  8.2.1 ),  the  industry  called  on  governement  to 
679 Ibid., pp. 160-161. 
680 The Competitive Position of  the Québec Pulp and Paper lndustry (1 972, p. 5). 381 
substantially reduce its  operational costs by ali  possible means, including drastic reductions 
in  stumpage dues,  the  removal  of ground  rents,  and the  development of more subsidised 
forest access roads.
681  In concluding their demands, Council members reminded government 
th at: 
"Our recommendation admittedly call for changes in public expenditures. [But they] 
should be  looked upon as  a priee required to  obtain the  much greater  benefit of a 
healthier, more dynamic pulp and paper industry." 
Based on the promises contained in the government's new policy directives, it appears 
as  though  the  industry  was Iargely  successful  in  obtaining what  it  asked  for.  In  fact,  the 
reason why government initially postponed delivery of its  intended policy and then delayed 
legislative  action  for  another two years was  ali  too  clear for  members  of the  opposition. 
lndustry,  and  concession  holders  in  particular,  wanted  nothing  to  do  with  the  proposed 
revocation  of  their  limits.
682  The  executive  might  have  supreme  authority  over  the 
administration of public affairs  in  the province,  but such a  concentration of authority  also 
renders  it  susceptible to  the pressure of well-organized groups. In other words, prospective 
rent seekers need not affect the opinion ofeveryone in the National Assembly, they only need 
to make sure that their preoccupations are clearly understood by  those at the very top of the 
system, and any other member of parliament who owes his or her seat to a forest-dependent 
constituency. 
Given the province's historical and contemporary dependence upon the resource sector 
for regional employment and its positive trade balance, the ability of government to subtract 
itself from such pressure of those who willingly invested in the province was unlikely to say 
the !east. The idea that "business needs inducements ... if it is to doits job" (Lindblom, 1977, 
p.  175) arguably constituted the central theme of the 1972 white book and the propositions 
that have since been formulated by succeeding governments (see below). As illustrated in the 
memoirs of René Lévesque,  the  industry's  power was  formidable  and  its  ability  to  affect 
government decisions unmistakable: 
681  Ibid., pp. 6-7. The industry also demanded the removal of ali  taxes on fuel, equipment, and products used in the manufacture 
of pulp and paper products;  reductions on energy  costs;  Jess rigid  pollution abatement policies;  and  a moratorium on social 
programs such as workmcn's compensation, medicare, minimum wage legislation, and obligatory contributions to  the Québec 
pension plan. 
682  E.g., Débats de J'Assemblée Nationale, 14 mai, 1974, pp. B-1541-1544. 382 
"Dès la  création  du  Ministère des Richesses naturelles, au printemps de  1961, je me 
retrouvais en plein cœur de  cette insignifiance collective, confronté à l'hégémonie des 
intérêts  du  dehors  et  de  leurs  valet  indigènes.  On  avait  ajouté  aux  ressources 
hydrauliques  dont j'étais  déjà  responsable  l'administration  du  secteur minier,  mais 
j'eu beau plaider pour qu'on me confiât également les forêts ...  , rien n'y fit et je sus 
quelques  temps  après  que  les  compagnies  de  pâtes  et  papiers  avaient  refusé  net 
d'avoir à traiter avec l'inquiétant gauchiste que j'étais. Il faut dire que ces entreprises 
régnaient  alors  sans  conteste  sur  d'immenses  concessions  forestières,  soi-disant 
renouvelables  mais en  pratique perpétuelles,  et  que  leurs  souscriptions aux caisses 
électorales comptaient parmi les plus plantureuses" (Lévesque, 1986, p. 228). 
8.2.3  Implementing the New Directives 
ln light of the new  directives  by which public forests were to  be managed (i.e.,  1972 
policy  directives),  the  rote of the  state  corporation  REXFOR (Société  de  récupération  et 
d'exploitation forestière)
683  was  expanded to support more intensive forms of resource use, 
and  thus  contribute  to  economie  development
684  by  stabilizing  the  flow  of raw  materials 
needed to  maintain industrial activity, create employment opportunities, and  favour a  more 
complete use of available wood.
685  Through REXFOR, public resources were leveraged to 
supplement  industrial  activity  by  "salvaging  overmature"  forests  that  were  too  costly  for 
private operators to  access  and  in  danger of being "wasted"  if not harvested. It was tasked 
with  restoring  previously  degraded  forests  intended  for  industrial  purposes  by  applying 
appropriate silvicultural treatments, and asked support the development of further industry to 
improve  employment opportunities.
686  Loans  contracted  by  REXFOR  in  the  pursuit of its 
activities  were guaranteed by government and  agreements  with  private operators could  be 
entered into, as  required and without legislative approval, to subsidize wood production and 
stabilize  industrial  development.  Finally,  in  order to  assist REXFOR in  the  pursuit of its 
obligations,  the  Ministry  Finance  could  be  called  upon  to  advance any  sum that might be 
required by the public corporation.
687 
683  REXFOR  was  formerly  established  under  the  name  of  "Office  de  Récupération  des  bois  des  rivières  Outardes  et 
Manicouagan"  in  1961 , to  remove timber from the two river valleys that were to  be  flooded by  hydro development projects. 
REXFOR was given a  more comprehensive  mandate in  1969 to  further the  economie development and  performance of the 
forest sector. Over ti me, ils role was conlinuously adopted to address emerging needs. 
684 Exposé, Tome Il, p. 71: " ... dans une perspective de développement économique ...  [pour] favoriser une utilisation plus intense 
des richesses forestières du  territoire québécois afin que le secteur forestier contribute advantage à promouvoir le progress 
économique du  Québec." 
685  Exposé, Tome Il, pp. 72-73. 
686 The Québec Wood Salvage, Logging and Forest Developrnent Company Act, Chapt. 21, 1973, section 3. 
""' Chapter 21 (1973),sections 17, 18, 19,21,22. 383 
Until the  1980s, and eventual assistance in  the development of Tembec, Donohue and 
Cascade,  the  extent  to  which  REXFOR  served  the  public's  interest  is  anything  but 
debatable.
688  Between  1971  and  1974  for  instance,  it  implemented  "Operation  2000"  to 
provide seasonal  employment to  welfare recipients, tasked  with  harvesting  activities in  the 
lower St.  Lawrence  and  Gaspé  regions.  However,  for  a  mere  few  thousand  seasonal jobs 
(2156 jobs  in  1971-72,  1852  in  1972-37,  and  900  jobs  for  1973-74),  government  spent 
$21,242,676  and  managed  to  recoup  only  $9,938,249  from  wood  sales.
689  In  1974-75, 
"Operation  2000"  was  revised  to  support  reforestation  efforts  near  existing  facil ities  to 
improve productivity and support road construction to salvage "overmature" stands that were 
in  danger of "wasting away." But again, high costs and  poor results brought a quick end to 
this initiative as well.
690  Over ti me, the mandate of the state-run enterprise was consistently 
refashioned to  supplement private sector  interests  and  keep questionable operations afloat, 
providing bailout packages and  supply guarantees to milling operations that were at risk of 
closing due to diminishing stocks, reliance on Jess efficient technologies, or other comparable 
ailments.
691 
In  fulfilment  of  the  government's  commitment  to  support  forest  infrastructure 
development,  the  first  of a  series  of federal-provincial  agreements  ($138.3  million)  was 
passed in  1974 to expand the network of forest roads (in order to  reduce supply costs) and 
invest in  reforestation activities  and  silvicultural treatments (e.g., thinning and improvement 
cutting).
692  Wh ile the terms of the Canada-Québec subsidiary agreements were modified over 
the years,  the extent to  which these and  other comparable initiatives  (  e.g., REXFOR) ever 
produced  appreciable  results  (in  terms  of improved  forest  resource  use  outcomes)  is  not 
supported by the succeeding forestry crises of  the 1980s and 2000s. 
By the end of the  l970s, the concerns raised  in  1965  and  1971-72 were again being 
voiced  with  renewed  vigour.  Due to  a  variety  of problems - the  ever increasing  costs  of 
688  REXFOR was instrumental in  creating the profitable state-owned Donohue, which was eventually privatized in  1987, as  part 
of a broader government agenda to sellmost of its public corporations. See Bernier (1989) and Fournier (1990). 
689  Côté, A.  1979. "Rexfor: un  outil  essentiel au  développement forestier."  in  La forêt au Québec, Numéro spécial de la revue 
forestière française. Ministère de l'agriculture, Nancy, France. p 137. 
690 Ibid., pp.  137-38, 140. 
691  Ibid., pp.  140-14 1; Annual reports of REXFOR (1973 to  1984); MER, L'industrie du bois de sciage de résineux du Québec, 
p.6. 
692  Canada. Ministère de l'expansion économique régionale, 1975. "Entente auxiliaire Canada-Québec sur l'accès aux ressources 
forestières 1974-78." Ministère de l'expansion économique régionale: Ottawa. 384 
obtaining  wood  supplies,  the  permanent  issues  of high  labour  and  transportation  costs, 
inefficient  or  obsolete  technologies,  and  chronic  overcapacity  in  many  regions  of the 
province  - the  competitiveness  of the  pulp  and  paper  sector  (especially  newsprint)  was 
consistently falling behind its  main rivais in  Southern United States and Scandinavia.
693  For 
its  part,  the  sawn  lumber industry  suffered from  too great a  dependency  on  the  American 
market and the vagaries of its domestic economy. On the supply side, sawn lumber producers 
faced  a  number of recurring  problems of their own.  The sector was  hampered  by  strong 
regional  variability  in  terms  of available  stocks.  The  province's  generalized  dearth  of 
valuable hardwoods was left unresolved. And the large number of  small mi lis, combined with 
high labour and supply costs pre-empted the industry's ability to develop economies of scale 
(i.e., larger and "more efficient" sawmills).
694  Y et, between 1956 and 1966, and 1966 to 1976 
respectively, the number ofsawmills dropped by halfat each period, whi1e overall production 
doubled.
695 
Production trends in the pulp and paper sector fol lowed similar growth patterns, such 
that by 1978, 30 million m
3 of wood and 8 million m
3 of  saw dust and wood chips were being 
consumed in the Province,
696  thus pushing available supplies to the brink of exhaustion in at 
]east  five  of the  nine  administrative  regions.
697  Over  time,  the  combined  effects  of 
overexploitation  on  private  land  and  intensive  resource  extraction  on  the  public  domain 
invariably  pushed  the  boundary of commercially  exploitable forests  ever further  from  the 
centers of production, making it increasingly costly to obtain supplies and rem ain in  business. 
As  a  consequence,  the  minister  delegated  to  forests  Yves  Bérubé  explained,  government 
could no longer act as a supplier of raw materials. In its new rote as a catalyst of the forest, it 
now had to provide such supplies at the least cost possible: 
" ...  l'absence de  rationalisation de la production forestière [a] pour conséquence que 
le  bois  [se]  fait  toujours  de  plus  en  plus  éloigné  et  de  plus  en  plus  cher ... 
693  Nadeau, J.P., (1979)  "Regard  sur  l'économie  forestière,"  in  La forêt  au  Québec,  Numéro  spécial  de  la  revue  forestière 
française.  Nancy  (France):  Ministère  de  l'agriculture,  pp.  31  and  33.  A  Parliamentary  Commission  was  held  in  1977  to 
investigate the future outlook of pulp and  paper manufacturers. Among other things, it  noted  that the  costs of making and 
delivering a ton of newsprint in Québec was at !east $52 higher than in Southern United States. See Nadeau p. 33. 
694 Ibid., pp. 35-36. "gg 
695 Ibid.,  p.36. 
696  Ouellet, E.  (1979) "L'Allocation du  bois", in  La forêt au  Québec,  Numéro spécial  de la  revue forestière  française.  Nancy 
(France): Ministère de 1  'agriculture, p. 60. 
697  Nadeau, 1979, p. 37. 385 
[Conséquemment],  il ne suff[it] plus au ministère des  Terres et Forêts de  remplir ses 
fonctions  de  pourvoyeur de  matière première, il [doit] désormais allouer ce  bois au 
meilleur coût possible, afin de remplir efficacement son nouveau rôle de catalyseur de 
l'économie forestière. "
598 
Relief  eventually  did  come,  after  a  1977  Parliamentary  Commission  found  that 
Québec's pulp and paper man11facturers were falling behind competition. Weak technological 
investments  combined  with  increasing  resource  scarcity  and  economie  uncertainty  helped 
foster a separate Canada-Québec subsidiary agreement for the modernisation of the pulp and 
pape"r  sector in  1978.
699  The two  part agreement focused  on  reducing appropriation costs
700 
and  improving the  production capacity of the  pulp and  paper sector through a $350 million 
subsidy that was eventually matched  by  sorne $3  billion in  private capital (Malenfant, 1987, 
p.  142). In addition to the modernization of the pulp and paper sector, the initiative sought to 
stimulate newsprint production (i.e., furthering daily output by  800,000 tons) and  prevent the 
closure  of out-dated  facilities.
701  The  purpose  of the  industrial  revitalization  fund  was 
essentially  based  on  a "business"  proposition, which  aimed  to  maximize economie  returns 
and ens ure the development of a more "aggressive and competitive" industry .
702  How su ch an 
approach  could  ever increa5e  the sustainability  of an  industry  that already  consumed  more 
than what the system  could Jlroduce was obviously not part of the criteria used to assess the 
situation or develop an alternative course of  action. 
A  more  modest  initiative  concerned  a  $21  million  investment  in  the  sawn-lumber 
industry of the Lower St.  Lawrence region that was designed to revitalize the local economy 
by  allocating supply  guarantees and  adapting existing technologies to  accommodate smaller 
diameter wood- a telling 5  ign of the diminishing quality of available resource stocks.
703  In 
anticipation  of the  positive results  that planned  reforestation  efforts  should  create, and  the 
698  Bérubé,  Y.  (1979)  "La  foresterie  Québécoise  à l'ère  industrielle. "  in  La  forêt  au  Québec, Numéro  spécial  de  la  revue 
forestière française. Nancy (France): Ministère de l'agriculture, pp. 44-45. 
699  Canada  (1978)  Entenle  auxilia.ir~ Canada-Québec  sur  la  modernisation  de  l'industrie  des  pâtes  el papiers, 1979- 1984. 
Ottawa: Ministère de l'expansion éoonomique régionale. 
700 This component was largely funded ihrough the 1979-84 Subsidiary agreement on forest development, a five year grant ($184 
million) to  build forest roads, engage  in  reforestation activities  and execute  silvicultural  treatments. See  En/ente auxiliaire 
Canada-Québec sur la. modernisation de l'industrie des pâtes et papiers ( 1978). 
701  Bérubé, 1979, p. 47. 
702  Ibid.  p.  45:  <<  •• •  mises  à  point  sous  l'impulsion  d'un  gouvernement  du  Québec  désireux  d'assumer  le  leadership  du 
développemenl de ses ressources na/urel!es,  en s'alliant avec un secteur privé susceptible de redevenir agressif el compétitif. 
L'approche es/ essenriellemenl  « d·affaires », basée sur des critères de rentabilité économique, elles solutions retenues pour 
leur effet d'enlraînemenlmaximum sur l'ensemble du secteur forestier. » 
703 Ibid. pp. 45-47. 386 
shorter  rotation  cycle  that  small  diameter  wood  provided  for,  the  Minister  confidently 
announced that the allowable eut in the region could be immediately raised from 2,330,000 
m
3  to  2,800,000  m
3  without  hindering  future  productivity.
704  Overall,  between  1977  and 
1980,  sorne $44 million  in  subsidies and low-interest loans were handed over to  the sawn 
1  b  .  d  705  um  er 111  ustry. 
In  these,  as  in  other sectors  of the provincial  resource  economy,  the  government's 
intentions  were clear.  In a  tone  reminiscent of 1920s,  Minister Bérubé contended that the 
barriers  between  public  administrators  and  industry  were  no  longer.  The  provincial 
government  was  interested  in  establishing  business  relationships  that  would  ultimately 
maxim ise the use of ali crown res ource as sets: 
"Sur des  dossiers-charnières  comme  ceux-.ci  commence  à  s'articuler  une  véritable 
industrie des  ressources,  reliée  à  cette colonne  vertébrale  que représente la  volonté 
politique  très  claire  du  Gouvernement  du  Québec  de  maximiser,  au  profit  des 
québécois, la mise en valeur du prodigieux potentiel forestier,  minier, et énergétique 
du Québec.  "
706 
Ultimately, efforts to  increase access to the public domain had a resounding effect on 
wood consumption. By providing direct financial  assistance, long-term supply guarantees to 
sawmills  (which  could  also  be  used  to  secure  loans  to  expand  operations),  and  reduced 
stumpage dues to make the industry more competitive, wood consumption (private and public 
sources combined) increased by 45% between 1970 and 1980, rising from 23.6 million m
3 to 
34.2 million m
3
.
707  During this period, domanial  reserves were likewise increased from  87 
000 miles
2 or 227 000 km
2 to 463  000 km
2
,  which in  tandem with the expansion of forest 
access roads rendered underutilized portions of the public domain economically productive. 
As the then deputy minister of Lands and Forests, Jean-Claude Mercier, explained, improved 
resource  access  ultimately  stimulated  competition,  and  competition  contributed  to 
704  As  reported  in  Mal  enfant ( 1987,  pp.  141-143), the  government of  Québec also  established  (or rather salvaged)  poorly 
performing mills  by creating state-sponsored  corporations such as  Donohue, with funding  partnerships from American and 
Canadian sources. lt acquired large shares of Domtar to maintain the value of the firm, and  made additional investments in the 
pulp and  paper sector (e.g., Consolidated  Bathurst, International  Paper Co., Noranda)  and  large sawmill  corporations  (e.g., 
Forex and Produits forestiers Saucier) to sustain their operations. 
705  Gouvernement du Québec, (1985). L'industrie du  bois de sciage au  Québec: analyse et perspectives. Québec: Ministère de 
1  'Industrie, du Commerce, et du Tourisme, p.  14 1. 
706  Bérubé, 1979, p. 48. 
707  Gouvernement du Québec (1984).  La  politique forestière  du  Québec:  Problématique d'ensemble, Québec:  Ministère  de 
1  'Énergie et des Ressources pp. 7-8. 387 
technological  investments and  improved productivity (i.e.,  processing efficiency). However, 
in  order to  minimize job !osses, production levels had to  be increased, which in turn meant 
having to push the boundary of  commercially viable forests ever further away: 
" ...  avec  un  plus  grand  nombre  d'unités  de  production,  la  compétition  et  la 
concurrence sont devenues  des facteurs d'évolution technologique. Pour réduire  ses 
coûts  et  demeurer  compétitive,  l'industrie  a  dû  moderniser  ses  usines.  Ce 
développement technologique a amené un accroissement rapide de la productivité et il 
a fallu, pour éviter une diminution du  nombre d'emplois, associer à la  modernisation 
des usines une augmentation de  la production ... créant des pressions supplémentaires 
sur la ressource ... [C ]es  développements ont été rendus possibles en éloignant de plus 
en plus les limites de la forêt économiquement exploitable. "
708 
To  suppo1t  this  frenzy  of  development,  public  managers  relied  on  simplistic 
assumptions that largely discounted the effects of natural disturbances (fire and insects) and 
overestimated the benefits of reforestation efforts and silvicultural treatments.  By  the early 
1980s  however,  more  than  lOO  million  m
3  of timber  had  been  decimated  by  a  severe 
budworm  epidemie  that  lasted  nearly  a  decade.  The  millions  of  dollars  invested  in 
reforestation activities  were not producing their desired effects (Vézina,  1985, p.  4)
709  and 
natural  regeneration  was  not  occurring  as  anticipated.
710  Consequently,  the  hypothesized 
wood  surplus  (i.e., "possibility")  that was  strongly  defended by  succeeding administrators 
never materialized.
711  In fact, at the onset of the  1980s, ali available stocks were essentially 
assigned  to  various  user  groups,  thus  limiting  the  prospects  of  correcting  allocative 
inefficiencies  through  further  structural  reforms  or reallocation  schemes.
712  Moreover,  the 
revocation of concessionary rights  proved more difficult to  achieve.  As highlighted earlier, 
only 32% of the land held un der concessionary title in  1972 had been transferred to the state 
in  1984 and the previously unused reserves of these concessions were by  now  being fully 
worked.
713 
7œ Mercier, J-C. (1983) "Les impératifs  de  la sociale-foresterie", in  Pour sortir de  la  crise: la  sociale-foresterie. Textes des 
conférences présentées au 69e congrès annuel de l'Ordre des ingénieurs forestiers du Québec, p. 53. 
709  In  his study of reforestation efforts Québec, Roberge (1986, p. 3) noted  thal although 65% of plants survived after 2 years, 
on!  y 20% remained after 8 years and survival rates were unclear thereafter. 
710 Nadeau, 1979, p. 37. For an indepth  discussion on the failure of reforestation efforts, see Mal  enfant, 1987. 
711  La politique forestière du Québec, 1984, p. 10. 
712  Ibid. 
713 Ibid., pp.9-1  O. 388 
As indicated in  its annual report for  1980, the Ministry of Energy and Resources was 
spending more than twice (i.e., $105 million) the annual revenues it collected from the forest 
sector (i.e., $44.7 million). Afterwards, the returns from  public forests were  so  meagre that 
the Ministry simply stopped reporting whatever revenues it  generated, preferring  instead to 
emphasise  the public "investments" that were made to bolster productivity, secure  regional 
employment or prevent mill  closures.  As for the industry  itself, the dissipation of resource 
rents  forced  user  groups  to  engage  in  an  ongoing  process  of horizontal  and  vertical 
integration  that  continuously  diminished  the  number  of competing  operators.  T hrough 
mergers, acquisitions, and closures, the number operating mills was reduced by  half between 
1970  and  1980  (i.e.,  381  establishments),  with  63%  of the  combined  production  capacity 
concentrated  in  only  43  large  industrial  complexes.
714  Within  the  pulp  and  paper  sector, 
consolidation  efforts  led  to  a  progressive  integration  of sawmilling  capacity  to  existing 
facilities  (mostly  through  the  purchase  of  existing  operations),  as  the  industry  sought  to 
control  each  working  part  of the  forest  sector,  capture  ali  potential  gains,  and  minimise 
supply costs.
715  However, the downside of bigger and faster processing facilities is  that in the 
event of a change in market demand, their abiiity to adjust or alter the flow of production is 
much  more  limited.  In other words, sunk costs  can seriously  limit the  scope of allowable 
action (Arthur, 1994  ). 
8.2.4  Continuing the Thrust ofExpansionism 
After  Jess  than  a  decade  of experimentation  with  public  resource  management, 
government  efforts  to  assume  responsibility  for  forest  maintenance  activities  came  to  an 
abrupt end. As  the threat of a  new global economie recession began to  affect the industry 
towards the end of the 1970s, the conversation again shifted from the promise of plenty to the 
threat of scarcity. Only this time, the provincial economy was  in  the red and the days of free 
spending were over.  Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan were now at the helm of the most 
powerful  western  democracies and the Keynesian era of state  interventionism  was brushed 
aside by a new ideological stance grounded in  the Hayekian worldview of spontaneous order 
714  Gouvernement du Québec, (1984). L'industrie du.  bois de sciage résineux du Québec, problématique et éléments de solution, 
Direction de l'industrie du  bois d'oeuvre, Ministère de  l'Énergie et Res  ressources, p. 6; Gouvernement  du  Québec, (1985). 
L'industrie du  bois de sciage au.  Québec: analyse et perspectives, Ministère de l'Industrie, du Commerce, et du  Tourisme, p. 
10. For a more thorough discussion of these factors, see Malenfant (1987). 
715 Nadeau, 1979, p. 37. 389 
and  free  market  adulation.  As  privatization,  deregulation,  and  government  downsizing 
became the operative words of a new world order, the theorized ability of  the private sector to 
exercise self-restraint and  use resources  more  efficiently  suddenly  regained  the favour  of 
Québec's  political  establishment.  In  short,  tough  economie  times  called  for  responsible 
government interventions. And like the rest of  society, the government of Québec also had to 
tighten its belt, make cuts in its civil service payroll, and dispense with non-essential services, 
including  failed  experiments  such  as  the  appropriation  of  public  forest  management 
"b"l" .  716  respons1  1 1t1es. 
As  the  combined  effects  of  overcapitalization,  overconsumption,  ineffectual 
provisioning efforts and the falling returns of weak market conditions began to take their toll, 
the forest sector found itselfin yet another crisis. The fundamental problem was again tied to 
the limited availability of resource supplies, which industry  desperately needed in  order to 
grow,  let  atone  maintain  existing  facilities.
717  While  the  productive  capacity  (i.e., 
"possibility")  of the  provincial  forest was  estimated to be around  18  million cubic  meters 
during  the  !980s/ 1 8 the  average  annual  eut was  nearer to  20  million  cubic  meters,  thus 
prompting  both  government
719  and  leading  experts  of the  day  to  suggest  that  overall 
production levels effective!  y outpaced the regenerative threshold of the province's forests.
720 
Confounding the  problem of  overexploitation even  further was the  recognition that heavy 
machinery  and  year-round  cutting  (introduced  during  the  1970s)  effectively  induced 
operators to  increase the  ir productive output (so as  to recoup sunk costs  ),  th us  generating 
more intensive  patterns  of resource  use,
721  and  an  increased incidence of soi!  compaction, 
which  delayed  or impeded forest  regeneration  efforts.
722  Hence,  if the  productivity of the 
forest sector was ever to recover and indeed improve in a context of increasing administrative 
716  Landry, B. (1983).  "Le secteur forestier: virage technologique et commerce extérieur." ln Pour sortir de la crise: la sociale-
foresterie. Textes des conférences présentées au 69e congrès annuel de l'Ordre des ingénieurs forestiers du Québec, pp. 68-70. 
717  MER 1984. "La politique forestière du Québec. Problématique d'ensemble"  p. 123:  "Le problème majeur du Québec réside 
essentiellement  dans  la  disponibililé  de  la  matière  ligneuse  nécessaire  non  seulement pour  assurer  le  développement  de 
l'industrie forestière ...  mais pour assurer le simple maintien des usines existantes" 
718 MER, 1985. Bâtir une forêt pour l'avenir: La politique forestière, Québec, p.44. 
719 Bâtir une forêt pour l'avenir, p. 85. 
720  As  Vézina (1985, p.  3) put it:  "Le déboisement va  plus vite que  le reboisement ... La plupart des peuplements accessibles 
d'arbres de  bonne qualité, parvenus à maturité, ont été aballus; il ne resle plus, dans bien des cas, que des boisés contenant 
des arbres dépérissant ou défectueux.  Nous commençons à entrevoir l'épuisement des forêts naturelles exploitables". 
721  Débats de l'Assemblé nationale, 25 novembre, 1985, p. 4233. 
722 See Vézina, 1985, p.4; Bâtir une forêt pour l'avenir, 1985, p. 83. 390 
austerity,  then substantial  changes  would have to  be introduced relative the way  resources 
were allocated and maintained.
723 
To solve this dilemma, experts and government turned to what they knew best: favour 
the development of the forest industry by  optimizing the use of provincial forests. 
724  And in 
this  context,  optimizing  forest  use  meant  increasing  the  annual  allowable  eut  without 
appearing to hinder the hypothesized volume of standing timber over time.  Achieving such 
ends required a two-prong approach. First, in order to generate an  immediate increase in  the 
overall  volume of standing timber, the frontier of commercially viable forests  was simply 
extended northwards  past the  50
111  parallel,  (see  Bouthillier,  2001,  p.  262;  and  Malenfant, 
1987), thus producing a "surplus" that could readily be used to stimulate near-term economie 
activity in  the south where operations were mostly concentrated. And second, to secure the 
long term needs of the forest sector, government proposed to intensify reforestation efforts in 
the south by  planting sorne 300 million trees annually, and to  stimulate the productivity of 
private forests through favourable economie incentives and ongoing technical assistance. By 
banking on the projected growth gains of new  silvicultural  investments, authorities posited 
that  the  maximum  sustainable  yield  or "possibility"  of Québec's  forests  could  again  be 
increased to  reflect the discounted future  benefits of provisioning efforts,  even though past 
investments  of this  nature  had  proven  to  be  generally  unsuccessful.  However,  this  time 
around,  forest  maintenance  activities  were  to  be  handed  over  to  the  industry  itself (see 
below),  and  tied  to  long-term  management  contracts  that  were  somehow  considered  a 
sufficient guarantee that more efficient and effective provisioning efforts would ultimately be 
achieved.  With  these  modifications,  deputy  minister  Gilbert Paillé  explained  in  1986,  the 
anticipated gains of reforestation efforts meant that the annual allowable eut could be raised 
immediately from  18 to 25.4 millions m
3 or even to 30 millions m
3  if the stocks lying in  the 
extended northern frontier were taken into consideration.
725  The problem of how to overcome 
723  Ministre des forêt, Albert Côté, Débats de l'Assemblé nationale, 25 novembre,  1985, p. 4233.: "l'importance économique de 
la re  source, son impact sur l'emploi dans les régions et l'état lamentable de nos forêts justifient pleinement la nature urgente 
et radicale de l'intervention gouvernementale dans ce secteur vital de l'économie du Québec." 
724  Ministère  de  l'énergie  et  des  ressources  (1 984).  La  politique forestière  du  Québec. Problématique  d'ensemble,  p.  121 : 
"favoriser le développement de l'industrie forestière par une mise en valeur optimale de la forêt québécoise." 
725 See extract from  presentation by Deputy minister Paillé during the 1986 "Congrès annuel de l'Association des manufacturiers 
de bois de sciages du Québec," cited in Malenfant (1987, pp. 157 &  163-164). 391 
diminishing  stocks  while  increasing  the  productivity  of  Québec's  forest  industry  was 
essentiall y so 1  ved. 
726 
Following nearly  six  m<Jnths  of discussion  in  parliamentary commission,
727  the Forest 
Act (Bill  150, c.  1  08) was  unanimously adopted  in  December 1986 with only  a few  mi nor 
changes to  appease concerns raised  during consultations.  While sorne  argued  that the initial 
draft of the  proposed  legislative reforms gave excessive reserve powers of the Minister; did 
not  recognize  regional  exige11cies  and  the  need  for  a more adaptive  legal  framework;  and 
placed most of the responsibility for reforestation efforts on the shoulders ofthe sawn lumber 
industry and  private forest owners (even though pulp and paper manufacturers  consumed the 
lion's share  of Québec's production), the  adopted  legislation stayed remarkably close to  the 
.  .  1 b'll  728  ongma  1  • 
Henceforth, ali  remaining forest concessions were cancelled and  resource rights  were 
to  be  allocated  through  renewable  Timber  Supply  and  Forest Management Contracts  that 
remained  were  valid  for  a  maximum  of 25  years.
729  Contract  holders  were  entitled  to  a 
specified  annual volume  of wood,  on  the  condition that  related obligations  were  fulfilled, 
including  the  reforestation  of cutover  areas  and  the  application  of planned  silvicultural 
treatments to  maintain  or  improve  the  annual  yield  in  the  managed areas  (sect.  42).  The 
annual  allowable  eut  that  contract  holders  were  allowed  to  make  was  defined  as  the 
maximum  volume of timber that may  be  harvested annually and  in  perpetuity from  a forest 
(sect. 45  & 46), and  in order to  ensure that such targets would be met, contract holders were 
obligated to  adopt a three tier management process  involving the  development  of a general 
plan (25 years), as weil  as tactical (5 years) and annual workplans (sect. 51 , 52, & 57). 
Throughout,  the  Mi11ister  reserved  the  right  to  revise  the  residual  volume  of round 
timber that may  be harvested from the public domain in fulfilment of a supply guarantee orto 
address  emerging  needs  (sect.  43,  68,  76,  77,  80).  In  short,  the  law  gave  the  Minister 
726  For a critique of this system, see the report of the Coulombe Commission (2004, p.  151). 
727 Journal des débats, 1986, pp. CET·557-1071. 
728 The orginal policy statement for the  1986 reforms was prcsented in  the  1985 white  paper titled Bâtir une forêt pour l'avenir. 
La  politique forestière,  prepared  by  the  Ministère  de  l'énergie  et  des  ressources.  Issues  raised  during  the  Parliamentory 
commission are available in Journal des débats, 1986, pp. CET-557-1071. For a brief discussion on these issues, see Boucher 
(1991 , pp. 76-78). 
729  Bettcr known un der the French acronym CAAF-Contrat d'approvisionnement et d'aménagement forestier. 392 
explicitly  powers  to  alter  and  even  increase  the  flow  of  supplies,  should  economie 
circumstances  suggest  the  need  to  do  so.
730  Additional  supplies  could either  be  granted 
directly from an allocated management unit, or could be secured through forest reserves that 
were not subject to any supply agreement and could thus be sold via public sales or through 
special agreements to provide auxiliary or guaranteed supplies to owners of wood processing 
plants (sect. 98 to 101). Such flexibility, Minister Côté explained, was essentially a reciprocal 
entitlement, which contract holders received for investing sorne $5 billion between 1979 and 
1986  to  improve  the  efficiency  of  their  operations  and  thus  maintain  the  industry's 
competitive  advantage.  It  was  only  fitting  that  such  investments  should  be  met  with 
appreciable long-term guarantees: 
"Des investissements d'une telle  ampleur ne peuvent s'envisager à  nouveau dans  un 
contexte d'insécurité  ... Il devient donc urgent de  mettre en place un régime de  gestion 
forestière qui garantisse des approvisionnements de  bois sur une longue période afin 
de rentabiliser à long terme les investissements consentis et à consentir par l'industrie. 
C'est ce que propose le nouveau régime forestier. "
731 
For  in  the  end,  what mattered  was  the  industry's capacity  to  generate or maintain_ 
economie  returns,  especially  in  resource  dependent  regions.  Government,  minister  Côté 
emphasized, had a  duty to  correct unfavourable economie situations and  stimulate growth 
wherever possible. Valued ends such as  regional development, the maintenance of existing 
employment conditions, and job creation via· the transfer of silvicultural responsibilities (i.e., 
forest maintenance activities) were to be prioritized.
732 
As  for  stumpage  dues,  these  were  made  payable  m  cash  or  in  kind  through  the 
performance of silvicultural treatments (sect.  89).  Following the precedent set forth  in  the 
1972 white book (see Exposé,  Tome II), timber dues and the means used to determine such 
values were the subject of such far-reaching conditionalities that in  ali  practical sense,  the 
minister (or appointed subordinate) retained near complete discretionary authority over their 
application. In the opinion of Minister Côté, dues necessarily had to reflect the market value 
of standing timber, fluctuations in market conditions (i.e., variations in  supply and demand), 
730  Débats de l'Assemblée nationale, 23  novembre, 1986, p. 4237: "le présent projet de loi conf ère de façon explicite le pouvoir 
au ministre d'octroyer un permis d'intervention à un utilisateur qui ne reçoit pas tout l'approvisionnement dont il a besoin." 
731 Ibid., p. 4235. 
732 Ibid., p. 4239. 393 
appropriation costs (including the costs of accessing and harvesting timber), the location of 
targeted  supplies  relative  to  processing  facilities,  the  costs  of  fulfilling  management 
obligations, and the actual quality of the timber harvested.
733  Consequently, even though the 
revenues  generated  through  the  complex  system  of  public  dues  increased  over  time 
(Coulombe,  2004,  pp.  20-22),  actual  gross  earnings  consistently  diminished,  such  that  by 
2003-2004, public expenditures were 25 to 45% higher than the revenues collected (Ibid., pp. 
285-286). 
8.3  Conclusion 
Over  time,  severa)  amendments  were  introduced  to  eliminate  the  use  of chemical 
pesticides  and  maintain  biological  diversity  (1994)
734
;  reflect  the  growing  importance  of 
sustainable forest management in the preamble to the Forest Act (1996); and better integrate 
local  socio-economic  and  ellvironmental  concerns  in  the  management  of public  forests 
(2000). However, as the Commission for the Study of Public Forest Management in  Québec 
(2004)
735  eventually revealed, such minor changes could do little to steer the management of 
public lands towards more sustainable outcomes. 
After  nearly  two  ce!lturies  of  consistent  overexploitation,  absent  or  inadequate 
provisioning  efforts,  and  endless  expansion  of  the  territory  assigned  to  commercial 
exploitation, so much inertia had been built into the system that failure of the  1986 reforms 
was almost predictable. In essence, the legislation failed because the underlying structure of 
the  situation  that  affected  the  incentives  that  politicians,  forest  user  groups,  and  forest 
dependent  communities  have  faced  over  time  bas  never  been  seriously  questioned.  By 
leaving  the  growth  imperative  unchallenged,  the  basic  thrust  of the  1986  reforms  was 
grounded  on  the  questionable  assumption  that  forest  appropriation  rates  could  increase 
continuously, as  long as y  et un proven forest maintenance activities were performed. ln this 
sense, the 2004 Commissi<m and the crisis that followed were but the inevitable results of a 
fundamentally skewed system grounded in the illusion ofplenty, the use of inherently flawed 
models and assumptions, and the beliefthat growth (i.e., ever increasing levels of production) 
733  Ibid. 
734 La Slralégie de proleclion desj orêls 
735  Commission d'étude sur la  gestion de  la forêt publique  québécoise, 2004. Rapporl final de la Commission d'élude  sur la 
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could  somehow  be  sustained  indefinitely.  Wh ile  the  1986  legislative  reforms  were  past 
unanimously and with a great deal of fanfare by  members of the National Assembly,
736  they 
did  not live  up to expectations. Overexploitation was  pursued unremittingly. The proposed 
reforestation strategy did not work, with much of it being poorly executed or maintained, and 
subject to  natural  disturbances (fire or insects)  that limited recovery efforts.  Monitoring of 
biophysical  conditions,  as  weil  as  resource  appropriation and maintenance activities,  were 
either weak or absent.  And the annual  allowable eut was based on faulty  assumptions that 
were both in  excess of what the system could actually provide, and  inadequately  linked to 
local/regional  variances  in  biophysical  conditions  and  silvicultural  treatments  (Coulombe, 
2004). 
In  considering  the  evidence  presented  in  this  and  subsequent  chapters,  it  appears 
reasonable to assume that the underlying Jogic of the situation in at the end of  the 20th century 
differed  little  of at ali  from  the  conditions  that  prevai1ed  at the  onset of the  century.  As 
evolutionary theorists remi nd  us, evolution is  myopie (Hodgson and Knudsen, 2006, 201 0). 
While institutional change may yield optimizing results over time, if directed in a direction 
that supports the fitness of social-ecological interactions, Otherwise, it can also be (and often 
is) a dead end - momentarily giving sorne a competitive advantage but ultimately doomed to 
fail  neve1theless. In  considering the ideas, values and beliefs that guided collective-choices 
and  allocative decisions  between  1960  and  1986, and  the  long streak of historical  failures 
associated with such propositions, it was but a  question of time before luck ran  out and  a 
fundamental reconsideration of  the system's underlying assumptions occurred (i.e., crisis). 
736 Débats de l'Assemblée nationale, 18-19 décembre, 1986, p. 5803-5860. 395 
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"What is needed are governments thot are strong enough to be pluralistic, and listen to the 
concerns of  the people"  (Deforesting the Earth, Michael Williams, 2003) 
9.1  Introduction 
Wh  en resource use is considered over prolonged periods of  ti me- the longue durée, as 
Fernand Braudel would put it- the importance of  context-specific issues tend to wither away 
and the explanatory strength of hypochesized variables, in particularized choice settings, !ose 
their potency. What remains are the discernable patterns ofreiterated problem-solving events, 
the solutions that emerge, and  the  long-run consequences that these produced. By  viewing 
institutional  change as  a  human-adaptive response to  the problems encountered  within  the 
iterative dynamics of social-ecological  interactions, then the critical  issue for understanding 
the path of  social evolutionary change lies in understanding the process by which institutional 
variations  are  selected,  replicated,  and  thus  reinforced  over time.  As  Lewis  and  Steinmo 
(2012) point out, who makes such decisions and what values, ideas, beliefs, and preferences 
informs  their  decisions  can  have  dramatic  long  term  effects  on  the  evolution  of a  given 
system. 
In closing this analytical inquiry, spanning nearly two centuries of human-environment 
interactions  related  to  the  use of forest  resources  in  Québec,  we turn  our attention to  the 
underlying question of  this thesis and  suggest a tentative hypothesis for explaining how forest 
governance institutions in  the province evolved and why. Given that each of the preceding 
chapters is suppotied by  a detailed conclusion, this section will be purposefully brief and aim 
to provide an overarching view of tlle cases considered in this thesis. 
9.2  Considering the Evidence 
Accepting the proposition that institutional change constitutes an adaptive response to 
alteration in  the broader social-ecological environment leads us to the proposition that social, 398 
political,  and  economtc  change  is  always  self-selected  and  therefore  endogenous  to  the 
system  under  consideration.  If this  proposition  holds  true  for  ali  social  systems,  then 
understanding  how  adaptive  responses  are  selected  and  by  whom  becomes  a  critical 
necessity, not only for understanding the past, but more importantly, for identifying ways to 
improve outcomes in the future. 
To be sure,  humans  actions  are  always  imbedded  in  dense  institutional  ecologies  -
from  the normative and socialized habits that inform  the values,  beliefs and  preferences of 
individual  actors  (Hodgson,  2010;  North,  2005),  to  the  formai  and  informai  rules  that 
condition operational, collective, and constitutional choice situations (E. Ostrom, 2005). Who 
has  access,  therefore,  to collective and  constitutional-choice arenas and  how decisions are 
made  in  these  settings  matters  because such  choices  and  decisions  invariably  reflect  the 
values,  beliefs  and  preferences  of decision-makers  (Katznelson  and  Weingast,  2005),  and 
institutional  decisions  always  have  broad scale effects.  In  this  sense,  governments  play  a 
pivotai role in ali societies by selecting the ideas, values, and interests that are to be promoted 
across social, political, and economie landscapes (Lewis and Steinmo, 2012). As such, they 
directly  affect  the  present  and  future  distribution  of costs,  determine  the  allocation  of 
benefits, and influence the course of political-economic affairs, including the degree to which 
astate will tend towards sustainable human-environment interactions or not. 
In  examining  the  evidence  considered  in  this  thesis,  the  selected  cases  can  be 
categorized by the nature of the related forest sector outputs, wh ether before industrialisation 
(i.e., prior to the development of the pulp and paper industry at the turn of the 20
111  century -
see Table 9.1) or after (see Table 9.2). During the nineteenth century, and in  particular, after 
the transfer of administrative oversight from  England to  Lower Canada (Québec) in  1826, 
institutional developments were essentially guided by two distinct considerations: the need to 
generate  revenues  and  that of balancing  the  demands  of settlement  with  the  interests  of 
lumberers. 
The pre-industrial  period  is  marked by  a relatively strong willingness to adapt to  the 
novel  situations  in  which  government  found  itself.  Institutional  changes  were  non-path 
dependent  in  the  sense  that  there  is  no  evidence  that  prior  decisions  created  positive 399 
feedbacks  that entrenched future  opportunities in  one way  or another.  By the  same token 
however, they can only be explained by the fact that the right to make decisions regarding the 
use,  allocation  and  management of public lands  rested  in  the hands of the executive. The 
consequences  of the  government's  overarchtng  authority  over  the  use  and  allocation  of 
available resources was observed in  a number of other ways. First, in  spite of clear evidence 
that  more  sustainable  options  existed  to  either  improve  the  social  wellbeing  of forest-
dependent  communities  or reduce  pressure  on  the  largest and  most valuable  trees  in  the 
province (i.e., white and red pine), changes were  never instituted (e.g., proper inventory of 
soit conditions suitable for agriculture; further the development of the sawn-lumber industry; 
bring an end to the wasteful practice of  squaring). Second, the friction between the competing 
land use claims of  settlers and lumbering interests was known, as were the remedies, and yet, 
nothing  was  ever  done  to  correct  the  near  constant  confrontations  between  the  two. 
Depending on the respective beliefs or persuasions of the government in power, succeeding 
cabinets  tended  to  favour  one  or  the  other,  resulting  in  dysfunctional  policies  (  e.g., 
colonization roads into marginal lands; reluctance to limit the rights of settlers to appropriate 
land held under license to eut timber) - policies  that were arguably making everyone worse 
off, though evidence suggest that lumberers profited handsomely from the incoherence of this 
institutional  interplay.  Third,  in  response  to  industry  demands,  government  consistently 
maintained  low  stumpage dues  and  ground rents,  which  in  turn  undermined the  value of 
Québec's wood on the British market and promoted volume-based exploitation where profits 
were derived  from  the  bulk  rather than the quality of the goods, And fourth,  the need  for 
investments  in  the  maintenance of forest resources,  including monitoring and  enforcement 
efforts was clearly established during the  L 860s and  1870s.  Y  et, the reluctance to diminish 
potential returns, combined with the appearance of plenty continually conspired against the 
government's willingness to  support, either directly or indirectly, the provisioning costs of 
ongoing resource exploitation. Table 9.1  presents a summary of the factors that directly or 
indirectly  affected  outcomes  in  the  Chapters  IV  to  VI.  Issues  that  were  under the  direct 
control of government are marked by an asterisk (*). 400 
Table 9.1 Pre-Industrial Sources of Causation 
DIRECT/ PROXIMAL FACTORS  INDIRECT / STRUCTURAL FACTORS 
COMMERCIAL E XPLOITATION*  NA TURE O F  THE GOOD 
Square timbering  Subtractable & non-excludable 
Lumber production  Relative abundance of forests 
E CONOMIC  CONDITIONS/ FACTOR S* 
SmLEMENT 1  C OL ONIZATION *  .  Encouragement of the staple trade  .  Conversion  .  Preferential duties & undervaluation 
Fuelwood production  .  Market demand for square timber & lumber  .  Private production  .  Agrarian economy & limited $sources  .  Sub-contracting (jobbing) 
RU  L ES*  SOCIO-CULTURAL FACTORS  .  Minimum production requirements  .  Rural population increase 1  colonization  .  lmprovement obligations  Seasonal 1  non-dedicated workforce 
POLITICAL /INS TITUTIONAL FACTOR S * 
GEOGR APHY 1  INFRAS TR UCTURE  .  Fiscal (revenue) 1  social (settlement) policies 
Rivers,  .  Discretionary oversight 1  manipulation 
Canals, slides•  .  Weak enforcement 1  insecure titi  es 
Colonization roads*  .  Unstable governments 
Railways•  .  Grou nd rent system & cull measurements 
With  the  advent  of the  pulp  and  paper  industry, the  more  or  less  passive  role that 
government  played  during  the  l9
1
h  century  came  to  an  abrupt  end.  Owing  to  the  more 
demanding nature of the  pulp and  paper industry,  both  in terms of up-front costs  and long 
term supply and energy needs, government became the primary instigator, supporter and ally 
of the  industry.  The  shift  towards  pulp  and  paper  sector  had  a decisive  influence  on  the 
government's  stance  towards  colonization  and  once  engaged  along  this  institutional path, 
investment  costs  were  such  that  changes  in  policy  directives  became  progressively 
inconceivable.  Sunk  costs,  regional  employment  and  development,  the  maintenance  of a 
positive  trade  balance,  and  the  need  to  guarantee  long  term  and  low  cost  supplies  ali 
conspired  against  change.  So  much  so  that  the  government  consistently  diminished  its 
requirements relative to  its  baseline appropriation rules, thus making it possible for the pulp 
and  paper industry to  supplement  its resource needs  with  little or  no  limitations on  the size 
harvestable  timber,  and  w itho~t  the  need  to  support  maintenance  costs.  Overtirne,  the 
province's socio-econornic dependence on  the  pulp and  paper industry gave corporations an 
increasing power  leverage that made  them  either too  large  or too  important to  fail.  ln the 
process,  industry  was  allowed  to  operate  without  ever  having  to  assume  the  costs  of the 401 
externalities  it  produced.  While  the  1986  reforms  meant  that  industry  had  to  assume 
responsibilities for maintenance cost, the full  subsidization of these requirements meant that 
costs were still borne by the public, not the industry. 
As  in  the previous century, options and solutions to  improve the sustainability of the 
sector were known and discussed but never pursued. Instead of advocating for limitations on 
the  productive  output of the sector,  and  investments  in  sustainable  resource  management 
closer to existing operations, ail succeeding governments willfully supported the expansionist 
tendencies of the industry, and  maintained an  unreserved belief in the reliability  of annual 
allowable  eut  estimates,  even  though  such  numbers  had  so  far  proven  to  be  flawed  and 
unreliable.  Table  9.2  presents  the  key  variables  that  affected  social-ecological  outcomes 
during the 20
1
h century, as  identified in  Chapters VII and VIII. As above, issues marked with 
an asterisk (*) were direct! y under the control or influence of government. 
Table 9.2Post-Industrial Sources ofCausation 
DIRECT / PROXIMAL FACTORS  INDIRECT / STRUCTURAL FACTORS 
COMMERCIAL EXPLOITATION*  NATURE OF THE GOOD .... 
Square timber/lumber production  .  Relative abundance- boreal forest 
Pulp & paper production  .  Belief in models*  .  lndustrial expansion 1  intensification  .  Perceived over-mature imbalance* 
TECHNOLOGICAL FACTORS*  ECONOMIC CONDITIONS/ FACTORS* 
Pulp manufacturing & mechanization  .  Market demand & growth imperative 
(OLONIZATION*  High  start-up  +  operating  costs  =  incentive  to  .  Land use conversion  redu ce supply & maintenance costs 
Private production  Efficiency seeking & externality producing 
RU LES*  SOCIO-CULTURAL FACTORS*  .  Minimum production requirements  .  Regional employment & development  .  No provisioning obligation  POLITICAL 1  INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS* 
GEOGRAPHY 1  INFRASTRUCTURE  Economie development policies 
Rivers, canals & dams*  .  Discretionary oversight; manipulation; 
.  Railways & forest access roads*  .  Rent seeking; short-time horizons; subsidization 
BIOPHYSICAL FACTORS  .  Weak 1 inadequate appropriation  &  provisioning  .  Fi re 1  insect disturbances  ru les 402 
9.3  Causal Analysis 
The direct and  indirect causal features  presented in the preceding tables ali  highlight 
variables  that  affected  the  evolving  social-ecological  contexts  within  which  forestry  in 
Québec  evolved.  Overall,  these  findings  are  consistent  with  the  existing  literature  (e.g., 
Ascher,  1999;  Geist et al.,  2006;  Repetto  and  Gillis,  1988;  Williams,  2003).  What  these 
tables and the analytical narrative presented in  this thesis point to however, is the underlying 
complexity  of  the  causal  relationships  that  affected  the  evolution  of  forest  resource 
institutions  over the past two centuries,  making it  difficult  if not impossible to  isolate the 
weight of any one variable. But when considered as a who le- especially in light of  the causal 
process observations that were traced over the study period - available evidence compels us 
to consider the overwhelming role of government as a central moderator of social-ecological 
interactions, from  the very beginnings of commercial forest exploitation until  this very day. 
As  shown  in  Figure  9.1  below,  issues  highlighted  in  the  four  quadrants  (i.e.,  political-
economic context, social context, institutional context, and resource system attributes) were 
ali  directly or indirectly affected by  choices that successive governments pursued.  Whether 
one considers support for industrialization, the development of colonization roads, the limited 
willingness  to  exercise  self-restraint  in  the  exploitation  of available  timber,  or rules  that 
forced operators to harvest specifie volumes of wood, regardless of market conditions - ali of 
these variables were conditioned by  the decisions of government. In this sense, government 
(used  here  as  a  denominator  and  not  in  a  monolith)  affected  overall  social-ecological 
outcomes by filtering or mediating the public choices that conditioned the incentives resource 
users faced over time. 9.4  Hypothesis 
Figure 9.1  Underlying Causal Features 
DIRECT 1  INDIRECT CAUSAL  FACTORS INFORMED BY (HOICES MADE WITHIN 
SOCIAL-ECOLOGICAL (ONTEXT 
(HOICES MEDIATED 1  FILTERED BY GOVERNMENT 
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Evidence suggests that the evolution of forest governance institutions in  Québec was, 
ceterus paribus,  primarily conditioned by  and  informed though the interests of succeeding 
governments. By setting the agenda for po licy  reforms; by affecting the allocation of public 
resources; by  agreeing to  long term supply guarantees; by engaging in  ongoing institutional 
changes; by limiting its own capacity or willingness to enforce rules; by supporting the short 
term  interests  of  large  operators  over  the  long  term  wellbeing  of  forest  dependent 
communities; by  using public  moneys to  pay  off the debt and externalities  produced by  the 
private  sector;  by  favouring  economie  growth  over  social-ecological  viability;  and  by 
maintaining the executive's stronghold over public forest resource, to the detriment of  greater 
regional  autonomy and  increased institutional diversification - government has  played (and 
continues  to  play)  a  key  role  in  selecting the  policy  ideas,  values,  and  beliefs  that were 
deemed valuable for the province and  reinforced replication and further refinement of these 
ideals  over  time. The  positive  returns  created  by  this  entrenchment made  it  progressively 
more difficult for future governments to deviate from the established course of action, forcing 
a continuation and dependence towards the selected path. 404 
Further,  anecdotal  evidence  suggest  that  by  the  later  half of the  20th  century,  the 
normative assumption that natural  resource management is a government prerogative was in 
ali  likelihood  appropriated  by  public  administrators  themselves.  In  other terms,  executive 
privileges  became  institutionalized,  and  the  central  authority  to  govern  led  to  centralized 
structures of public administration. As recent inquiries
737  have shown, concentrated authority 
in the administration of public affairs can lead to complacency and laxness in  the application 
of ministerial  mandates. Though this thesis  centered analytical  inquiry  on the  relationship 
between government and the evolution of forest governance institutions, the ability of public 
servants  to  advise  ministers,  develop  operational  guidelines  and  regulatory  measures, 
interpret  and  enforce  rules,  sanction  forest  management  plans  and  oversee  harvesting 
operations obviously provides tremendous leverage. Whether and how the authority of public 
servants  to  formulate,  apply,  and  en  force  ru les  iteratively  affected  the  selection  and 
replication or inheritance of  normative and institutional assumptions in Québec's forest sector 
constitutes an area of  research that warrants further investigation. 
White  the  answer  to  how  forest  resource  institutions  evolved  m  Québec  can  be 
positively asserted, the reasons why are more problematic. Ifanything, evidence suggests that 
ignorance or malfeasance were never at play, though the longer a government stays in power, 
the more it is likely to take risks and blur the boundaries between private and public interests. 
On the surface, governments tended to favour pol ici es th at could satisfice the interests of the 
electorate  (i.e.,  maintain  or  enhance  voter  confidence)  and  answer  the  demands  of the 
political-economic  elite.  However,  to  understand  the  path  of institutional  dynamics,  one 
needs to  dig deeper and uncover the fundamental  values, beliefs, and  ideas that ultimately 
guide human action in purposeful situations (North, 2005). White acknowledging that human 
actors are able to exercise agency, such agency invariably occurs within social structures that 
create  "systems of durable  dispositions"  (Bourdieu,  1977,  p.  72;  see  also  Sewell,  2005). 
Acquired through processes of cultural selection and replication, these dispositions or habits, 
(Hodgson,  2010)  foreshadow  what John  Dewey  refers  to  as  "predispositions  to  ways  or 
modes ofresponse" in socialized situations (cited in Hodgson, 2010, p.  4), thus providing the 
enduring "solidarities" that "construct the world and give it its meaning" (Bourdieu, 2000, p. 
737  Rapport du  Vérificateur  général , 2002. "Faits saillants, chapitre 4:  Les  Ressources forestières". In  Rapport  à  l'Assemblée 
nationale pour l'année 2001-2002, Tome Il. Québec; 2004 Commission for the Study of Public Forest Management. 405 
142).  When applied to the case study periods examined in this thesis, the suggestion here is 
that  conventions  such  as  the  prerogative  rights  of the  executive,  the  idea that  land  only 
acquires value if it's "improved" (i.e., conve1ied to agricultural use) or that intensive forms of 
forest  exploitation  are  acceptable,  as  long  socio-economic  benefits  outweigh  social-
environmental costs, and so on so forth- ali such ideas rested on narratives of how the world 
works.  As  such,  actors  charged  with  the  prerogatives  of rulership,  at  various  periods  of 
history, made decisions within the boundaries of their legal authority that were (and always 
are) grounded  in  sorne recognizable mental mode) or narrative of what is  to  be valued, the 
ends to be acnieve, and the acceptable means of achieving such ends. What this thesis makes 
clear however,  is  that the fundamental  beliefs that guided government interventions during 
the better part of history tended to  reflect a  relatively narrow subset of ideals, which more 
often than not, were consistent with the interests of the political-economic elite, as  opposed 
the broader range of ideas and values that were being discussed at any specifie point in ti me. 
As  such,  if there  is  one  reason  that  seems to  provide a  sustained  rationale  for  the 
actions  and decisions of government over the years,  it  is  that of profit and  ultimately,  the 
belief that economie growth generates returns that outweigh other fundamental  values, such 
as  the maintenance of forest ecosystem services, the maintenance of old growth forests, the 
maintenance of a healthy environment and ali the other necessary amenities of li fe, including 
the need for  locally adapted communities grounded in locally adapted economies. In fact, the 
only viable reason that can reasonably explain the path of institutional change in  Quebec's 
forest sector over the  last century,  and  the  motives  or interests  th at  lie  at the heart of the 
chroniè state of  crises that began in the 1920s is the pursuit of growth. In a nutshell, evidence 
suggests that governments have played a pervasive role in structuring the evolution of forest 
governance  institutions  by  affecting the normative values of institutional  development;  by 
determining whose interests are selected and replicated; and by  systematically using natural 
resources as an unlimited bank account that can continuously be tapped into to achieve what 
ever  political-economic  ends  are  deemed  necessary  (e.g.,  local/regional  development, 
maintain  a  positive  trade  balance,  support  special  interests  or  provide  inducements  to 
industry, secure political gains, etc.). While there undoubtedly were initiatives that produced 
positive social-ecological outcomes, our review of his tory and the current predicament of the 406 
forest sector suggest that these were insufficient to compensate the  massive !osses accrued 
throughout in the system. 
9.5  Conclusion 
The performance of forest governance institutions can no more be disassociated from 
the social, political and economie circumstances from whence they arise than can the growth 
of a forest be considered in  isolation of its  biophysical  environment. Fottunately,  nature  is 
resilient and many of  the mistakes highlighted in this thesis can be remediated, if, and only if, 
there is a sufficiently strong collective will to do so. The Sustainable Forest Development Act 
(Bill  57, L.Q., 2010, chapter 3) represents a  major step  in  the right direction. Adoption of 
ecosystem-based principles to judge the performance of forest resource use on public lands, 
along with  the  regionalisation  of management decisions  are sorne  of the  more  significant 
changes embodied in  this  legislative reform. However, history provides a strong cautionary 
note. For in spi te of progress made, go  vern ment remains the princi pie custodian of collective-
choice  rights  and  in  the  absence  of more  inclusive  and  deliberative  decision-making 
processes, that can incorporate the full  breadth of ideas, values and beliefs that form the basis 
of any resilient and adaptive social-ecological system, opportunities for shifting the direction 
of  change towards more narrowly defined interests will remain strong. 
To improve social-ecological outcomes  in  the use of public forests, the principles of 
adaptive  resource  management,  which  are  part and  parce!  of ecosystem-based  approaches 
must be met with adaptive resource governance institutions (Dietz et al., 2003). Effectively, 
this  means  that policies  must be treated as  hypotheses to  be  tried, tested, and  ameliorated 
(Chapin III et al., 2010; Dewey,  1938; Lewis and  Steinmo, 2012). In  turn, adapting to the 
ti me and place exigencies of complex and varied social-ecological systems implies a need for 
locally  adapted  institutions  and  therefore,  localised  (i.e.,  decentralised)  collective  choice 
rights  (E.  Ostrom,  201 0;  V.  Ostrom,  [1999]  20 12).  Bill  57  on! y  parti ally  addresses  this 
requirement.  At  the  legislative  leve!,  proportional  representation,  as  weil  as  inclusive  and 
authoritative  deliberative  mechanisms,  such  as  those  proposed  by  Gerring  and  Thacker 
(2008) would representa significant, though longer term refinement of constitutional choice 
rules. And to this, there is the undeniable need to establish clear constitutional constraints on 
the actions and decisions of government. For as Buchanan (2002, p.  1) points out, "if ultimate ,------------ - ---- - ------------· -------------------- - --- - -------- -
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improvements in patterns of poli ti cal outcomes are to be expected," then constitutional choice 
rules "are [the] instruments through which reforms must be effected." 
Admittedly, the constitutional leve! of analysis remains an open field of study that has 
yet to attract the attention it deserves. But to  develop effective institutional reforms that can 
begin to  address the flaws of past evolutionary pathways, one must likewise develop a clear 
understanding of how a  gi-ven  social-ecological  system  evolved over time and why. If  the 
world oftoday was forged by  past agency-structure interactions and the consequent selection, 
retention  and  replication  of CUITent  institutional  traits,  including  the  values,  beliefs  and 
cognitive schemas that give meaning to human agency, then fundamental change will require 
a deep appreciation of the past,  and the nature of the institutional structures that affect our 
ability to choose, engage in collective action and support sustainable outcomes. 408 
REFERENCES 
Ascher,  W.  (1999).  Why  Governments  Waste  Natural  Resources:  Policy  Failures  In 
Developing Countries. Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Bourdieu, P. (1977). Outline of a theory of practice (R. Nice, Trans.). Cambridge; New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Bourdieu, P.  (2000). Pascalian meditations (R. Nice, Trans.).  Stanford: Stanford University 
Press. 
Buchanan, J.  M. (2002).  Why  do  Constitutions Matter? In  N.  Berggren, N.  Karlson and J. 
Nergelius  (Eds.),  Why  do  Constitutions  Matter.  (pp.  1-16).  New  Brunswick,  NJ: 
Transaction Publishers. 
Chapin  III,  F.  S.,  Carpenter,  S.  R.,  Kofinas,  G.  P.,  Folke,  C.,  et  al.  (2010).  Ecosystem 
stewardship: sustainability strategies for a rapidly changing planet. Trends in Ecology & 
Evolution, 25(4), 2.41-249. 
Dewey, J.  (1938). Logic: The Theory ofinquiry. New York: Holt. 
Dietz,  T.,  Ostrom,  E.,  and  Stem,  P.  C.  (2003).  The  Struggle  to  Govern  the  Commons. 
Science, 302(5652), 1907-1912. 
Geist, H., McConnell, W., Lambin, E.  F., Moran, E., et al. (2006). Causes and Trajectories of 
Land-Use/Cover Change.  ln E.  F.  Lambin and  H.  Geist  (Eds.),  Land-Use and  Land-
Caver Change (pp. 41 -70). Berlin/New York: Springer. 
Gerring,  J.,  and  Thacker,  S.  C.  (2008).  A  Centripetal  Theory  of Democratie Governance. 
Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Hodgson, G.  M. (2010).  Choice,  habit and  evolution. Journal  of Evolutionary  Economies, 
20(1), 1-18. 
Katznelson, I., and Weingast, B. R. (2005). Preferences and Situations: Points ofintersection 
between  Historical  and  Rational  Choice  Institutionalism.  New  York:  Russell  Sage 
Foundation. 
Lewis,  O.  A.,  and  Steinmo,  S.  (2012).  How  Institutions  Evolve:  Evolutionary  Theory  and 
Institutional Change. Polity, 44(3), 314-339. 409 
North, D. C.  (2005). Understanding the Process of Institutional Change. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. 
Ostrom,  E.  (2005).  Understanding Institutional  Diversity.  Princeton:  Princeton  University 
Press. 
Ostrom,  E.  (2010).  Beyond  Markets  and  States:  Polycentric  Governance  of  Complex 
Economie Systems. American Economie Review, 100(June), 641-672. 
Ostrom,  V.  ([ 1999]  20 12).  Some  Requisites  for  Understanding  Viable  Constitutional 
Designs. In B. Allen (Ed.), The Quest To Understand Human Affairs. Vol.  2:  Essays on 
Collective,  Constitutional,  and  Epistemic  Choice  (pp.  394-406).  Lanham,  Md.: 
Lexington Books. 
Repetto,  R.  C.,  and  Gillis,  M.  ( 1988). Public  policies  and  the  mi suse of forest  resources. 
Cambridge [Cambridgeshire] ; New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Sewell, W.  H. (2005). Logics ofHistory: Social Theory and Social Transformation. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Williams,  M.  (2003).  Deforesting  the  Earth:  From  Prehistory  to  Global  Crisis.  Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 